Andries Richter
Biographic Data
| ID | 3708036 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Andries Richter |
| GIVEN NAMES | Andries |
| FAMILY NAME | Richter |
| SIGNATURE | RICHTER A |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Oslo |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-3423-4377 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 13 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 15 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 13 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2013 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Social–ecological network analysis of governance gaps in a newly designated marine protected area of the Global South
Effective Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) depend on governance arrangements that are well-aligned with the dynamics of the social–ecological systems they aim to manage. However, baseline assessments at the time of MPA designation often prioritize ecological and biological data, while social dimensions tend to receive less attention, limiting opportunities to inform early management planning. To address this gap, we applied Social–Ecological Network…
Coordinating on good and bad outcomes in threshold games – Evidence from an artefactual field experiment in Cambodia
Effects of fishery bycatch-mitigation measures on vulnerable marine fauna and target catch
Telecouplings in Atlantic cod—The role of global trade and climate change
Seafood trade is a global business, where catches, processing, and consumption are increasingly separated. An increasingly integrated global market creates telecouplings, i.e. connections between fish stocks that are ecologically separated. These telecouplings may spread the impact of vulnerabilities, such as climate change, between unconnected fisheries. The effect of climate change on fisheries is often analyzed on a fish stock basis, which may…
Water scarcity and support for costly institutions in public goods: Experimental evidence from Cambodia
Voluntary contributions to public goods are vulnerable to free riding. A potential solution is the implementation of a costly institutional arrangement that deters free riding behavior. In this paper, we analyze to what extent resource users are willing to bear those costs and vote in favor of costly institutions. We carried out lab-in-the-field experiments with Cambodian farmers in the Kampong Chhnang province. In the first experiment, the subje…
Path dependencies and institutional traps in water governance – Evidence from Cambodia
Institutional inertia in European fisheries – Insights from the Atlantic horse mackerel case
Fisheries management has to deal with uncertainty about the genetic composition and the location of fish stocks. If institutions are inert, i.e. unable to adapt to new insights, management may not be effective. This paper analyses fisheries management in Europe which relies on scientific advice feeding into the management decision process. The spatial boundaries of fish stocks define the scientific areas and management areas, which are not necess…
Control activities and compliance behavior—Survey evidence from Norway
Successful fisheries management relies on compliance. Compliance in turn relies on the perceived legitimacy of the existing rules and regulations, the effectiveness of monitoring and enforcement, and on the positive feedback loop between legitimacy and effectiveness. Against the backdrop of increasing incentives to violate rules and regulations in modern fisheries, there are concerns that traditional control activities relying on physical inspect…
Institutions and inequality interplay shapes the impact of economic growth on biodiversity loss
Mirza, M. U., A. Richter, E. H. van Nes, and M. Scheffer. 2020. Institutions and inequality interplay shapes the impact of economic growth on biodiversity loss. Ecology and Society 25(4):39. https://doi.org/10.5751/ES-12078-250439
Overcapitalization and social norms of cooperation in a small-scale fishery
Technology driven inequality leads to poverty and resource depletion
Profit fluctuations signal eroding resilience of natural resources
The transmission of sustainable harvesting norms when agents are conditionally cooperative
Experimental and observational studies have highlighted the importance of agents being conditionally cooperative when facing a social dilemma. We formalize this mechanism in a theoretical model that portrays a small community having joint access to a common pool resource. The diffusion of norms of cooperation takes place via interpersonal relations, while individual agents face the temptation of higher profits by overexploiting the resource. Agen…
Technology driven inequality leads to poverty and resource depletion
The transmission of sustainable harvesting norms when agents are conditionally cooperative
Experimental and observational studies have highlighted the importance of agents being conditionally cooperative when facing a social dilemma. We formalize this mechanism in a theoretical model that portrays a small community having joint access to a common pool resource. The diffusion of norms of cooperation takes place via interpersonal relations, while individual agents face the temptation of higher profits by overexploiting the resource. Agen…
