Randy T Simmons
Biographic Data
| ID | 3626856 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Randy T Simmons |
| GIVEN NAMES | Randy T |
| FAMILY NAME | Simmons |
| SIGNATURE | SIMMONS R T |
| AFFILIATIONS | Utah State University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-1003-2394 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 15 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 71 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 15 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1984 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 4 |
Social Media, (Mis)information, and Voting Decisions
Economics as moral exchange
In this article, we examine the methodological writings of James M. Buchanan and relate them to those of the moral philosopher, Martin Buber. We analyze Buchanan’s views, both explicit and implicit in his writings, on the morality of the exchange relationship between individuals. We imagine a hypothetical meeting between Buchanan and Buber and conclude that Buchanan would have agreed with Buber’s dialogical philosophy of human interaction as a fo…
The empty intersection
Property and markets in Elmer Kelton novels
Public choice and public life
Trading places
William C. Mitchell
Wilderness and Political Ecology
Journal Article Wilderness and Political Ecology: Aboriginal Influences and the Original State of Nature Get access Wilderness and Political Ecology: Aboriginal Influences and the Original State of Nature. Edited by Kay Charles E. Simmons Randy T.. (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2002. xix + 342 pp. Illustrations, tables, charts, notes, bibliography. $45.00.) Shepard Krech, III Shepard Krech, III Brown University Search for other works…
America's Water
Pathological politics
Banking in the American West
Journal Article Banking in the American West: From the Gold Rush to Deregulation Get access Banking in the American West: From the Gold Rush to Deregulation. By Doti Lynne Pierson Schweikart Larry. (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991. ix + 357 pp. Illustrations, tables, notes, bibliography, index. $38.50.) Randy T. Simmons Randy T. Simmons Utah State University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Weste…
Egoism, Parochialism, and Universalism
In the standard n-Prisoners' Dilemma (nPD), defection is generally interpreted as evidence of egoistic or self-interested motives. Cooperation, however, is compatible with (at least) two motives: universalism, a generalized norm that one should restrain one's selfish impulses to benefit humanity, and parochialism, the norm that one owes cooperation to one's "solidarity group." In contrast to research supporting the parochial explanation of cooper…
The layered prisoners' dilemma
Organizing Groups for Collective Action
How can the beneficiaries of collective action be persuaded to contribute the resources (time, energy, money) necessary for the effort to succeed? Rational and selfish players will recognize they can free ride on the successful contributions of others. If the effort is not successful, they will lose a contribution-and be "suckered." Other than relying on altruism, organizers of the group effort can modify incentives so that players are more prepa…
Do Cooperators Exit More Readily than Defectors
Standard prisoners' dilemma games offer players the binary choice between cooperating and defecting, but in a related game there is the third possibility of leaving the game altogether. We conceptualize exiting as taking the individual beyond the reach of externalities generated in the original group, and on that basis-together with the assumption of self-interested (dollar-maximizing) behavior on the part of all players-we derive the prediction …
Do Cooperators Exit More Readily than Defectors
Standard prisoners' dilemma games offer players the binary choice between cooperating and defecting, but in a related game there is the third possibility of leaving the game altogether. We conceptualize exiting as taking the individual beyond the reach of externalities generated in the original group, and on that basis-together with the assumption of self-interested (dollar-maximizing) behavior on the part of all players-we derive the prediction …
Organizing Groups for Collective Action
How can the beneficiaries of collective action be persuaded to contribute the resources (time, energy, money) necessary for the effort to succeed? Rational and selfish players will recognize they can free ride on the successful contributions of others. If the effort is not successful, they will lose a contribution-and be "suckered." Other than relying on altruism, organizers of the group effort can modify incentives so that players are more prepa…
Egoism, Parochialism, and Universalism
In the standard n-Prisoners' Dilemma (nPD), defection is generally interpreted as evidence of egoistic or self-interested motives. Cooperation, however, is compatible with (at least) two motives: universalism, a generalized norm that one should restrain one's selfish impulses to benefit humanity, and parochialism, the norm that one owes cooperation to one's "solidarity group." In contrast to research supporting the parochial explanation of cooper…
The layered prisoners' dilemma
Social Media, (Mis)information, and Voting Decisions
Economics as moral exchange
In this article, we examine the methodological writings of James M. Buchanan and relate them to those of the moral philosopher, Martin Buber. We analyze Buchanan’s views, both explicit and implicit in his writings, on the morality of the exchange relationship between individuals. We imagine a hypothetical meeting between Buchanan and Buber and conclude that Buchanan would have agreed with Buber’s dialogical philosophy of human interaction as a fo…
The empty intersection
Do Cooperators Exit More Readily than Defectors
Standard prisoners' dilemma games offer players the binary choice between cooperating and defecting, but in a related game there is the third possibility of leaving the game altogether. We conceptualize exiting as taking the individual beyond the reach of externalities generated in the original group, and on that basis-together with the assumption of self-interested (dollar-maximizing) behavior on the part of all players-we derive the prediction …
Organizing Groups for Collective Action
How can the beneficiaries of collective action be persuaded to contribute the resources (time, energy, money) necessary for the effort to succeed? Rational and selfish players will recognize they can free ride on the successful contributions of others. If the effort is not successful, they will lose a contribution-and be "suckered." Other than relying on altruism, organizers of the group effort can modify incentives so that players are more prepa…
The layered prisoners' dilemma
Egoism, Parochialism, and Universalism
In the standard n-Prisoners' Dilemma (nPD), defection is generally interpreted as evidence of egoistic or self-interested motives. Cooperation, however, is compatible with (at least) two motives: universalism, a generalized norm that one should restrain one's selfish impulses to benefit humanity, and parochialism, the norm that one owes cooperation to one's "solidarity group." In contrast to research supporting the parochial explanation of cooper…
Banking in the American West
Journal Article Banking in the American West: From the Gold Rush to Deregulation Get access Banking in the American West: From the Gold Rush to Deregulation. By Doti Lynne Pierson Schweikart Larry. (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991. ix + 357 pp. Illustrations, tables, notes, bibliography, index. $38.50.) Randy T. Simmons Randy T. Simmons Utah State University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Weste…
America's Water
Pathological politics
Wilderness and Political Ecology
Journal Article Wilderness and Political Ecology: Aboriginal Influences and the Original State of Nature Get access Wilderness and Political Ecology: Aboriginal Influences and the Original State of Nature. Edited by Kay Charles E. Simmons Randy T.. (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2002. xix + 342 pp. Illustrations, tables, charts, notes, bibliography. $45.00.) Shepard Krech, III Shepard Krech, III Brown University Search for other works…
William C. Mitchell
Trading places
Public choice and public life
Property and markets in Elmer Kelton novels
The empty intersection
Economics as moral exchange
In this article, we examine the methodological writings of James M. Buchanan and relate them to those of the moral philosopher, Martin Buber. We analyze Buchanan’s views, both explicit and implicit in his writings, on the morality of the exchange relationship between individuals. We imagine a hypothetical meeting between Buchanan and Buber and conclude that Buchanan would have agreed with Buber’s dialogical philosophy of human interaction as a fo…
Social Media, (Mis)information, and Voting Decisions
Political science (12 works) · Economics (11 works) · Law (9 works) · Law (6 works) · Philosophy (6 works) · Politics (6 works) · Public finance (6 works) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (5 works) · Sociology (5 works) · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation (4 works)