Nathan M Jensen
Biographic Data
| ID | 3717895 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Nathan M Jensen |
| GIVEN NAMES | Nathan M |
| FAMILY NAME | Jensen |
| SIGNATURE | JENSEN N M |
| AFFILIATIONS | Washington University in St. Louis |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-3251-8117 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 38 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 1153 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 38 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2003 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 17 |
When sunshine gets you down: The role of transparency on public sentiment toward the amazon HQ2 competition
In 2019, more than 230 local governments sought to attract the second headquarters of Amazon (HQ2). The Amazon HQ2 contest presents a unique, high‐profile case of state and local government competition for a project. It took place in a defined timeframe with varying bids and levels of government transparency and offers a rare window to explore how the information environment shapes expressions of sentiment by distinct actors in the political mark…
How do women’s empowerment metrics measure up? A comparative analysis
Women’s empowerment is a critical factor for nutrition and health outcomes. • There is no consensus on how empowerment should be measured. • With data from a single sample of Kenyan women, we compare five empowerment metrics. • We find striking differences between these common empowerment metrics. • Metric choice dramatically influences which women are identified as empowered. Research has identified women’s empowerment as a critical factor for n…
Leakage” in International Regulatory Regimes: Did the OECD Anti-bribery Convention Increase Bribery
When do well-intended regulatory regimes have unintended consequences? We examine one obstacle to successful regulation, “regulatory leakage,” in the context of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention (ABC). Leakage occurs when regulated behavior decreases for actors under a regime’s jurisdiction, but increases among those outside of it. We analyze a formal model that demonstrates how the ABC may simultaneously reduce bribery among firms from member cou…
Electoral Institutions and Electoral Cycles in Investment Incentives: A Field Experiment on Over 3,000 U.S. Municipalities
Through a field experiment and audit study, we test how the electoral calendar affects the use of local economic development policies. We explore how electoral timing along with local political institutions and party composition affect local governments’ offers of investment incentives to outside firms. We legally incorporated a consultancy and, on behalf of a real investor in manufacturing, approached roughly 3,000 U.S. municipalities with inqui…
Open for Politics? Globalization, Economic Growth, and Responsibility Attribution
Previous literature suggests that economic performance affects government approval asymmetrically, either because voters are quicker to blame incompetence than to credit ability (grievance asymmetry) or because they understand that the degree to which policy-makers can affect the economy varies depending on economic openness (clarity of responsibility asymmetry). We seek to understand whether these asymmetries coexist, arguing that these theories…
Bargaining and the effectiveness of economic development incentives: An evaluation of the Texas chapter 313 program
Nonstate Actors and Compliance with International Agreements: An Empirical Analysis of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention
International relations scholarship has made great progress on the study of compliance with international agreements. While persuasive, most of this work has focused on states’de jurecompliance decisions, largely excluding thede factobehavior of nonstate actors whose actions the agreement hopes to constrain. Of particular interest has been whether the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention (ABC) might reduce the propensity of multinational corporations (MN…
The effect of economic development incentives and clawback provisions on job creation: A pre-registered evaluation of Maryland and Virginia programs
Economic development incentives target individual firms for financial or non-financial benefits to induce capital investment or job creation. Previous studies have found a mixed impact of incentives on economic development, with numerous studies pointing to no impact of incentives on economic growth or job creation. I add to this literature by analyzing two different state economic development incentive programs using the same methods and time-pe…
Job creation and firm-specific location incentives
Government economic development programmes provide opportunities for firms to leverage financial incentives for business expansion and relocation. This article examines the ability of these incentives to promote employment. Using establishment-level data from the state of Kansas as well as original firm-level survey data, I evaluate the effectiveness of financial incentives in creating jobs through recipient firms. My findings from the establishm…
Can Results-Free Review Reduce Publication Bias? The Results and Implications of a Pilot Study
