Timothy Schroeder
Biographic Data
| ID | 3698456 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Timothy Schroeder |
| GIVEN NAMES | Timothy |
| FAMILY NAME | Schroeder |
| SIGNATURE | SCHROEDER T |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Manitoba |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 16 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 31 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 16 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2004 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2016 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
Response to Swanton and Badhwar
On Romantic Love
The Causal Map and Moral Psychology
Some philosophers hold that the neuroscience of action is, in practice or in principle, incapable of touching debates in action theory and moral psychology. The role of desires in action, the existence of basic actions, and the like are topics that (they hold) must be sorted out by philosophers alone: at least at present, and perhaps by the very nature of the questions. This paper examines both philosophical and empirical arguments against the re…
Précis of In Praise of Desire
Replies to Critics
In Praise of Desire
In Praise of Desire' aims to show that ordinary desires belong at the heart of moral psychology, basing its thesis on a doctrine called Spare Conativism. It gives a full defence of the central role intrinsic desires have in our moral lives
Deliberation and Acting for Reasons
Theoretical and practical deliberation are voluntary activities, and like all voluntary activities, they are performed for reasons. To hold that all voluntary activities are performed for reasons in virtue of their relations to past, present, or even merely possible acts of deliberation thus leads to infinite regresses and related problems. As a consequence, there must be processes that are nondeliberative and nonvoluntary but that nonetheless al…
On the Content of Experience
The intentionalist about consciousness holds that the qualitative character of experience, “what it’s like,” is determined by the contents of a select group of special intentional states of the subject. Fred Dretske (1995) , Mike Thau (2002) , Michael Tye (1995) and many others have embraced intentionalism, but these philosophers have not generally appreciated that, since we are intimately familiar with the qualitative character of experience, we…
Two Ways of Seeing Ways of Seeing
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
Imagination and Emotion
Theorists in the philosophy of art and philosophy of psychology are converging on the view that imagining is a distinct propositional attitude. When one imagines that P (while engaging with a fiction, daydreaming, contemplating, etc.), one tokens a representation that P, and this representation plays the functional role that is distinctive of imagining. In particular, this representation plays a role that is distinct from the role of belief, but …
Précis of Three Faces of Desire
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Reply to Critics
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Propositional Attitudes
The propositional attitudes are attitudes such as believing and desiring, taken toward propositions such as the proposition that snow flurries are expected, or that the Prime Minister likes poutine. Collectively, our views about the propositional attitudes make up much of folk psychology, our everyday theory of how the mind works
Moral Responsibility and Tourette Syndrome
Philosophers generally assume that individuals with Tourette syndrome are not responsible for their Tourettic tics, and so not blameworthy for any harm their tics might cause. Yet this assumption is based largely on ignorance of the lived experience of Tourette syndrome. Individuals with Tourette syndrome often experience their tics as freely chosen and reason-responsive. Yet it still seems wrong to treat a Tourettic individual's tic as on a mora…
Three Faces of Desire
Desires lead to actions, influence feelings, and determine what counts as a reward. Recent empirical evidence shows that these three aspects of desire stem from a common biological origin. Informed by contemporary science as much as by the philosophical tradition, this book reveals this common foundation and builds a new philosophical theory of desire that puts desire's neglected face — reward — at its core. This book delves into the way that act…
Three Faces of Desire (Philosophy of Mind Series)
In Praise of Desire
In Praise of Desire' aims to show that ordinary desires belong at the heart of moral psychology, basing its thesis on a doctrine called Spare Conativism. It gives a full defence of the central role intrinsic desires have in our moral lives
Deliberation and Acting for Reasons
Theoretical and practical deliberation are voluntary activities, and like all voluntary activities, they are performed for reasons. To hold that all voluntary activities are performed for reasons in virtue of their relations to past, present, or even merely possible acts of deliberation thus leads to infinite regresses and related problems. As a consequence, there must be processes that are nondeliberative and nonvoluntary but that nonetheless al…
