Indraneel Dasgupta
Biographic Data
| ID | 3710421 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Indraneel Dasgupta |
| GIVEN NAMES | Indraneel |
| FAMILY NAME | Dasgupta |
| SIGNATURE | DASGUPTA I |
| AFFILIATIONS | Durham University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-3212-0782 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 11 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 16 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 11 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2005 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
On the relative sequencing of internal and external rent-seeking contests
The importance of rapid assessment tools in evaluating mental health in emergency departments among patients with chronic diseases
Between-group contests over group-specific public goods with within-group fragmentation
Government as Practice
"Government as Practice: Democratic Left in a Transforming India, By Dwaipayan Bhattacharya." The Journal of Development Studies, 52(12), pp. 1830–1831
Why Pay Ngo S to Involve the Community
We examine the case for donors providing financial incentives to, i.e. subsidizing, NGOs to increase community participation. We show that the introduction of such a ‘participation subsidy’ may reduce beneficiary welfare. Thus, eliminating community participation from the set of conditions for funding an NGO may in fact benefit target communities. We show how our theoretical analysis may be operationalized by applying it to data from the NGO sect…
A Model of Nongovernmental Organization Regulation with an Application to Uganda
We develop a model of regulation of service-delivery nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), where future grants are conditional on prior spending of some minimal proportion of current revenue on direct project-related expenses. Such regulation induces some NGOs to increase current project spending but imposes wasteful costs of compliance verification on all NGOs. Under a large class of parametric configurations, we find that regulation increases t…
Globalization and Economic Injustice in Modern India
This book is about the informalization of formal-sector jobs in India, that is, the transfer of jobs out of India’s modern industrial sector into an employment sector which is almost wholly unregulated. Rohini Hensman attributes this change to government policies which discriminate in favour of small-scale production and the informal sector and which encourage the relocation of factories to areas with weak union presence, rather than to globaliza…
Repayment versus Investment Conditions and Exclusivity in Lending Contracts
Lenders condition future loans on some index of past performance. Typically, banks condition future loans on repayments of earlier obligations, whilst international organizations (official lenders) condition future loans on the implementation of some policy action (»investment«). We build an agency model that accounts for these tendencies. The optimal conditionality contract depends on exclusivity — the likelihood that a borrower who has been den…
Does philanthropy reduce inequality
Development as Freedom
Community and anti-poverty targeting
Community and anti-poverty targeting
Does philanthropy reduce inequality
Between-group contests over group-specific public goods with within-group fragmentation
Why Pay Ngo S to Involve the Community
We examine the case for donors providing financial incentives to, i.e. subsidizing, NGOs to increase community participation. We show that the introduction of such a ‘participation subsidy’ may reduce beneficiary welfare. Thus, eliminating community participation from the set of conditions for funding an NGO may in fact benefit target communities. We show how our theoretical analysis may be operationalized by applying it to data from the NGO sect…
A Model of Nongovernmental Organization Regulation with an Application to Uganda
We develop a model of regulation of service-delivery nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), where future grants are conditional on prior spending of some minimal proportion of current revenue on direct project-related expenses. Such regulation induces some NGOs to increase current project spending but imposes wasteful costs of compliance verification on all NGOs. Under a large class of parametric configurations, we find that regulation increases t…
Community and anti-poverty targeting
Development as Freedom
Does philanthropy reduce inequality
Repayment versus Investment Conditions and Exclusivity in Lending Contracts
Lenders condition future loans on some index of past performance. Typically, banks condition future loans on repayments of earlier obligations, whilst international organizations (official lenders) condition future loans on the implementation of some policy action (»investment«). We build an agency model that accounts for these tendencies. The optimal conditionality contract depends on exclusivity — the likelihood that a borrower who has been den…
Globalization and Economic Injustice in Modern India
This book is about the informalization of formal-sector jobs in India, that is, the transfer of jobs out of India’s modern industrial sector into an employment sector which is almost wholly unregulated. Rohini Hensman attributes this change to government policies which discriminate in favour of small-scale production and the informal sector and which encourage the relocation of factories to areas with weak union presence, rather than to globaliza…
Why Pay Ngo S to Involve the Community
We examine the case for donors providing financial incentives to, i.e. subsidizing, NGOs to increase community participation. We show that the introduction of such a ‘participation subsidy’ may reduce beneficiary welfare. Thus, eliminating community participation from the set of conditions for funding an NGO may in fact benefit target communities. We show how our theoretical analysis may be operationalized by applying it to data from the NGO sect…
A Model of Nongovernmental Organization Regulation with an Application to Uganda
We develop a model of regulation of service-delivery nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), where future grants are conditional on prior spending of some minimal proportion of current revenue on direct project-related expenses. Such regulation induces some NGOs to increase current project spending but imposes wasteful costs of compliance verification on all NGOs. Under a large class of parametric configurations, we find that regulation increases t…
Government as Practice
"Government as Practice: Democratic Left in a Transforming India, By Dwaipayan Bhattacharya." The Journal of Development Studies, 52(12), pp. 1830–1831
Between-group contests over group-specific public goods with within-group fragmentation
The importance of rapid assessment tools in evaluating mental health in emergency departments among patients with chronic diseases
On the relative sequencing of internal and external rent-seeking contests
Economics (8 works) · Political science (5 works) · Business (4 works) · Law (4 works) · Microeconomics (4 works) · Public economics (4 works) · Economic growth (3 works) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (3 works) · Market economy (3 works) · Politics (3 works)