Serge Taylor
Biographic Data
| ID | 3629279 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Serge Taylor |
| GIVEN NAMES | Serge |
| FAMILY NAME | Taylor |
| SIGNATURE | TAYLOR S |
| AFFILIATIONS | Carnegie Mellon University |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 4 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 155 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 4 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1985 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1987 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
Politicians, Bureaucrats, and Asymmetric Information
In the analysis of the budgetary game between politicians and bureaucrats, the emphasis has been on the politicians' uncertainties about bureaucratic performance and the ensuing advantages enjoyed by nonelected officials. Such a perspective neglects the uncertainties that bureaucrats must confront. This paper models these dual uncertainties-superiors about subordinates, subordinates about superiors-where each party uses its informational advantag…
Stacking the Deck
Empirical studies suggest that mission-oriented bureaucrats bias their design of program alternatives to increase the odds that a superior will choose the kind of program the officials want. However, political executives may anticipate this manipulation and try to reassert control. These struggles are examined in three models. In Model 1 a senior bureaucrat is interested only in missions; the bureaucrat's political superior controls him or her by…
Making Bureaucracies Think
Bureaucratic Expertise versus Legislative Authority
The empirical literature on the control of bureaus notes that politicians have difficulty observing bureaucratic output, but this insight is rarely represented informal models. To analyze how bureaus use this uncertainty strategically, we develop a model of expertise-based agenda control, building on the Niskanen (1971) and Miller and Moe (1983) tradition. We show that under some plausible conditions, bureaus will underestimate the benefits, and …
Politicians, Bureaucrats, and Asymmetric Information
In the analysis of the budgetary game between politicians and bureaucrats, the emphasis has been on the politicians' uncertainties about bureaucratic performance and the ensuing advantages enjoyed by nonelected officials. Such a perspective neglects the uncertainties that bureaucrats must confront. This paper models these dual uncertainties-superiors about subordinates, subordinates about superiors-where each party uses its informational advantag…
Bureaucratic Expertise versus Legislative Authority
The empirical literature on the control of bureaus notes that politicians have difficulty observing bureaucratic output, but this insight is rarely represented informal models. To analyze how bureaus use this uncertainty strategically, we develop a model of expertise-based agenda control, building on the Niskanen (1971) and Miller and Moe (1983) tradition. We show that under some plausible conditions, bureaus will underestimate the benefits, and …
Stacking the Deck
Empirical studies suggest that mission-oriented bureaucrats bias their design of program alternatives to increase the odds that a superior will choose the kind of program the officials want. However, political executives may anticipate this manipulation and try to reassert control. These struggles are examined in three models. In Model 1 a senior bureaucrat is interested only in missions; the bureaucrat's political superior controls him or her by…
Bureaucratic Expertise versus Legislative Authority
The empirical literature on the control of bureaus notes that politicians have difficulty observing bureaucratic output, but this insight is rarely represented informal models. To analyze how bureaus use this uncertainty strategically, we develop a model of expertise-based agenda control, building on the Niskanen (1971) and Miller and Moe (1983) tradition. We show that under some plausible conditions, bureaus will underestimate the benefits, and …
Making Bureaucracies Think
Politicians, Bureaucrats, and Asymmetric Information
In the analysis of the budgetary game between politicians and bureaucrats, the emphasis has been on the politicians' uncertainties about bureaucratic performance and the ensuing advantages enjoyed by nonelected officials. Such a perspective neglects the uncertainties that bureaucrats must confront. This paper models these dual uncertainties-superiors about subordinates, subordinates about superiors-where each party uses its informational advantag…
Stacking the Deck
Empirical studies suggest that mission-oriented bureaucrats bias their design of program alternatives to increase the odds that a superior will choose the kind of program the officials want. However, political executives may anticipate this manipulation and try to reassert control. These struggles are examined in three models. In Model 1 a senior bureaucrat is interested only in missions; the bureaucrat's political superior controls him or her by…
Bureaucracy (4 works) · Law (4 works) · Law (4 works) · Political science (4 works) · Politics (4 works) · Economics (3 works) · Local Government Finance and Decentralization (3 works) · Public Administration (3 works) · Public Administration (3 works) · Public economics (3 works)