Tony Morgan
Biographic Data
| ID | 3661373 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Tony Morgan |
| GIVEN NAMES | Tony |
| FAMILY NAME | Morgan |
| SIGNATURE | MORGAN T |
| AFFILIATIONS | Rice University |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 15 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 582 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 15 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1986 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2023 |
| H-INDEX | 10 |
Economic Sanctions
Taking an interdisciplinary perspective, we examine the evolution of economic sanctions in the post-World War II era and reflect on the lessons that could be drawn from their features and patterns of use. We observe that, during this time, there has been a remarkable increase in the use of sanctions as an instrument of foreign policy. We classify this period into four 'eras' and discuss, in this context, how the evolution of sanctions may be link…
Hearing the Noise
Our understanding of economic sanctions has progressed significantly over the past three decades. Sanctions scholars have done a remarkable job at using empirical anomalies to guide theoretical developments and then using these to guide the next iteration of data collection and empirical testing. Here, I argue that mounting empirical evidence suggests it is time to develop a new theoretical perspective. I identify a number of empirical results, s…
Threat and imposition of economic sanctions 1945–2005
Recent research on economic sanctions has produced significant advances in our theoretical and empirical understanding of the causes and effects of these phenomena. Our theoretical understanding, which has been guided by empirical findings, has reached the point where existing datasets are no longer adequate to test important hypotheses. This article presents a recently updated version of the Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions dataset. T…
Determinants of Sanctions Effectiveness
In the literature on sanctions effectiveness, scholars have identified a number of factors that may contribute to sanctions success. However, existing empirical studies provide mixed findings concerning the effects of these factors. This research note explores two possible reasons for this lack of consistency in the literature. First, informed by the recent theories that suggest threats are an important part of sanctions episodes, we analyze both…
Ending Economic Coercion
Research on when economic sanctions end has emphasized either the international bargaining game played by the sender and the target or the redistributive politics and ruling coalition changes in each state. We contend that neither approach offers a fully satisfactory explanation for economic coercion termination. Bargaining is inconsistent with long coercion episodes while ruling coalition changes cannot inform our understanding of very short epi…
The Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions, 1971—2000
Economic sanctions, increasingly used as instruments of foreign policy in recent decades, have been the focus of numerous academic studies. Recent theoretical advances in our understanding of sanctions cannot be tested adequately with existing data. This article presents a newly developed dataset that contains information on 888 cases in which sanctions were threatened and/or implemented in the 1971—2000 period. We describe the dataset, present d…
Multilateral Versus Unilateral Sanctions Reconsidered
Policymakers frequently argue that multilateral sanctions are more likely to induce a target state to alter its behavior than are unilateral sanctions. Repeated empirical studies using the familiar Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot data set demonstrate that unilateral sanctions "work" more often than multilateral sanctions, however. In this study, we subject three theoretical explanations for this counterintuitive finding to additional empirical testi…
The Best of All Possible Islands
Teach a Man to Fish and You Can Sell Him Bait for a Lifetime
Journal Article Teach a Man to Fish and You Can Sell Him Bait for a Lifetime Get access The Institutional Economics of Foreign Aid. By Martens Bertin Mummert Uwe Murrell Peter Seabright Paul. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. 212 pp., $60.00 (ISBN: 0-5218-0818-9). T. Clifton Morgan T. Clifton Morgan Department of Political Science, Rice University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar International St…
Imposing Sanctions
The majority of research on economic sanctions focuses on the effectiveness of sanctions as an instrument of foreign policy. Although the number of sanctions episodes is rapidly growing, the empirical record suggests that sanctions, while possibly effective for symbolic purposes, often fail to alter the behavior of target states (Wagner 1988; Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot 1990; Pape 1997; Drury 1998, 2001). But even though the empirical work indic…
Multilateral Sanctions and Foreign Policy Success
In this article, we consider the puzzle of whether unilateral or multilateral sanctions are more likely to be successful in changing a targeted state's behavior. Policymakers maintain that multilateral sanctioning efforts will be more likely to succeed, while the majority of empirical academic research suggests otherwise. We present an argument, based on multidimensional spatial models, to explain why multilateral sanctions may not be more effect…
Fools Suffer Gladly
A number of recent international situations have raised again questions regarding the usefulness of economic sanctions as an instrument of foreign policy. Sanctions continue to be applied in a variety of contexts, yet we have not developed a sufficient understanding of the processes involved to determine when, or even if, sanctions can "work." While a great deal has been written on the subject, there have been neither attempts to subject the theo…
Economic sanctions as an instrument of foreign policy
Most studies of economic sanctions have concluded that they are ineffective as instruments of foreign policy. In a previous effort, we applied the spatial model of bargaining to the question of sanctions effectiveness to identify the‐conditions under which sanctions can be expected to “work.” In this paper, we refine that analysis by examining the impact of domestic politics in the state that is the target of the sanctions. Sanction episodes may …
Power, resolve and bargaining in international crises