On the Content of Experience
The intentionalist about consciousness holds that the qualitative character of experience, “what it’s like,” is determined by the contents of a select group of special intentional states of the subject. Fred Dretske (1995) , Mike Thau (2002) , Michael Tye (1995) and many others have embraced intentionalism, but these philosophers have not generally appreciated that, since we are intimately familiar with the qualitative character of experience, we…
Propositional Attitudes
The propositional attitudes are attitudes such as believing and desiring, taken toward propositions such as the proposition that snow flurries are expected, or that the Prime Minister likes poutine. Collectively, our views about the propositional attitudes make up much of folk psychology, our everyday theory of how the mind works
Reply to Critics
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
Three Faces of Desire
Desires lead to actions, influence feelings, and determine what counts as a reward. Recent empirical evidence shows that these three aspects of desire stem from a common biological origin. Informed by contemporary science as much as by the philosophical tradition, this book reveals this common foundation and builds a new philosophical theory of desire that puts desire's neglected face — reward — at its core. This book delves into the way that act…
Three Faces of Desire (Philosophy of Mind Series)
Moral Responsibility and Tourette Syndrome
Philosophers generally assume that individuals with Tourette syndrome are not responsible for their Tourettic tics, and so not blameworthy for any harm their tics might cause. Yet this assumption is based largely on ignorance of the lived experience of Tourette syndrome. Individuals with Tourette syndrome often experience their tics as freely chosen and reason-responsive. Yet it still seems wrong to treat a Tourettic individual's tic as on a mora…
Imagination and Emotion
Theorists in the philosophy of art and philosophy of psychology are converging on the view that imagining is a distinct propositional attitude. When one imagines that P (while engaging with a fiction, daydreaming, contemplating, etc.), one tokens a representation that P, and this representation plays the functional role that is distinctive of imagining. In particular, this representation plays a role that is distinct from the role of belief, but …
Précis of Three Faces of Desire
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
Reply to Critics
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
Propositional Attitudes
The propositional attitudes are attitudes such as believing and desiring, taken toward propositions such as the proposition that snow flurries are expected, or that the Prime Minister likes poutine. Collectively, our views about the propositional attitudes make up much of folk psychology, our everyday theory of how the mind works
On the Content of Experience
The intentionalist about consciousness holds that the qualitative character of experience, “what it’s like,” is determined by the contents of a select group of special intentional states of the subject. Fred Dretske (1995) , Mike Thau (2002) , Michael Tye (1995) and many others have embraced intentionalism, but these philosophers have not generally appreciated that, since we are intimately familiar with the qualitative character of experience, we…
Two Ways of Seeing Ways of Seeing
An abstract is not available for this content so a preview has been provided. Please use the Get access link above for information on how to access this content
Deliberation and Acting for Reasons
Theoretical and practical deliberation are voluntary activities, and like all voluntary activities, they are performed for reasons. To hold that all voluntary activities are performed for reasons in virtue of their relations to past, present, or even merely possible acts of deliberation thus leads to infinite regresses and related problems. As a consequence, there must be processes that are nondeliberative and nonvoluntary but that nonetheless al…
In Praise of Desire
In Praise of Desire' aims to show that ordinary desires belong at the heart of moral psychology, basing its thesis on a doctrine called Spare Conativism. It gives a full defence of the central role intrinsic desires have in our moral lives
Précis of In Praise of Desire
Replies to Critics
Response to Swanton and Badhwar
On Romantic Love
The Causal Map and Moral Psychology
Some philosophers hold that the neuroscience of action is, in practice or in principle, incapable of touching debates in action theory and moral psychology. The role of desires in action, the existence of basic actions, and the like are topics that (they hold) must be sorted out by philosophers alone: at least at present, and perhaps by the very nature of the questions. This paper examines both philosophical and empirical arguments against the re…
Psychology (13 works) · Epistemology (11 works) · Philosophy (11 works) · Social Psychology (6 works) · Computer Science (5 works) · Aesthetics (4 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (4 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (4 works) · Philosophy (4 works) · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment (4 works)