Chris Tucker
Biographic Data
| ID | 3607582 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Chris Tucker |
| GIVEN NAMES | Chris |
| FAMILY NAME | Tucker |
| SIGNATURE | TUCKER C |
| AFFILIATIONS | William & Mary |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-2478-7210 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 15 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 24 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 14 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 1 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1991 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Parity and the Permissivism Puzzle
Moral philosophers generally affirm that there are moral options: a single person sometimes has multiple morally permissible actions at a time. But epistemologists generally deny that there are epistemic options: a single person never has multiple epistemically permissible doxastic attitudes at a time. This asymmetry is striking. Furthermore, there are intuitive cases of epistemic options. However, it's not clear how these cases differ from cases…
Withhold by default
In practical rationality, if two reasons for alternative actions are tied, then either action is *permissible*. In epistemic rationality, we get the Epistemic Ties Datum: if the reasons for belief and disbelief are tied, then withholding judgment is *required*. I argue that this difference is explained by a difference in default biases. Practical rationality is biased toward permissibility. An action is permissible unless the specific features of…
A Holist Balance Scale
Scale-based models of weighing reasons face challenges concerning the context sensitivity of weight, the aggregation of weight, and the methodology for determining what the weights of reasons are. I resolve these challenges
Parity, moral options, and the weights of reasons
The (moral) permissibility of an act is determined by the relative weights of reasons, or so I assume. But how many weights does a reason have? Weight Monism is the idea that reasons have a single weight value. There is just the weight of reasons. The simplest versions hold that the weight of each reason is either weightier than, less weighty than, or equal to every other reason. We'll see that this simple view leads to paradox in at least two wa…
Too far beyond the call of duty
The dual scale model of weighing reasons
The metaphor of weighing reasons brings to mind a single (double‐pan balance) scale. The reasons for φ go in one pan and the reasons for ∼φ go in the other. The relative weights, as indicated by the relative heights of the two pans of the scale, determine the deontic status of φ. This model is simple and intuitive, but it cannot capture what it is to weigh reasons correctly. A reason pushes the φ pan down toward permissibility (has justifying wei…
Satisficing and Motivated Submaximization (in the Philosophy of Religion)
In replying to certain objections to the existence of God, Robert Adams, Bruce Langtry, and Peter van Inwagen assume that God can appropriately choose a suboptimal world, a world less good than some other world God could have chosen. A number of philosophers, such as Michael Slote and Klaas Kraay, claim that these theistic replies are therefore committed to the claim that satisficing can be appropriate. Kraay argues that this commitment is a sign…
On what inferentially justifies what
Seemings And Justification New Essays On Dogmatism And Phenomenal Conservatism
Application of 3D Laser Scanning to the Preservation of Fort Conger, a Historic Polar Research Base on Northern Ellesmere Island, Arctic Canada
Fort Conger, located in Quttinirpaaq National Park, Ellesmere Island, is a historic landmark of national and international significance. The site is associated with many important Arctic expeditions, including the ill-fated Lady Franklin Bay Expedition of the First International Polar Year and Robert Peary’s attempts to claim the North Pole. Although situated in one of the most remote locations on earth, Fort Conger is currently at risk because o…
Why Open-Minded People Should Endorse Dogmatism
Open-minded people should endorse dogmatism because of its explanatory power. In more careful (but less catchy) words, the purpose of this paper is to provide a reason to accept dogmatism by showing how well it addresses four issues concerning non-inferential justification. In this context, dogmatism doesn’t pick out an attitude of stubborn adherence to some doctrine; rather, it is a view about non-inferential justification,1 the sort of justific…
Divine hiddenness and the value of divine–creature relationships
Apparently, relationships between God (if He exists) and His creatures would be very valuable. Appreciating this value raises the question of whether it can motivate a certain premise in John Schellenberg's argument from divine hiddenness, a premise which claims, roughly, that if some capable, non-resistant subject fails to believe in God, then God does not exist. In this paper, I argue that the value of divine–creature relationships can justify …
Hermeneutics as a … Foundationalism
It is commonly assumed, at least by continental philosophers, that epistemological hermeneutics and foundationalism are incompatible. I argue that this assumption is mistaken. If I am correct, the analytic and continental traditions may be closer than is commonly supposed. Hermeneutics, as I will argue, is a descriptive claim about human cognition, and foundationalism is a normative claim about how beliefs ought to be related to one another. Once…
Contractarianism, Justification, and Relativity
Une justification d'institutions morales ou politiques doit fournir aux gens une motivation pour agir en conformité avec ses diktats. Cela étant admis, je soutiens que le contractualisme est la seule méthode plausible par laquelle une telle justification puisse être fournie. Les contractualistes soutiennent que les institutions morales ou politiques sont justifiées dans la mesure où elles seraient le résultat d'une entente conclue par des agents …
Remote Sensing of Permafrost by Ground-Penetrating Radar at Two Airports in Arctic Canada
Over a cycle of seasons, ground-penetrating radar studies were carried out at Inuvik and Rankin Inlet, Northwest Territories. The two airports are part of the Forward Operating Location (FOL) program of the Department of National Defence and have been slated for significant upgrading of runways, taxiways and parking aprons. This provided a good opportunity to investigate the extent of permafrost and its seasonal variation at two locations distrib…
Why Open-Minded People Should Endorse Dogmatism
Open-minded people should endorse dogmatism because of its explanatory power. In more careful (but less catchy) words, the purpose of this paper is to provide a reason to accept dogmatism by showing how well it addresses four issues concerning non-inferential justification. In this context, dogmatism doesn’t pick out an attitude of stubborn adherence to some doctrine; rather, it is a view about non-inferential justification,1 the sort of justific…
