Dmitriy Gershenson
Biographic Data
| ID | 3715204 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Dmitriy Gershenson |
| GIVEN NAMES | Dmitriy |
| FAMILY NAME | Gershenson |
| SIGNATURE | GERSHENSON D |
| AFFILIATIONS | International Monetary Fund |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 2 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 15 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 2 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2000 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2002 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Sanctions and Civil Conflict
Using a formal general equilibrium framework, this paper analyses how sanctions imposed on the contestants in civil conflict affect the welfare of these contestants and the allocation of resources to conflict. It is shown that weak sanctions can hurt the contestant they are supposed to help, while strong sanctions augment the expected welfare of their intended beneficiaries. Moreover, sanctions are more likely to be successful if the contestant w…
Civil Conflict
In many historical cases, victory by a challenger for political dominance over an initially dominant group has ended civil conflict. But in other places, victory by a challenger has provided only a temporary respite, a brief intermission before the resumption of civil conflict. This article uses a theoretical model of civil conflict to identify the factors that determine whether civil conflict is ended or never ending. This theory focuses on how …
Civil Conflict
In many historical cases, victory by a challenger for political dominance over an initially dominant group has ended civil conflict. But in other places, victory by a challenger has provided only a temporary respite, a brief intermission before the resumption of civil conflict. This article uses a theoretical model of civil conflict to identify the factors that determine whether civil conflict is ended or never ending. This theory focuses on how …
Sanctions and Civil Conflict
Using a formal general equilibrium framework, this paper analyses how sanctions imposed on the contestants in civil conflict affect the welfare of these contestants and the allocation of resources to conflict. It is shown that weak sanctions can hurt the contestant they are supposed to help, while strong sanctions augment the expected welfare of their intended beneficiaries. Moreover, sanctions are more likely to be successful if the contestant w…
Civil Conflict
In many historical cases, victory by a challenger for political dominance over an initially dominant group has ended civil conflict. But in other places, victory by a challenger has provided only a temporary respite, a brief intermission before the resumption of civil conflict. This article uses a theoretical model of civil conflict to identify the factors that determine whether civil conflict is ended or never ending. This theory focuses on how …
Sanctions and Civil Conflict
Using a formal general equilibrium framework, this paper analyses how sanctions imposed on the contestants in civil conflict affect the welfare of these contestants and the allocation of resources to conflict. It is shown that weak sanctions can hurt the contestant they are supposed to help, while strong sanctions augment the expected welfare of their intended beneficiaries. Moreover, sanctions are more likely to be successful if the contestant w…
Civil Conflict (2 works) · Law (2 works) · Political science (2 works) · Spanish Civil War (2 works) · Affect (linguistics) (1 work) · Compliance (psychology) (1 work) · Corruption and Economic Development (1 work) · Culture, Economy, and Development Studies (1 work) · Dominance (genetics (1 work) · Economic sanctions (1 work)