Thomas Schwartz
Biographic Data
| ID | 3628070 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Thomas Schwartz |
| GIVEN NAMES | Thomas |
| FAMILY NAME | Schwartz |
| SIGNATURE | SCHWARTZ T |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of California, Los Angeles |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-8012-1512 |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 51 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 1285 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 51 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1973 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 9 |
Esketamine-Induced Dissociation: A Case Report
Esketamine, the isolated S-enantiomer of ketamine, has been a recent breakthrough as a non-monoaminergic treatment for treatment-resistant depression (TRD). This case report explores a rare adverse event in a 41-year-old female with TRD, who, despite experiencing significant depressive improvement with esketamine, encountered a severe dissociative episode accompanied by hallucinogenic-like phenomena. While esketamine's efficacy in TRD is well-doc…
Kniefall and Ostpolitik: Willy Brandt’s Legacy for Germany and the West
Willy Brandt was one of the most distinguished founders of the Federal Republic of Germany, a country that now ranks as the most admired and respected in the world. An exile who fought against the Nazis, returned to become Mayor of Berlin when the Wall was built, and then as Chancellor went on to conduct the policy of Ostpolitik, which sought to reconcile Germany with the Eastern European countries and the Soviet Union, Brandt was a visionary lea…
Parties
Maritime Territorial Disputes in Asia and the Relaxation of Cold War Tensions: The Case of Dokdo and the 1965 Japan-Korea Normalization Agreements
This article continues the legal and historical inquiry into the dispute between Japan and Korea over Dokdo, an island that sits in the sea between the two nations, by examining the 1965 normalization agreement between Japan and Korea. Japan has argued that the agreement, in which Japan provided economic aid to Korea, settled all outstanding claims stemming from World War II between the nations, including those over territory. We analyze the mean…
Parties, agendas, and roll rates
For the US House of Representatives, Cox and McCubbins discover tiny majority-party roll rates and offer them as evidence of majority-party agenda control. However, the observed roll rates are approximately what would result from chance alone or from chance constrained in several natural ways. Besides that, we show that rolls themselves are not evidence of any lapse in partisan agenda control and may even occur as the intended consequence of agen…
Asian Territorial Disputes and the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty: The Case of Dokdo
This Article analyzes whether the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty, the only multilateral international agreement that draws borders in East Asia, resolves the longstanding dispute over Dokdo between Korea and Japan. It uses the dispute to draw larger lessons about the nature of the treaty that ended World War II in the Pacific and how it structured the peace in Asia differently from that in Europe. It uses U.S. archival material to reconstruct th…
Cycles and Social Choice: The True and Unabridged Story of a Most Protean Paradox
Power and Cooperation
The pure realist picture of world politics combines the demand for power with the problem of cooperation. In a more up-to-date, less austere variant, power is no unqualified asset: a state can profit from a unilateral loss of power, all else equal. And mutual cooperation is often achievable, thanks in great measure to the shadow of the future. My newer, richer variant enlarges and combines those two features of anarchy: sometimes a loss of power …
Contra Koza
Three of our arguments drew no objection from Dr. Koza. One is that plurality rule—the heart of his proposed reform—can be anti-majoritarian. In our three-candidate example, Libby was the plurality favorite but Maude beat each of her rivals, Libby included, by a majority. A plurality can be a majority, of course, but the Electoral College has never reversed a popular majority
A Calamitous Compact
The National Popular Vote Interstate Compact (joined so far by ten states and DC) would replace the current presidential-election system, based on the electoral college and the winner-take-all rule, with nationwide plurality rule, and it would do so by changes in state law, not a Constitutional amendment. The mischief that would create (especially procedural instability, noncompliant electors, nation-wide recounts, vote manipulation, and narrowed…
Interbranch cooperation and the shadow of the future
Choice functions and bounded rationality
The New Geopolitics of Transatlantic Relations: Coordinated Responses to Common Dangers
Journal Article The New Geopolitics of Transatlantic Relations: Coordinated Responses to Common Dangers Get access The New Geopolitics of Transatlantic Relations: Coordinated Responses to Common Dangers by Stefan Frohlich. Baltimore, MD, Johns Hopkins University Press, 2012. 344 pp. $55.00. Thomas Schwartz Thomas Schwartz Vanderbilt University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Political Science Quarterly, Vo…
Integrating Psychotherapy and Psychopharmacology: A Handbook for Clinicians
Perforating the Iron Curtain: European détente, transatlantic relations, and the Cold War, 1965–1985