In 2015, Comparative Political Studies embarked on a landmark pilot study in research transparency in the social sciences. The editors issued an open call for submissions of manuscripts that contained no mention of their actual results, incentivizing reviewers to evaluate manuscripts based on their theoretical contributions, research designs, and analysis plans. The three papers in this special issue are the result of this process that began with…
Monopoly Money: Foreign Investment and Bribery in Vietnam, a Survey Experiment
Prevailing work argues that foreign investment reduces corruption, either by competing down monopoly rents or diffusing best practices of corporate governance. We argue that the mechanisms generating this relationship are not clear because the extant empirical work is too heavily drawn from aggregations of total foreign investment entering an economy. Alternatively, we suggest that openness to foreign investment has differential effects on corrup…
Competing for global capital or local voters? The politics of business location incentives
Globalization and Domestic Trade Policy Preferences: Foreign Frames and Mass Support for Agriculture Subsidies
Reforming agriculture trade policy is key to breaking the deadlock in multilateral trade negotiations. While existing studies have focused on institutions and interest group barriers to agriculture trade reform in developed countries, most have failed to recognize the broad support for agriculture protection among developed countries. In this article we examine one of the drivers of this support: the ability of politicians to frame their own agri…
Introduction: Survey and Experimental Research in International Political Economy
Studies in international political economy (IPE) that use survey-response data sets and survey (or field) experiments have grown dramatically in recent years. New developments in survey and experimental methodology have arguably influenced IPE scholars not only to think more deeply about the microfoundations of the preferences, attitudes, and political behavior of key IPE actors but also to use survey or experimental methods to test causal claims…
Pass the Bucks: Credit, Blame, and the Global Competition for Investment
Both countries and subnational governments commonly engage in competition for mobile capital, offering generous incentives to attract investment. Existing economics research has suggested that these tax incentives have a limited ability to affect investment patterns and are often excessively costly when measured against the amount of investment and jobs created. In this paper, we argue instead that the "competition" for capital can be politically…
Political Liabilities: Surviving Banking Crises
Little is known about the political repercussions of banking crises despite the extensive literature on the link between economic performance and political outcomes. We develop a theory of how clarity of responsibility affects incumbent party survival patterns in 89 democracies between 1975 and 2005. Our results are robust to modeling strategies that include hazard models with shared frailties to account for country-specific factors that affect i…
Unbundling the Relationship between Authoritarian Legislatures and Political Risk
A strong statistical association between legislative opposition in authoritarian regimes and investment has been interpreted as evidence that authoritarian legislatures constrain executive decisions and reduce the threat of expropriation. Although the empirical relationship is robust, scholars have not provided systematic evidence that authoritarian parliaments are able to restrain the actions of state leaders, reverse activities they disagree wi…
Domestic Institutions and the Taxing of Multinational Corporations1: Taxing of Multinational Corporations
Political scientists have examined how domestic politics and the competition for international capital affect the setting of national tax rates. In this paper, I explore how political institutions, specifically the level of democracy, affect firm-level taxation across the world. I argue that electoral competition leads democratic governments to higher levels of taxation on firms. Using a data set on firm tax payments on the foreign affiliates of …
Leaning Right and Learning From the Left: Diffusion of Corporate Tax Policy Across Borders
There is an increased focus in comparative politics and international relations on how choices of governments are dependent on choices made by other governments. The authors argue that although the relationship between policy choices across countries is often labeled as either diffusion or competition, in many cases the theoretical mechanisms underpinning these labels are unclear. In this article, the authors build a model of social learning with…
Fiscal Policy and the Firm: Do Low Corporate Tax Rates Attract Multinational Corporations
The existing literature on the political economy of taxation explores how the mobility of firms affects the ability of governments to tax capital. In this article the author tests the relationship between corporate tax rates and multinational investment decisions in advanced, industrialized economies. He utilizes a time-series cross-sectional general error correction model to explore the impact of corporate taxation rates and foreign direct inves…
