Björn Lundgren
Biographic Data
| ID | 3650708 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Björn Lundgren |
| GIVEN NAMES | Björn |
| FAMILY NAME | Lundgren |
| SIGNATURE | LUNDGREN B |
| AFFILIATIONS | Stockholm University |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-5830-3432 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 33 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 22 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 33 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2015 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Can Deepfakes Violate an Individual’s Moral Right to Privacy
So-called “deepfakes” (i.e., highly believable but fabricated media) are infamous for their potential political application. However, they can also contain false information about individuals, which raises the question whether deepfakes can violate a moral right to privacy. This question is directly related to the often ignored but still highly contentious issue of whether the spreading or use of false or fake information can violate a moral righ…
Inquiry, the Alignment Challenge, the Risk View, and the Right to Privacy
In the privacy literature, epistemic analyses of privacy are quite popular. However, epistemic accounts of the right to privacy face substantial challenges. Epistemic analyses of privacy also suffer from the prima facie puzzling alignment challenge (according to which there are cases when an individual’s right to privacy is violated even if their privacy is unaffected). A recent proposal by Lauritz Aastrup Munch provides a solution to these issue…
Defining socially disruptive technologies and reframing the ethical challenges they pose
Socially Disruptive Technologies (SDTs) loom large in public debate, yet scholarly discourse on the ethical implications of social disruption is still in its infancy. This article makes two contributions to advance this discourse. First, we propose and defend a new definition of SDTs that allows for classification of those technologies that warrant further ethical analysis, specifically in virtue of their socially disruptive nature (among the exa…
Can the Normic de minimis Expected Utility Theory save the de minimis Principle
Recently, Martin Smith defended a view he called the “normic de minimis expected utility theory”. The basic idea is to integrate a ‘normic’ version of the de minimis principle into an expected utility-based decision theoretical framework. According to the de minimis principle some risks are so small (falling below a threshold) that they can be ignored. While this threshold standardly is defined in terms of some probability, the normic conception …
How Social Should AI Be
Social AI systems have the potential to outperform humans in certain ways—raising the question of whether we should have AI systems (including robots) replace humans in the labor market (i.e., not only in non-social contexts). This article will first put forward three sets of pro tanto reasons why social AI systems should not be implemented, then it will consider three possible situations in which these reasons may be overridden, arguing that the…
God and the Possibility of a Moral Right to Privacy
In their Unfit for the Future , Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu argued that there is no moral right to privacy, which resulted in a string of papers. This paper addresses their most recent contribution, arguing that—contrary to their claims—there is no conflict between God and a moral right to privacy
Hobbes' Ship of Theseus: On the Limits of Surviving a Gradual Replacement of Parts
In the ancient example of the Ship of Theseus, a ship is restored, having all its parts replaced. Ancient philosophers in Athens wondered if the restored ship was identical to the original ship. About 2000 years later, Thomas Hobbes introduced a twist; after all of the parts of the original ship had been replaced, what if the original parts of the ship had been kept and were now reassembled into a ship? If so, which ship would be identical to the…
The Risk of Surveillance Capitalism
Open Access funding enabled and organized by Projekt DEAL
Undisruptable or stable concepts: Can we design concepts that can avoid conceptual disruption, normative critique, and counterexamples
It has been argued that our concepts can be disrupted or challenged by technology or normative concerns, which raises the question of whether we can create, design, engineer, or define more robust concepts that avoid counterexamples and conceptual challenges that can lead to conceptual disruption. In this paper, it is argued that we can. This argument is presented through a case study of a definition in the technological domain
A new standard for accident simulations for self-driving vehicles: Can we use Waymo’s results from accident simulations
Recent simulations by Scanlon et al. showed seemingly spectacular results for the Waymo self-driving vehicle in simulations of real accident situations. In this paper, it is argued that the selection criteria for accident situations must be modified in accordance with the relevant policy alternatives. While Scanlon et al. compare Waymo with old human-driven vehicles, it is argued here that the relevant policy question is whether we ought to use s…
There is No Scarcity Problem
