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Kenneth C Williams

Biographic Data

ID3628664
NAMEKenneth C Williams
GIVEN NAMESKenneth C
FAMILY NAMEWilliams
SIGNATUREWILLIAMS K C
AFFILIATIONSMichigan State University
VERIFIEDNo
TOTAL WORKS9
TOTAL CITATIONS76
AUTHOR COUNT9
EDITOR COUNT0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR1958
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2011
H-INDEX5
  • The Effects of Identities, Incentives, and Information on Voting

    Anna Bassi, Anna Maria Bassi et al.•ARTICLE•The Journal of Politics•2011•Cited by: 18•References: 31

    We report on majority voting experiments where subjects are randomly assigned identities in common with a candidate. However, subjects sometimes receive a financial incentive from voting contrary to their identity. We vary the size of the incentive as well as information voters have about the advantage of the incentive. We find that subjects are influenced by their assigned identities, and the effect is stronger when voters have less information.…

  • Experimental Political Science and the Study of Causality: From Nature to the Lab

    Open Access•Rebecca B Morton, Kenneth C Williams•BOOK•Experimental Political Science…•2010

    Increasingly, political scientists use the term 'experiment' or 'experimental' to describe their empirical research. One of the primary reasons for doing so is the advantage of experiments in establishing causal inferences. In this book, Rebecca B. Morton and Kenneth C. Williams discuss in detail how experiments and experimental reasoning with observational data can help researchers determine causality. They explore how control and random assignm…

  • A Principal-Agent Model of Elections with Novice Incumbents: Some Experimental Results

    Open Access•Sugato Dasgupta, Kenneth C Williams•ARTICLE•Journal of Theoretical Politics•2002•Cited by: 2•References: 32

    The efficient aggregation of information is a prerequisite for the operation of a democratic system. In order for political office-holders to act responsively so that policy outcomes reflect public sentiments, sufficient levels of information about their actions must be aggregated within the electorate. This is fundamental since very few citizens will be aware of the office-holder’s actions. One way in which information is aggregated is through p…

  • Information Asymmetries and Simultaneous versus Sequential Voting

    Open Access•Rebecca B Morton, Kenneth C Williams•ARTICLE•American Political Science Review•1999•Cited by: 22•References: 8

    Sequential voting takes place when some voters make choices with knowledge of earlier decisions in the same election. Historically, voting in U.S. presidential primaries is sequential, but recent primaries have been "front-loaded" into the early weeks of the season. We explore sequential voting in drawn-out primaries and simultaneous voting in front-loaded ones theoretically and use laboratory elections to examine our predictions empirically. We …

  • Spatial elections with endorsements and uninformed voters: Some laboratory experiments

    Open Access•Kenneth C Williams•ARTICLE•Public Choice•1994•Cited by: 4•References: 3

  • Sequential Elections and Retrospective Voting: Some Laboratory Experiments

    Open Access•Kenneth C Williams•ARTICLE•Journal of Theoretical Politics•1994•Cited by: 5•References: 7

    Retrospective considerations do influence vote choice. But the manner in which voters incorporate retrospective evaluations is still an empirical question. This essay compares two voting rules: a traditional retrospective rule and a retrospective-prospective rule. The rules are differentiated based on the information costs associated with each. It is assumed that the traditional retrospective rule is less costly since voters need only make evalua…

  • The Decline of Private Bills: Resource Allocation, Credit Claiming, and the Decision to Delegate

    Jeffrey S Hill, Kenneth C Williams•ARTICLE•American Journal of Political…•1993•Cited by: 13•References: 6

    In this analysis, we examine how resources and credit-claiming opportunities influence congressional decisions to delegate authority. We review the potential for conflict between institutional (or collective) and individual incentives for delegation, suggesting that this conflict inhibited Congress's attempts to manage the work load created by private claims legislation. Specifically, until an increase in resources created alternative opportuniti…

  • Retrospective voting: An experimental study

    Open Access•Kenneth E Collier, Richard D Mckelvey et al.•ARTICLE•Public Choice•1987•Cited by: 12•References: 4

