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Jeffrey S Hill

Biographic Data

ID3628465
NAMEJeffrey S Hill
GIVEN NAMESJeffrey S
FAMILY NAMEHill
SIGNATUREHILL J S
AFFILIATIONSNortheastern Illinois University
VERIFIEDNo
TOTAL WORKS7
TOTAL CITATIONS106
AUTHOR COUNT7
EDITOR COUNT0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR1985
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2010
H-INDEX6
  • Stump Speeches and Road Trips: The Impact of State Campaign Appearances in Presidential Elections

    Open Access•Jeffrey S Hill, Elaine Rodriquez et al.•ARTICLE•PS Political Science & Politics•2010•Cited by: 6•References: 21

    Travel, stump speeches, and pressing-the-flesh make up a large part of any presidential electoral campaign. Obviously, candidates feel that their appearances are important, as they make hundreds of appearances between Labor Day and Election Day. But are they right? Well over 100 million people cast ballots in November, but only the tiniest fraction of voters meets or catches a glimpse of either of the candidates. Do candidate appearances and cont…

  • Implementation and the Irony of Delegation: The Politics of Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal

    Jeffrey S Hill, Carol S Weissert•ARTICLE•The Journal of Politics•1995•Cited by: 16•References: 14

    This analysis identifies a potential problem associated with the delegation of authority from Congress to an administrative agent. The existence of an effective system of oversight and control is an important part of any decision to delegate authority. However, we show that this system of oversight and control also creates the opportunity for Congress to alter the directives given to the agent. Ironically, this can create an incentive for the age…

  • Low-level Radioactive Waste Compacts: Lessons Learned from Theory and Practice

    Carol S Weissert, Jeffrey S Hill•ARTICLE•Publius The Journal of Federalism•1994

    The interstate compact as a policy tool has a long history of use in the United States. Yet some observers feel that interstate compacts have never lived up to their potential. Nevertheless, in 1980, the compact was chosen as the policy instrument to solve one of the thorniest environmental policy issues of the decade: the siting of low-level radioactive waste (LLRW) disposal facilities. Drawing from research on interstate compacts and on allianc…

  • Deference or Preference: Explaining Senate Confirmation of Presidential Nominees to Administrative Agencies

    Open Access•Thomas H Hammond, Jeffrey S Hill•ARTICLE•Journal of Theoretical Politics•1993•Cited by: 32•References: 14

    Presidential nominees for executive office are almost always confirmed by the Senate. There is considerable disagreement in the literature about what accounts for this Senate behavior. Some scholars argue that the high degree of presidential success reflects a norm of senatorial deference to presidential wishes. Other scholars argue that while senators may say that it is desirable for the Senate to defer to the president's choices for administrat…

  • The Decline of Private Bills: Resource Allocation, Credit Claiming, and the Decision to Delegate

    Jeffrey S Hill, Kenneth C Williams•ARTICLE•American Journal of Political…•1993•Cited by: 13•References: 6

    In this analysis, we examine how resources and credit-claiming opportunities influence congressional decisions to delegate authority. We review the potential for conflict between institutional (or collective) and individual incentives for delegation, suggesting that this conflict inhibited Congress's attempts to manage the work load created by private claims legislation. Specifically, until an increase in resources created alternative opportuniti…

  • Why so much stability? The impact of agency determined stability

    Open Access•Jeffrey S Hill•ARTICLE•Public Choice•1985•Cited by: 10•References: 6

  • The Impact of Multimember Districts on Party Representation in U. S. State Legislatures

    Open Access•Richard G Niemi, Jeffrey S Hill et al.•ARTICLE•Legislative Studies Quarterly•1985•Cited by: 29•References: 1

    Though theory and empirical evidence suggest that minorities are less likely to be represented under multimember districting plans than under single-member plans, there are reasons to wonder whether this logic and evidence are applicable to the political party case. Evidence from multiple tests shows that, as a general proposition, minority party strength in state legislatures is not diluted by multimember districts. Reasons include concentration…

  • Deference or Preference: Explaining Senate Confirmation of Presidential Nominees to Administrative Agencies

    Open Access•Thomas H Hammond, Jeffrey S Hill•ARTICLE•Journal of Theoretical Politics•1993•Cited by: 32•References: 14

    Presidential nominees for executive office are almost always confirmed by the Senate. There is considerable disagreement in the literature about what accounts for this Senate behavior. Some scholars argue that the high degree of presidential success reflects a norm of senatorial deference to presidential wishes. Other scholars argue that while senators may say that it is desirable for the Senate to defer to the president's choices for administrat…

  • The Impact of Multimember Districts on Party Representation in U. S. State Legislatures

    Open Access•Richard G Niemi, Jeffrey S Hill et al.•ARTICLE•Legislative Studies Quarterly•1985•Cited by: 29•References: 1

    Though theory and empirical evidence suggest that minorities are less likely to be represented under multimember districting plans than under single-member plans, there are reasons to wonder whether this logic and evidence are applicable to the political party case. Evidence from multiple tests shows that, as a general proposition, minority party strength in state legislatures is not diluted by multimember districts. Reasons include concentration…

  • Implementation and the Irony of Delegation: The Politics of Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal

    Jeffrey S Hill, Carol S Weissert•ARTICLE•The Journal of Politics•1995•Cited by: 16•References: 14

