Roy Gardner
Biographic Data
| ID | 3628458 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Roy Gardner |
| GIVEN NAMES | Roy |
| FAMILY NAME | Gardner |
| SIGNATURE | GARDNER R |
| AFFILIATIONS | Indiana University |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 22 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 546 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 21 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 1 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1975 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 8 |
Expanding Your Vocabulary
Topic discovery and integration are vital for maintaining vocabularies that categorize textual corpora. Automated approaches are often computationally expensive and lack domain-specific conceptual nuance; manual approaches are costly in terms of time and potential bias. To address this dilemma, we introduce the segments-as-topic (SAT) methodology, a four-stage process that combines automation and human expertise to assess candidate topics for voc…
Values and the Curriculum
The Evolution of the Maine Lobster V-Notch Practice
Acheson, J., and R. Gardner. 2011. The evolution of the Maine lobster V-notch practice: cooperation in a prisoner's dilemma game. Ecology and Society 16(1): 41. https://doi.org/10.5751/ES-04004-160141
Spatial Strategies and Territoriality in the Maine Lobster Industry
Although territoriality of one kind or another is found in every society, our understanding of the way territorial systems come into being remains undeveloped. In this article, we use game theory to understand the evolution of institutional arrangements in the Maine lobster fishery. Nash equilibrium of models explains the three stages observed in the local-scale informal system of the past century. These stages are the result of decisions to inva…
Faith Schools
Strategies, Conflict, and the Emergence of Territoriality
In this article, we use game theory to understand the emergence of various kinds of territorial arrangements in the Maine lobster fishery during the past century. Using the Nash equilibria of models of the fishery as our theoretical framework, we show that informal territorial arrangements in this fishery went through three sequential stages. These stages are the result of decisions by groups of lobster fishermen to defend fishing areas or invade…
The power and limitations of proportional cutbacks in common-pool resources
Collective Choice in the Commons
We analyse and empirically examine a multi‐level common‐pool resource (CPR) game consisting of a collective‐choice level game and an operational‐level game. In the collective‐choice game, participants anonymously propose allocation rules to be used in the operational game and vote anonymously on the proposed rules. Majority and unanimity rules are investigated. Our major finding is that both types of voting rules substantially increase efficiency…
Civic Education for the Next Century
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. As you have access to this content, a full PDF is available via the ‘Save PDF’ action button
Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources
While the tragedy of the commons is real, there are many instances where institutions develop to protect against overexploitation. In this important work, the authors explore empirically, theoretically, and experimentally the nature of such institutions and the way they come about.
Coping with Asymmetries in the Commons
Many analysts presume that the appropriators of a common-pool resource are trapped in a Hobbesian state of nature and cannot themselves create rules to counteract the perverse incentives they face in managing the resource. The logical consequence of this view is to recommend that an external authority-"the" government-take over the commons. But considerable empirical evidence from field and experimental settings holds that appropriators frequentl…
Probabilistic Destruction of Common-pool Resources
Journal Article Probabilistic Destruction of Common-pool Resources: Experimental Evidence Get access James M. Walker, James M. Walker Indiana University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Roy Gardner Roy Gardner Indiana University and USDA-ERS Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 102, Issue 414, 1 September 1992, Pages 1149–1161, https://doi.org…
Geography in the United Kingdom 1988-92
Geography in
Covenants with and without a Sword
Contemporary political theory often assumes that individuals cannot make credible commitments where substantial temptations exist to break them unless such commitments are enforced by anexternalagent. One such situation may occur in relation tocommon pool resources, which are natural or man-made resources whose yield is subtractable and whose exclusion is nontrivial (but not necessarily impossible). Examples include fisheries, forests, grazing ra…
Rules and games
The Nature of Common-Pool Resource Problems
This article presents a conceptual framework for theoretical and empirical analysis of the multiplicity of behavioral problems encountered in common-pool resources (CPRs). This framework is used to specify more clearly the strategic content of CPR dilemmas and to show their interaction. The framework shows how general theoretical constructs (e.g., Prisoner's Dilemma and coordination games) apply to these behavioral dilemmas. Finally, results from…
A theory of the spoils system
Variation of the electorate
The strategic inconsistency of Paretian liberalism
Liberal paradox, game equilibrium, and Gibbard optimum
The Borda game
Financial Conditions and the Time Path of Equipment Expenditures
T HE standard neoclassical investment analysis postulates a fixed timing relationship between changes in the determinants of the desired stock of capacity and actual investment responses these changes elicit.' There are, however, good reasons to suppose that no such fixed timing relationship exists. This paper seeks to explore one class of variables which could influence firms' decisions concerning the time shape of the investment response to a g…
Covenants with and without a Sword
Contemporary political theory often assumes that individuals cannot make credible commitments where substantial temptations exist to break them unless such commitments are enforced by anexternalagent. One such situation may occur in relation tocommon pool resources, which are natural or man-made resources whose yield is subtractable and whose exclusion is nontrivial (but not necessarily impossible). Examples include fisheries, forests, grazing ra…
Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources
While the tragedy of the commons is real, there are many instances where institutions develop to protect against overexploitation. In this important work, the authors explore empirically, theoretically, and experimentally the nature of such institutions and the way they come about.
