Rebecca Morton
Biographic Data
| ID | 3628281 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Rebecca Morton |
| GIVEN NAMES | Rebecca |
| FAMILY NAME | Morton |
| SIGNATURE | MORTON R |
| AFFILIATIONS | New York University |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 7 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 26 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 7 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2007 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2023 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Pork versus Policy: Experimental Evidence on Majoritarian Bargaining with Real-World Consequences
Pork-barrel politics has long attracted controversy; difficult to prove and vigorously denied by those accused of it, the practice is nevertheless defended by others who argue that pork facilitates compromise. We design a novel field-in-the-lab experiment to study how legislators bargain over pork and real-world policy. We first introduce a new incentivized method to measure subjects’ ideological peak preferences and attitudinal strength. Subject…
Run-off Elections in the Laboratory
We study experimentally the properties of the majority run-off system and compare them to those of plurality rule. Our focus is on Duverger’s famous prediction that the plurality rule leads to higher co-ordination of votes on a limited number of candidates than the majority run-off rule. We find strong co-ordination forces under both systems. However, as predicted by the theory, in some cases these forces are stronger under plurality. Despite the…
Social Groups and the Effectiveness of Protests
We present an informational theory of public protests, according to which public protests allow citizens to aggregate privately dispersed information and signal it to the policy maker. The model predicts that information sharing of signals within social groups can facilitate information aggregation when the social groups are sufficiently large even when it is not predicted with individual signals. We use experiments in the laboratory and on Amazo…
Negative campaigns, interpersonal trust, and prosocial behavior: The mediating effect of democratic experience
Communication and Voting in Multi‐party Elections: An Experimental Study
We investigate communication and costly voting in multi‐party election experiments. Turnout is consistently lower across electorate communication as compared with restricted communication within parties. Voters are more likely to choose the strategic voting option at the outset in restricted communication but more likely to start deliberation by stating their first preference when unrestricted. Distributions of earnings are more inequitable when …
Political Economy Experiments: Introduction
Journal Article Political Economy Experiments: Introduction Get access Rebecca Morton Rebecca Morton New York University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 124, Issue 574, February 2014, Pages F129–F130, https://doi.org/10.1111/ecoj.12121 Published: 24 February 2014
Efficiency, Equity, and Timing of Voting Mechanisms
We compare the behavior of voters under simultaneous and sequential voting rules when voting is costly and information is incomplete. In many political institutions, ranging from small committees to mass elections, voting is sequential, which allows some voters to know the choices of earlier voters. For a stylized model, we generate a variety of predictions about the relative efficiency and participation equity of these two systems, which we test…
Efficiency, Equity, and Timing of Voting Mechanisms
We compare the behavior of voters under simultaneous and sequential voting rules when voting is costly and information is incomplete. In many political institutions, ranging from small committees to mass elections, voting is sequential, which allows some voters to know the choices of earlier voters. For a stylized model, we generate a variety of predictions about the relative efficiency and participation equity of these two systems, which we test…
Communication and Voting in Multi‐party Elections: An Experimental Study
We investigate communication and costly voting in multi‐party election experiments. Turnout is consistently lower across electorate communication as compared with restricted communication within parties. Voters are more likely to choose the strategic voting option at the outset in restricted communication but more likely to start deliberation by stating their first preference when unrestricted. Distributions of earnings are more inequitable when …
Pork versus Policy: Experimental Evidence on Majoritarian Bargaining with Real-World Consequences
Pork-barrel politics has long attracted controversy; difficult to prove and vigorously denied by those accused of it, the practice is nevertheless defended by others who argue that pork facilitates compromise. We design a novel field-in-the-lab experiment to study how legislators bargain over pork and real-world policy. We first introduce a new incentivized method to measure subjects’ ideological peak preferences and attitudinal strength. Subject…
Run-off Elections in the Laboratory
We study experimentally the properties of the majority run-off system and compare them to those of plurality rule. Our focus is on Duverger’s famous prediction that the plurality rule leads to higher co-ordination of votes on a limited number of candidates than the majority run-off rule. We find strong co-ordination forces under both systems. However, as predicted by the theory, in some cases these forces are stronger under plurality. Despite the…
Negative campaigns, interpersonal trust, and prosocial behavior: The mediating effect of democratic experience
Political Economy Experiments: Introduction
Journal Article Political Economy Experiments: Introduction Get access Rebecca Morton Rebecca Morton New York University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 124, Issue 574, February 2014, Pages F129–F130, https://doi.org/10.1111/ecoj.12121 Published: 24 February 2014
Efficiency, Equity, and Timing of Voting Mechanisms
We compare the behavior of voters under simultaneous and sequential voting rules when voting is costly and information is incomplete. In many political institutions, ranging from small committees to mass elections, voting is sequential, which allows some voters to know the choices of earlier voters. For a stylized model, we generate a variety of predictions about the relative efficiency and participation equity of these two systems, which we test…
Communication and Voting in Multi‐party Elections: An Experimental Study
We investigate communication and costly voting in multi‐party election experiments. Turnout is consistently lower across electorate communication as compared with restricted communication within parties. Voters are more likely to choose the strategic voting option at the outset in restricted communication but more likely to start deliberation by stating their first preference when unrestricted. Distributions of earnings are more inequitable when …
Political Economy Experiments: Introduction
Journal Article Political Economy Experiments: Introduction Get access Rebecca Morton Rebecca Morton New York University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 124, Issue 574, February 2014, Pages F129–F130, https://doi.org/10.1111/ecoj.12121 Published: 24 February 2014
Social Groups and the Effectiveness of Protests
We present an informational theory of public protests, according to which public protests allow citizens to aggregate privately dispersed information and signal it to the policy maker. The model predicts that information sharing of signals within social groups can facilitate information aggregation when the social groups are sufficiently large even when it is not predicted with individual signals. We use experiments in the laboratory and on Amazo…
Negative campaigns, interpersonal trust, and prosocial behavior: The mediating effect of democratic experience
Run-off Elections in the Laboratory
We study experimentally the properties of the majority run-off system and compare them to those of plurality rule. Our focus is on Duverger’s famous prediction that the plurality rule leads to higher co-ordination of votes on a limited number of candidates than the majority run-off rule. We find strong co-ordination forces under both systems. However, as predicted by the theory, in some cases these forces are stronger under plurality. Despite the…
Pork versus Policy: Experimental Evidence on Majoritarian Bargaining with Real-World Consequences
Pork-barrel politics has long attracted controversy; difficult to prove and vigorously denied by those accused of it, the practice is nevertheless defended by others who argue that pork facilitates compromise. We design a novel field-in-the-lab experiment to study how legislators bargain over pork and real-world policy. We first introduce a new incentivized method to measure subjects’ ideological peak preferences and attitudinal strength. Subject…
Political science (7 works) · Economics (5 works) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (5 works) · Electoral Systems and Political Participation (4 works) · Game Theory and Voting Systems (4 works) · Law (4 works) · Politics (4 works) · Computer Science (3 works) · Law (3 works) · Voting (3 works)