Globalization and the Politics of Natural Resources
Much political science scholarship, including important work in this journal, has explored the implications of natural resource endowments— particularly oil and other highly valuable export commodities—on political and economic outcomes. Although the first wave of literature emphasized the negative effects of these resources, more recent work emphasizes how domestic institutions can condition the relationship, sometimes leading to positive effect…
Political Risk, Reputation, and the Resource Curse
There is a growing literature on how natural resources affect both economic performance and political regimes. In this article the authors add to this literature by focusing on how natural resource wealth affects the incentives of governments to uphold contracts with foreign investors across all sectors. They argue that although all states suffer reputation costs from reneging on contracts, governments in natural-resource-dependent economies are …
Vote-seeking incentives and investment environments: The need for credit claiming and the provision of protectionism
Nation-States and the Multinational Corporation: A Political Economy of Foreign Direct Investment
Political Risk, Democratic Institutions, and Foreign Direct Investment
There is a renewed interest in how political risk affects multinational corporations operating in emerging markets. Much of this research has focused on the relationship between democratic institutions and flows of foreign direct investment (FDI). Yet the existing studies suffer from data problems that only allow for indirect evidence of the relationship between political institutions and political risk. In this paper I utilize price data from po…
Democratic Governance and Multinational Corporations: Political Regimes and Inflows of Foreign Direct Investment
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is an important element of the global economy and a central component of economic development strategies of both developed and developing countries. Numerous scholars theorize that the economic benefits of attracting multinational corporations come at tremendous political costs, arguing that democratic political systems attract lower levels of international investment than their authoritarian counterparts. Using bo…
Resource Wealth and Political Regimes in Africa
Political economists point to the levels of economic development, poverty, and income inequality as the most important determinants of political regimes. The authors present empirical evidence suggesting a robust and negative correlation between the presence of a sizable natural resource sector and the level of democracy in Africa. They argue that resource abundance not only is an important determinant of democratic transition but also partially …
Political Risk, Democratic Institutions, and Foreign Direct Investment
There is a renewed interest in how political risk affects multinational corporations operating in emerging markets. Much of this research has focused on the relationship between democratic institutions and flows of foreign direct investment (FDI). Yet the existing studies suffer from data problems that only allow for indirect evidence of the relationship between political institutions and political risk. In this paper I utilize price data from po…
Nation-States and the Multinational Corporation: A Political Economy of Foreign Direct Investment
Political Risk, Reputation, and the Resource Curse
There is a growing literature on how natural resources affect both economic performance and political regimes. In this article the authors add to this literature by focusing on how natural resource wealth affects the incentives of governments to uphold contracts with foreign investors across all sectors. They argue that although all states suffer reputation costs from reneging on contracts, governments in natural-resource-dependent economies are …
Crisis, Conditions, and Capital: The Effect of International Monetary Fund Agreements on Foreign Direct Investment Inflows
A selection model for 68 countries between 1970 and 1998 is used to test the impact of International Monetary Fund(IMF) programs on international capital markets and examine how agreements are perceived by multinational investors. Results reveal that even after controlling for the factors that lead countries to seek IMF support, IMF agreements lead to lower levels of foreign direct investment (FDI). Countries that sign IMF agreements, ceteris par…
Unbundling the Relationship between Authoritarian Legislatures and Political Risk
A strong statistical association between legislative opposition in authoritarian regimes and investment has been interpreted as evidence that authoritarian legislatures constrain executive decisions and reduce the threat of expropriation. Although the empirical relationship is robust, scholars have not provided systematic evidence that authoritarian parliaments are able to restrain the actions of state leaders, reverse activities they disagree wi…
Electoral Competition and Agricultural Support in OECD Countries
