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Laura W Arnold

Biographic Data

ID3627423
NAMELaura W Arnold
GIVEN NAMESLaura W
FAMILY NAMEArnold
SIGNATUREARNOLD L W
AFFILIATIONSThe Ohio State University
VERIFIEDNo
TOTAL WORKS4
TOTAL CITATIONS92
WORKS AS AUTHOR4
WORKS AS EDITOR0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR1997
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2002
H-INDEX2
  • Veto Threats as a Policy Tool

    Open Access•Rebecca E Deen, Laura W Arnold•ARTICLE•Presidential Studies Quarterly•2002•Cited by: 12•References: 8

    One of the most powerful tools of the president in the policy‐making process is the veto. Although presidents can veto legislation at will, the use of the veto is costly as it can be perceived as a sign of weakness. Veto threats may provide the president with a bargaining tool that relies on the power of the veto without incurring its costs. This article explores the conditions under which presidents are likely to use veto threats. The authors po…

  • Assessing Effectiveness of Veto Threats in the Bush Administration (1989-1993)

    Rebecca E Deen, Laura W Arnold•ARTICLE•Congress & the Presidency•2002•Cited by: 2•References: 14

    Presidents have many tools in the policy-making process. One of the most powerful of these is vetoing legislation. Although presidents can veto legislation at will, the use of the veto is costly as it can be perceived as a sign of weakness. Veto threats may provide the president with a bargaining tool relying on the power of the veto without incurring its costs. This article provides a framework for understanding the use and effectiveness of veto…

  • The Distribution of Senate Committee Positions

    Open Access•Laura W Arnold•ARTICLE•Legislative Studies Quarterly•2001•Cited by: 2•References: 4

    Recent work on the United States Senate has focused on its transformation from a clublike dominance of a few members to one in which individual senators play significant roles in the policymaking process regardless of seniority (Ripley 1969; Sinclair 1989a). Some argue that part of this transformation was the democratization of committee assignments (Sinclair 1988). I examine the degree to which the Senate has democratized its committee assignmen…

  • The Strategic Timing of Position Taking in Congress

    Open Access•J M Box-Steffensmeier, Laura W Arnold et al.•ARTICLE•American Political Science Review•1997•Cited by: 76•References: 38

    A critical element of decision making is the timing of choices political actors make; often when a decision is made is as critical as the decision itself. We posit a dynamic model of strategic position announcement based on signaling theories of legislative politics. We suggest that members who receive clear signals from constituents, interest groups, and policy leaders will announce their positions earlier. Those with conflicting signals will se…

  • The Strategic Timing of Position Taking in Congress

    Open Access•J M Box-Steffensmeier, Laura W Arnold et al.•ARTICLE•American Political Science Review•1997•Cited by: 76•References: 38

    A critical element of decision making is the timing of choices political actors make; often when a decision is made is as critical as the decision itself. We posit a dynamic model of strategic position announcement based on signaling theories of legislative politics. We suggest that members who receive clear signals from constituents, interest groups, and policy leaders will announce their positions earlier. Those with conflicting signals will se…

  • Veto Threats as a Policy Tool

    Open Access•Rebecca E Deen, Laura W Arnold•ARTICLE•Presidential Studies Quarterly•2002•Cited by: 12•References: 8

    One of the most powerful tools of the president in the policy‐making process is the veto. Although presidents can veto legislation at will, the use of the veto is costly as it can be perceived as a sign of weakness. Veto threats may provide the president with a bargaining tool that relies on the power of the veto without incurring its costs. This article explores the conditions under which presidents are likely to use veto threats. The authors po…

  • Assessing Effectiveness of Veto Threats in the Bush Administration (1989-1993)

    Rebecca E Deen, Laura W Arnold•ARTICLE•Congress & the Presidency•2002•Cited by: 2•References: 14

    Presidents have many tools in the policy-making process. One of the most powerful of these is vetoing legislation. Although presidents can veto legislation at will, the use of the veto is costly as it can be perceived as a sign of weakness. Veto threats may provide the president with a bargaining tool relying on the power of the veto without incurring its costs. This article provides a framework for understanding the use and effectiveness of veto…

  • The Distribution of Senate Committee Positions

    Open Access•Laura W Arnold•ARTICLE•Legislative Studies Quarterly•2001•Cited by: 2•References: 4

    Recent work on the United States Senate has focused on its transformation from a clublike dominance of a few members to one in which individual senators play significant roles in the policymaking process regardless of seniority (Ripley 1969; Sinclair 1989a). Some argue that part of this transformation was the democratization of committee assignments (Sinclair 1988). I examine the degree to which the Senate has democratized its committee assignmen…

  • The Strategic Timing of Position Taking in Congress

    Open Access•J M Box-Steffensmeier, Laura W Arnold et al.•ARTICLE•American Political Science Review•1997•Cited by: 76•References: 38

    A critical element of decision making is the timing of choices political actors make; often when a decision is made is as critical as the decision itself. We posit a dynamic model of strategic position announcement based on signaling theories of legislative politics. We suggest that members who receive clear signals from constituents, interest groups, and policy leaders will announce their positions earlier. Those with conflicting signals will se…

  • The Distribution of Senate Committee Positions

    Open Access•Laura W Arnold•ARTICLE•Legislative Studies Quarterly•2001•Cited by: 2•References: 4

    Recent work on the United States Senate has focused on its transformation from a clublike dominance of a few members to one in which individual senators play significant roles in the policymaking process regardless of seniority (Ripley 1969; Sinclair 1989a). Some argue that part of this transformation was the democratization of committee assignments (Sinclair 1988). I examine the degree to which the Senate has democratized its committee assignmen…

  • Veto Threats as a Policy Tool

    Open Access•Rebecca E Deen, Laura W Arnold•ARTICLE•Presidential Studies Quarterly•2002•Cited by: 12•References: 8

    One of the most powerful tools of the president in the policy‐making process is the veto. Although presidents can veto legislation at will, the use of the veto is costly as it can be perceived as a sign of weakness. Veto threats may provide the president with a bargaining tool that relies on the power of the veto without incurring its costs. This article explores the conditions under which presidents are likely to use veto threats. The authors po…

  • Assessing Effectiveness of Veto Threats in the Bush Administration (1989-1993)

    Rebecca E Deen, Laura W Arnold•ARTICLE•Congress & the Presidency•2002•Cited by: 2•References: 14

    Presidents have many tools in the policy-making process. One of the most powerful of these is vetoing legislation. Although presidents can veto legislation at will, the use of the veto is costly as it can be perceived as a sign of weakness. Veto threats may provide the president with a bargaining tool relying on the power of the veto without incurring its costs. This article provides a framework for understanding the use and effectiveness of veto…

Electoral Systems and Political Participation (4 works) · Law (4 works) · Law (4 works) · Political science (4 works) · Computer Science (3 works) · Economics (3 works) · Law and economics (3 works) · Policy Transfer and Learning (3 works) · Politics (3 works) · Legislation (2 works)

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