Satisficing and Motivated Submaximization (in the Philosophy of Religion)
In replying to certain objections to the existence of God, Robert Adams, Bruce Langtry, and Peter van Inwagen assume that God can appropriately choose a suboptimal world, a world less good than some other world God could have chosen. A number of philosophers, such as Michael Slote and Klaas Kraay, claim that these theistic replies are therefore committed to the claim that satisficing can be appropriate. Kraay argues that this commitment is a sign…
On what inferentially justifies what
Remote Sensing of Permafrost by Ground-Penetrating Radar at Two Airports in Arctic Canada
Over a cycle of seasons, ground-penetrating radar studies were carried out at Inuvik and Rankin Inlet, Northwest Territories. The two airports are part of the Forward Operating Location (FOL) program of the Department of National Defence and have been slated for significant upgrading of runways, taxiways and parking aprons. This provided a good opportunity to investigate the extent of permafrost and its seasonal variation at two locations distrib…
Contractarianism, Justification, and Relativity
Une justification d'institutions morales ou politiques doit fournir aux gens une motivation pour agir en conformité avec ses diktats. Cela étant admis, je soutiens que le contractualisme est la seule méthode plausible par laquelle une telle justification puisse être fournie. Les contractualistes soutiennent que les institutions morales ou politiques sont justifiées dans la mesure où elles seraient le résultat d'une entente conclue par des agents …
Hermeneutics as a … Foundationalism
It is commonly assumed, at least by continental philosophers, that epistemological hermeneutics and foundationalism are incompatible. I argue that this assumption is mistaken. If I am correct, the analytic and continental traditions may be closer than is commonly supposed. Hermeneutics, as I will argue, is a descriptive claim about human cognition, and foundationalism is a normative claim about how beliefs ought to be related to one another. Once…
Divine hiddenness and the value of divine–creature relationships
Apparently, relationships between God (if He exists) and His creatures would be very valuable. Appreciating this value raises the question of whether it can motivate a certain premise in John Schellenberg's argument from divine hiddenness, a premise which claims, roughly, that if some capable, non-resistant subject fails to believe in God, then God does not exist. In this paper, I argue that the value of divine–creature relationships can justify …
Why Open-Minded People Should Endorse Dogmatism
Open-minded people should endorse dogmatism because of its explanatory power. In more careful (but less catchy) words, the purpose of this paper is to provide a reason to accept dogmatism by showing how well it addresses four issues concerning non-inferential justification. In this context, dogmatism doesn’t pick out an attitude of stubborn adherence to some doctrine; rather, it is a view about non-inferential justification,1 the sort of justific…
Seemings And Justification New Essays On Dogmatism And Phenomenal Conservatism
Application of 3D Laser Scanning to the Preservation of Fort Conger, a Historic Polar Research Base on Northern Ellesmere Island, Arctic Canada
Fort Conger, located in Quttinirpaaq National Park, Ellesmere Island, is a historic landmark of national and international significance. The site is associated with many important Arctic expeditions, including the ill-fated Lady Franklin Bay Expedition of the First International Polar Year and Robert Peary’s attempts to claim the North Pole. Although situated in one of the most remote locations on earth, Fort Conger is currently at risk because o…
On what inferentially justifies what
Satisficing and Motivated Submaximization (in the Philosophy of Religion)
In replying to certain objections to the existence of God, Robert Adams, Bruce Langtry, and Peter van Inwagen assume that God can appropriately choose a suboptimal world, a world less good than some other world God could have chosen. A number of philosophers, such as Michael Slote and Klaas Kraay, claim that these theistic replies are therefore committed to the claim that satisficing can be appropriate. Kraay argues that this commitment is a sign…
Too far beyond the call of duty
The dual scale model of weighing reasons
The metaphor of weighing reasons brings to mind a single (double‐pan balance) scale. The reasons for φ go in one pan and the reasons for ∼φ go in the other. The relative weights, as indicated by the relative heights of the two pans of the scale, determine the deontic status of φ. This model is simple and intuitive, but it cannot capture what it is to weigh reasons correctly. A reason pushes the φ pan down toward permissibility (has justifying wei…
A Holist Balance Scale
Scale-based models of weighing reasons face challenges concerning the context sensitivity of weight, the aggregation of weight, and the methodology for determining what the weights of reasons are. I resolve these challenges
Parity, moral options, and the weights of reasons
The (moral) permissibility of an act is determined by the relative weights of reasons, or so I assume. But how many weights does a reason have? Weight Monism is the idea that reasons have a single weight value. There is just the weight of reasons. The simplest versions hold that the weight of each reason is either weightier than, less weighty than, or equal to every other reason. We'll see that this simple view leads to paradox in at least two wa…
Withhold by default
In practical rationality, if two reasons for alternative actions are tied, then either action is *permissible*. In epistemic rationality, we get the Epistemic Ties Datum: if the reasons for belief and disbelief are tied, then withholding judgment is *required*. I argue that this difference is explained by a difference in default biases. Practical rationality is biased toward permissibility. An action is permissible unless the specific features of…
Parity and the Permissivism Puzzle
Moral philosophers generally affirm that there are moral options: a single person sometimes has multiple morally permissible actions at a time. But epistemologists generally deny that there are epistemic options: a single person never has multiple epistemically permissible doxastic attitudes at a time. This asymmetry is striking. Furthermore, there are intuitive cases of epistemic options. However, it's not clear how these cases differ from cases…
Philosophy (11 works) · Epistemology (10 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (7 works) · Free Will and Agency (7 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (5 works) · Psychology (5 works) · Geography (4 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (4 works) · Cartography (3 works) · Computer Science (3 works)