Subhayu Bandyopadhyay
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 3713588 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | Subhayu Bandyopadhyay |
| NOMBRES | Subhayu |
| APELLIDO | Bandyopadhyay |
| FIRMA | BANDYOPADHYAY S |
| AFILIACIONES | Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-1626-6543 |
| VERIFICADO | Sí |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 10 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 14 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 10 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 1996 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2026 |
| ÍNDICE H | 2 |
The Cambridge Handbook on the Economics of Terrorism
Since the turn of the century, few issues have shaped political debate and policy-making more than terrorism. As a result, there has been a huge increase in the amount of academic research devoted to investigating the causes and consequences of terrorism. The Cambridge Handbook on the Economics of Terrorism is the first to present a state-of-the art survey of the economics of terrorism. It adopts a rational-choice perspective according to which t…
On terms of trade, offshoring ties, and the enforcement of trade agreements
Politically influenced counterterrorism policy and welfare efficiency
Effects of Defensive and Proactive Measures on Competition Between Terrorist Groups
A two-stage game investigates how counterterrorism measures affect within-country competition between two rival terrorist groups. Although such competition is commonplace (e.g., al-Nusra Front and Free Syria Army; Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia and the National Liberation Army; and al-Fatah and Hamas), there is no theoretical treatment of how proactive and defensive measures influence this interaction. Previous studies on rival terrorist …
Trade and terrorism
We construct a model of the consequences of terrorism on trade, where firms in trading nations face different costs arising from domestic and transnational terrorism. Using a dyadic dataset in a gravity model, we test terrorism's effects on overall trade, exports, and imports, while allowing for disaggregation by primary commodities and manufactured goods. While domestic and transnational terrorism have marginal or no significant influence on the…
The Interplay Between Preemptive and Defensive Counterterrorism Measures
A two-stage game depiction of counterterrorism is presented, emphasizing the interaction between preemptive and defensive measures taken by two commonly targeted countries. The preemptor is apt to be the high-cost defender with the greater foreign interests. A prime-target country may also assume the preemptor role. The analysis identifies key factors—cost comparisons, foreign interests, targeting risks and domestic terrorism losses—that determin…
Multilateral transfers, export taxation and asymmetry
Illegal immigration
Endogenous effort in a Dynamic Model of Union–Firm Interaction
This paper studies the implications of union deviation by reducing effort in the context of a repeated game model. We find that a failure to account for the possibility of union deviation may lead to an overestimation of the possibility of cooperation. In contrast to the existing literature, we find that unions may reach the efficient outcome despite wage hikes because they work harder under cooperation. We also find that when effort is an endoge…
Growth, welfare and optimal trade taxes
The Interplay Between Preemptive and Defensive Counterterrorism Measures
A two-stage game depiction of counterterrorism is presented, emphasizing the interaction between preemptive and defensive measures taken by two commonly targeted countries. The preemptor is apt to be the high-cost defender with the greater foreign interests. A prime-target country may also assume the preemptor role. The analysis identifies key factors—cost comparisons, foreign interests, targeting risks and domestic terrorism losses—that determin…
Trade and terrorism
We construct a model of the consequences of terrorism on trade, where firms in trading nations face different costs arising from domestic and transnational terrorism. Using a dyadic dataset in a gravity model, we test terrorism's effects on overall trade, exports, and imports, while allowing for disaggregation by primary commodities and manufactured goods. While domestic and transnational terrorism have marginal or no significant influence on the…
Illegal immigration
Multilateral transfers, export taxation and asymmetry
Growth, welfare and optimal trade taxes
Growth, welfare and optimal trade taxes
Endogenous effort in a Dynamic Model of Union–Firm Interaction
This paper studies the implications of union deviation by reducing effort in the context of a repeated game model. We find that a failure to account for the possibility of union deviation may lead to an overestimation of the possibility of cooperation. In contrast to the existing literature, we find that unions may reach the efficient outcome despite wage hikes because they work harder under cooperation. We also find that when effort is an endoge…
Illegal immigration
Multilateral transfers, export taxation and asymmetry
The Interplay Between Preemptive and Defensive Counterterrorism Measures
A two-stage game depiction of counterterrorism is presented, emphasizing the interaction between preemptive and defensive measures taken by two commonly targeted countries. The preemptor is apt to be the high-cost defender with the greater foreign interests. A prime-target country may also assume the preemptor role. The analysis identifies key factors—cost comparisons, foreign interests, targeting risks and domestic terrorism losses—that determin…
Trade and terrorism
We construct a model of the consequences of terrorism on trade, where firms in trading nations face different costs arising from domestic and transnational terrorism. Using a dyadic dataset in a gravity model, we test terrorism's effects on overall trade, exports, and imports, while allowing for disaggregation by primary commodities and manufactured goods. While domestic and transnational terrorism have marginal or no significant influence on the…
Effects of Defensive and Proactive Measures on Competition Between Terrorist Groups
A two-stage game investigates how counterterrorism measures affect within-country competition between two rival terrorist groups. Although such competition is commonplace (e.g., al-Nusra Front and Free Syria Army; Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia and the National Liberation Army; and al-Fatah and Hamas), there is no theoretical treatment of how proactive and defensive measures influence this interaction. Previous studies on rival terrorist …
Politically influenced counterterrorism policy and welfare efficiency
On terms of trade, offshoring ties, and the enforcement of trade agreements
The Cambridge Handbook on the Economics of Terrorism
Since the turn of the century, few issues have shaped political debate and policy-making more than terrorism. As a result, there has been a huge increase in the amount of academic research devoted to investigating the causes and consequences of terrorism. The Cambridge Handbook on the Economics of Terrorism is the first to present a state-of-the art survey of the economics of terrorism. It adopts a rational-choice perspective according to which t…
Economics (9 obras) · International economics (6 obras) · Law (6 obras) · Political science (6 obras) · International trade (5 obras) · Terrorism (5 obras) · Terrorism, Counterterrorism, and Political Violence (5 obras) · Market economy (4 obras) · Microeconomics (4 obras) · Business (3 obras)