Water scarcity and support for costly institutions in public goods: Experimental evidence from Cambodia
Voluntary contributions to public goods are vulnerable to free riding. A potential solution is the implementation of a costly institutional arrangement that deters free riding behavior. In this paper, we analyze to what extent resource users are willing to bear those costs and vote in favor of costly institutions. We carried out lab-in-the-field experiments with Cambodian farmers in the Kampong Chhnang province. In the first experiment, the subje…
The transmission of sustainable harvesting norms when agents are conditionally cooperative
Experimental and observational studies have highlighted the importance of agents being conditionally cooperative when facing a social dilemma. We formalize this mechanism in a theoretical model that portrays a small community having joint access to a common pool resource. The diffusion of norms of cooperation takes place via interpersonal relations, while individual agents face the temptation of higher profits by overexploiting the resource. Agen…
Profit fluctuations signal eroding resilience of natural resources
Overcapitalization and social norms of cooperation in a small-scale fishery
Technology driven inequality leads to poverty and resource depletion
Institutions and inequality interplay shapes the impact of economic growth on biodiversity loss
Mirza, M. U., A. Richter, E. H. van Nes, and M. Scheffer. 2020. Institutions and inequality interplay shapes the impact of economic growth on biodiversity loss. Ecology and Society 25(4):39. https://doi.org/10.5751/ES-12078-250439
Institutional inertia in European fisheries – Insights from the Atlantic horse mackerel case
Fisheries management has to deal with uncertainty about the genetic composition and the location of fish stocks. If institutions are inert, i.e. unable to adapt to new insights, management may not be effective. This paper analyses fisheries management in Europe which relies on scientific advice feeding into the management decision process. The spatial boundaries of fish stocks define the scientific areas and management areas, which are not necess…
Control activities and compliance behavior—Survey evidence from Norway
Successful fisheries management relies on compliance. Compliance in turn relies on the perceived legitimacy of the existing rules and regulations, the effectiveness of monitoring and enforcement, and on the positive feedback loop between legitimacy and effectiveness. Against the backdrop of increasing incentives to violate rules and regulations in modern fisheries, there are concerns that traditional control activities relying on physical inspect…
Path dependencies and institutional traps in water governance – Evidence from Cambodia
Telecouplings in Atlantic cod—The role of global trade and climate change
Seafood trade is a global business, where catches, processing, and consumption are increasingly separated. An increasingly integrated global market creates telecouplings, i.e. connections between fish stocks that are ecologically separated. These telecouplings may spread the impact of vulnerabilities, such as climate change, between unconnected fisheries. The effect of climate change on fisheries is often analyzed on a fish stock basis, which may…
Water scarcity and support for costly institutions in public goods: Experimental evidence from Cambodia
Voluntary contributions to public goods are vulnerable to free riding. A potential solution is the implementation of a costly institutional arrangement that deters free riding behavior. In this paper, we analyze to what extent resource users are willing to bear those costs and vote in favor of costly institutions. We carried out lab-in-the-field experiments with Cambodian farmers in the Kampong Chhnang province. In the first experiment, the subje…
Effects of fishery bycatch-mitigation measures on vulnerable marine fauna and target catch
Coordinating on good and bad outcomes in threshold games – Evidence from an artefactual field experiment in Cambodia
Social–ecological network analysis of governance gaps in a newly designated marine protected area of the Global South
Effective Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) depend on governance arrangements that are well-aligned with the dynamics of the social–ecological systems they aim to manage. However, baseline assessments at the time of MPA designation often prioritize ecological and biological data, while social dimensions tend to receive less attention, limiting opportunities to inform early management planning. To address this gap, we applied Social–Ecological Network…
Economics (10 works) · Business (7 works) · Ecology (7 works) · Natural resource economics (7 works) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (6 works) · Microeconomics (5 works) · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation (4 works) · Fishery (4 works) · Psychology (4 works) · Resource (disambiguation (4 works)