Caíque Melo
Biographic Data
| ID | 3710169 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Caíque Melo |
| GIVEN NAMES | Caíque |
| FAMILY NAME | Melo |
| SIGNATURE | MELO C |
| AFFILIATIONS | Bocconi University |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 2 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 1 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 2 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
The distribution game
This paper examines how reduced individual influence leads politicians to use public-sector employment as a compensatory instrument. Identification exploits a Brazilian reform imposing population-based ceilings on municipal council size, generating quasi-experimental variation in political leverage. I combine electoral records for city councilors, campaign donation data on roughly 200,000 individuals, and matched administrative labor-market recor…
Are Educated Candidates Less Corrupt Bureaucrats? Evidence from Randomized Audits in Brazil
In this paper, we test whether more educated candidates make less corrupt public managers. Leveraging electoral regression discontinuity design and a randomized inspection program, we show that more educated candidates commit 32% fewer moderate infringements (associated with public management), but we do not find a differential in severe irregularities (corruption related). Exploiting data on judicial records, we find this effect does not stem fr…
Are Educated Candidates Less Corrupt Bureaucrats? Evidence from Randomized Audits in Brazil
In this paper, we test whether more educated candidates make less corrupt public managers. Leveraging electoral regression discontinuity design and a randomized inspection program, we show that more educated candidates commit 32% fewer moderate infringements (associated with public management), but we do not find a differential in severe irregularities (corruption related). Exploiting data on judicial records, we find this effect does not stem fr…
Are Educated Candidates Less Corrupt Bureaucrats? Evidence from Randomized Audits in Brazil
In this paper, we test whether more educated candidates make less corrupt public managers. Leveraging electoral regression discontinuity design and a randomized inspection program, we show that more educated candidates commit 32% fewer moderate infringements (associated with public management), but we do not find a differential in severe irregularities (corruption related). Exploiting data on judicial records, we find this effect does not stem fr…
The distribution game
This paper examines how reduced individual influence leads politicians to use public-sector employment as a compensatory instrument. Identification exploits a Brazilian reform imposing population-based ceilings on municipal council size, generating quasi-experimental variation in political leverage. I combine electoral records for city councilors, campaign donation data on roughly 200,000 individuals, and matched administrative labor-market recor…
Accounting (1 work) · Accounting (1 work) · Audit (1 work) · Bureaucracy (1 work) · Business (1 work) · Corruption and Economic Development (1 work) · Crime, Illicit Activities, and Governance (1 work) · Distribution (mathematics (1 work) · Donation (1 work) · Electoral Systems and Political Participation (1 work)