Agricultural trade protectionism in developed countries remains a politically charged issue, yet few studies have attempted to explain the political dynamics behind this important trade issue. We consider agricultural subsidies as a type of distributive policy that targets the agricultural sector at the expense of consumers and taxpayers. Based on Cox (1987, 1990) and Myerson (1993), we argue that electoral systems that encourage politicians to a…
A Violent Future? Political Risk Insurance Markets and Violence Forecasts
There is a substantial literature that has linked past acts of violence to investment. In this article, we argue that the appropriate mechanism linking violence to investment is investor perceptions of risk, in which forward-looking investors attempt to predict the likelihood of future political violence. We take advantage of a new data source—the price paid by investors to purchase risk insurance coverage—to more accurately capture how risk is a…
Market Responses to Politics: The Rise of Lula and the Decline of the Brazilian Stock Market
This article argues that stock market responses to political events provide information on how politics affect markets. Political events, such as the election of a politician that is expected to enact “market-friendly” policies, lead to increases in stock market returns. Conversely, political events that are expected to have a negative impact on the economy and specific firms lead to decreases in stock market returns. The 2002 Brazilian president…
Pass the Bucks: Credit, Blame, and the Global Competition for Investment
Both countries and subnational governments commonly engage in competition for mobile capital, offering generous incentives to attract investment. Existing economics research has suggested that these tax incentives have a limited ability to affect investment patterns and are often excessively costly when measured against the amount of investment and jobs created. In this paper, we argue instead that the "competition" for capital can be politically…
Political Liabilities: Surviving Banking Crises
Little is known about the political repercussions of banking crises despite the extensive literature on the link between economic performance and political outcomes. We develop a theory of how clarity of responsibility affects incumbent party survival patterns in 89 democracies between 1975 and 2005. Our results are robust to modeling strategies that include hazard models with shared frailties to account for country-specific factors that affect i…
Domestic Institutions and the Taxing of Multinational Corporations1: Taxing of Multinational Corporations
Political scientists have examined how domestic politics and the competition for international capital affect the setting of national tax rates. In this paper, I explore how political institutions, specifically the level of democracy, affect firm-level taxation across the world. I argue that electoral competition leads democratic governments to higher levels of taxation on firms. Using a data set on firm tax payments on the foreign affiliates of …
Leaning Right and Learning From the Left: Diffusion of Corporate Tax Policy Across Borders
There is an increased focus in comparative politics and international relations on how choices of governments are dependent on choices made by other governments. The authors argue that although the relationship between policy choices across countries is often labeled as either diffusion or competition, in many cases the theoretical mechanisms underpinning these labels are unclear. In this article, the authors build a model of social learning with…
Globalization and the Politics of Natural Resources
Much political science scholarship, including important work in this journal, has explored the implications of natural resource endowments— particularly oil and other highly valuable export commodities—on political and economic outcomes. Although the first wave of literature emphasized the negative effects of these resources, more recent work emphasizes how domestic institutions can condition the relationship, sometimes leading to positive effect…
Foreign Direct Investment and Income Inequality in Mexico, 1990–2000
In this paper we explore the relationship between the investments of multinational corporations (foreign direct investment) and income inequality in Mexico. We argue that Mexico's liberalization of foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows in the 1990s provides a natural experiment to test how FDI affects income inequality in a middle-income country. We use an instrumental variables approach as our identification strategy to mitigate problems of en…
Competing for global capital or local voters? The politics of business location incentives
Can Results-Free Review Reduce Publication Bias? The Results and Implications of a Pilot Study
In 2015, Comparative Political Studies embarked on a landmark pilot study in research transparency in the social sciences. The editors issued an open call for submissions of manuscripts that contained no mention of their actual results, incentivizing reviewers to evaluate manuscripts based on their theoretical contributions, research designs, and analysis plans. The three papers in this special issue are the result of this process that began with…
Fiscal Policy and the Firm: Do Low Corporate Tax Rates Attract Multinational Corporations
