Alan Hajek
Biographic Data
| ID | 3698665 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Alan Hajek |
| GIVEN NAMES | Alan |
| FAMILY NAME | Hajek |
| SIGNATURE | HAJEK A |
| AFFILIATIONS | Australian National University |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-2315-2114 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 25 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 176 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 23 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 2 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1994 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 6 |
More paradoxical Moore-paradoxical sentences
‘Moore’s Paradox’ concerns sentences like ‘it’s raining and I don’t believe that it’s raining’. Philosophers have attempted to explain why asserting them, or believing their contents, would be absurd. Why are they paradoxical? The common story is that unlike contradictory sentences, Moore-paradoxical sentences could be true or might be true, so it is puzzling why they cannot be appropriately asserted or their contents rationally believed. However…
Similarity accounts of counterfactuals: A reality check1
To an unusual extent, philosophers agree that counterfactuals have truth conditions involving the most similar possible worlds where their antecedents are true, in the style of the celebrated and path‐breaking Stalnaker/Lewis accounts. Roughly, these accounts say that the counterfactual if A were the case, C would be the case is true if and only if at the most similar A‐worlds, C is true . I will argue that there are general structural problems w…
Degrees of commensurability and the repugnant conclusion
Two objects of valuation are said to be incommensurable if neither is better than the other, nor are they equally good. This negative, coarse‐grained characterization fails to capture the nuanced structure of incommensurability. We argue that our evaluative resources are far richer than orthodoxy recognizes. We model value comparisons with the corresponding class of permissible preference orderings. Then, making use of our model, we introduce a p…
Risky business
Start with orthodox Bayesianism, whose only (synchronic) constraint on rational credences is that they be coherent. That's remarkably permissive—it licenses unreasonable credences. Bayesians are fond of replying with convergence theorems, but for various reasons, I find them inadequate. So I approve of extra constraints on rational credences. Moreover, orthodox Bayesian decision theory is remarkably permissive about how agents value things. Again…
Counterfactual scepticism and antecedent-contextualism
Contra counterfactism
Minkish dispositions
The Oxford Handbook of Probability and Philosophy
Probability theory is a key tool of the physical, mathematical, and social sciences. It has also been playing an increasingly significant role in philosophy: in epistemology, philosophy of science, ethics, social philosophy, philosophy of religion, and elsewhere. This Handbook encapsulates and furthers the influence of philosophy on probability, and of probability on philosophy. Nearly forty articles summarize the state of play and present new in…
Probabilistic Opinion Pooling
Suppose several individuals (e.g., experts on a panel) each assign probabilities to some events. How can these individual probability assignments be aggregated into a single collective probability assignment? This chapter is a review of several proposed solutions to this problem, focusing on three salient proposals: linear pooling (the weighted or unweighted linear averaging of probabilities), geometric pooling (the weighted or unweighted geometr…
Declarations of independence
Counterfactual Reasoning, Quantitative: Philosophical Aspects
Satan, Saint Peter and Saint Petersburg: Decision theory and discontinuity at infinity
Rationality and indeterminate probabilities
CHAPTER 7 Dutch Book Arguments
Dutch Book arguments purport to show that rationality requires certain constraints on an agent's subjective probabilities, on pain of the agent being susceptible to sure losses in corresponding bets. This survey offers critical assessments of several kinds of Dutch Book arguments. The chapter begins with the classic argument for obedience to the probability calculus, emphasizing both its literal interpretation in terms of monetary losses at the h…
Arguments for–or against–Probabilism
Four important arguments for probabilism—the Dutch Book, representation theorem, calibration, and gradational accuracy arguments—have a strikingly similar structure. Each begins with a mathematical theorem, a conditional with an existentially quantified consequent, of the general form: if your credences are not probabilities, then there is a way in which your rationality is impugned.Each argument concludes that rationality requires your credences…
What Are Degrees of Belief?