  • Predicting Success in Beginning High School Algebra

    Open Access•Robert J McQueen, ROBERT MCQUEEN et al.•ARTICLE•Psychological Reports•1958

    The study to be reported here was undertaken during the 1957-1958 academic year at Sparks High School, Sparks, Nevada, and had as its aim the identification of variables which would predict success or failure in first year algebra. At the start of the school year there were a number of educational measurements made for each ninth grade student. Three of the measurements were scores on standardized tests: (a) The Otis Quick Scoring Mental Ability …

  • Information Asymmetries and Simultaneous versus Sequential Voting

    Open Access•Rebecca B Morton, Kenneth C Williams•ARTICLE•American Political Science Review•1999•Cited by: 22•References: 8

    Sequential voting takes place when some voters make choices with knowledge of earlier decisions in the same election. Historically, voting in U.S. presidential primaries is sequential, but recent primaries have been "front-loaded" into the early weeks of the season. We explore sequential voting in drawn-out primaries and simultaneous voting in front-loaded ones theoretically and use laboratory elections to examine our predictions empirically. We …

  • The Effects of Identities, Incentives, and Information on Voting

    Anna Bassi, Anna Maria Bassi et al.•ARTICLE•The Journal of Politics•2011•Cited by: 18•References: 31

    We report on majority voting experiments where subjects are randomly assigned identities in common with a candidate. However, subjects sometimes receive a financial incentive from voting contrary to their identity. We vary the size of the incentive as well as information voters have about the advantage of the incentive. We find that subjects are influenced by their assigned identities, and the effect is stronger when voters have less information.…

  • The Decline of Private Bills: Resource Allocation, Credit Claiming, and the Decision to Delegate

    Jeffrey S Hill, Kenneth C Williams•ARTICLE•American Journal of Political…•1993•Cited by: 13•References: 6

    In this analysis, we examine how resources and credit-claiming opportunities influence congressional decisions to delegate authority. We review the potential for conflict between institutional (or collective) and individual incentives for delegation, suggesting that this conflict inhibited Congress's attempts to manage the work load created by private claims legislation. Specifically, until an increase in resources created alternative opportuniti…

  • Retrospective voting: An experimental study

    Open Access•Kenneth E Collier, Richard D Mckelvey et al.•ARTICLE•Public Choice•1987•Cited by: 12•References: 4

  • Sequential Elections and Retrospective Voting: Some Laboratory Experiments

    Open Access•Kenneth C Williams•ARTICLE•Journal of Theoretical Politics•1994•Cited by: 5•References: 7

    Retrospective considerations do influence vote choice. But the manner in which voters incorporate retrospective evaluations is still an empirical question. This essay compares two voting rules: a traditional retrospective rule and a retrospective-prospective rule. The rules are differentiated based on the information costs associated with each. It is assumed that the traditional retrospective rule is less costly since voters need only make evalua…

  • Spatial elections with endorsements and uninformed voters: Some laboratory experiments

    Open Access•Kenneth C Williams•ARTICLE•Public Choice•1994•Cited by: 4•References: 3

  • A Principal-Agent Model of Elections with Novice Incumbents: Some Experimental Results

    Open Access•Sugato Dasgupta, Kenneth C Williams•ARTICLE•Journal of Theoretical Politics•2002•Cited by: 2•References: 32

    The efficient aggregation of information is a prerequisite for the operation of a democratic system. In order for political office-holders to act responsively so that policy outcomes reflect public sentiments, sufficient levels of information about their actions must be aggregated within the electorate. This is fundamental since very few citizens will be aware of the office-holder’s actions. One way in which information is aggregated is through p…

  • Predicting Success in Beginning High School Algebra

    Open Access•Robert J McQueen, ROBERT MCQUEEN et al.•ARTICLE•Psychological Reports•1958

    The study to be reported here was undertaken during the 1957-1958 academic year at Sparks High School, Sparks, Nevada, and had as its aim the identification of variables which would predict success or failure in first year algebra. At the start of the school year there were a number of educational measurements made for each ninth grade student. Three of the measurements were scores on standardized tests: (a) The Otis Quick Scoring Mental Ability …

