Timothy Besley
Biographic Data
| ID | 3605129 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Timothy Besley |
| GIVEN NAMES | Timothy |
| FAMILY NAME | Besley |
| SIGNATURE | BESLEY T |
| AFFILIATIONS | London School of Economics and Political Science |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 59 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 1345 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 59 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1988 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 15 |
Five Principles for a New Economic Consensus
This paper puts forward five principles for a new economic consensus, which could serve as a modern alternative to the Washington Consensus of 35 years ago. They are built on new ideas that have gained currency in economics over the past three decades. We also provide examples of the policies that could follow from these principles. The goal is not to advocate a particular constellation of policies pitched as global ‘best practice’, because a one…
Principles of Political Equality and the Logic of Power
At its core, democracy carries a promise of political equality that rests on rules, norms, and procedures that govern the polity to afford equal consideration and freedom from domination to every member. However, despite being widely cherished, political equality is rarely defined precisely. This article offers a framework for studying political equality that can be used to organize thinking. We begin with an idealized notion of direct democracy,…
How Big Is the Media Multiplier? Evidence from Dyadic News Data
This paper estimates the size of the media multiplier, an easily generalizable model-based measure of how far media coverage magnifies the economic response to shocks. We combine monthly aggregated and anonymized credit card activity data from 114 card-issuing countries in 5 destination countries with a large corpus of news coverage in issuing countries reporting on violent events in the destinations. To define and quantify the media multiplier, …
Political equality: What is it and why does it matter?
Political inequality is a distinctive type of inequality, which cannot be reduced to economic or power inequalities. The article frames political equality as trying to achieve ‘equal consideration’ among members of a polity, arguing that assessing whether this is achieved requires looking at process as well as outcomes. The analysis focuses on two core dimensions that can be studied empirically: patterns of political participation and political r…
Trust and State Effectiveness: The Political Economy of Compliance
This paper explores the link between trust in government, policymaking and compliance. It focuses on a specific channel whereby citizens who are convinced of the merits of a policy are more motivated to comply with it. This, in turn, reduces the government’s cost of implementing this policy and may also increase the set of feasible interventions. As a result, state effectiveness is greater when citizens trust their government. The paper discusses…
The political economy of lockdown: Does free media matter
This paper studies the role of free media in how governments and the public responded to the COVID-19 pandemic. We first document the presence of policy and behavioural responsiveness during the early phase of the pandemic. Using a panel data of daily COVID-19 deaths, lockdown policies, and mobility changes in 155 countries, we find that governments were more likely to impose a lockdown, and citizens to reduce their mobility, as the initial numbe…
Norms, Enforcement, and Tax Evasion
This paper studies individual and social motives in tax evasion. We build a simple dynamic model that incorporates these motives and their interaction. The social motives underpin the role of norms and are the source of the dynamics that we study. Our empirical analysis exploits the adoption in 1990 of a poll tax to fund local government in the United Kingdom, which led to widespread evasion. The evidence is consistent with the model's main predi…
Gender Quotas and the Crisis of the Mediocre Man: Theory and Evidence from Sweden
We develop a model where party leaders choose the competence of politicians on the ballot to trade off electoral success against their own survival. The predicted correlation between the competence of party leaders and followers is strongly supported in Swedish data. We use a novel approach, based on register data for the earnings of the whole population, to measure the competence of all politicians in 7 parties, 290 municipalities, and 10 electi…
Resilient Leaders and Institutional Reform: Theory and Evidence
Strengthening executive constraints is one of the key means of improving political governance. This paper argues that resilient leaders who face a lower probability of being replaced are less likely to reform institutions in the direction of constraining executive power. We test this idea empirically using data on leaders since 1875 using two proxies of resilience: whether a leader survives long enough to die in office, and whether recent natural…
Long-run impacts of land regulation: Evidence from tenancy reform in India
