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Gary M Anderson

Biographic Data

ID3624139
NAMEGary M Anderson
GIVEN NAMESGary M
FAMILY NAMEAnderson
SIGNATUREANDERSON G M
AFFILIATIONSCalifornia State University, Northridge
VERIFIEDNo
TOTAL WORKS18
TOTAL CITATIONS107
WORKS AS AUTHOR18
WORKS AS EDITOR0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR1982
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2001
H-INDEX5
  • Jim F. Couch and William F. Shughart II, The political economy of the New Deal

    Open Access•Gary M Anderson•ARTICLE•Public Choice•2001•References: 4

  • Soviet venality

    Open Access•Gary M Anderson, Peter J Boettke•ARTICLE•Public Choice•1997•Cited by: 13•References: 10

  • Sacred Trust

    Robert B Ekelund, Robert F Hébert et al.•BOOK•Sacred Trust•1996

    The Church dominated society in the Middle Ages and functioned as a quasi-government, providing public and private goods. This book is the first to examine specific institutions in the Church in the Middle Ages in economic terms. Other books have argued generally that the Church either had a positive or negative effect on economic development. The authors of this book look more closely at the actual Church institutions and practices and describe …

  • Drafting the competition

    Gary M Anderson, Dennis Halcoussis et al.•ARTICLE•Defence and Peace Economics•1996

    This paper applies the interest‐group theory of government to the question of what determines the choice by a government to employ conscription as a recruiting device. We model the government's choice of the draft as a function of various potentially significant influences on that decision, including the extent of unionization of the labor force. We argue that unions may expect to benefit from the presence of conscription in much the same way as …

  • Between the constitution and the deep blue sea

    Open Access•Gary M Anderson, Adam Gifford•ARTICLE•Constitutional Political Economy•1996•Cited by: 1•References: 9

  • Privateering, state-sponsored violence as a tragedy of the commons

    Open Access•Gary M Anderson, Adam Gifford•ARTICLE•Public Choice•1995•References: 1

  • Procrastination, Obedince, and Public Policy

    Open Access•Gary M Anderson, Walter Block et al.•ARTICLE•American Journal of Economics and…•1995•Cited by: 1•References: 6

    Modern economics assumes that individuals are rational maximizers, who, in the presence of costly information, sometimes make mistakes. Recently, George Akerlof has challenged this presumption. He proposes that people sometimes fail to maximize their long-run utility, due to the phenomenon of "salience." This refers to the alleged systematic distortion in individual perception where events closer to a person (in time and in space) seem bigger and…

  • Perestroika and public choice

    Open Access•Gary M Anderson, Peter J Boettke•ARTICLE•Public Choice•1993•Cited by: 5•References: 12

  • The Struggle of Methods and the Missed Opportunity

    Open Access•Gary M Anderson•ARTICLE•Cultural Dynamics•1992•Cited by: 2•References: 6

  • Congressional Influence and Patterns of New Deal Spending, 1933-1939

    Gary M Anderson, Robert D Tollison•ARTICLE•The Journal of Law and Economics•1991

  • A public choice theory of the Great Contraction

    Open Access•Gary M Anderson, William F Shughart et al.•ARTICLE•Public Choice•1990•Cited by: 1•References: 3

  • Nassau Senior as Economic Consultant

    Gary M Anderson, Robert B Ekelund et al.•ARTICLE•Economica•1989•Cited by: 2

    The role of N. W. Senior in nineteenth-century factory legislation has been given only incomplete treatment. This paper employs a broader reading of Senior's views and shows that Senior provided a clear understanding of the interest group pressures behind Factory Act legislation. Within a dynamic analysis of these forces, moreover, some support is developed for Senior's "last hour" theory as a correct interpretation of a regulation that reduced e…

  • The Butcher, the Baker, and the Policy-Maker

    Gary M Anderson•ARTICLE•History of Political Economy•1989•Cited by: 4•References: 16

    Research Article| November 01 1989 The Butcher, the Baker, and the Policy-Maker: Adam Smith on Public Choice, with a Reply by Stigler Gary M. Anderson Gary M. Anderson Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google History of Political Economy (1989) 21 (4): 641–659. https://doi.org/10.1215/00182702-21-4-641 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Permissions Search Site Citation Gary M. Anderson; The Butcher,…

  • A public choice theory of the great contraction

    Open Access•Gary M Anderson, William F Shughart et al.•ARTICLE•Public Choice•1988•Cited by: 9•References: 10

  • Public finance in autocratic process

    Open Access•Gary M Anderson•ARTICLE•Public Choice•1988•Cited by: 4•References: 4

  • Mr. Smith and the Preachers

    Gary M Anderson•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•1988•Cited by: 36•References: 1

    The extension of economic analysis to problems beyond the domain of formal markets and explicit prices represents a major recent intellectual development. But "economic imperialism" is not new and was not invented in Chicago. Adam Smith, in his Wealth of Nations, extended economic reasoning to a variety of nonmarket exchange problems. One example is his analysis of religious behavior. Smith viewed participation in religion as a rational device by…