Recently, John Danaher and Sven Nyholm argued that partial “digital duplicates” of real persons (simulations and imitations) prima facie makes the real person less valuable because they become less scarce. They call this the “scarcity problem.” If true, this thesis is amongst the most important insights in ethics of technology because of the simplicity of duplication. However, based on an analysis of their argument, I suggest that the thesis has …
Automated informed consent
Online privacy policies or terms and conditions ideally provide users with information about how their personal data are being used. The reality is that very few users read them: they are long, often hard to understand, and ubiquitous. The average internet user cannot realistically read and understand all aspects that apply to them and thus give informed consent to the companies who use their personal data. In this article, we provide a basic ove…
On the need for a global AI ethics
What we owe (to) the present: Normative and practical challenges for strong longtermism
This paper critically examines the conceptual, normative, and practical challenges to strong longtermism—the view that the far future is the key priority in moral decision-making. The main challenge is that if we take strong longtermism seriously, it follows that harming present and near-future people is permissible, if not obligatory. Given that this conclusion is repugnant to most, we argue that strong longtermism must be substantially weakened…
An unrealistic and undesirable alternative to the right to be forgotten
In their “Così fan tutte: A better approach than the right to be forgotten”, Martha Garcia-Murillo and Ian MacInnes (2018) present an alternative to the right to be forgotten. It mainly consists of changing social norms to a more open and transparent society and improving anti-discrimination laws. In this reply, I challenge their suggestions both empirically and normatively, arguing that they cannot achieve what they set-out; that their analysis …
Should we allow for the possibility of necessarily unexercised abilities? A new route to rejecting the poss-ability principle
Most analyses of can and abilities accept what is known as the poss-ability principle (i.e. that an agent S is able to Φ only if it is possible for S to Φ). In this paper, I devise a new route to rejecting the poss-ability principle. I argue that the poss-ability principle is incompatible with some kind of agent, such as God; that the poss-ability principle has normatively unacceptable consequences (granted the existence of a certain kind of evil…
Is Lack of Literature Engagement a Reason for Rejecting a Paper in Philosophy
Although philosophy cites less than most other academic subjects, many scholars still take a lack of reference to and engagement with the relevant literature as a reason to reject a paper in philosophy. Here I argue against that idea. Literature requests should only in rare circumstances be an absolute requirement, and a lack of (engagement with) references is not a good reason to reject a paper. Lastly, I briefly discuss whether an author has re…
Two notes on Axiological Futurism: The importance of disagreement and methodological implications for value theory
Recently, John Danaher defended a research agenda he calls “Axiological Futurism”. In this commentary, I propose two revisions for how that research agenda is defined. I argue that it ought to focus on disagreements and comparison of different axiologies
Ethics of Socially Disruptive Technologies: An Introduction
Technologies shape who we are, how we organize our societies and how we relate to nature. For example, social media challenges democracy; artificial intelligence raises the question of what is unique to humans; and the possibility to create artificial wombs may affect notions of motherhood and birth. Some have suggested that we address global warming by engineering the climate, but how does this impact our responsibility to future generations and…
Improving on and assessing ethical guidelines for digital tracking and tracing systems for pandemics
So-called digital tracking and tracing systems (DTTSs) have been proposed as a means to prevent the spread of SARS-CoV-2. There are ethical guidelines and evaluations of such systems available. As part of a research project, I will build on and critically evaluate the foundations of such guidelines. The goal is to provide both incremental improvements of the specific requirements for DTTSs and to present and discuss more fundamental challenge, th…
Why the immorality of consuming alcohol during pregnancy cannot tell us that abortion is immoral: A reply to Hendricks
Recently, Perry Hendricks argued that abortion is immoral even if the fetus is not a person. He did so by arguing that causing a future child to suffer from fetal alcohol syndrome is wrong because it is an impairment, and an abortion would be an even more substantial impairment. Here I reply that the argument depends on ignoring relevant facts that are essential for moral decision‐making. Moreover, if we adapt the argument to consider these essen…
Safety requirements vs. crashing ethically: What matters most for policies on autonomous vehicles
