Sergio Tenenbaum
Dados Biográficos
| ID | 3698259 |
|---|---|
| NOME | Sergio Tenenbaum |
| PRENOMES | Sergio |
| SOBRENOME | Tenenbaum |
| ASSINATURA | TENENBAUM S |
| AFILIAÇÕES | University of Toronto |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-5449-7513 |
| VERIFICADO | Sim |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 19 |
| TOTAL DE CITAÇÕES | 39 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 18 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 1 |
| PRIMEIRO ANO DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 1940 |
| ANO MAIS RECENTE DE PUBLICAÇÃO | 2026 |
| ÍNDICE H | 4 |
The normative structure of imperfection
Many philosophers have attempted to draw a distinction between perfect and imperfect duties. Roughly, imperfect duties are supposed to be obligations that allow for latitude, or room for choice, in complying with them. Beneficence is typically given as the paradigm example. Examples of perfect duties include our obligations not to harm others, and our obligations to keep promises. While there seems to be a real distinction here, we argue that phi…
Kant’s Reason
Cullity on The Foundations of Morality
Duality of motivation and the guise of the good in Kant’s practical philosophy
Although Kant is clearly committed to some version of the Guise of the Good thesis (GG), he only explicitly endorses a very weak version of it; namely, that under the direction of reason, we only pursue what we conceive to be good. This version of thesis seems to allow that human beings might act in defiance of reason’s directives, and that if they did so, they would not necessarily be engaging in actions that they conceive to be good in any way.…
Formalism and constitutivism in Kantian practical philosophy
Constitutivists have tried to answer Enoch’s “schmagency” objection by arguing that Enoch fails to appreciate the inescapability of agency. Although these arguments are effective against some versions of the objection, I argue that they leave constitutivism vulnerable to an important worry; namely, that constitutivism leaves us alienated from the moral norms that it claims we must follow. In the first part of the paper, I try to make this vague c…
Representing collective agency
The Perils of Earnest Consequentializing
Vague Projects and the Puzzle of the Self-Torturer
In this essay we advance a new solution to Quinn’s puzzle of the self-torturer. The solution falls directly out of an application of the principle of instrumental reasoning to what we call “vague projects,” that is, projects whose completion does not occur at any particular or definite point or moment. The resulting treatment of the puzzle extends our understanding of instrumental rationality to projects and ends that cannot be accommodated by or…
The Idea of Freedom and Moral Cognition in Groundwork III
Good and Good For
This chapter tries to understand the notions of good and good for (and related evaluative notions) that seem to be in operation when, for instance, one says that by bringing about the greatest good, or by acting as morality requires us to act, we do something that is worse for Bill. The first section of the chapter tries to present more specific intuitions that seem to require that good and good for be capable of diverging, as well as presenting …
Desire, Practical Reason, and the Good
Philosophers disagree sharply over how we are supposed to understand the notions of 'desire' and 'good', how these notions relate, and whether both play a significant and independent role in practical reason. This volume brings together 'systematic' and more historically-oriented work on these issues
"In Defense of "Appearances
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
Appearing Good
Moral Psychology
The Conclusion of Practical Reason
Quasi-Realism's Problem of Autonomous Effects
Journal Article Quasi‐Realism's Problem of Autonomous Effects Get access Sergio Tenenbaum Sergio Tenenbaum University of Toronto Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 53, Issue 212, July 2003, Pages 392–409, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9213.00320 Published: 10 June 2003
Ethical Internalism and Glaucon's Question
The Judgment of a Weak Will
In trying to explain the possibility of akrasia (weakness of will), it seems plausible to deny that there is a conceptual connection between motivation (what one wants) and evaluation (what one judges to be good); akrasia occurs when the agent is (most) motivated to do something that she does not judge to be good (all things considered). However, it is hard to see how such accounts could respect our intuition that the akratic agent acts freely, o…
The Machine
Desire, Practical Reason, and the Good
Philosophers disagree sharply over how we are supposed to understand the notions of 'desire' and 'good', how these notions relate, and whether both play a significant and independent role in practical reason. This volume brings together 'systematic' and more historically-oriented work on these issues
The Judgment of a Weak Will
In trying to explain the possibility of akrasia (weakness of will), it seems plausible to deny that there is a conceptual connection between motivation (what one wants) and evaluation (what one judges to be good); akrasia occurs when the agent is (most) motivated to do something that she does not judge to be good (all things considered). However, it is hard to see how such accounts could respect our intuition that the akratic agent acts freely, o…
Vague Projects and the Puzzle of the Self-Torturer