  • Adam Smith in the Customhouse

    Gary M Anderson, William F Shughart et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•1985•Cited by: 11•References: 2

  • Adam Smith's Analysis of Joint-Stock Companies

    Gary M Anderson, Robert D Tollison•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•1982•Cited by: 18•References: 3

    We defend Adam Smith's theory of the firm from the standpoint of positive economics. We argue that his evaluation of the joint-stock firm was not moralistic but instead based on available empirical evidence. The record showed that joint-stock companies had a poor survivorship record, even when granted legal monopoly status. His analysis contained an explanation of the role of agency costs within the firm. Finally, he did not discuss the East Indi…

  • Mr. Smith and the Preachers

    Gary M Anderson•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•1988•Cited by: 36•References: 1

    The extension of economic analysis to problems beyond the domain of formal markets and explicit prices represents a major recent intellectual development. But "economic imperialism" is not new and was not invented in Chicago. Adam Smith, in his Wealth of Nations, extended economic reasoning to a variety of nonmarket exchange problems. One example is his analysis of religious behavior. Smith viewed participation in religion as a rational device by…

  • Adam Smith's Analysis of Joint-Stock Companies

    Gary M Anderson, Robert D Tollison•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•1982•Cited by: 18•References: 3

    We defend Adam Smith's theory of the firm from the standpoint of positive economics. We argue that his evaluation of the joint-stock firm was not moralistic but instead based on available empirical evidence. The record showed that joint-stock companies had a poor survivorship record, even when granted legal monopoly status. His analysis contained an explanation of the role of agency costs within the firm. Finally, he did not discuss the East Indi…

  • Soviet venality

    Open Access•Gary M Anderson, Peter J Boettke•ARTICLE•Public Choice•1997•Cited by: 13•References: 10

  • Adam Smith in the Customhouse

    Gary M Anderson, William F Shughart et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•1985•Cited by: 11•References: 2

  • A public choice theory of the great contraction

    Open Access•Gary M Anderson, William F Shughart et al.•ARTICLE•Public Choice•1988•Cited by: 9•References: 10

  • Perestroika and public choice

    Open Access•Gary M Anderson, Peter J Boettke•ARTICLE•Public Choice•1993•Cited by: 5•References: 12

  • The Butcher, the Baker, and the Policy-Maker

    Gary M Anderson•ARTICLE•History of Political Economy•1989•Cited by: 4•References: 16

    Research Article| November 01 1989 The Butcher, the Baker, and the Policy-Maker: Adam Smith on Public Choice, with a Reply by Stigler Gary M. Anderson Gary M. Anderson Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google History of Political Economy (1989) 21 (4): 641–659. https://doi.org/10.1215/00182702-21-4-641 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Permissions Search Site Citation Gary M. Anderson; The Butcher,…

  • Public finance in autocratic process

    Open Access•Gary M Anderson•ARTICLE•Public Choice•1988•Cited by: 4•References: 4

  • The Struggle of Methods and the Missed Opportunity

    Open Access•Gary M Anderson•ARTICLE•Cultural Dynamics•1992•Cited by: 2•References: 6

  • Nassau Senior as Economic Consultant

    Gary M Anderson, Robert B Ekelund et al.•ARTICLE•Economica•1989•Cited by: 2

    The role of N. W. Senior in nineteenth-century factory legislation has been given only incomplete treatment. This paper employs a broader reading of Senior's views and shows that Senior provided a clear understanding of the interest group pressures behind Factory Act legislation. Within a dynamic analysis of these forces, moreover, some support is developed for Senior's "last hour" theory as a correct interpretation of a regulation that reduced e…

  • Between the constitution and the deep blue sea

    Open Access•Gary M Anderson, Adam Gifford•ARTICLE•Constitutional Political Economy•1996•Cited by: 1•References: 9

  • Procrastination, Obedince, and Public Policy

    Open Access•Gary M Anderson, Walter Block et al.•ARTICLE•American Journal of Economics and…•1995•Cited by: 1•References: 6

    Modern economics assumes that individuals are rational maximizers, who, in the presence of costly information, sometimes make mistakes. Recently, George Akerlof has challenged this presumption. He proposes that people sometimes fail to maximize their long-run utility, due to the phenomenon of "salience." This refers to the alleged systematic distortion in individual perception where events closer to a person (in time and in space) seem bigger and…

  • A public choice theory of the Great Contraction

    Open Access•Gary M Anderson, William F Shughart et al.•ARTICLE•Public Choice•1990•Cited by: 1•References: 3

  • Adam Smith's Analysis of Joint-Stock Companies

    Gary M Anderson, Robert D Tollison•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•1982•Cited by: 18•References: 3

    We defend Adam Smith's theory of the firm from the standpoint of positive economics. We argue that his evaluation of the joint-stock firm was not moralistic but instead based on available empirical evidence. The record showed that joint-stock companies had a poor survivorship record, even when granted legal monopoly status. His analysis contained an explanation of the role of agency costs within the firm. Finally, he did not discuss the East Indi…