The existing literature on the political economy of taxation explores how the mobility of firms affects the ability of governments to tax capital. In this article the author tests the relationship between corporate tax rates and multinational investment decisions in advanced, industrialized economies. He utilizes a time-series cross-sectional general error correction model to explore the impact of corporate taxation rates and foreign direct inves…
Nonstate Actors and Compliance with International Agreements: An Empirical Analysis of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention
International relations scholarship has made great progress on the study of compliance with international agreements. While persuasive, most of this work has focused on states’de jurecompliance decisions, largely excluding thede factobehavior of nonstate actors whose actions the agreement hopes to constrain. Of particular interest has been whether the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention (ABC) might reduce the propensity of multinational corporations (MN…
Job creation and firm-specific location incentives
Government economic development programmes provide opportunities for firms to leverage financial incentives for business expansion and relocation. This article examines the ability of these incentives to promote employment. Using establishment-level data from the state of Kansas as well as original firm-level survey data, I evaluate the effectiveness of financial incentives in creating jobs through recipient firms. My findings from the establishm…
Vote-seeking incentives and investment environments: The need for credit claiming and the provision of protectionism
Federal Institutions and Multinational Investors: Federalism, Government Credibility, and Foreign Direct Investment
Political risk is an important factor in the decision to invest abroad. While the investment potential might be lucrative, there is always the risk that the host government will expropriate the profits and assets of the foreign investor. Political institutions, however, can serve as constraints on the actions of political actors in the host country. We argue that federal structures lower political risk. Joint-reputational accountability in overla…
Introduction: Survey and Experimental Research in International Political Economy
Studies in international political economy (IPE) that use survey-response data sets and survey (or field) experiments have grown dramatically in recent years. New developments in survey and experimental methodology have arguably influenced IPE scholars not only to think more deeply about the microfoundations of the preferences, attitudes, and political behavior of key IPE actors but also to use survey or experimental methods to test causal claims…
Electoral Institutions and Electoral Cycles in Investment Incentives: A Field Experiment on Over 3,000 U.S. Municipalities
Through a field experiment and audit study, we test how the electoral calendar affects the use of local economic development policies. We explore how electoral timing along with local political institutions and party composition affect local governments’ offers of investment incentives to outside firms. We legally incorporated a consultancy and, on behalf of a real investor in manufacturing, approached roughly 3,000 U.S. municipalities with inqui…
Democratic Governance and Multinational Corporations: Political Regimes and Inflows of Foreign Direct Investment
Foreign direct investment (FDI) is an important element of the global economy and a central component of economic development strategies of both developed and developing countries. Numerous scholars theorize that the economic benefits of attracting multinational corporations come at tremendous political costs, arguing that democratic political systems attract lower levels of international investment than their authoritarian counterparts. Using bo…
Rational Citizens Against Reform: Poverty and Economic Reform in Transition Economies
The debate on the political obstacles to economic reform in postcommunist countries has centered around two interrelated theories. Adam Przeworski argues that short-term negative distributional consequences can stall economic reform. Joel Hellman contends that industry insiders and political elites have incentives to stall economic reform. Although both sets of theories contend that the distributional aspects of economic transition affect reform,…
Crisis, Conditions, and Capital: The Effect of International Monetary Fund Agreements on Foreign Direct Investment Inflows
A selection model for 68 countries between 1970 and 1998 is used to test the impact of International Monetary Fund(IMF) programs on international capital markets and examine how agreements are perceived by multinational investors. Results reveal that even after controlling for the factors that lead countries to seek IMF support, IMF agreements lead to lower levels of foreign direct investment (FDI). Countries that sign IMF agreements, ceteris par…
Resource Wealth and Political Regimes in Africa
Political economists point to the levels of economic development, poverty, and income inequality as the most important determinants of political regimes. The authors present empirical evidence suggesting a robust and negative correlation between the presence of a sizable natural resource sector and the level of democracy in Africa. They argue that resource abundance not only is an important determinant of democratic transition but also partially …