Law, Regulation, and the Business Climate: The Nature and Influence of the World Bank Doing Business Project
The importance of a well-functioning legal and regulatory system in creating an effective market economy is now widely accepted. One flagship project that tries to measure the environment in which businesses operate in countries across the world is the World Bank's Doing Business project, which was launched in 2002. This project gathers quantitative data to compare regulations faced by small and medium-size enterprises across economies and over t…
Why Do Developing Countries Tax So Little
Low-income countries typically collect taxes of between 10 to 20 percent of GDP while the average for high-income countries is more like 40 percent. In order to understand taxation, economic development, and the relationships between them, we need to think about the forces that drive the development process. Poor countries are poor for certain reasons, and these reasons can also help to explain their weakness in raising tax revenue. We begin by l…
The Legacy of Historical Conflict: Evidence from Africa
This article exploits variation between and within countries to examine the legacy of recorded conflicts in Africa in the precolonial period between 1400 and 1700. There are three main findings. First, we show that historical conflict is correlated with a greater prevalence of postcolonial conflict. Second, historical conflict is correlated with lower levels of trust, a stronger sense of ethnic identity, and a weaker sense of national identity ac…
Taxation and Development
Pillars of Prosperity: The Political Economics of Development Clusters
“Little else is required to carry a state to the highest degree of opulence from the lowest barbarism, but peace, easy taxes, and a tolerable administration of justice; all the rest being brought about by the natural course of things.” So wrote Adam Smith a quarter of a millennium ago. Using the tools of modern political economics and combining economic theory with a bird's-eye view of the data, this book reinterprets Smith's pillars of prosperit…
Working or shirking? Expenses and attendance in the UK Parliament
Do Educated Leaders Matter
Journal Article Do Educated Leaders Matter? Get access Timothy Besley, Timothy Besley LSE and CIFAR Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Jose G. Montalvo, Jose G. Montalvo Universitat Pompeu Fabra, ICREA‐Academia and IVIE Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Marta Reynal‐Querol Marta Reynal‐Querol Universitat Pompeu Fabra, ICREA, CEPR and CESIfo Search for other works by this…
Angus Deaton Symposium – Introduction
Journal Article Angus Deaton Symposium – Introduction Get access Timothy Besley, Timothy Besley London School of Economics Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Anne Case, Anne Case London School of Economics Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Christina Paxson Christina Paxson Princeton University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The E…
Do Democracies Select More Educated Leaders
This paper uses a unique data set on over 1,400 world leaders between 1848 and 2004 to investigate differences in educational qualifications between leaders who are selected in democracies and autocracies. After including country and year fixed effects, we find that democracies are around 20% more likely to select highly educated leaders. This finding is robust to a wide range of specifications, choices of subsamples, controls, and ways of measur…
Political Competition, Policy and Growth: Theory and Evidence from the US
This paper develops a simple model to analyse how a lack of political competition may lead to policies that hinder economic growth. We test the predictions of the model on panel data for the US states. In these data, we find robust evidence that lack of political competition in a state is associated with anti-growth policies: higher taxes, lower capital spending, and a reduced likelihood of using rightto- work laws. We also document a strong link…
Property Rights and Economic Development
The Origins of State Capacity: Property Rights, Taxation, and Politics
Economists generally assume that the state has sufficient institutional capacity to support markets and levy taxes. This paper develops a framework where “policy choices” in market regulation and taxation are constrained by past investments in legal and fiscal capacity. It studies the economic and political determinants of such investments, demonstrating that legal and fiscal capacity are typically complements. The results show that, among other …
Wars and State Capacity
The article builds a simple model to investigate how different types of armed conflict shape fiscal capacity: the state's ability to raise revenue from taxes. It starts from the simple observation that external war tends to generate common interests across groups in society, whereas internal, civil war entails deep conflicting interests across groups. Our model predicts that—compared to a society without conflict—civil wars lead to smaller invest…
Institutions and Economic Performance