The philosophical–ethical literature and the public debate on autonomous vehicles have been obsessed with ethical issues related to crashing. In this article, these discussions, including more empirical investigations, will be critically assessed. It is argued that a related and more pressing issue is questions concerning safety. For example, what should we require from autonomous vehicles when it comes to safety? What do we mean by ‘safety’? How…
Self-Driving Vehicles—an Ethical Overview
The introduction of self-driving vehicles gives rise to a large number of ethical issues that go beyond the common, extremely narrow, focus on improbable dilemma-like scenarios. This article provides a broad overview of realistic ethical issues related to self-driving vehicles. Some of the major topics covered are as follows: Strong opinions for and against driverless cars may give rise to severe social and political conflicts. A low tolerance fo…
How We Can Make Sense of Control-Based Intuitions for Limited Access Conceptions of the Right to Privacy
Over the years, several counterexamples arguably establish the limits of control-based conceptions of privacy and the right to privacy. Some of these counterexamples focus only on privacy, while the control-based conception of the right to privacy is rejected because of conceptual consistency between privacy and the right to privacy. Yet, these counterexamples do not deny the intuitions of control-based conceptions of the right to privacy. This r…
Why Extending Actions Through Time Can Violate a Moral Right to Privacy
Recently, Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu argued that an action that does not violate a moral right to privacy cannot violate that right if it is extended over time. Specifically, they argue that a moral right to privacy does not protect against gawking or stalking. In this reply the reverse position is defended. Specifically, it is argued that their arguments fails on according to their own definition of the right to privacy. Furthermore, it…
Defining Social Housing: A Discussion on the Suitable Criteria
The term social housing has been characterized as a “floating signifier”, i.e. a term with no agreed-upon meaning. The lack of a definition often leads to misunderstandings, rather than constructive dialogue on the advantages and disadvantages of such a system. The aim of this article is to contribute to clarity by providing a discussion on the potential defining criteria of social housing and suggesting a definition of the concept. Definitions o…
Confusion and the Role of Intuitions in the Debate on the Conception of the Right to Privacy
Recently, Jakob Thraine Mainz and Rasmus Uhrenfeldt defended a control-based conception of a moral right to privacy (Mainz and Uhrenfeldt, Res Publica , 2020)—focusing on conceptualizing necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for a privacy right violation. This reply comments on a number of mistakes they make, which have long reverberated through the debate on the conceptions of privacy and the right to privacy and therefore deserve to be co…
Two notes on Axiological Futurism: The importance of disagreement and methodological implications for value theory
Recently, John Danaher defended a research agenda he calls “Axiological Futurism”. In this commentary, I propose two revisions for how that research agenda is defined. I argue that it ought to focus on disagreements and comparison of different axiologies
Ethics of Socially Disruptive Technologies: An Introduction
Technologies shape who we are, how we organize our societies and how we relate to nature. For example, social media challenges democracy; artificial intelligence raises the question of what is unique to humans; and the possibility to create artificial wombs may affect notions of motherhood and birth. Some have suggested that we address global warming by engineering the climate, but how does this impact our responsibility to future generations and…
On the need for a global AI ethics
The Information Liar Paradox: A Problem for Floridi’s RSDI Definition
The Common Cold, Influenza and Immunity in Post-Pandemic Times: Lay representations of Self and Other among older people in Sweden
The need for new knowledge about lay representations of contagions, immunity, vaccination, common colds, and influenza has become clear after the A(H1N1) pandemic and the resulting challenges regarding pandemic preparedness. This article analyses written responses from 67 persons, mostly women, to a semi-structured questionnaire about colds and the flu. Three themes are discussed: “Common cold and flus as ritualized experiences”, “Me, my body, an…
Defining Social Housing: A Discussion on the Suitable Criteria
The term social housing has been characterized as a “floating signifier”, i.e. a term with no agreed-upon meaning. The lack of a definition often leads to misunderstandings, rather than constructive dialogue on the advantages and disadvantages of such a system. The aim of this article is to contribute to clarity by providing a discussion on the potential defining criteria of social housing and suggesting a definition of the concept. Definitions o…
Does semantic information need to be truthful