Federal Institutions and Multinational Investors: Federalism, Government Credibility, and Foreign Direct Investment
Political risk is an important factor in the decision to invest abroad. While the investment potential might be lucrative, there is always the risk that the host government will expropriate the profits and assets of the foreign investor. Political institutions, however, can serve as constraints on the actions of political actors in the host country. We argue that federal structures lower political risk. Joint-reputational accountability in overla…
Market Responses to Politics: The Rise of Lula and the Decline of the Brazilian Stock Market
This article argues that stock market responses to political events provide information on how politics affect markets. Political events, such as the election of a politician that is expected to enact “market-friendly” policies, lead to increases in stock market returns. Conversely, political events that are expected to have a negative impact on the economy and specific firms lead to decreases in stock market returns. The 2002 Brazilian president…
Fiscal Federalism and International Capital: The Effects of Fiscal Federalism on Foreign Direct Investment and Sovereign Dept Ratings
Although the study of federalism has become one of the most intensely studied areas in economics and political science, no consensus has emerged on the impact of fiscal federalism on macroeconomic performance. I focus on one specific element of the debate- the role of fiscally federal institutions in allowing a country access to international capital markets. In an empirical analysis of 60 countries from 1975-1995 I find fiscal federalism has no …
The Multinational Corporation Empowers the Nation-State
In the next ten years, who will win and who will lose from globalization? In thinking about this question, I avoid speculating on the broad impact of globalization on economic outcomes. Instead, I limit my treatment to the impact of multinational corporations (MNCs) on developed and developing countries, especially how competition to attract firms affects domestic politics and national economies
Heard Melodies Are Sweet, But Those Unheard Are Sweeter: Understanding Corruption Using Cross-National Firm-Level Surveys
Since the early 1990s, a large number of studies have been undertaken to understand the causes and consequences of corruption. Many of these studies have employed firm-level survey data from various countries. While insightful, these analyses based on firm-level surveys have largely ignored two important potential problems: nonresponse and false response by the firms. Treating firms' responses on a sensitive issue like corruption at their face va…
Independent Actor or Agent? An Empirical Analysis of the Impact of U.S. Interests on International Monetary Fund Conditions
In this paper, we analyze whether International Monetary Fund (IMF) conditionality is exclusively designed to be in line with observable economic indicators or whether it is partly driven by the IMF's major shareholder, the United States. A panel data analysis of 206 letters of intent from 38 countries, submitted during the period April 1997 through February 2003, revealed that the number of conditions on an IMF loan depended on a borrowing count…
Foreign Direct Investment and Income Inequality in Mexico, 1990–2000
In this paper we explore the relationship between the investments of multinational corporations (foreign direct investment) and income inequality in Mexico. We argue that Mexico's liberalization of foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows in the 1990s provides a natural experiment to test how FDI affects income inequality in a middle-income country. We use an instrumental variables approach as our identification strategy to mitigate problems of en…
Electoral Competition and Agricultural Support in OECD Countries
Agricultural trade protectionism in developed countries remains a politically charged issue, yet few studies have attempted to explain the political dynamics behind this important trade issue. We consider agricultural subsidies as a type of distributive policy that targets the agricultural sector at the expense of consumers and taxpayers. Based on Cox (1987, 1990) and Myerson (1993), we argue that electoral systems that encourage politicians to a…
Nation-States and the Multinational Corporation: A Political Economy of Foreign Direct Investment
Political Risk, Democratic Institutions, and Foreign Direct Investment
There is a renewed interest in how political risk affects multinational corporations operating in emerging markets. Much of this research has focused on the relationship between democratic institutions and flows of foreign direct investment (FDI). Yet the existing studies suffer from data problems that only allow for indirect evidence of the relationship between political institutions and political risk. In this paper I utilize price data from po…
A Violent Future? Political Risk Insurance Markets and Violence Forecasts
There is a substantial literature that has linked past acts of violence to investment. In this article, we argue that the appropriate mechanism linking violence to investment is investor perceptions of risk, in which forward-looking investors attempt to predict the likelihood of future political violence. We take advantage of a new data source—the price paid by investors to purchase risk insurance coverage—to more accurately capture how risk is a…
