Christian B Jensen
Biographic Data
| ID | 3717860 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Christian B Jensen |
| GIVEN NAMES | Christian B |
| FAMILY NAME | Jensen |
| SIGNATURE | JENSEN C B |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Nevada, Las Vegas |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 19 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 400 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 19 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2001 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2022 |
| H-INDEX | 11 |
Changing the Rules: Institutions, Party Systems, and the Frequency of Constitutional Amendments in Africa
What factors influence constitutional stability in the emerging democracies of Sub-Saharan Africa? This is an important question that has never been addressed in a systematic cross-national study of Africa's emerging democracies. Using the Comparative Constitutions Project dataset and our own original dataset for veto players and party systems, we examine the influence of veto players and party system characteristics on the frequency of constitut…
The cost of coalition compromise: The electoral effects of holding salient portfolios
This article highlights the electoral effects of holding salient portfolios within a coalition government. For voters, holding ministries can be seen as a symbol of a party’s success within the coalition. As a voting heuristic, parties not controlling the portfolios on issues important to their platforms signal their failure to achieve these goals. Following this perspective, we hypothesize that the difference between coalition parties that hold …
The effects of political parties on roll-call voting in Kenya’s Parliament
Parties are thought to organise democratic legislatures by influencing the voting behaviour of individual legislators. We examine whether parties and party coalitions influence the behaviour of legislators in Kenya. Ethnicity has been seen as the driver of party and electoral politics in Kenya and therefore Kenya provides a hard test of the proposition that political parties organise the legislature in Africa. Analysing roll-call voting in the 11…
Ruling divided: Disagreement, issue salience, and portfolio allocation
Issue salience and ideological disagreement often predict coalition government behavior. However, research on portfolio allocation has yet to fully specify the complex relationship between issue salience, disagreement, and coalition negotiations. Scholars treat issue salience and disagreement as distinct and disconnected, despite evidence that they work together and with conditional effects in a range of settings. Following a logic of portfolio t…
Confrontation and competition: The electoral benefits of regionalist parties’ positions in parliamentary democracies
Recent research has shown that niche parties are both increasing in importance in European party systems and behave differently than their more mainstream counterparts. Indeed, there is growing evidence that the dynamic between green parties and social democratic parties is especially nuanced. Regionalist parties differ from other niche parties in that they can be found on the left, right, and center of the ideological spectrum. We find that regi…
Predicting Ambiguity: Costs, Benefits, and Party Competition
We present a formal model of party competition to explain differences in party ideological ambiguity. Existing works generally argue that parties are more or less ambiguous depending on whether their supporters are risk-acceptant or risk-averse. Our model explores more fully strategic choice of ambiguity by considering nonelectoral benefits to ambiguity—that is, party elite recruitment and retention. In terms of costs, we assume that all voters a…
Manifestos, salience and junior ministerial appointments
We build on previous theories of junior minister allocation and coalition oversight by incorporating a novel theory of strategic changes in the issues covered in party manifestos. We argue that parties use junior ministerial appointments to oversee their coalition partners on portfolios that correspond to issues emphasized by the parties’ activists when the coalition partner’s preferences deviate from the party’s. The findings, based on a data se…
Constraining a Shadowy Future: Enacting APAs in Parliamentary Systems
Single‐party parliamentary governments often have no institutional checks on their authority. Such governments can pass and implement policies constrained only by the need to maintain party loyalty and win elections. Literature on delegation suggests that such governments would never adopt reforms such as Administrative Procedures Acts (APAs) that are designed to constrain this freedom. Nevertheless, such governments do pass APAs: Greece, Portuga…
Parliamentary Questions, Oversight, and National Opposition Status intheEuropeanParliament
This study examines when and why members of theEuropeanParliament (EP) use parliamentary questions as a form of fire alarm oversight. We argue that the multilevel nature of theEUpolitical system allows members of theEPfrom national opposition parties to use parliamentary questions to alert theEuropean Commission to governments' failures to implementEUpolicy. Representation in theEPprovides the only avenue for such oversight for national oppositio…
Institutional hokey-pokey: The politics of multispeed integration in the European Union
EU member states desiring deeper integration often call for a multispeed approach to pursue ambitious projects without the hinderance of laggards. At other times, laggards have desired a multispeed approach to avoid policies they find objectionable. Under what circumstances do laggards (integrationists) propose (object) to a multispeed Europe? We investigate the institutions and member state preferences that lead these camps to accept or resist m…