  • Adam Smith in the Customhouse

    Gary M Anderson, William F Shughart et al.•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•1985•Cited by: 11•References: 2

  • A public choice theory of the great contraction

    Open Access•Gary M Anderson, William F Shughart et al.•ARTICLE•Public Choice•1988•Cited by: 9•References: 10

  • Public finance in autocratic process

    Open Access•Gary M Anderson•ARTICLE•Public Choice•1988•Cited by: 4•References: 4

  • Mr. Smith and the Preachers

    Gary M Anderson•ARTICLE•Journal of Political Economy•1988•Cited by: 36•References: 1

    The extension of economic analysis to problems beyond the domain of formal markets and explicit prices represents a major recent intellectual development. But "economic imperialism" is not new and was not invented in Chicago. Adam Smith, in his Wealth of Nations, extended economic reasoning to a variety of nonmarket exchange problems. One example is his analysis of religious behavior. Smith viewed participation in religion as a rational device by…

  • Nassau Senior as Economic Consultant

    Gary M Anderson, Robert B Ekelund et al.•ARTICLE•Economica•1989•Cited by: 2

    The role of N. W. Senior in nineteenth-century factory legislation has been given only incomplete treatment. This paper employs a broader reading of Senior's views and shows that Senior provided a clear understanding of the interest group pressures behind Factory Act legislation. Within a dynamic analysis of these forces, moreover, some support is developed for Senior's "last hour" theory as a correct interpretation of a regulation that reduced e…

  • The Butcher, the Baker, and the Policy-Maker

    Gary M Anderson•ARTICLE•History of Political Economy•1989•Cited by: 4•References: 16

    Research Article| November 01 1989 The Butcher, the Baker, and the Policy-Maker: Adam Smith on Public Choice, with a Reply by Stigler Gary M. Anderson Gary M. Anderson Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google History of Political Economy (1989) 21 (4): 641–659. https://doi.org/10.1215/00182702-21-4-641 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Permissions Search Site Citation Gary M. Anderson; The Butcher,…

  • A public choice theory of the Great Contraction

    Open Access•Gary M Anderson, William F Shughart et al.•ARTICLE•Public Choice•1990•Cited by: 1•References: 3

  • Congressional Influence and Patterns of New Deal Spending, 1933-1939

    Gary M Anderson, Robert D Tollison•ARTICLE•The Journal of Law and Economics•1991

  • The Struggle of Methods and the Missed Opportunity

    Open Access•Gary M Anderson•ARTICLE•Cultural Dynamics•1992•Cited by: 2•References: 6

  • Perestroika and public choice

    Open Access•Gary M Anderson, Peter J Boettke•ARTICLE•Public Choice•1993•Cited by: 5•References: 12

  • Privateering, state-sponsored violence as a tragedy of the commons

    Open Access•Gary M Anderson, Adam Gifford•ARTICLE•Public Choice•1995•References: 1

  • Procrastination, Obedince, and Public Policy

    Open Access•Gary M Anderson, Walter Block et al.•ARTICLE•American Journal of Economics and…•1995•Cited by: 1•References: 6

    Modern economics assumes that individuals are rational maximizers, who, in the presence of costly information, sometimes make mistakes. Recently, George Akerlof has challenged this presumption. He proposes that people sometimes fail to maximize their long-run utility, due to the phenomenon of "salience." This refers to the alleged systematic distortion in individual perception where events closer to a person (in time and in space) seem bigger and…

  • Sacred Trust

    Robert B Ekelund, Robert F Hébert et al.•BOOK•Sacred Trust•1996

    The Church dominated society in the Middle Ages and functioned as a quasi-government, providing public and private goods. This book is the first to examine specific institutions in the Church in the Middle Ages in economic terms. Other books have argued generally that the Church either had a positive or negative effect on economic development. The authors of this book look more closely at the actual Church institutions and practices and describe …

  • Drafting the competition

    Gary M Anderson, Dennis Halcoussis et al.•ARTICLE•Defence and Peace Economics•1996

    This paper applies the interest‐group theory of government to the question of what determines the choice by a government to employ conscription as a recruiting device. We model the government's choice of the draft as a function of various potentially significant influences on that decision, including the extent of unionization of the labor force. We argue that unions may expect to benefit from the presence of conscription in much the same way as …

  • Between the constitution and the deep blue sea

    Open Access•Gary M Anderson, Adam Gifford•ARTICLE•Constitutional Political Economy•1996•Cited by: 1•References: 9

  • Soviet venality

    Open Access•Gary M Anderson, Peter J Boettke•ARTICLE•Public Choice•1997•Cited by: 13•References: 10

  • Jim F. Couch and William F. Shughart II, The political economy of the New Deal

    Open Access•Gary M Anderson•ARTICLE•Public Choice•2001•References: 4

Political science (15 works) · Economics (14 works) · Law (14 works) · Economic Theory and Institutions (8 works) · Law (8 works) · Politics (8 works) · Public finance (6 works) · Computer Science (5 works) · Philosophy (5 works) · Macroeconomics (4 works)

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