Vote-seeking incentives and investment environments: The need for credit claiming and the provision of protectionism
Globalization and the Politics of Natural Resources
Much political science scholarship, including important work in this journal, has explored the implications of natural resource endowments— particularly oil and other highly valuable export commodities—on political and economic outcomes. Although the first wave of literature emphasized the negative effects of these resources, more recent work emphasizes how domestic institutions can condition the relationship, sometimes leading to positive effect…
Political Risk, Reputation, and the Resource Curse
There is a growing literature on how natural resources affect both economic performance and political regimes. In this article the authors add to this literature by focusing on how natural resource wealth affects the incentives of governments to uphold contracts with foreign investors across all sectors. They argue that although all states suffer reputation costs from reneging on contracts, governments in natural-resource-dependent economies are …
Leaning Right and Learning From the Left: Diffusion of Corporate Tax Policy Across Borders
There is an increased focus in comparative politics and international relations on how choices of governments are dependent on choices made by other governments. The authors argue that although the relationship between policy choices across countries is often labeled as either diffusion or competition, in many cases the theoretical mechanisms underpinning these labels are unclear. In this article, the authors build a model of social learning with…
Fiscal Policy and the Firm: Do Low Corporate Tax Rates Attract Multinational Corporations
The existing literature on the political economy of taxation explores how the mobility of firms affects the ability of governments to tax capital. In this article the author tests the relationship between corporate tax rates and multinational investment decisions in advanced, industrialized economies. He utilizes a time-series cross-sectional general error correction model to explore the impact of corporate taxation rates and foreign direct inves…
Domestic Institutions and the Taxing of Multinational Corporations1: Taxing of Multinational Corporations
Political scientists have examined how domestic politics and the competition for international capital affect the setting of national tax rates. In this paper, I explore how political institutions, specifically the level of democracy, affect firm-level taxation across the world. I argue that electoral competition leads democratic governments to higher levels of taxation on firms. Using a data set on firm tax payments on the foreign affiliates of …
Globalization and Domestic Trade Policy Preferences: Foreign Frames and Mass Support for Agriculture Subsidies
Reforming agriculture trade policy is key to breaking the deadlock in multilateral trade negotiations. While existing studies have focused on institutions and interest group barriers to agriculture trade reform in developed countries, most have failed to recognize the broad support for agriculture protection among developed countries. In this article we examine one of the drivers of this support: the ability of politicians to frame their own agri…
Introduction: Survey and Experimental Research in International Political Economy
Studies in international political economy (IPE) that use survey-response data sets and survey (or field) experiments have grown dramatically in recent years. New developments in survey and experimental methodology have arguably influenced IPE scholars not only to think more deeply about the microfoundations of the preferences, attitudes, and political behavior of key IPE actors but also to use survey or experimental methods to test causal claims…
Pass the Bucks: Credit, Blame, and the Global Competition for Investment
Both countries and subnational governments commonly engage in competition for mobile capital, offering generous incentives to attract investment. Existing economics research has suggested that these tax incentives have a limited ability to affect investment patterns and are often excessively costly when measured against the amount of investment and jobs created. In this paper, we argue instead that the "competition" for capital can be politically…
Political Liabilities: Surviving Banking Crises
Little is known about the political repercussions of banking crises despite the extensive literature on the link between economic performance and political outcomes. We develop a theory of how clarity of responsibility affects incumbent party survival patterns in 89 democracies between 1975 and 2005. Our results are robust to modeling strategies that include hazard models with shared frailties to account for country-specific factors that affect i…
Economics (35 works) · Political science (33 works) · Politics (26 works) · Business (19 works) · Market economy (19 works) · Law (17 works) · International economics (15 works) · Law (15 works) · Macroeconomics (12 works) · Finance (11 works)