Procedural Change and the Sources of Ex Ante Constraints in EU Legislation: Procedural Change and Ex Ante Constraints
With 27 member states using a variety of administrative practices and institutions to implement European Union (EU) policy, the EU has been widely used as a natural laboratory for analyzing administrative politics and institutions. This research has largely focused on the institutional relationships as they are at the time of the analysis. However, the EU has used several legislative procedures. Furthermore, there has been little attention given …
Testing the ‘Party Matters' Thesis: Explaining Progress Towards Kyoto Protocol Targets
There is growing interest in whether and how parties matter. We add to this discussion by exploring the ways in which parties matter for policy outcomes. To do this, we look at the European Union (EU) member states' progress towards the greenhouse gas emissions targets set for them by the Kyoto Protocol and the EU's Burden Sharing Agreement. We find that governments that are more pro-environment and less ideologically divided make better progress…
Making Rules about Rulemaking: A Comparison of Presidential and Parliamentary Systems
The authors examine the administrative procedures acts (APAs) of separation of powers and parliamentary systems. They examine sixteen national APAs (thirteen parliamentary and three presidential) and forty-eight APAs from the U.S. states that have institutional structures analogous to the presidential systems. They identify a very stark difference between the parliamentary and presidential APAs. While all of the presidential system APAs place con…
Compelled without direction: Compulsory voting and party system spreading
Thinking locally, acting supranationally: Niche party behaviour in the European Parliament
Recent research on the European Parliament (EP) has neglected the idiosyncrasies of niche parties. Similarly, analyses of niche parties have not fully engaged the literature on the EP. This article builds on both literatures by analysing niche party behaviour in the EP as a distinct phenomenon. It is argued that niche parties will respond differently to institutional stimuli than parties more generally. To test this argument, Hix, Noury and Rolan…
Implementing Europe: A Question of Oversight
This article shows that member state governments' ability rather than their willingness to implement directives drives uneven implementation of European Union labor policy. Analysis of 186 labor policy infringement cases against 15 member states between 1978 and 2000 shows that administrative oversight mechanisms that concentrate authority in the hands of government and exclude interest group participation enhance governments' ability to resolve …
Who Calls for a Common EU Foreign Policy: Partisan Constraints on CFSP Reform
What drove the preferences over institutional choices of EU Constitutional Convention delegates in the area of foreign policy? We examine delegate preferences and find strong evidence that partisan identity rather than government positions drove delegates' preferences for both the role of the Commission and the voting rule in the Council. We also find evidence that delegates' party positions on an EU foreign policy are better predictors than dele…
Inspecting the Inspectors: Overseeing Labor Inspectorates in Parliamentary Democracies
Most theories of how to control bureaucracies are derived from American experience and are tested with data from the U.S. In contrast, this article uses evidence from the 15 members of the European Union to examine oversight mechanisms through which legislators attempt to control the bureaucracy. Analysis of European data shows that “police patrol” mechanisms of oversight appear in countries with relatively little gridlock as measured by the ideo…
Legislative Procedures in the European Union: An Empirical Analysis
The article analyses the role of the Commission, the Parliament, and the Council in the two main legislative procedures in the European Union: co-operation and co-decision (I). We use the legislative history of some 5,000 parliamentary amendments. These procedures have been the subject of a great deal of theoretical debate. According to conventional wisdom the co-decision procedure increases the powers of the European Parliament. Revisionist appr…
Legislative Procedures in the European Union: An Empirical Analysis
The article analyses the role of the Commission, the Parliament, and the Council in the two main legislative procedures in the European Union: co-operation and co-decision (I). We use the legislative history of some 5,000 parliamentary amendments. These procedures have been the subject of a great deal of theoretical debate. According to conventional wisdom the co-decision procedure increases the powers of the European Parliament. Revisionist appr…
Thinking locally, acting supranationally: Niche party behaviour in the European Parliament
Recent research on the European Parliament (EP) has neglected the idiosyncrasies of niche parties. Similarly, analyses of niche parties have not fully engaged the literature on the EP. This article builds on both literatures by analysing niche party behaviour in the EP as a distinct phenomenon. It is argued that niche parties will respond differently to institutional stimuli than parties more generally. To test this argument, Hix, Noury and Rolan…
Testing the ‘Party Matters' Thesis: Explaining Progress Towards Kyoto Protocol Targets
There is growing interest in whether and how parties matter. We add to this discussion by exploring the ways in which parties matter for policy outcomes. To do this, we look at the European Union (EU) member states' progress towards the greenhouse gas emissions targets set for them by the Kyoto Protocol and the EU's Burden Sharing Agreement. We find that governments that are more pro-environment and less ideologically divided make better progress…