Preface * Introduction Part One: History * The Impact of Administrative Power on Political and Economic Developments: Toward a Political Economy of Implementation Avner Greif * The Institutional Origins of the Industrial Revolution Joel Mokyr * Institutions and the Resource Curse in Early Modern Spain Mauricio Drelichman and Hans-Joachim Voth * Slavery, Inequality, and Economic Development in the Americas: An Examination of the Engerman-Sokoloff …
Principled Agents?: The Political Economy of Good Government (Lindahl Lectures)
What is good government? Why do some governments fail? How do you implement political accountability in practice? What incentives do you need to put in place to ensure that politicians and public servants act in the public interest and not their own? These questions and many more are addressed in this book of intriguing Lindahl lectures. Economic analyses of government usually divide into two broad camps. One that emphasises government as a force…
Property Rights and Investment Incentives: Theory and Evidence from Ghana
This paper examines the link between property rights and investment incentives. The author develops three theoretical arguments based on security of tenure, using land as collateral and obtaining gains from trade. The paper then presents empirical evidence from two regions in Ghana. The author investigates the possibility that rights are endogenous, with farmers making improvements to enhance their land rights. Finally, he suggests tests for whic…
Competition and Incentives with Motivated Agents
A unifying theme in the literature on organizations such as public bureaucracies and private nonprofits is the importance of mission, as opposed to profit, as an organizational goal. Such mission-oriented organizations are frequently staffed by motivated agents who subscribe to the mission. This paper studies incentives in such contexts and emphasizes the role of matching the mission preferences of principals and agents in increasing organization…
Do Educated Leaders Matter
Journal Article Do Educated Leaders Matter? Get access Timothy Besley, Timothy Besley LSE and CIFAR Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Jose G. Montalvo, Jose G. Montalvo Universitat Pompeu Fabra, ICREA‐Academia and IVIE Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Marta Reynal‐Querol Marta Reynal‐Querol Universitat Pompeu Fabra, ICREA, CEPR and CESIfo Search for other works by this…
Political Selection
Almost every major episode of economic change over the past 200 years of political history has been associated with key personalities coming to power with a commitment to these changes. But if such dynamic leaders are so important, then we need to understand how they come to hold the reins of power. This outcome could be viewed as largely the product of random events colored by idiosyncratic personalities and chance encounters. However, at least …
Group lending, repayment incentives and social collateral
In this paper, we investigate the impact on repayment rates of lending to groups which are made jointly liable for repayment. This type of scheme, especially in the guise of the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh, has received increasing attention. We set up and analyze the ‘repayment game’ which group lending gives rise to. Our analysis suggests that such schemes have both positive and negative effects on repayment rates. The positive effect is that suc…
Do Democracies Select More Educated Leaders
This paper uses a unique data set on over 1,400 world leaders between 1848 and 2004 to investigate differences in educational qualifications between leaders who are selected in democracies and autocracies. After including country and year fixed effects, we find that democracies are around 20% more likely to select highly educated leaders. This finding is robust to a wide range of specifications, choices of subsamples, controls, and ways of measur…
Unnatural Experiments? Estimating the Incidence of Endogenous Policies
Journal Article Unnatural Experiments? Estimating the Incidence of Endogenous Policies Get access Timothy Besley, Timothy Besley Princeton University and NBER Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Anne Case Anne Case Princeton University and NBER Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 110, Issue 467, 1 November 2000, Pages 672–694, https://doi.org/10…
Taxes and Bribery: The Role of Wage Incentives
Journal Article Taxes and Bribery: The Role of Wage Incentives Get access Timothy Besley, Timothy Besley Princeton University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar John McLaren John McLaren Columbia University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 103, Issue 416, 1 January 1993, Pages 119–141, https://doi.org/10.2307/2234340 Published: 01 January 19…
The Legacy of Historical Conflict: Evidence from Africa
This article exploits variation between and within countries to examine the legacy of recorded conflicts in Africa in the precolonial period between 1400 and 1700. There are three main findings. First, we show that historical conflict is correlated with a greater prevalence of postcolonial conflict. Second, historical conflict is correlated with lower levels of trust, a stronger sense of ethnic identity, and a weaker sense of national identity ac…
Why Do Developing Countries Tax So Little