Poul Villaume and Odd Arne Westad, Copenhagen, Museum Tusculanum Press, 2010, 272 pp The picture on the cover of Perforating the Iron Curtain comes from the famous 1975 Helsinki conference, and in
Henry Kissinger: Realism, Domestic Politics, and the Struggle Against Exceptionalism in American Foreign Policy
Henry Kissinger was the single most controversial diplomat of the 20th century. This article explores Kissinger's approach to the philosophy of realism in international affairs, his role in Vietnam policy making, and his most recent engagement in the debate over the Iraq War. It argues that Kissinger's realism, although philosophically consistent and having roots within his own life's experience, was always tempered by his desire to exercise infl…
One-dimensionality and stability in legislative voting
The widespread use in legislative studies of the one-dimensional model and its median-stability consequence raises a question: Do stability and one-dimensionality rest on evidence drawn from observed votes? They do not and cannot. I prove that every possible legislative history is compatible with a transitive majority preference (hence stability), and except in very special circumstances with a cyclic majority preference (hence instability) as we…
Reply to Miller on agendas and sincerity
Contrary to Miller, Farquharson’s agenda trees do omit real parliamentary information. And the assumptions he uses to justify Farquharson’s definition of sincere (or naive) voting justify too little (e.g., he drops maximax) and rule out too much (e.g., non-pre-set agendas and principled sincere voting)
The friend of my enemy is my enemy, the enemy of my enemy is my friend: Axioms for structural balance and bi-polarity
Legacies of détente: A three-way discussion
Participating in this discussion about détente with two respected friends and scholars, both of whom have authored significant books about the subject of my current research, Henry Kissinger, compels me to confess that I have been strongly influenced by their work, and that this discussion threatens to be repetitious and even dangerously in agreement! Nevertheless, having been invited by Noam Kochavi to comment upon and discuss some of the big is…
Parliamentary procedure: Principal forms and political effects
Presidential Vetoes in Latin American Constitutions
A portrayal of the bill-to-law provisions of Latin American constitutions as extensive game forms shows presidential veto powers to be richer, more varied, and more regionally distinctive than hitherto appreciated. Small details and apparent redundancies are surprisingly consequential, the distribution of institutional advantages is both counterintuitive and incompatible with any simple pattern or overall measure of ‘presidential power’, and regi…
Vetoes Overridable by Simple Majorities
The myth of the democratic peace
"Empire" by Integration: The United States and European Integration, 1945-1997
Journal Article “Empire” by Integration: The United States and European Integration, 1945–1997. By Geir Lundestad. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998. x, 200 pp. Cloth, $77.00, ISBN 0-19-878212-8. Paper, $18.95, ISBN 0-19-878211-X.) Get access Thomas Schwartz Thomas Schwartz Vanderbilt University, Nashville, Tennessee Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Journal of American History, Volume 87, Issue 3, De…
Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms
Scholars have often remarked that Congress neglects its oversight responsibility. We argue that Congress does no such thing: what appears to be a neglect of oversight really is the rational preference for one form of oversight-which we call fire-alarm oversight-over another form-police-patrol oversight. Our analysis supports a somewhat neglected way of looking at the strategies by which legislators seek to achieve their goals
The Paradox of Representation
It has long been taken for granted that legislative representation is an asset, something of which more is always better than less, all else equal. No, sometimes less is better than more though all else be equal. This paradox can occur under naive, sophisticated, and cooperative voting. From a model of distributive politics I deduce that a strong version must occur in all but special cases. The paradox refutes an assumption of many electoral-syst…
Agendas and the Control of Political Outcomes
A considerable theoretical literature argues that if everyone votes sincerely, then an agenda setter has near dictatorial influence on final outcomes, whereas if everyone votes strategically, then an agenda setter's power is considerably reduced. This literature assumes that all feasible agendas are of a special type called amendment agendas . But actual legislative and committee agendas—notably those found in Congress—often are not of this type.…
Your vote counts on account of the way it is counted: An institutional solution to the paradox of not voting
Presidential Vetoes in Latin American Constitutions
A portrayal of the bill-to-law provisions of Latin American constitutions as extensive game forms shows presidential veto powers to be richer, more varied, and more regionally distinctive than hitherto appreciated. Small details and apparent redundancies are surprisingly consequential, the distribution of institutional advantages is both counterintuitive and incompatible with any simple pattern or overall measure of ‘presidential power’, and regi…
The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials: A Personal Memoir
