Martin Strobel
Biographic Data
| ID | 3605171 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Martin Strobel |
| GIVEN NAMES | Martin |
| FAMILY NAME | Strobel |
| SIGNATURE | STROBEL M |
| AFFILIATIONS | Maastricht University |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-4692-1035 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 3 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 9 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 3 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2003 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2004 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Inequality Aversion, Efficiency, and Maximin Preferences in Simple Distribution Experiments
We present simple one-shot distribution experiments comparing the relative importance of efficiency concerns, maximin preferences, and inequality aversion, as well as the relative performance of the fairness theories by Gary E Bolton and Axel Ockenfels and by Ernst Fehr and Klaus M. Schmidt. While the Fehr-Schmidt theory performs better in a direct comparison, this appears to be due to being in line with maximin preferences. More importantly, we …
Learning to bid – an experimental study of bid function adjustments in auctions and fair division games
We examine learning behaviour in auction and fair division experiments with independent private values under two different price rules, first and second price. Participants play all four games repeatedly and submit complete bid functions rather than single bids. This allows us to study how institutional changes are anticipated and whether learning is influenced by the structural differences between games. We find that learning does not drive bidd…
A Comparison of Punishment Rules in Repeated Public Good Games
One individual and three collective punishment rules in a public good setting are analyzed. Evidence and explanations for differences between the rules concerning punishment intensity, contribution, profit levels, and justice are presented. Influences crucial to participants’ support for a collective rule when the individual rule is the status quo are also investigated. Results showthat besides profit differences, the degree of consent required b…
A Comparison of Punishment Rules in Repeated Public Good Games
One individual and three collective punishment rules in a public good setting are analyzed. Evidence and explanations for differences between the rules concerning punishment intensity, contribution, profit levels, and justice are presented. Influences crucial to participants’ support for a collective rule when the individual rule is the status quo are also investigated. Results showthat besides profit differences, the degree of consent required b…
Learning to bid – an experimental study of bid function adjustments in auctions and fair division games
We examine learning behaviour in auction and fair division experiments with independent private values under two different price rules, first and second price. Participants play all four games repeatedly and submit complete bid functions rather than single bids. This allows us to study how institutional changes are anticipated and whether learning is influenced by the structural differences between games. We find that learning does not drive bidd…
Learning to bid – an experimental study of bid function adjustments in auctions and fair division games
We examine learning behaviour in auction and fair division experiments with independent private values under two different price rules, first and second price. Participants play all four games repeatedly and submit complete bid functions rather than single bids. This allows us to study how institutional changes are anticipated and whether learning is influenced by the structural differences between games. We find that learning does not drive bidd…
A Comparison of Punishment Rules in Repeated Public Good Games
One individual and three collective punishment rules in a public good setting are analyzed. Evidence and explanations for differences between the rules concerning punishment intensity, contribution, profit levels, and justice are presented. Influences crucial to participants’ support for a collective rule when the individual rule is the status quo are also investigated. Results showthat besides profit differences, the degree of consent required b…
Inequality Aversion, Efficiency, and Maximin Preferences in Simple Distribution Experiments
We present simple one-shot distribution experiments comparing the relative importance of efficiency concerns, maximin preferences, and inequality aversion, as well as the relative performance of the fairness theories by Gary E Bolton and Axel Ockenfels and by Ernst Fehr and Klaus M. Schmidt. While the Fehr-Schmidt theory performs better in a direct comparison, this appears to be due to being in line with maximin preferences. More importantly, we …
Economics (3 works) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (3 works) · Microeconomics (3 works) · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics (2 works) · Mathematical economics (2 works) · Mathematics (2 works) · Psychology (2 works) · Social Psychology (2 works) · Auction theory (1 work) · Auction Theory and Applications (1 work)