Low-income countries typically collect taxes of between 10 to 20 percent of GDP while the average for high-income countries is more like 40 percent. In order to understand taxation, economic development, and the relationships between them, we need to think about the forces that drive the development process. Poor countries are poor for certain reasons, and these reasons can also help to explain their weakness in raising tax revenue. We begin by l…
Issue Unbundling via Citizens' Initiatives
The role of citizens’ initiatives figures prominently in contemporary debates on constitutional change. It is widely believed that permitting initiatives should improve the congruence between citizen preferences and policy outcomes across the spectrum of issues on which initiatives may be placed. This paper investigates the theoretical basis for this view. It begins by identifying three basic reasons why electoral competition may not, by itself, …
Food Subsidies and Poverty Alleviation
Journal Article Food Subsidies and Poverty Alleviation Get access Timothy Besley, Timothy Besley All Souls College, Oxford Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Ravi Kanbur Ravi Kanbur University of Warwick Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 98, Issue 392, 1 September 1988, Pages 701–719, https://doi.org/10.2307/2233909 Published: 01 September 19…
Nonmarket Institutions for Credit and Risk Sharing in Low-Income Countries
The design credit and risk institutions in low-income countries provides one of the most exciting testing grounds for theories of contracting with imperfect information and limited enforcement. This paper reviews some of the recent literature, with a special focus on nonmarket institutions that cope with risk and provide credit. This literature attempts to bring together insights from economic theory, especially information economics, contract th…
Long-run impacts of land regulation: Evidence from tenancy reform in India
The New Political Economy
The aim of the New Political Economy is to understand important issues that arise in the policy sphere. -super-1 It is not, as is occasionally hinted, an effort by economists to colonise political science. Rather, the main concern is to extend the competence of economists to analyse issues that require some facility with economic and political decision making. At the margin, the New Political Economy reverses the split that occurred between the d…
Working or shirking? Expenses and attendance in the UK Parliament
Halving Global Poverty
The Millennium Development Goals-global targets that the world's leaders set at the Millennium Summit in September 2000-are an ambitious agenda for reducing poverty. As a central plank, these goals include halving the proportion of people living below a dollar a day from around 30 percent of the developing world's population in 1990 to 15 percent by 2015-a reduction in the absolute number of poor of around one billion. This paper examines what ec…
Means Testing versus Universal Provision in Poverty Alleviation Programmes
This paper contrasts the use of means-tested and universal schemes in the alleviation of poverty. Using a class of poverty measures, the authors illustrate the trade-off from the fact that means testing is costly to both the government and the claimant, while universal provision entails a leakage to the nonpoor. The paper provides numerical, as well as analytical, results. Copyright 1990 by The London School of Economics and Political Science
Law, Regulation, and the Business Climate: The Nature and Influence of the World Bank Doing Business Project
The importance of a well-functioning legal and regulatory system in creating an effective market economy is now widely accepted. One flagship project that tries to measure the environment in which businesses operate in countries across the world is the World Bank's Doing Business project, which was launched in 2002. This project gathers quantitative data to compare regulations faced by small and medium-size enterprises across economies and over t…
The Role of Informal Finance in Household Capital Accumulation: Evidence from Taiwan
Economies that experience rapid growth also experience major changes in their consumption patterns, particularly for consumer durables. This paper studies the diffusion of durables in Taiwan between 1977 and 1991. We focus on the link between household accumulation of durables and participation in informal financial institutions. While growth in per capita income in Taiwan has been great, many households still rely on traditional forms of finance…
The anatomy of an informal financial market: Rosca participation in Taiwan
Resilient Leaders and Institutional Reform: Theory and Evidence
Strengthening executive constraints is one of the key means of improving political governance. This paper argues that resilient leaders who face a lower probability of being replaced are less likely to reform institutions in the direction of constraining executive power. We test this idea empirically using data on leaders since 1875 using two proxies of resilience: whether a leader survives long enough to die in office, and whether recent natural…
On the Public Choice Critique of Welfare Economics
Trust and State Effectiveness: The Political Economy of Compliance