In this essay we advance a new solution to Quinn’s puzzle of the self-torturer. The solution falls directly out of an application of the principle of instrumental reasoning to what we call “vague projects,” that is, projects whose completion does not occur at any particular or definite point or moment. The resulting treatment of the puzzle extends our understanding of instrumental rationality to projects and ends that cannot be accommodated by or…
The Idea of Freedom and Moral Cognition in Groundwork III
Formalism and constitutivism in Kantian practical philosophy
Constitutivists have tried to answer Enoch’s “schmagency” objection by arguing that Enoch fails to appreciate the inescapability of agency. Although these arguments are effective against some versions of the objection, I argue that they leave constitutivism vulnerable to an important worry; namely, that constitutivism leaves us alienated from the moral norms that it claims we must follow. In the first part of the paper, I try to make this vague c…
The Perils of Earnest Consequentializing
"In Defense of "Appearances
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
Quasi-Realism's Problem of Autonomous Effects
Journal Article Quasi‐Realism's Problem of Autonomous Effects Get access Sergio Tenenbaum Sergio Tenenbaum University of Toronto Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 53, Issue 212, July 2003, Pages 392–409, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9213.00320 Published: 10 June 2003
The Machine
The Judgment of a Weak Will
In trying to explain the possibility of akrasia (weakness of will), it seems plausible to deny that there is a conceptual connection between motivation (what one wants) and evaluation (what one judges to be good); akrasia occurs when the agent is (most) motivated to do something that she does not judge to be good (all things considered). However, it is hard to see how such accounts could respect our intuition that the akratic agent acts freely, o…
Ethical Internalism and Glaucon's Question
Quasi-Realism's Problem of Autonomous Effects
Journal Article Quasi‐Realism's Problem of Autonomous Effects Get access Sergio Tenenbaum Sergio Tenenbaum University of Toronto Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 53, Issue 212, July 2003, Pages 392–409, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9213.00320 Published: 10 June 2003
Moral Psychology
The Conclusion of Practical Reason
Appearing Good
"In Defense of "Appearances
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
Good and Good For
This chapter tries to understand the notions of good and good for (and related evaluative notions) that seem to be in operation when, for instance, one says that by bringing about the greatest good, or by acting as morality requires us to act, we do something that is worse for Bill. The first section of the chapter tries to present more specific intuitions that seem to require that good and good for be capable of diverging, as well as presenting …
Desire, Practical Reason, and the Good
Philosophers disagree sharply over how we are supposed to understand the notions of 'desire' and 'good', how these notions relate, and whether both play a significant and independent role in practical reason. This volume brings together 'systematic' and more historically-oriented work on these issues
The Idea of Freedom and Moral Cognition in Groundwork III
Vague Projects and the Puzzle of the Self-Torturer
In this essay we advance a new solution to Quinn’s puzzle of the self-torturer. The solution falls directly out of an application of the principle of instrumental reasoning to what we call “vague projects,” that is, projects whose completion does not occur at any particular or definite point or moment. The resulting treatment of the puzzle extends our understanding of instrumental rationality to projects and ends that cannot be accommodated by or…
The Perils of Earnest Consequentializing
Representing collective agency
Formalism and constitutivism in Kantian practical philosophy
Constitutivists have tried to answer Enoch’s “schmagency” objection by arguing that Enoch fails to appreciate the inescapability of agency. Although these arguments are effective against some versions of the objection, I argue that they leave constitutivism vulnerable to an important worry; namely, that constitutivism leaves us alienated from the moral norms that it claims we must follow. In the first part of the paper, I try to make this vague c…
Duality of motivation and the guise of the good in Kant’s practical philosophy
Although Kant is clearly committed to some version of the Guise of the Good thesis (GG), he only explicitly endorses a very weak version of it; namely, that under the direction of reason, we only pursue what we conceive to be good. This version of thesis seems to allow that human beings might act in defiance of reason’s directives, and that if they did so, they would not necessarily be engaging in actions that they conceive to be good in any way.…
Cullity on The Foundations of Morality
Kant’s Reason
The normative structure of imperfection
Many philosophers have attempted to draw a distinction between perfect and imperfect duties. Roughly, imperfect duties are supposed to be obligations that allow for latitude, or room for choice, in complying with them. Beneficence is typically given as the paradigm example. Examples of perfect duties include our obligations not to harm others, and our obligations to keep promises. While there seems to be a real distinction here, we argue that phi…
Epistemology (13 obras) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (12 obras) · Psychology (11 obras) · Philosophy (10 obras) · Computer Science (7 obras) · Philosophy (7 obras) · Sociology (7 obras) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (6 obras) · Free Will and Agency (5 obras) · Morality (5 obras)