Jeffrey Banks
Biographic Data
| ID | 3628310 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Jeffrey Banks |
| GIVEN NAMES | Jeffrey |
| FAMILY NAME | Banks |
| SIGNATURE | BANKS J |
| AFFILIATIONS | Film Independent |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 6 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 365 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 6 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1988 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
An Archaeological Survey of Polyaigos
This article presents an archaeological survey of the island of Polyaigos, undertaken in 2022 by the Small Cycladic Islands Project (SCIP). Since 2019, SCIP has surveyed 87 uninhabited islands in the southern Aegean, most of which are well under 1 km2 in size. The larger island of Polyaigos (18 km2) was included in the project in order to investigate the importance of island size (among other things) in long-term population and land-use dynamics.…
Positive Political Theory II
Debate
Monotonicity in Electoral Systems
Much of the literature concerning the relative merits of alternative electoral rules is centered around the extent to which particular rules select "representative" legislatures. And an important concern in evaluating the "representativeness" of an electoral rule is whether or not the rule responds positively to changes in individuals' preferences, that is, whether or not the rule is monotonic. By explicitly considering electoral rules in the con…
Stable Governments and the Allocation of Policy Portfolios
Different members of coalition governments typically have responsibility for different aspects, or dimensions, of policy. Such responsibilities are allocated as portfolios to government members. Given a distribution of such portfolios, final government policy is derived as the accumulation of individual members' decisions in regard to their respective responsibilities. We develop a portfolio allocation model of government formation and policy dec…
Elections, Coalitions, and Legislative Outcomes
Predictions of electoral behavior in a multiparty setting should be a function of the voters' beliefs about how parties will perform following an election. Similarly, party behavior in a legislature should be a function of electoral promises and rewards. We develop a multistage game-theoretic model of three-party competition under proportional representation. The final policy outcome of the game is generated by a noncooperative bargaining game be…
Elections, Coalitions, and Legislative Outcomes
Predictions of electoral behavior in a multiparty setting should be a function of the voters' beliefs about how parties will perform following an election. Similarly, party behavior in a legislature should be a function of electoral promises and rewards. We develop a multistage game-theoretic model of three-party competition under proportional representation. The final policy outcome of the game is generated by a noncooperative bargaining game be…
Stable Governments and the Allocation of Policy Portfolios
Different members of coalition governments typically have responsibility for different aspects, or dimensions, of policy. Such responsibilities are allocated as portfolios to government members. Given a distribution of such portfolios, final government policy is derived as the accumulation of individual members' decisions in regard to their respective responsibilities. We develop a portfolio allocation model of government formation and policy dec…
Monotonicity in Electoral Systems
Much of the literature concerning the relative merits of alternative electoral rules is centered around the extent to which particular rules select "representative" legislatures. And an important concern in evaluating the "representativeness" of an electoral rule is whether or not the rule responds positively to changes in individuals' preferences, that is, whether or not the rule is monotonic. By explicitly considering electoral rules in the con…
Debate
Elections, Coalitions, and Legislative Outcomes
Predictions of electoral behavior in a multiparty setting should be a function of the voters' beliefs about how parties will perform following an election. Similarly, party behavior in a legislature should be a function of electoral promises and rewards. We develop a multistage game-theoretic model of three-party competition under proportional representation. The final policy outcome of the game is generated by a noncooperative bargaining game be…
Stable Governments and the Allocation of Policy Portfolios
Different members of coalition governments typically have responsibility for different aspects, or dimensions, of policy. Such responsibilities are allocated as portfolios to government members. Given a distribution of such portfolios, final government policy is derived as the accumulation of individual members' decisions in regard to their respective responsibilities. We develop a portfolio allocation model of government formation and policy dec…
Monotonicity in Electoral Systems
Much of the literature concerning the relative merits of alternative electoral rules is centered around the extent to which particular rules select "representative" legislatures. And an important concern in evaluating the "representativeness" of an electoral rule is whether or not the rule responds positively to changes in individuals' preferences, that is, whether or not the rule is monotonic. By explicitly considering electoral rules in the con…
Debate
Positive Political Theory II
An Archaeological Survey of Polyaigos
This article presents an archaeological survey of the island of Polyaigos, undertaken in 2022 by the Small Cycladic Islands Project (SCIP). Since 2019, SCIP has surveyed 87 uninhabited islands in the southern Aegean, most of which are well under 1 km2 in size. The larger island of Polyaigos (18 km2) was included in the project in order to investigate the importance of island size (among other things) in long-term population and land-use dynamics.…
Political science (5 works) · Law (4 works) · Economics (3 works) · Game Theory and Voting Systems (3 works) · Law (3 works) · Legislature (3 works) · Politics (3 works) · Computer Science (2 works) · Electoral Systems and Political Participation (2 works) · Microeconomics (2 works)