  • Retrospective voting: An experimental study

    Open Access•Kenneth E Collier, Richard D Mckelvey et al.•ARTICLE•Public Choice•1987•Cited by: 12•References: 4

  • The Decline of Private Bills: Resource Allocation, Credit Claiming, and the Decision to Delegate

    Jeffrey S Hill, Kenneth C Williams•ARTICLE•American Journal of Political…•1993•Cited by: 13•References: 6

    In this analysis, we examine how resources and credit-claiming opportunities influence congressional decisions to delegate authority. We review the potential for conflict between institutional (or collective) and individual incentives for delegation, suggesting that this conflict inhibited Congress's attempts to manage the work load created by private claims legislation. Specifically, until an increase in resources created alternative opportuniti…

  • Spatial elections with endorsements and uninformed voters: Some laboratory experiments

    Open Access•Kenneth C Williams•ARTICLE•Public Choice•1994•Cited by: 4•References: 3

  • Sequential Elections and Retrospective Voting: Some Laboratory Experiments

    Open Access•Kenneth C Williams•ARTICLE•Journal of Theoretical Politics•1994•Cited by: 5•References: 7

    Retrospective considerations do influence vote choice. But the manner in which voters incorporate retrospective evaluations is still an empirical question. This essay compares two voting rules: a traditional retrospective rule and a retrospective-prospective rule. The rules are differentiated based on the information costs associated with each. It is assumed that the traditional retrospective rule is less costly since voters need only make evalua…

  • Information Asymmetries and Simultaneous versus Sequential Voting

    Open Access•Rebecca B Morton, Kenneth C Williams•ARTICLE•American Political Science Review•1999•Cited by: 22•References: 8

    Sequential voting takes place when some voters make choices with knowledge of earlier decisions in the same election. Historically, voting in U.S. presidential primaries is sequential, but recent primaries have been "front-loaded" into the early weeks of the season. We explore sequential voting in drawn-out primaries and simultaneous voting in front-loaded ones theoretically and use laboratory elections to examine our predictions empirically. We …

  • A Principal-Agent Model of Elections with Novice Incumbents: Some Experimental Results

    Open Access•Sugato Dasgupta, Kenneth C Williams•ARTICLE•Journal of Theoretical Politics•2002•Cited by: 2•References: 32

    The efficient aggregation of information is a prerequisite for the operation of a democratic system. In order for political office-holders to act responsively so that policy outcomes reflect public sentiments, sufficient levels of information about their actions must be aggregated within the electorate. This is fundamental since very few citizens will be aware of the office-holder’s actions. One way in which information is aggregated is through p…

  • Experimental Political Science and the Study of Causality: From Nature to the Lab

    Open Access•Rebecca B Morton, Kenneth C Williams•BOOK•Experimental Political Science…•2010

    Increasingly, political scientists use the term 'experiment' or 'experimental' to describe their empirical research. One of the primary reasons for doing so is the advantage of experiments in establishing causal inferences. In this book, Rebecca B. Morton and Kenneth C. Williams discuss in detail how experiments and experimental reasoning with observational data can help researchers determine causality. They explore how control and random assignm…

  • The Effects of Identities, Incentives, and Information on Voting

    Anna Bassi, Anna Maria Bassi et al.•ARTICLE•The Journal of Politics•2011•Cited by: 18•References: 31

    We report on majority voting experiments where subjects are randomly assigned identities in common with a candidate. However, subjects sometimes receive a financial incentive from voting contrary to their identity. We vary the size of the incentive as well as information voters have about the advantage of the incentive. We find that subjects are influenced by their assigned identities, and the effect is stronger when voters have less information.…

Political science (8 works) · Electoral Systems and Political Participation (7 works) · Law (7 works) · Economics (6 works) · Law (6 works) · Politics (6 works) · Computer Science (5 works) · Game Theory and Voting Systems (5 works) · Mathematics (5 works) · Microeconomics (5 works)

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