Parliamentary Questions, Oversight, and National Opposition Status intheEuropeanParliament
This study examines when and why members of theEuropeanParliament (EP) use parliamentary questions as a form of fire alarm oversight. We argue that the multilevel nature of theEUpolitical system allows members of theEPfrom national opposition parties to use parliamentary questions to alert theEuropean Commission to governments' failures to implementEUpolicy. Representation in theEPprovides the only avenue for such oversight for national oppositio…
Implementing Europe: A Question of Oversight
This article shows that member state governments' ability rather than their willingness to implement directives drives uneven implementation of European Union labor policy. Analysis of 186 labor policy infringement cases against 15 member states between 1978 and 2000 shows that administrative oversight mechanisms that concentrate authority in the hands of government and exclude interest group participation enhance governments' ability to resolve …
Institutional hokey-pokey: The politics of multispeed integration in the European Union
EU member states desiring deeper integration often call for a multispeed approach to pursue ambitious projects without the hinderance of laggards. At other times, laggards have desired a multispeed approach to avoid policies they find objectionable. Under what circumstances do laggards (integrationists) propose (object) to a multispeed Europe? We investigate the institutions and member state preferences that lead these camps to accept or resist m…
Manifestos, salience and junior ministerial appointments
We build on previous theories of junior minister allocation and coalition oversight by incorporating a novel theory of strategic changes in the issues covered in party manifestos. We argue that parties use junior ministerial appointments to oversee their coalition partners on portfolios that correspond to issues emphasized by the parties’ activists when the coalition partner’s preferences deviate from the party’s. The findings, based on a data se…
Compelled without direction: Compulsory voting and party system spreading
The cost of coalition compromise: The electoral effects of holding salient portfolios
This article highlights the electoral effects of holding salient portfolios within a coalition government. For voters, holding ministries can be seen as a symbol of a party’s success within the coalition. As a voting heuristic, parties not controlling the portfolios on issues important to their platforms signal their failure to achieve these goals. Following this perspective, we hypothesize that the difference between coalition parties that hold …
Ruling divided: Disagreement, issue salience, and portfolio allocation
Issue salience and ideological disagreement often predict coalition government behavior. However, research on portfolio allocation has yet to fully specify the complex relationship between issue salience, disagreement, and coalition negotiations. Scholars treat issue salience and disagreement as distinct and disconnected, despite evidence that they work together and with conditional effects in a range of settings. Following a logic of portfolio t…
Making Rules about Rulemaking: A Comparison of Presidential and Parliamentary Systems
The authors examine the administrative procedures acts (APAs) of separation of powers and parliamentary systems. They examine sixteen national APAs (thirteen parliamentary and three presidential) and forty-eight APAs from the U.S. states that have institutional structures analogous to the presidential systems. They identify a very stark difference between the parliamentary and presidential APAs. While all of the presidential system APAs place con…
Confrontation and competition: The electoral benefits of regionalist parties’ positions in parliamentary democracies
Recent research has shown that niche parties are both increasing in importance in European party systems and behave differently than their more mainstream counterparts. Indeed, there is growing evidence that the dynamic between green parties and social democratic parties is especially nuanced. Regionalist parties differ from other niche parties in that they can be found on the left, right, and center of the ideological spectrum. We find that regi…
Predicting Ambiguity: Costs, Benefits, and Party Competition
We present a formal model of party competition to explain differences in party ideological ambiguity. Existing works generally argue that parties are more or less ambiguous depending on whether their supporters are risk-acceptant or risk-averse. Our model explores more fully strategic choice of ambiguity by considering nonelectoral benefits to ambiguity—that is, party elite recruitment and retention. In terms of costs, we assume that all voters a…
Constraining a Shadowy Future: Enacting APAs in Parliamentary Systems
Single‐party parliamentary governments often have no institutional checks on their authority. Such governments can pass and implement policies constrained only by the need to maintain party loyalty and win elections. Literature on delegation suggests that such governments would never adopt reforms such as Administrative Procedures Acts (APAs) that are designed to constrain this freedom. Nevertheless, such governments do pass APAs: Greece, Portuga…
Who Calls for a Common EU Foreign Policy: Partisan Constraints on CFSP Reform
What drove the preferences over institutional choices of EU Constitutional Convention delegates in the area of foreign policy? We examine delegate preferences and find strong evidence that partisan identity rather than government positions drove delegates' preferences for both the role of the Commission and the voting rule in the Council. We also find evidence that delegates' party positions on an EU foreign policy are better predictors than dele…