The reference class problem is your problem too
In Memory of Richard Jeffrey: Some Reminiscences and Some Reflections on The Logic of Decision
This paper is partly a tribute to Richard Jeffrey, partly a reflection on some of his writings, The Logic of Decision in particular. I begin with a brief biography and some fond reminiscences of Dick. I turn to some of the key tenets of his version of Bayesianism. All of these tenets are deployed in my discussion of his response to the St. Petersburg paradox, a notorious problem for decision theory that involves a game of infinite expectation. Pr…
Scotching Dutch Books
Desire Beyond Belief
David Lewis [1988; 1996] canvases an anti-Humean thesis about mental states: that the rational agent desires something to the extent that he or she believes it to be good. Lewis offers and refutes a decision-theoretic formulation of it, the 'Desire-as-Belief Thesis'. Other authors have since added further negative results in the spirit of Lewis's. We explore ways of being anti-Humean that evade all these negative results. We begin by providing ba…
What Conditional Probability Could Not Be
Waging War on Pascal's Wager
Research Article| January 01 2003 Waging War on Pascal's Wager Alan Hájek Alan Hájek Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2003) 112 (1): 27–56. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-112-1-27 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn Email Permissions Search Site Citation Alan Hájek; Waging War on Pascal's Wager. The Philosophical Review 1 January 2003; 112 (1): 27–56. doi: https://doi.org…
Bayes or Bust: A Critical Examination of Bayesian Confirmation Theory
Full Belief and Probability: Comments on Van Fraassen
As van Fraassen pointed out in his opening remarks, Henry Kyburg's lottery paradox has long been known to raise difficulties in attempts to represent full belief as a probability greater than or equal to p, where p is some number less than 1. Recently, Patrick Maher has pointed out that to identify full belief with probability equal to 1 presents similar difficulties. In his paper, van Fraassen investigates ways of representing full belief by per…
The Fixation of Belief and its Undoing: Changing Beliefs through Inquiry
What Conditional Probability Could Not Be
The reference class problem is your problem too
Arguments for–or against–Probabilism
Four important arguments for probabilism—the Dutch Book, representation theorem, calibration, and gradational accuracy arguments—have a strikingly similar structure. Each begins with a mathematical theorem, a conditional with an existentially quantified consequent, of the general form: if your credences are not probabilities, then there is a way in which your rationality is impugned.Each argument concludes that rationality requires your credences…
Waging War on Pascal's Wager
Research Article| January 01 2003 Waging War on Pascal's Wager Alan Hájek Alan Hájek Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2003) 112 (1): 27–56. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-112-1-27 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn Email Permissions Search Site Citation Alan Hájek; Waging War on Pascal's Wager. The Philosophical Review 1 January 2003; 112 (1): 27–56. doi: https://doi.org…
Rationality and indeterminate probabilities
Desire Beyond Belief
David Lewis [1988; 1996] canvases an anti-Humean thesis about mental states: that the rational agent desires something to the extent that he or she believes it to be good. Lewis offers and refutes a decision-theoretic formulation of it, the 'Desire-as-Belief Thesis'. Other authors have since added further negative results in the spirit of Lewis's. We explore ways of being anti-Humean that evade all these negative results. We begin by providing ba…
Declarations of independence
Contra counterfactism
Scotching Dutch Books
Counterfactual scepticism and antecedent-contextualism
Satan, Saint Peter and Saint Petersburg: Decision theory and discontinuity at infinity
Risky business
Start with orthodox Bayesianism, whose only (synchronic) constraint on rational credences is that they be coherent. That's remarkably permissive—it licenses unreasonable credences. Bayesians are fond of replying with convergence theorems, but for various reasons, I find them inadequate. So I approve of extra constraints on rational credences. Moreover, orthodox Bayesian decision theory is remarkably permissive about how agents value things. Again…
Minkish dispositions
In Memory of Richard Jeffrey: Some Reminiscences and Some Reflections on The Logic of Decision
This paper is partly a tribute to Richard Jeffrey, partly a reflection on some of his writings, The Logic of Decision in particular. I begin with a brief biography and some fond reminiscences of Dick. I turn to some of the key tenets of his version of Bayesianism. All of these tenets are deployed in my discussion of his response to the St. Petersburg paradox, a notorious problem for decision theory that involves a game of infinite expectation. Pr…
The Fixation of Belief and its Undoing: Changing Beliefs through Inquiry
Full Belief and Probability: Comments on Van Fraassen
As van Fraassen pointed out in his opening remarks, Henry Kyburg's lottery paradox has long been known to raise difficulties in attempts to represent full belief as a probability greater than or equal to p, where p is some number less than 1. Recently, Patrick Maher has pointed out that to identify full belief with probability equal to 1 presents similar difficulties. In his paper, van Fraassen investigates ways of representing full belief by per…
Bayes or Bust: A Critical Examination of Bayesian Confirmation Theory
What Conditional Probability Could Not Be
Waging War on Pascal's Wager
Research Article| January 01 2003 Waging War on Pascal's Wager Alan Hájek Alan Hájek Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2003) 112 (1): 27–56. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-112-1-27 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn Email Permissions Search Site Citation Alan Hájek; Waging War on Pascal's Wager. The Philosophical Review 1 January 2003; 112 (1): 27–56. doi: https://doi.org…
Desire Beyond Belief
David Lewis [1988; 1996] canvases an anti-Humean thesis about mental states: that the rational agent desires something to the extent that he or she believes it to be good. Lewis offers and refutes a decision-theoretic formulation of it, the 'Desire-as-Belief Thesis'. Other authors have since added further negative results in the spirit of Lewis's. We explore ways of being anti-Humean that evade all these negative results. We begin by providing ba…
Scotching Dutch Books
In Memory of Richard Jeffrey: Some Reminiscences and Some Reflections on The Logic of Decision
This paper is partly a tribute to Richard Jeffrey, partly a reflection on some of his writings, The Logic of Decision in particular. I begin with a brief biography and some fond reminiscences of Dick. I turn to some of the key tenets of his version of Bayesianism. All of these tenets are deployed in my discussion of his response to the St. Petersburg paradox, a notorious problem for decision theory that involves a game of infinite expectation. Pr…
What Are Degrees of Belief?