The Nature of Common-Pool Resource Problems
This article presents a conceptual framework for theoretical and empirical analysis of the multiplicity of behavioral problems encountered in common-pool resources (CPRs). This framework is used to specify more clearly the strategic content of CPR dilemmas and to show their interaction. The framework shows how general theoretical constructs (e.g., Prisoner's Dilemma and coordination games) apply to these behavioral dilemmas. Finally, results from…
Coping with Asymmetries in the Commons
Many analysts presume that the appropriators of a common-pool resource are trapped in a Hobbesian state of nature and cannot themselves create rules to counteract the perverse incentives they face in managing the resource. The logical consequence of this view is to recommend that an external authority-"the" government-take over the commons. But considerable empirical evidence from field and experimental settings holds that appropriators frequentl…
Collective Choice in the Commons
We analyse and empirically examine a multi‐level common‐pool resource (CPR) game consisting of a collective‐choice level game and an operational‐level game. In the collective‐choice game, participants anonymously propose allocation rules to be used in the operational game and vote anonymously on the proposed rules. Majority and unanimity rules are investigated. Our major finding is that both types of voting rules substantially increase efficiency…
Strategies, Conflict, and the Emergence of Territoriality
In this article, we use game theory to understand the emergence of various kinds of territorial arrangements in the Maine lobster fishery during the past century. Using the Nash equilibria of models of the fishery as our theoretical framework, we show that informal territorial arrangements in this fishery went through three sequential stages. These stages are the result of decisions by groups of lobster fishermen to defend fishing areas or invade…
Rules and games
Probabilistic Destruction of Common-pool Resources
Journal Article Probabilistic Destruction of Common-pool Resources: Experimental Evidence Get access James M. Walker, James M. Walker Indiana University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Roy Gardner Roy Gardner Indiana University and USDA-ERS Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 102, Issue 414, 1 September 1992, Pages 1149–1161, https://doi.org…
The power and limitations of proportional cutbacks in common-pool resources
Geography in the United Kingdom 1988-92
Geography in
Spatial Strategies and Territoriality in the Maine Lobster Industry
Although territoriality of one kind or another is found in every society, our understanding of the way territorial systems come into being remains undeveloped. In this article, we use game theory to understand the evolution of institutional arrangements in the Maine lobster fishery. Nash equilibrium of models explains the three stages observed in the local-scale informal system of the past century. These stages are the result of decisions to inva…
The Evolution of the Maine Lobster V-Notch Practice
Acheson, J., and R. Gardner. 2011. The evolution of the Maine lobster V-notch practice: cooperation in a prisoner's dilemma game. Ecology and Society 16(1): 41. https://doi.org/10.5751/ES-04004-160141
Civic Education for the Next Century
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. As you have access to this content, a full PDF is available via the ‘Save PDF’ action button
The strategic inconsistency of Paretian liberalism
Financial Conditions and the Time Path of Equipment Expenditures
T HE standard neoclassical investment analysis postulates a fixed timing relationship between changes in the determinants of the desired stock of capacity and actual investment responses these changes elicit.' There are, however, good reasons to suppose that no such fixed timing relationship exists. This paper seeks to explore one class of variables which could influence firms' decisions concerning the time shape of the investment response to a g…
The Borda game
The strategic inconsistency of Paretian liberalism
Liberal paradox, game equilibrium, and Gibbard optimum
Variation of the electorate
A theory of the spoils system
The Nature of Common-Pool Resource Problems
This article presents a conceptual framework for theoretical and empirical analysis of the multiplicity of behavioral problems encountered in common-pool resources (CPRs). This framework is used to specify more clearly the strategic content of CPR dilemmas and to show their interaction. The framework shows how general theoretical constructs (e.g., Prisoner's Dilemma and coordination games) apply to these behavioral dilemmas. Finally, results from…