This paper explores the link between trust in government, policymaking and compliance. It focuses on a specific channel whereby citizens who are convinced of the merits of a policy are more motivated to comply with it. This, in turn, reduces the government’s cost of implementing this policy and may also increase the set of feasible interventions. As a result, state effectiveness is greater when citizens trust their government. The paper discusses…
General equilibrium with parallel markets for goods and foreign exchange: Theory and application to Ghana
Food Subsidies and Poverty Alleviation
Journal Article Food Subsidies and Poverty Alleviation Get access Timothy Besley, Timothy Besley All Souls College, Oxford Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Ravi Kanbur Ravi Kanbur University of Warwick Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 98, Issue 392, 1 September 1988, Pages 701–719, https://doi.org/10.2307/2233909 Published: 01 September 19…
General equilibrium with parallel markets for goods and foreign exchange: Theory and application to Ghana
A Definition of Luxury and Necessity for Cardinal Utility Functions
Journal Article A Definition of Luxury and Necessity for Cardinal Utility Functions Get access Timothy Besley Timothy Besley All Souls College, Oxford and Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 99, Issue 397, 1 September 1989, Pages 844–849, https://doi.org/10.2307/2233775 Published: 01 September 1989
Ex Ante Evaluation of Health States and the Provision for Ill-Health
Journal Article Ex Ante Evaluation of Health States and the Provision for Ill-Health Get access Timothy Besley Timothy Besley All Souls College, Oxford and Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 99, Issue 394, 1 March 1989, Pages 132–146, https://doi.org/10.2307/2234209 Published: 01 March 1989
The Economics of Safety and Physical Risk
This book is concerned with the underlying economic questions which arise when decisions are made about the allocation of scarce resources to safety improvement. It examines contributions from other disciplines and explores the interrelationship between them and the economic analysis of safety. The book presents valuable theoretical and empirical results on attitudes to risk and the valuation of safety, and assesses the implications of recent wor…
Means Testing versus Universal Provision in Poverty Alleviation Programmes
This paper contrasts the use of means-tested and universal schemes in the alleviation of poverty. Using a class of poverty measures, the authors illustrate the trade-off from the fact that means testing is costly to both the government and the claimant, while universal provision entails a leakage to the nonpoor. The paper provides numerical, as well as analytical, results. Copyright 1990 by The London School of Economics and Political Science
Hunger and public action
Taxes and Bribery: The Role of Wage Incentives
Journal Article Taxes and Bribery: The Role of Wage Incentives Get access Timothy Besley, Timothy Besley Princeton University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar John McLaren John McLaren Columbia University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 103, Issue 416, 1 January 1993, Pages 119–141, https://doi.org/10.2307/2234340 Published: 01 January 19…
Thy Neighbor's Keeper: The Design of a Credit Cooperative with Theory and a Test
Economists now appreciate that resource allocation in less economically developed economies is profoundly influenced by nonfirm economic institutions. However, our theories of nonfirm institutions often suggest different answers to many questions including those of policy. This paper illustrates a method for discriminating between alternative theories using data from German credit cooperatives from nineteenth and early twentieth century Germany. …
An Inquiry into Well-being and Destitution
Journal Article An Inquiry into Well-being and Destitution. Get access An Inquiry into Well-Being and Destitution. By Dasgupta (Partha). (Oxford and New York: Clarendon Press, 1993. Pp. xviii + 661. £35.00 hardback. ISBN 0 19 828756 9.) Timothy Besley Timothy Besley Princeton University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 104, Issue 427, 1 November 1994, Pages 1460–1462, https://do…
Does Electoral Accountability Affect Economic Policy Choices? Evidence from Gubernatorial Term Limits
This paper analyzes the behavior of U. S. governors from 1950 to 1986 to investigate a reputation-building model of political behavior. We argue that differences in the behavior of governors who face a binding term limit and those who are able to run again provides a source of variation in discount rates that can be used to test a political agency model. We find evidence that taxes, spending, and other policy instruments respond to a binding term…
Group lending, repayment incentives and social collateral
In this paper, we investigate the impact on repayment rates of lending to groups which are made jointly liable for repayment. This type of scheme, especially in the guise of the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh, has received increasing attention. We set up and analyze the ‘repayment game’ which group lending gives rise to. Our analysis suggests that such schemes have both positive and negative effects on repayment rates. The positive effect is that suc…