The reference class problem is your problem too
Arguments for–or against–Probabilism
Four important arguments for probabilism—the Dutch Book, representation theorem, calibration, and gradational accuracy arguments—have a strikingly similar structure. Each begins with a mathematical theorem, a conditional with an existentially quantified consequent, of the general form: if your credences are not probabilities, then there is a way in which your rationality is impugned.Each argument concludes that rationality requires your credences…
CHAPTER 7 Dutch Book Arguments
Dutch Book arguments purport to show that rationality requires certain constraints on an agent's subjective probabilities, on pain of the agent being susceptible to sure losses in corresponding bets. This survey offers critical assessments of several kinds of Dutch Book arguments. The chapter begins with the classic argument for obedience to the probability calculus, emphasizing both its literal interpretation in terms of monetary losses at the h…
Rationality and indeterminate probabilities
Satan, Saint Peter and Saint Petersburg: Decision theory and discontinuity at infinity
Counterfactual Reasoning, Quantitative: Philosophical Aspects
The Oxford Handbook of Probability and Philosophy
Probability theory is a key tool of the physical, mathematical, and social sciences. It has also been playing an increasingly significant role in philosophy: in epistemology, philosophy of science, ethics, social philosophy, philosophy of religion, and elsewhere. This Handbook encapsulates and furthers the influence of philosophy on probability, and of probability on philosophy. Nearly forty articles summarize the state of play and present new in…
Probabilistic Opinion Pooling
Suppose several individuals (e.g., experts on a panel) each assign probabilities to some events. How can these individual probability assignments be aggregated into a single collective probability assignment? This chapter is a review of several proposed solutions to this problem, focusing on three salient proposals: linear pooling (the weighted or unweighted linear averaging of probabilities), geometric pooling (the weighted or unweighted geometr…
Declarations of independence
Minkish dispositions
Risky business
Start with orthodox Bayesianism, whose only (synchronic) constraint on rational credences is that they be coherent. That's remarkably permissive—it licenses unreasonable credences. Bayesians are fond of replying with convergence theorems, but for various reasons, I find them inadequate. So I approve of extra constraints on rational credences. Moreover, orthodox Bayesian decision theory is remarkably permissive about how agents value things. Again…
Counterfactual scepticism and antecedent-contextualism
Contra counterfactism
Degrees of commensurability and the repugnant conclusion
Two objects of valuation are said to be incommensurable if neither is better than the other, nor are they equally good. This negative, coarse‐grained characterization fails to capture the nuanced structure of incommensurability. We argue that our evaluative resources are far richer than orthodoxy recognizes. We model value comparisons with the corresponding class of permissible preference orderings. Then, making use of our model, we introduce a p…
Similarity accounts of counterfactuals: A reality check1
To an unusual extent, philosophers agree that counterfactuals have truth conditions involving the most similar possible worlds where their antecedents are true, in the style of the celebrated and path‐breaking Stalnaker/Lewis accounts. Roughly, these accounts say that the counterfactual if A were the case, C would be the case is true if and only if at the most similar A‐worlds, C is true . I will argue that there are general structural problems w…
More paradoxical Moore-paradoxical sentences
‘Moore’s Paradox’ concerns sentences like ‘it’s raining and I don’t believe that it’s raining’. Philosophers have attempted to explain why asserting them, or believing their contents, would be absurd. Why are they paradoxical? The common story is that unlike contradictory sentences, Moore-paradoxical sentences could be true or might be true, so it is puzzling why they cannot be appropriately asserted or their contents rationally believed. However…
Epistemology (18 works) · Philosophy (18 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (17 works) · Philosophy and History of Science (13 works) · Mathematics (12 works) · Computer Science (11 works) · Psychology (11 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (10 works) · Mathematical economics (9 works) · Metaphysics (8 works)