Rules and games
Probabilistic Destruction of Common-pool Resources
Journal Article Probabilistic Destruction of Common-pool Resources: Experimental Evidence Get access James M. Walker, James M. Walker Indiana University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Roy Gardner Roy Gardner Indiana University and USDA-ERS Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Economic Journal, Volume 102, Issue 414, 1 September 1992, Pages 1149–1161, https://doi.org…
Geography in the United Kingdom 1988-92
Geography in
Covenants with and without a Sword
Contemporary political theory often assumes that individuals cannot make credible commitments where substantial temptations exist to break them unless such commitments are enforced by anexternalagent. One such situation may occur in relation tocommon pool resources, which are natural or man-made resources whose yield is subtractable and whose exclusion is nontrivial (but not necessarily impossible). Examples include fisheries, forests, grazing ra…
Coping with Asymmetries in the Commons
Many analysts presume that the appropriators of a common-pool resource are trapped in a Hobbesian state of nature and cannot themselves create rules to counteract the perverse incentives they face in managing the resource. The logical consequence of this view is to recommend that an external authority-"the" government-take over the commons. But considerable empirical evidence from field and experimental settings holds that appropriators frequentl…
Rules, Games, and Common-Pool Resources
While the tragedy of the commons is real, there are many instances where institutions develop to protect against overexploitation. In this important work, the authors explore empirically, theoretically, and experimentally the nature of such institutions and the way they come about.
Civic Education for the Next Century
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. As you have access to this content, a full PDF is available via the ‘Save PDF’ action button
The power and limitations of proportional cutbacks in common-pool resources
Collective Choice in the Commons
We analyse and empirically examine a multi‐level common‐pool resource (CPR) game consisting of a collective‐choice level game and an operational‐level game. In the collective‐choice game, participants anonymously propose allocation rules to be used in the operational game and vote anonymously on the proposed rules. Majority and unanimity rules are investigated. Our major finding is that both types of voting rules substantially increase efficiency…
Faith Schools
Strategies, Conflict, and the Emergence of Territoriality
In this article, we use game theory to understand the emergence of various kinds of territorial arrangements in the Maine lobster fishery during the past century. Using the Nash equilibria of models of the fishery as our theoretical framework, we show that informal territorial arrangements in this fishery went through three sequential stages. These stages are the result of decisions by groups of lobster fishermen to defend fishing areas or invade…
Spatial Strategies and Territoriality in the Maine Lobster Industry
Although territoriality of one kind or another is found in every society, our understanding of the way territorial systems come into being remains undeveloped. In this article, we use game theory to understand the evolution of institutional arrangements in the Maine lobster fishery. Nash equilibrium of models explains the three stages observed in the local-scale informal system of the past century. These stages are the result of decisions to inva…
The Evolution of the Maine Lobster V-Notch Practice
Acheson, J., and R. Gardner. 2011. The evolution of the Maine lobster V-notch practice: cooperation in a prisoner's dilemma game. Ecology and Society 16(1): 41. https://doi.org/10.5751/ES-04004-160141
Values and the Curriculum
Expanding Your Vocabulary
Topic discovery and integration are vital for maintaining vocabularies that categorize textual corpora. Automated approaches are often computationally expensive and lack domain-specific conceptual nuance; manual approaches are costly in terms of time and potential bias. To address this dilemma, we introduce the segments-as-topic (SAT) methodology, a four-stage process that combines automation and human expertise to assess candidate topics for voc…
Economics (16 works) · Microeconomics (11 works) · Political science (10 works) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (8 works) · Law (8 works) · Computer Science (7 works) · Sociology (7 works) · Game theory (6 works) · Game Theory and Voting Systems (6 works) · Mathematical economics (6 works)