The concept of information has well-known difficulties. Among the many issues that have been discussed is the alethic nature of a semantic conception of information. Floridi (Minds Mach 14(2):197–222, 2004; Philos Phenomenol Res 70:351–370, 2005; EUJAP 3(1):31–41, 2007; The philosophy of information, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011) argued that semantic information must be truthful. In this article, arguments will be presented in favor of a…
A Dilemma for Privacy as Control
Although popular, control accounts of privacy suffer from various counterexamples. In this article, it is argued that two such counterexamples—while individually resolvable—can be combined to yield a dilemma for control accounts of privacy. Furthermore, it is argued that it is implausible that control accounts of privacy can defend against this dilemma. Thus, it is concluded that we ought not define privacy in terms of control. Lastly, it is argu…
How software developers can fix part of GDPR’s problem of click-through consents
Improving on and assessing ethical guidelines for digital tracking and tracing systems for pandemics
So-called digital tracking and tracing systems (DTTSs) have been proposed as a means to prevent the spread of SARS-CoV-2. There are ethical guidelines and evaluations of such systems available. As part of a research project, I will build on and critically evaluate the foundations of such guidelines. The goal is to provide both incremental improvements of the specific requirements for DTTSs and to present and discuss more fundamental challenge, th…
Why the immorality of consuming alcohol during pregnancy cannot tell us that abortion is immoral: A reply to Hendricks
Recently, Perry Hendricks argued that abortion is immoral even if the fetus is not a person. He did so by arguing that causing a future child to suffer from fetal alcohol syndrome is wrong because it is an impairment, and an abortion would be an even more substantial impairment. Here I reply that the argument depends on ignoring relevant facts that are essential for moral decision‐making. Moreover, if we adapt the argument to consider these essen…
Safety requirements vs. crashing ethically: What matters most for policies on autonomous vehicles
The philosophical–ethical literature and the public debate on autonomous vehicles have been obsessed with ethical issues related to crashing. In this article, these discussions, including more empirical investigations, will be critically assessed. It is argued that a related and more pressing issue is questions concerning safety. For example, what should we require from autonomous vehicles when it comes to safety? What do we mean by ‘safety’? How…
Self-Driving Vehicles—an Ethical Overview
The introduction of self-driving vehicles gives rise to a large number of ethical issues that go beyond the common, extremely narrow, focus on improbable dilemma-like scenarios. This article provides a broad overview of realistic ethical issues related to self-driving vehicles. Some of the major topics covered are as follows: Strong opinions for and against driverless cars may give rise to severe social and political conflicts. A low tolerance fo…
How We Can Make Sense of Control-Based Intuitions for Limited Access Conceptions of the Right to Privacy
Over the years, several counterexamples arguably establish the limits of control-based conceptions of privacy and the right to privacy. Some of these counterexamples focus only on privacy, while the control-based conception of the right to privacy is rejected because of conceptual consistency between privacy and the right to privacy. Yet, these counterexamples do not deny the intuitions of control-based conceptions of the right to privacy. This r…
Why Extending Actions Through Time Can Violate a Moral Right to Privacy
Recently, Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu argued that an action that does not violate a moral right to privacy cannot violate that right if it is extended over time. Specifically, they argue that a moral right to privacy does not protect against gawking or stalking. In this reply the reverse position is defended. Specifically, it is argued that their arguments fails on according to their own definition of the right to privacy. Furthermore, it…
Confusion and the Role of Intuitions in the Debate on the Conception of the Right to Privacy
Recently, Jakob Thraine Mainz and Rasmus Uhrenfeldt defended a control-based conception of a moral right to privacy (Mainz and Uhrenfeldt, Res Publica , 2020)—focusing on conceptualizing necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for a privacy right violation. This reply comments on a number of mistakes they make, which have long reverberated through the debate on the conceptions of privacy and the right to privacy and therefore deserve to be co…
Ethical machine decisions and the input-selection problem
This article is about the role of factual uncertainty for moral decision-making as it concerns the ethics of machine decision-making (i.e., decisions by AI systems, such as autonomous vehicles, autonomous robots, or decision support systems). The view that is defended here is that factual uncertainties require a normative evaluation and that ethics of machine decision faces a triple-edged problem, which concerns what a machine ought to do, given …
An unrealistic and undesirable alternative to the right to be forgotten