    This analysis identifies a potential problem associated with the delegation of authority from Congress to an administrative agent. The existence of an effective system of oversight and control is an important part of any decision to delegate authority. However, we show that this system of oversight and control also creates the opportunity for Congress to alter the directives given to the agent. Ironically, this can create an incentive for the age…

  • The Decline of Private Bills: Resource Allocation, Credit Claiming, and the Decision to Delegate

    Jeffrey S Hill, Kenneth C Williams•ARTICLE•American Journal of Political…•1993•Cited by: 13•References: 6

    In this analysis, we examine how resources and credit-claiming opportunities influence congressional decisions to delegate authority. We review the potential for conflict between institutional (or collective) and individual incentives for delegation, suggesting that this conflict inhibited Congress's attempts to manage the work load created by private claims legislation. Specifically, until an increase in resources created alternative opportuniti…

  • Why so much stability? The impact of agency determined stability

    Open Access•Jeffrey S Hill•ARTICLE•Public Choice•1985•Cited by: 10•References: 6

  • Stump Speeches and Road Trips: The Impact of State Campaign Appearances in Presidential Elections

    Open Access•Jeffrey S Hill, Elaine Rodriquez et al.•ARTICLE•PS Political Science & Politics•2010•Cited by: 6•References: 21

    Travel, stump speeches, and pressing-the-flesh make up a large part of any presidential electoral campaign. Obviously, candidates feel that their appearances are important, as they make hundreds of appearances between Labor Day and Election Day. But are they right? Well over 100 million people cast ballots in November, but only the tiniest fraction of voters meets or catches a glimpse of either of the candidates. Do candidate appearances and cont…

  • Why so much stability? The impact of agency determined stability

    Open Access•Jeffrey S Hill•ARTICLE•Public Choice•1985•Cited by: 10•References: 6

  • The Impact of Multimember Districts on Party Representation in U. S. State Legislatures

    Open Access•Richard G Niemi, Jeffrey S Hill et al.•ARTICLE•Legislative Studies Quarterly•1985•Cited by: 29•References: 1

    Though theory and empirical evidence suggest that minorities are less likely to be represented under multimember districting plans than under single-member plans, there are reasons to wonder whether this logic and evidence are applicable to the political party case. Evidence from multiple tests shows that, as a general proposition, minority party strength in state legislatures is not diluted by multimember districts. Reasons include concentration…

  • Deference or Preference: Explaining Senate Confirmation of Presidential Nominees to Administrative Agencies

    Open Access•Thomas H Hammond, Jeffrey S Hill•ARTICLE•Journal of Theoretical Politics•1993•Cited by: 32•References: 14

    Presidential nominees for executive office are almost always confirmed by the Senate. There is considerable disagreement in the literature about what accounts for this Senate behavior. Some scholars argue that the high degree of presidential success reflects a norm of senatorial deference to presidential wishes. Other scholars argue that while senators may say that it is desirable for the Senate to defer to the president's choices for administrat…

  • The Decline of Private Bills: Resource Allocation, Credit Claiming, and the Decision to Delegate

    Jeffrey S Hill, Kenneth C Williams•ARTICLE•American Journal of Political…•1993•Cited by: 13•References: 6

    In this analysis, we examine how resources and credit-claiming opportunities influence congressional decisions to delegate authority. We review the potential for conflict between institutional (or collective) and individual incentives for delegation, suggesting that this conflict inhibited Congress's attempts to manage the work load created by private claims legislation. Specifically, until an increase in resources created alternative opportuniti…

  • Low-level Radioactive Waste Compacts: Lessons Learned from Theory and Practice

    Carol S Weissert, Jeffrey S Hill•ARTICLE•Publius The Journal of Federalism•1994

    The interstate compact as a policy tool has a long history of use in the United States. Yet some observers feel that interstate compacts have never lived up to their potential. Nevertheless, in 1980, the compact was chosen as the policy instrument to solve one of the thorniest environmental policy issues of the decade: the siting of low-level radioactive waste (LLRW) disposal facilities. Drawing from research on interstate compacts and on allianc…

  • Implementation and the Irony of Delegation: The Politics of Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal

    Jeffrey S Hill, Carol S Weissert•ARTICLE•The Journal of Politics•1995•Cited by: 16•References: 14

    This analysis identifies a potential problem associated with the delegation of authority from Congress to an administrative agent. The existence of an effective system of oversight and control is an important part of any decision to delegate authority. However, we show that this system of oversight and control also creates the opportunity for Congress to alter the directives given to the agent. Ironically, this can create an incentive for the age…

  • Stump Speeches and Road Trips: The Impact of State Campaign Appearances in Presidential Elections

    Open Access•Jeffrey S Hill, Elaine Rodriquez et al.•ARTICLE•PS Political Science & Politics•2010•Cited by: 6•References: 21

    Travel, stump speeches, and pressing-the-flesh make up a large part of any presidential electoral campaign. Obviously, candidates feel that their appearances are important, as they make hundreds of appearances between Labor Day and Election Day. But are they right? Well over 100 million people cast ballots in November, but only the tiniest fraction of voters meets or catches a glimpse of either of the candidates. Do candidate appearances and cont…

Electoral Systems and Political Participation (6 works) · Law (6 works) · Political science (6 works) · Business (5 works) · Law (5 works) · Public Administration (5 works) · Public Administration (5 works) · Economics (4 works) · Law and economics (4 works) · Politics (4 works)

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