Journal Article The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials: A Personal Memoir. By Telford Taylor. (New York: Knopf, 1992. xii, 703 pp. $35.00, ISBN 0-39458355-8.) Get access Thomas A. Schwartz Thomas A. Schwartz Vanderbilt University, Nashville, Tennessee Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Journal of American History, Volume 80, Issue 3, December 1993, Pages 1147–1148, https://doi.org/10.2307/2080542 Published: 01 D…
Congress, the Courts, and Public Policy: Consequences of the One Man, One Vote Rule
Examines the consequences of the one man, one vote rule in congress, the courts and public policy. Analysis of the court-ordered congressional redistricting in the United States House of Representatives based on the one man, one vote rule; Policy changes attributable to the one man, one vote rule
The universal-instability theorem
Ethical standards as an independent variable in psychological research
Collective Choice, Separation of Issues and Vote Trading
In legislatures and committees, a number of issues are voted on separately, leading to an outcome consisting of positions on each of these issues. I investigate the effects this separation of issues has on collective choices, assuming a very abstract collective choice model, whose assumptions are presupposed by many less abstract models, notably spatial models. Assuming the model, if there exists an undominated outcome (one to which no winning co…
Henry Kissinger: Realism, Domestic Politics, and the Struggle Against Exceptionalism in American Foreign Policy
Henry Kissinger was the single most controversial diplomat of the 20th century. This article explores Kissinger's approach to the philosophy of realism in international affairs, his role in Vietnam policy making, and his most recent engagement in the debate over the Iraq War. It argues that Kissinger's realism, although philosophically consistent and having roots within his own life's experience, was always tempered by his desire to exercise infl…
Parliamentary procedure: Principal forms and political effects
The politics of flatland
Vote trading and Pareto efficiency
The myth of the democratic peace
The Executive Veto: Purpose, Procedure, and Paradox
Representation as agency and the Pork Barrel Paradox
Parties
Parties, agendas, and roll rates
For the US House of Representatives, Cox and McCubbins discover tiny majority-party roll rates and offer them as evidence of majority-party agenda control. However, the observed roll rates are approximately what would result from chance alone or from chance constrained in several natural ways. Besides that, we show that rolls themselves are not evidence of any lapse in partisan agenda control and may even occur as the intended consequence of agen…
A Calamitous Compact
The National Popular Vote Interstate Compact (joined so far by ten states and DC) would replace the current presidential-election system, based on the electoral college and the winner-take-all rule, with nationwide plurality rule, and it would do so by changes in state law, not a Constitutional amendment. The mischief that would create (especially procedural instability, noncompliant electors, nation-wide recounts, vote manipulation, and narrowed…
The Logic of Collective Choice
Journal Article The Logic of Collective Choice Get access The Logic of Collective Choice. By THOMAS SCHWARTZ. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986. Pp. xiv + 315. S35.00 hardback.) John Bonner John Bonner University of Leicester Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 97, Issue 386, 1 June 1987, Pages 517–518, https://doi.org/10.2307/2232904 Published: 01 June 1987
Contra Koza
Three of our arguments drew no objection from Dr. Koza. One is that plurality rule—the heart of his proposed reform—can be anti-majoritarian. In our three-candidate example, Libby was the plurality favorite but Maude beat each of her rivals, Libby included, by a majority. A plurality can be a majority, of course, but the Electoral College has never reversed a popular majority
One-dimensionality and stability in legislative voting
The widespread use in legislative studies of the one-dimensional model and its median-stability consequence raises a question: Do stability and one-dimensionality rest on evidence drawn from observed votes? They do not and cannot. I prove that every possible legislative history is compatible with a transitive majority preference (hence stability), and except in very special circumstances with a cyclic majority preference (hence instability) as we…
The friend of my enemy is my enemy, the enemy of my enemy is my friend: Axioms for structural balance and bi-polarity
Vetoes Overridable by Simple Majorities
Ethical standards as an independent variable in psychological research
Vote trading and Pareto efficiency
Collective Choice, Separation of Issues and Vote Trading
In legislatures and committees, a number of issues are voted on separately, leading to an outcome consisting of positions on each of these issues. I investigate the effects this separation of issues has on collective choices, assuming a very abstract collective choice model, whose assumptions are presupposed by many less abstract models, notably spatial models. Assuming the model, if there exists an undominated outcome (one to which no winning co…
Recital Theology
The universal-instability theorem
No minimally reasonable collective-choice process can be strategy-proof
Entitlement theory: Prospects and problems
The Supreme Court and the First Amendment
Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms
Scholars have often remarked that Congress neglects its oversight responsibility. We argue that Congress does no such thing: what appears to be a neglect of oversight really is the rational preference for one form of oversight-which we call fire-alarm oversight-over another form-police-patrol oversight. Our analysis supports a somewhat neglected way of looking at the strategies by which legislators seek to achieve their goals
The politics of flatland
The Logic of Collective Choice
The “Skeleton Key” — American Foreign Policy, European Unity, and German Rearmament, 1949–54
An older colleague recently observed to me that today we stand further removed in time from the end of World War II than Americans at the beginning of that conflict were from the Spanish American War. To those Americans of 1939, he said, the war with Spain seemed almost antediluvian, while to us World War II lives vividly in memory, and its consequences still shape our lives. As a student of modern American foreign policy, I found my colleague's …
Your vote counts on account of the way it is counted: An institutional solution to the paradox of not voting
The Logic of Collective Choice
Journal Article The Logic of Collective Choice Get access The Logic of Collective Choice. By THOMAS SCHWARTZ. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986. Pp. xiv + 315. S35.00 hardback.) John Bonner John Bonner University of Leicester Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 97, Issue 386, 1 June 1987, Pages 517–518, https://doi.org/10.2307/2232904 Published: 01 June 1987
Agendas and the Control of Political Outcomes
A considerable theoretical literature argues that if everyone votes sincerely, then an agenda setter has near dictatorial influence on final outcomes, whereas if everyone votes strategically, then an agenda setter's power is considerably reduced. This literature assumes that all feasible agendas are of a special type called amendment agendas . But actual legislative and committee agendas—notably those found in Congress—often are not of this type.…
Congress, the Courts, and Public Policy: Consequences of the One Man, One Vote Rule
Examines the consequences of the one man, one vote rule in congress, the courts and public policy. Analysis of the court-ordered congressional redistricting in the United States House of Representatives based on the one man, one vote rule; Policy changes attributable to the one man, one vote rule
The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials: A Personal Memoir
Journal Article The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials: A Personal Memoir. By Telford Taylor. (New York: Knopf, 1992. xii, 703 pp. $35.00, ISBN 0-39458355-8.) Get access Thomas A. Schwartz Thomas A. Schwartz Vanderbilt University, Nashville, Tennessee Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Journal of American History, Volume 80, Issue 3, December 1993, Pages 1147–1148, https://doi.org/10.2307/2080542 Published: 01 D…
Whither Clinton and Foreign Policy? A Year-End Review
Malgré quelques succès relatifs, la première année de la présidence Clinton a vu s'accumuler les échecs diplomatiques dans tous les dossiers difficiles. C'est que pour la première fois une administration doit formuler une politique étrangère en l'absence de menace militaire directe sur la sécurité des États-Unis. La fin de la guerre froide et le changement spectaculaire de l'environnement international ont eu pour conséquence de renvoyer l'Amériq…
Representation as agency and the Pork Barrel Paradox
Germany and America: New Identities. Fateful Rift
The United States and Germany after 1945: Alliances, Transnational Relations, and the Legacy of the Cold War
Journal Article The United States and Germany after 1945: Alliances, Transnational Relations, and the Legacy of the Cold War Get access Thomas A. Schwartz Thomas A. Schwartz Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Diplomatic History, Volume 19, Issue 4, September 1995, Pages 549–568, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7709.1995.tb00664.x Published: 01 June 2007
The Paradox of Representation
It has long been taken for granted that legislative representation is an asset, something of which more is always better than less, all else equal. No, sometimes less is better than more though all else be equal. This paradox can occur under naive, sophisticated, and cooperative voting. From a model of distributive politics I deduce that a strong version must occur in all but special cases. The paradox refutes an assumption of many electoral-syst…
Politics after Hitler: The Western Allies and the German Party System. Daniel E. Rogers
Drawing the Line: The American Decision to Divide Germany 1944-1949
Journal Article Drawing the Line: The American Decision to Divide Germany, 1944–1949. By Carolyn Woods Eisenberg. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996. xiv, 522 pp. $59.95, ISBN 0-521-39212-8.) Get access Thomas A. Schwartz Thomas A. Schwartz Vanderbilt University, Nashville, Tennessee Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Journal of American History, Volume 83, Issue 4, March 1997, Pages 1474–1475, https…
The Executive Veto: Purpose, Procedure, and Paradox
Political science (38 works) · Law (29 works) · Law (28 works) · Economics (27 works) · Politics (26 works) · Computer Science (18 works) · Law and economics (15 works) · Mathematical economics (15 works) · Electoral Systems and Political Participation (14 works) · Game Theory and Voting Systems (13 works)