In this paper the spatial model of crisis bargaining is utilized to derive a number of hypotheses relating the relative power and resolve of crisis participants to crisis outcomes. The resolve and two power variables are defined and the manner in which they are incorporated into the model is demonstrated. The model, which represents a synthesis of traditional utility based bargaining models and the spatial theory of voting, is then used to establ…
Notable Family Networks in Latin America
Fools Suffer Gladly
A number of recent international situations have raised again questions regarding the usefulness of economic sanctions as an instrument of foreign policy. Sanctions continue to be applied in a variety of contexts, yet we have not developed a sufficient understanding of the processes involved to determine when, or even if, sanctions can "work." While a great deal has been written on the subject, there have been neither attempts to subject the theo…
Threat and imposition of economic sanctions 1945–2005
Recent research on economic sanctions has produced significant advances in our theoretical and empirical understanding of the causes and effects of these phenomena. Our theoretical understanding, which has been guided by empirical findings, has reached the point where existing datasets are no longer adequate to test important hypotheses. This article presents a recently updated version of the Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions dataset. T…
Multilateral Versus Unilateral Sanctions Reconsidered
Policymakers frequently argue that multilateral sanctions are more likely to induce a target state to alter its behavior than are unilateral sanctions. Repeated empirical studies using the familiar Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot data set demonstrate that unilateral sanctions "work" more often than multilateral sanctions, however. In this study, we subject three theoretical explanations for this counterintuitive finding to additional empirical testi…
Determinants of Sanctions Effectiveness
In the literature on sanctions effectiveness, scholars have identified a number of factors that may contribute to sanctions success. However, existing empirical studies provide mixed findings concerning the effects of these factors. This research note explores two possible reasons for this lack of consistency in the literature. First, informed by the recent theories that suggest threats are an important part of sanctions episodes, we analyze both…
The Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions, 1971—2000
Economic sanctions, increasingly used as instruments of foreign policy in recent decades, have been the focus of numerous academic studies. Recent theoretical advances in our understanding of sanctions cannot be tested adequately with existing data. This article presents a newly developed dataset that contains information on 888 cases in which sanctions were threatened and/or implemented in the 1971—2000 period. We describe the dataset, present d…
Multilateral Sanctions and Foreign Policy Success
In this article, we consider the puzzle of whether unilateral or multilateral sanctions are more likely to be successful in changing a targeted state's behavior. Policymakers maintain that multilateral sanctioning efforts will be more likely to succeed, while the majority of empirical academic research suggests otherwise. We present an argument, based on multidimensional spatial models, to explain why multilateral sanctions may not be more effect…
Economic sanctions as an instrument of foreign policy
Most studies of economic sanctions have concluded that they are ineffective as instruments of foreign policy. In a previous effort, we applied the spatial model of bargaining to the question of sanctions effectiveness to identify the‐conditions under which sanctions can be expected to “work.” In this paper, we refine that analysis by examining the impact of domestic politics in the state that is the target of the sanctions. Sanction episodes may …
Imposing Sanctions
The majority of research on economic sanctions focuses on the effectiveness of sanctions as an instrument of foreign policy. Although the number of sanctions episodes is rapidly growing, the empirical record suggests that sanctions, while possibly effective for symbolic purposes, often fail to alter the behavior of target states (Wagner 1988; Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot 1990; Pape 1997; Drury 1998, 2001). But even though the empirical work indic…
Ending Economic Coercion
Research on when economic sanctions end has emphasized either the international bargaining game played by the sender and the target or the redistributive politics and ruling coalition changes in each state. We contend that neither approach offers a fully satisfactory explanation for economic coercion termination. Bargaining is inconsistent with long coercion episodes while ruling coalition changes cannot inform our understanding of very short epi…
Power, resolve and bargaining in international crises
In this paper the spatial model of crisis bargaining is utilized to derive a number of hypotheses relating the relative power and resolve of crisis participants to crisis outcomes. The resolve and two power variables are defined and the manner in which they are incorporated into the model is demonstrated. The model, which represents a synthesis of traditional utility based bargaining models and the spatial theory of voting, is then used to establ…
Hearing the Noise
Our understanding of economic sanctions has progressed significantly over the past three decades. Sanctions scholars have done a remarkable job at using empirical anomalies to guide theoretical developments and then using these to guide the next iteration of data collection and empirical testing. Here, I argue that mounting empirical evidence suggests it is time to develop a new theoretical perspective. I identify a number of empirical results, s…
Economic Sanctions
Taking an interdisciplinary perspective, we examine the evolution of economic sanctions in the post-World War II era and reflect on the lessons that could be drawn from their features and patterns of use. We observe that, during this time, there has been a remarkable increase in the use of sanctions as an instrument of foreign policy. We classify this period into four 'eras' and discuss, in this context, how the evolution of sanctions may be link…
The Best of All Possible Islands
Notable Family Networks in Latin America
Power, resolve and bargaining in international crises