Inspecting the Inspectors: Overseeing Labor Inspectorates in Parliamentary Democracies
Most theories of how to control bureaucracies are derived from American experience and are tested with data from the U.S. In contrast, this article uses evidence from the 15 members of the European Union to examine oversight mechanisms through which legislators attempt to control the bureaucracy. Analysis of European data shows that “police patrol” mechanisms of oversight appear in countries with relatively little gridlock as measured by the ideo…
Changing the Rules: Institutions, Party Systems, and the Frequency of Constitutional Amendments in Africa
What factors influence constitutional stability in the emerging democracies of Sub-Saharan Africa? This is an important question that has never been addressed in a systematic cross-national study of Africa's emerging democracies. Using the Comparative Constitutions Project dataset and our own original dataset for veto players and party systems, we examine the influence of veto players and party system characteristics on the frequency of constitut…
The effects of political parties on roll-call voting in Kenya’s Parliament
Parties are thought to organise democratic legislatures by influencing the voting behaviour of individual legislators. We examine whether parties and party coalitions influence the behaviour of legislators in Kenya. Ethnicity has been seen as the driver of party and electoral politics in Kenya and therefore Kenya provides a hard test of the proposition that political parties organise the legislature in Africa. Analysing roll-call voting in the 11…
Legislative Procedures in the European Union: An Empirical Analysis
The article analyses the role of the Commission, the Parliament, and the Council in the two main legislative procedures in the European Union: co-operation and co-decision (I). We use the legislative history of some 5,000 parliamentary amendments. These procedures have been the subject of a great deal of theoretical debate. According to conventional wisdom the co-decision procedure increases the powers of the European Parliament. Revisionist appr…
Inspecting the Inspectors: Overseeing Labor Inspectorates in Parliamentary Democracies
Most theories of how to control bureaucracies are derived from American experience and are tested with data from the U.S. In contrast, this article uses evidence from the 15 members of the European Union to examine oversight mechanisms through which legislators attempt to control the bureaucracy. Analysis of European data shows that “police patrol” mechanisms of oversight appear in countries with relatively little gridlock as measured by the ideo…
Implementing Europe: A Question of Oversight
This article shows that member state governments' ability rather than their willingness to implement directives drives uneven implementation of European Union labor policy. Analysis of 186 labor policy infringement cases against 15 member states between 1978 and 2000 shows that administrative oversight mechanisms that concentrate authority in the hands of government and exclude interest group participation enhance governments' ability to resolve …
Who Calls for a Common EU Foreign Policy: Partisan Constraints on CFSP Reform
What drove the preferences over institutional choices of EU Constitutional Convention delegates in the area of foreign policy? We examine delegate preferences and find strong evidence that partisan identity rather than government positions drove delegates' preferences for both the role of the Commission and the voting rule in the Council. We also find evidence that delegates' party positions on an EU foreign policy are better predictors than dele…
Thinking locally, acting supranationally: Niche party behaviour in the European Parliament
Recent research on the European Parliament (EP) has neglected the idiosyncrasies of niche parties. Similarly, analyses of niche parties have not fully engaged the literature on the EP. This article builds on both literatures by analysing niche party behaviour in the EP as a distinct phenomenon. It is argued that niche parties will respond differently to institutional stimuli than parties more generally. To test this argument, Hix, Noury and Rolan…
Procedural Change and the Sources of Ex Ante Constraints in EU Legislation: Procedural Change and Ex Ante Constraints
With 27 member states using a variety of administrative practices and institutions to implement European Union (EU) policy, the EU has been widely used as a natural laboratory for analyzing administrative politics and institutions. This research has largely focused on the institutional relationships as they are at the time of the analysis. However, the EU has used several legislative procedures. Furthermore, there has been little attention given …
Testing the ‘Party Matters' Thesis: Explaining Progress Towards Kyoto Protocol Targets
There is growing interest in whether and how parties matter. We add to this discussion by exploring the ways in which parties matter for policy outcomes. To do this, we look at the European Union (EU) member states' progress towards the greenhouse gas emissions targets set for them by the Kyoto Protocol and the EU's Burden Sharing Agreement. We find that governments that are more pro-environment and less ideologically divided make better progress…
Making Rules about Rulemaking: A Comparison of Presidential and Parliamentary Systems
The authors examine the administrative procedures acts (APAs) of separation of powers and parliamentary systems. They examine sixteen national APAs (thirteen parliamentary and three presidential) and forty-eight APAs from the U.S. states that have institutional structures analogous to the presidential systems. They identify a very stark difference between the parliamentary and presidential APAs. While all of the presidential system APAs place con…
