Woojin Moon
Biographic Data
| ID | 3717547 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Woojin Moon |
| GIVEN NAMES | Woojin |
| FAMILY NAME | Moon |
| SIGNATURE | MOON W |
| AFFILIATIONS | Ajou University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-9792-7528 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 6 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 92 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 6 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2004 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
The paradox of the mixed semi-compensatory system in South Korea: Gaming the System or Toeing the Mark
Law Production in Multiparty Presidentialism: Veto Player Theory and its Application to Korea
In this article, I offer a theory of lawmaking in multiparty presidential systems with different legislative institutions. I present a model that combines Krehbiel's pivotal politics theory with Tsebelis's veto players theory. This model simplifies various institutional veto players into the de facto veto players. I analyze the model to explain how the government type (unified versus divided governments), the legislative rules (majoritarian versu…
Positional effects of partisan attachments on candidate position taking
The Paradox of Less Effective Incumbent Spending: Theory and Tests
In this article, the reason why incumbent spending is less effective than challenger spending is explained. The argument is that incumbent spending efficiency depends on the marginality of seats: safe incumbent spending is less effective than marginal incumbent spending, since safe incumbents have to buy fewer extreme voters, whereas marginal incumbents can easily buy a larger number of swing voters. The analysis of the US Senate elections betwee…
Decomposition of Regional Voting in South Korea: Ideological Conflicts and Regional Interests
In this article, I offer a theoretical model specifying the electoral mechanism in South Korea. In the model, political parties offer regional benefits to sway the ideological voting decisions of voters. Regional benefits are an effective way of winning regional votes as the parties’ ideological positions become less distinguishable. Analysis of the model shows that political parties receive stronger regional support (1) as the ideological positi…
Party Activists, Campaign Resources and Candidate Position Taking: Theory, Tests and Applications
Electoral competition is here specified as revolving around both candidate policy positions and non-policy issues.Two candidates spend their resources on non-policy issues to sway citizens' ideological voting decisions but they are constrained by their party activists who provide them with electoral resources. In this setting, a candidate with a resource advantage converges more towards the centre, but a candidate with a resource disadvantage div…
Party Activists, Campaign Resources and Candidate Position Taking: Theory, Tests and Applications
Electoral competition is here specified as revolving around both candidate policy positions and non-policy issues.Two candidates spend their resources on non-policy issues to sway citizens' ideological voting decisions but they are constrained by their party activists who provide them with electoral resources. In this setting, a candidate with a resource advantage converges more towards the centre, but a candidate with a resource disadvantage div…
Decomposition of Regional Voting in South Korea: Ideological Conflicts and Regional Interests
In this article, I offer a theoretical model specifying the electoral mechanism in South Korea. In the model, political parties offer regional benefits to sway the ideological voting decisions of voters. Regional benefits are an effective way of winning regional votes as the parties’ ideological positions become less distinguishable. Analysis of the model shows that political parties receive stronger regional support (1) as the ideological positi…
The Paradox of Less Effective Incumbent Spending: Theory and Tests
In this article, the reason why incumbent spending is less effective than challenger spending is explained. The argument is that incumbent spending efficiency depends on the marginality of seats: safe incumbent spending is less effective than marginal incumbent spending, since safe incumbents have to buy fewer extreme voters, whereas marginal incumbents can easily buy a larger number of swing voters. The analysis of the US Senate elections betwee…
The paradox of the mixed semi-compensatory system in South Korea: Gaming the System or Toeing the Mark
Positional effects of partisan attachments on candidate position taking
Party Activists, Campaign Resources and Candidate Position Taking: Theory, Tests and Applications
Electoral competition is here specified as revolving around both candidate policy positions and non-policy issues.Two candidates spend their resources on non-policy issues to sway citizens' ideological voting decisions but they are constrained by their party activists who provide them with electoral resources. In this setting, a candidate with a resource advantage converges more towards the centre, but a candidate with a resource disadvantage div…
Decomposition of Regional Voting in South Korea: Ideological Conflicts and Regional Interests
In this article, I offer a theoretical model specifying the electoral mechanism in South Korea. In the model, political parties offer regional benefits to sway the ideological voting decisions of voters. Regional benefits are an effective way of winning regional votes as the parties’ ideological positions become less distinguishable. Analysis of the model shows that political parties receive stronger regional support (1) as the ideological positi…
The Paradox of Less Effective Incumbent Spending: Theory and Tests
In this article, the reason why incumbent spending is less effective than challenger spending is explained. The argument is that incumbent spending efficiency depends on the marginality of seats: safe incumbent spending is less effective than marginal incumbent spending, since safe incumbents have to buy fewer extreme voters, whereas marginal incumbents can easily buy a larger number of swing voters. The analysis of the US Senate elections betwee…
Positional effects of partisan attachments on candidate position taking
Law Production in Multiparty Presidentialism: Veto Player Theory and its Application to Korea
In this article, I offer a theory of lawmaking in multiparty presidential systems with different legislative institutions. I present a model that combines Krehbiel's pivotal politics theory with Tsebelis's veto players theory. This model simplifies various institutional veto players into the de facto veto players. I analyze the model to explain how the government type (unified versus divided governments), the legislative rules (majoritarian versu…
The paradox of the mixed semi-compensatory system in South Korea: Gaming the System or Toeing the Mark
Economics (6 works) · Electoral Systems and Political Participation (4 works) · Law (4 works) · Law (4 works) · Microeconomics (4 works) · Political science (4 works) · Politics (4 works) · Ideology (3 works) · Political economy (3 works) · Context (archaeology (2 works)