In this paper the spatial model of crisis bargaining is utilized to derive a number of hypotheses relating the relative power and resolve of crisis participants to crisis outcomes. The resolve and two power variables are defined and the manner in which they are incorporated into the model is demonstrated. The model, which represents a synthesis of traditional utility based bargaining models and the spatial theory of voting, is then used to establ…
Economic sanctions as an instrument of foreign policy
Most studies of economic sanctions have concluded that they are ineffective as instruments of foreign policy. In a previous effort, we applied the spatial model of bargaining to the question of sanctions effectiveness to identify the‐conditions under which sanctions can be expected to “work.” In this paper, we refine that analysis by examining the impact of domestic politics in the state that is the target of the sanctions. Sanction episodes may …
Fools Suffer Gladly
A number of recent international situations have raised again questions regarding the usefulness of economic sanctions as an instrument of foreign policy. Sanctions continue to be applied in a variety of contexts, yet we have not developed a sufficient understanding of the processes involved to determine when, or even if, sanctions can "work." While a great deal has been written on the subject, there have been neither attempts to subject the theo…
Multilateral Sanctions and Foreign Policy Success
In this article, we consider the puzzle of whether unilateral or multilateral sanctions are more likely to be successful in changing a targeted state's behavior. Policymakers maintain that multilateral sanctioning efforts will be more likely to succeed, while the majority of empirical academic research suggests otherwise. We present an argument, based on multidimensional spatial models, to explain why multilateral sanctions may not be more effect…
Teach a Man to Fish and You Can Sell Him Bait for a Lifetime
Journal Article Teach a Man to Fish and You Can Sell Him Bait for a Lifetime Get access The Institutional Economics of Foreign Aid. By Martens Bertin Mummert Uwe Murrell Peter Seabright Paul. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. 212 pp., $60.00 (ISBN: 0-5218-0818-9). T. Clifton Morgan T. Clifton Morgan Department of Political Science, Rice University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar International St…
Imposing Sanctions
The majority of research on economic sanctions focuses on the effectiveness of sanctions as an instrument of foreign policy. Although the number of sanctions episodes is rapidly growing, the empirical record suggests that sanctions, while possibly effective for symbolic purposes, often fail to alter the behavior of target states (Wagner 1988; Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot 1990; Pape 1997; Drury 1998, 2001). But even though the empirical work indic…
The Best of All Possible Islands
The Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions, 1971—2000
Economic sanctions, increasingly used as instruments of foreign policy in recent decades, have been the focus of numerous academic studies. Recent theoretical advances in our understanding of sanctions cannot be tested adequately with existing data. This article presents a newly developed dataset that contains information on 888 cases in which sanctions were threatened and/or implemented in the 1971—2000 period. We describe the dataset, present d…
Multilateral Versus Unilateral Sanctions Reconsidered
Policymakers frequently argue that multilateral sanctions are more likely to induce a target state to alter its behavior than are unilateral sanctions. Repeated empirical studies using the familiar Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot data set demonstrate that unilateral sanctions "work" more often than multilateral sanctions, however. In this study, we subject three theoretical explanations for this counterintuitive finding to additional empirical testi…
Ending Economic Coercion
Research on when economic sanctions end has emphasized either the international bargaining game played by the sender and the target or the redistributive politics and ruling coalition changes in each state. We contend that neither approach offers a fully satisfactory explanation for economic coercion termination. Bargaining is inconsistent with long coercion episodes while ruling coalition changes cannot inform our understanding of very short epi…
Determinants of Sanctions Effectiveness
In the literature on sanctions effectiveness, scholars have identified a number of factors that may contribute to sanctions success. However, existing empirical studies provide mixed findings concerning the effects of these factors. This research note explores two possible reasons for this lack of consistency in the literature. First, informed by the recent theories that suggest threats are an important part of sanctions episodes, we analyze both…
Threat and imposition of economic sanctions 1945–2005
Recent research on economic sanctions has produced significant advances in our theoretical and empirical understanding of the causes and effects of these phenomena. Our theoretical understanding, which has been guided by empirical findings, has reached the point where existing datasets are no longer adequate to test important hypotheses. This article presents a recently updated version of the Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions dataset. T…
Hearing the Noise
Our understanding of economic sanctions has progressed significantly over the past three decades. Sanctions scholars have done a remarkable job at using empirical anomalies to guide theoretical developments and then using these to guide the next iteration of data collection and empirical testing. Here, I argue that mounting empirical evidence suggests it is time to develop a new theoretical perspective. I identify a number of empirical results, s…
Economic Sanctions
Taking an interdisciplinary perspective, we examine the evolution of economic sanctions in the post-World War II era and reflect on the lessons that could be drawn from their features and patterns of use. We observe that, during this time, there has been a remarkable increase in the use of sanctions as an instrument of foreign policy. We classify this period into four 'eras' and discuss, in this context, how the evolution of sanctions may be link…
Law (14 works) · Political science (14 works) · Law (13 works) · Economics (12 works) · Economic Sanctions and International Relations (11 works) · Sanctions (11 works) · Economic sanctions (10 works) · Empirical research (7 works) · Law and economics (7 works) · Computer Science (6 works)