Compelled without direction: Compulsory voting and party system spreading
Institutional hokey-pokey: The politics of multispeed integration in the European Union
EU member states desiring deeper integration often call for a multispeed approach to pursue ambitious projects without the hinderance of laggards. At other times, laggards have desired a multispeed approach to avoid policies they find objectionable. Under what circumstances do laggards (integrationists) propose (object) to a multispeed Europe? We investigate the institutions and member state preferences that lead these camps to accept or resist m…
Parliamentary Questions, Oversight, and National Opposition Status intheEuropeanParliament
This study examines when and why members of theEuropeanParliament (EP) use parliamentary questions as a form of fire alarm oversight. We argue that the multilevel nature of theEUpolitical system allows members of theEPfrom national opposition parties to use parliamentary questions to alert theEuropean Commission to governments' failures to implementEUpolicy. Representation in theEPprovides the only avenue for such oversight for national oppositio…
Manifestos, salience and junior ministerial appointments
We build on previous theories of junior minister allocation and coalition oversight by incorporating a novel theory of strategic changes in the issues covered in party manifestos. We argue that parties use junior ministerial appointments to oversee their coalition partners on portfolios that correspond to issues emphasized by the parties’ activists when the coalition partner’s preferences deviate from the party’s. The findings, based on a data se…
Constraining a Shadowy Future: Enacting APAs in Parliamentary Systems
Single‐party parliamentary governments often have no institutional checks on their authority. Such governments can pass and implement policies constrained only by the need to maintain party loyalty and win elections. Literature on delegation suggests that such governments would never adopt reforms such as Administrative Procedures Acts (APAs) that are designed to constrain this freedom. Nevertheless, such governments do pass APAs: Greece, Portuga…
Predicting Ambiguity: Costs, Benefits, and Party Competition
We present a formal model of party competition to explain differences in party ideological ambiguity. Existing works generally argue that parties are more or less ambiguous depending on whether their supporters are risk-acceptant or risk-averse. Our model explores more fully strategic choice of ambiguity by considering nonelectoral benefits to ambiguity—that is, party elite recruitment and retention. In terms of costs, we assume that all voters a…
Ruling divided: Disagreement, issue salience, and portfolio allocation
Issue salience and ideological disagreement often predict coalition government behavior. However, research on portfolio allocation has yet to fully specify the complex relationship between issue salience, disagreement, and coalition negotiations. Scholars treat issue salience and disagreement as distinct and disconnected, despite evidence that they work together and with conditional effects in a range of settings. Following a logic of portfolio t…
Confrontation and competition: The electoral benefits of regionalist parties’ positions in parliamentary democracies
Recent research has shown that niche parties are both increasing in importance in European party systems and behave differently than their more mainstream counterparts. Indeed, there is growing evidence that the dynamic between green parties and social democratic parties is especially nuanced. Regionalist parties differ from other niche parties in that they can be found on the left, right, and center of the ideological spectrum. We find that regi…
The effects of political parties on roll-call voting in Kenya’s Parliament
Parties are thought to organise democratic legislatures by influencing the voting behaviour of individual legislators. We examine whether parties and party coalitions influence the behaviour of legislators in Kenya. Ethnicity has been seen as the driver of party and electoral politics in Kenya and therefore Kenya provides a hard test of the proposition that political parties organise the legislature in Africa. Analysing roll-call voting in the 11…
The cost of coalition compromise: The electoral effects of holding salient portfolios
This article highlights the electoral effects of holding salient portfolios within a coalition government. For voters, holding ministries can be seen as a symbol of a party’s success within the coalition. As a voting heuristic, parties not controlling the portfolios on issues important to their platforms signal their failure to achieve these goals. Following this perspective, we hypothesize that the difference between coalition parties that hold …
Changing the Rules: Institutions, Party Systems, and the Frequency of Constitutional Amendments in Africa
What factors influence constitutional stability in the emerging democracies of Sub-Saharan Africa? This is an important question that has never been addressed in a systematic cross-national study of Africa's emerging democracies. Using the Comparative Constitutions Project dataset and our own original dataset for veto players and party systems, we examine the influence of veto players and party system characteristics on the frequency of constitut…
Law (19 works) · Law (19 works) · Political science (19 works) · Economics (16 works) · Politics (16 works) · Electoral Systems and Political Participation (12 works) · Public Administration (11 works) · Public Administration (11 works) · Political economy (9 works) · Political Influence and Corporate Strategies (9 works)