Property Rights and Investment Incentives: Theory and Evidence from Ghana
This paper examines the link between property rights and investment incentives. The author develops three theoretical arguments based on security of tenure, using land as collateral and obtaining gains from trade. The paper then presents empirical evidence from two regions in Ghana. The author investigates the possibility that rights are endogenous, with farmers making improvements to enhance their land rights. Finally, he suggests tests for whic…
Nonmarket Institutions for Credit and Risk Sharing in Low-Income Countries
The design credit and risk institutions in low-income countries provides one of the most exciting testing grounds for theories of contracting with imperfect information and limited enforcement. This paper reviews some of the recent literature, with a special focus on nonmarket institutions that cope with risk and provide credit. This literature attempts to bring together insights from economic theory, especially information economics, contract th…
The anatomy of an informal financial market: Rosca participation in Taiwan
The Role of Informal Finance in Household Capital Accumulation: Evidence from Taiwan
Economies that experience rapid growth also experience major changes in their consumption patterns, particularly for consumer durables. This paper studies the diffusion of durables in Taiwan between 1977 and 1991. We focus on the link between household accumulation of durables and participation in informal financial institutions. While growth in per capita income in Taiwan has been great, many households still rely on traditional forms of finance…
Land Reform, Poverty Reduction, and Growth: Evidence from India
In recent times there has been a renewed interest in relationships between redistribution, growth, and welfare. Land reforms in developing countries are often aimed at improving the poor's access to land, although their effectiveness has often been hindered by political constraints on implementation. In this paper we use panel data on the sixteen main Indian states from 1958 to 1992 to consider whether the large volume of legislated land reforms …
Issue Unbundling via Citizens' Initiatives
The role of citizens’ initiatives figures prominently in contemporary debates on constitutional change. It is widely believed that permitting initiatives should improve the congruence between citizen preferences and policy outcomes across the spectrum of issues on which initiatives may be placed. This paper investigates the theoretical basis for this view. It begins by identifying three basic reasons why electoral competition may not, by itself, …
Unnatural Experiments? Estimating the Incidence of Endogenous Policies
Journal Article Unnatural Experiments? Estimating the Incidence of Endogenous Policies Get access Timothy Besley, Timothy Besley Princeton University and NBER Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Anne Case Anne Case Princeton University and NBER Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 110, Issue 467, 1 November 2000, Pages 672–694, https://doi.org/10…
Development microeconomics
Political Institutions and Policy Choices: Evidence from the United States
A rich array of institutional diversity makes the United States an excellent place to study the relationship between political institutions and public policy outcomes. This essay has three main aims. First, it reviews existing empirical evidence on the relationship between institutional rules, political representation and policy outcomes. It aims to place the literature into a broader context of theoretical and empirical work in the field of poli…
Centralized versus decentralized provision of local public goods: A political economy approach
Elected versus Appointed Regulators: Theory and Evidence
This paper contrasts direct election with political appointment of regulators. When regulators are appointed, regulatory policy becomes bundled with other policy issues the appointing politicians are responsible for. Because voters have only one vote to cast and regulatory issues are not salient for most voters, there are electoral incentives to respond to stakeholder interests. If regulators are elected, their stance on regulation is the only sa…
On the Public Choice Critique of Welfare Economics
Halving Global Poverty
The Millennium Development Goals-global targets that the world's leaders set at the Millennium Summit in September 2000-are an ambitious agenda for reducing poverty. As a central plank, these goals include halving the proportion of people living below a dollar a day from around 30 percent of the developing world's population in 1990 to 15 percent by 2015-a reduction in the absolute number of poor of around one billion. This paper examines what ec…
Economics (48 works) · Political science (44 works) · Law (29 works) · Politics (26 works) · Public economics (21 works) · Business (15 works) · Sociology (14 works) · Fiscal Policy and Economic Growth (13 works) · Culture, Economy, and Development Studies (10 works) · Law (10 works)