In their “Così fan tutte: A better approach than the right to be forgotten”, Martha Garcia-Murillo and Ian MacInnes (2018) present an alternative to the right to be forgotten. It mainly consists of changing social norms to a more open and transparent society and improving anti-discrimination laws. In this reply, I challenge their suggestions both empirically and normatively, arguing that they cannot achieve what they set-out; that their analysis …
Should we allow for the possibility of necessarily unexercised abilities? A new route to rejecting the poss-ability principle
Most analyses of can and abilities accept what is known as the poss-ability principle (i.e. that an agent S is able to Φ only if it is possible for S to Φ). In this paper, I devise a new route to rejecting the poss-ability principle. I argue that the poss-ability principle is incompatible with some kind of agent, such as God; that the poss-ability principle has normatively unacceptable consequences (granted the existence of a certain kind of evil…
Is Lack of Literature Engagement a Reason for Rejecting a Paper in Philosophy
Although philosophy cites less than most other academic subjects, many scholars still take a lack of reference to and engagement with the relevant literature as a reason to reject a paper in philosophy. Here I argue against that idea. Literature requests should only in rare circumstances be an absolute requirement, and a lack of (engagement with) references is not a good reason to reject a paper. Lastly, I briefly discuss whether an author has re…
Two notes on Axiological Futurism: The importance of disagreement and methodological implications for value theory
Recently, John Danaher defended a research agenda he calls “Axiological Futurism”. In this commentary, I propose two revisions for how that research agenda is defined. I argue that it ought to focus on disagreements and comparison of different axiologies
Ethics of Socially Disruptive Technologies: An Introduction
Technologies shape who we are, how we organize our societies and how we relate to nature. For example, social media challenges democracy; artificial intelligence raises the question of what is unique to humans; and the possibility to create artificial wombs may affect notions of motherhood and birth. Some have suggested that we address global warming by engineering the climate, but how does this impact our responsibility to future generations and…
Undisruptable or stable concepts: Can we design concepts that can avoid conceptual disruption, normative critique, and counterexamples
It has been argued that our concepts can be disrupted or challenged by technology or normative concerns, which raises the question of whether we can create, design, engineer, or define more robust concepts that avoid counterexamples and conceptual challenges that can lead to conceptual disruption. In this paper, it is argued that we can. This argument is presented through a case study of a definition in the technological domain
A new standard for accident simulations for self-driving vehicles: Can we use Waymo’s results from accident simulations
Recent simulations by Scanlon et al. showed seemingly spectacular results for the Waymo self-driving vehicle in simulations of real accident situations. In this paper, it is argued that the selection criteria for accident situations must be modified in accordance with the relevant policy alternatives. While Scanlon et al. compare Waymo with old human-driven vehicles, it is argued here that the relevant policy question is whether we ought to use s…
There is No Scarcity Problem
Recently, John Danaher and Sven Nyholm argued that partial “digital duplicates” of real persons (simulations and imitations) prima facie makes the real person less valuable because they become less scarce. They call this the “scarcity problem.” If true, this thesis is amongst the most important insights in ethics of technology because of the simplicity of duplication. However, based on an analysis of their argument, I suggest that the thesis has …
Automated informed consent
Online privacy policies or terms and conditions ideally provide users with information about how their personal data are being used. The reality is that very few users read them: they are long, often hard to understand, and ubiquitous. The average internet user cannot realistically read and understand all aspects that apply to them and thus give informed consent to the companies who use their personal data. In this article, we provide a basic ove…
On the need for a global AI ethics
What we owe (to) the present: Normative and practical challenges for strong longtermism
This paper critically examines the conceptual, normative, and practical challenges to strong longtermism—the view that the far future is the key priority in moral decision-making. The main challenge is that if we take strong longtermism seriously, it follows that harming present and near-future people is permissible, if not obligatory. Given that this conclusion is repugnant to most, we argue that strong longtermism must be substantially weakened…
Philosophy (17 works) · Epistemology (16 works) · Computer Science (15 works) · Sociology (14 works) · Ethics and Social Impacts of AI (12 works) · Political science (12 works) · Law (10 works) · Economics (8 works) · Neuroethics, Human Enhancement, Biomedical Innovations (8 works) · Engineering (7 works)