Joel W Johnson
Biographic Data
| ID | 3717903 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Joel W Johnson |
| GIVEN NAMES | Joel W |
| FAMILY NAME | Johnson |
| SIGNATURE | JOHNSON J W |
| AFFILIATIONS | Colorado State University Pueblo |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-4638-1147 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 5 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 26 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 5 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2011 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2018 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
Electoral Systems and Campaign Finance
Studies that emphasize the importance of legislative electoral systems for campaign finance mostly fit into one of two groups. One literature identifies consequences of electoral systems that foster intraparty competition, including high levels of campaign spending and campaign finance–motivated pork, particularism, and political corruption. The second literature studies “spending effects” (i.e., vote-share gains per unit of expenditure), especia…
Presidential Elections and Corruption Perceptions in Latin America
This paper argues that perceptions of corruption in Latin America exhibit predictable fluctuations in the wake of presidential turnover. Specifically, presidential elections that result in the partisan transfer of power are normally followed by a surge-and-decline pattern in perceived corruption control, with initial improvements that fade with time. The causes are multiple and stem from the removal of corrupt administrations, public enthusiasm a…
Campaign Spending in Proportional Electoral Systems
This article (a) argues that campaign spending is no more effective for challengers than incumbents in congressional elections using candidate-centered forms of proportional representation (PR), (b) develops a new method to estimate spending effects in poly-candidate elections, and (c) demonstrates that spending benefits incumbents as much as challengers in the congressional elections of three separate countries (Brazil, Ireland, and Finland). Th…
Beyond personal vote incentives
Incumbents without a Campaign Finance Advantage
Research from various countries has shown that incumbents in legislative elections raise and spend more money when they face a tougher contest. A statistical analysis of Chilean candidates’ campaign finance disclosures shows the opposite: an inverse relationship between incumbent spending and electoral competitiveness. This occurs because Chile's deputies are relatively limited in their influence over policy and pork and because the congressional…
Campaign Spending in Proportional Electoral Systems
This article (a) argues that campaign spending is no more effective for challengers than incumbents in congressional elections using candidate-centered forms of proportional representation (PR), (b) develops a new method to estimate spending effects in poly-candidate elections, and (c) demonstrates that spending benefits incumbents as much as challengers in the congressional elections of three separate countries (Brazil, Ireland, and Finland). Th…
Beyond personal vote incentives
Incumbents without a Campaign Finance Advantage
Research from various countries has shown that incumbents in legislative elections raise and spend more money when they face a tougher contest. A statistical analysis of Chilean candidates’ campaign finance disclosures shows the opposite: an inverse relationship between incumbent spending and electoral competitiveness. This occurs because Chile's deputies are relatively limited in their influence over policy and pork and because the congressional…
Presidential Elections and Corruption Perceptions in Latin America
This paper argues that perceptions of corruption in Latin America exhibit predictable fluctuations in the wake of presidential turnover. Specifically, presidential elections that result in the partisan transfer of power are normally followed by a surge-and-decline pattern in perceived corruption control, with initial improvements that fade with time. The causes are multiple and stem from the removal of corrupt administrations, public enthusiasm a…
Incumbents without a Campaign Finance Advantage
Research from various countries has shown that incumbents in legislative elections raise and spend more money when they face a tougher contest. A statistical analysis of Chilean candidates’ campaign finance disclosures shows the opposite: an inverse relationship between incumbent spending and electoral competitiveness. This occurs because Chile's deputies are relatively limited in their influence over policy and pork and because the congressional…
Beyond personal vote incentives
Campaign Spending in Proportional Electoral Systems
This article (a) argues that campaign spending is no more effective for challengers than incumbents in congressional elections using candidate-centered forms of proportional representation (PR), (b) develops a new method to estimate spending effects in poly-candidate elections, and (c) demonstrates that spending benefits incumbents as much as challengers in the congressional elections of three separate countries (Brazil, Ireland, and Finland). Th…
Presidential Elections and Corruption Perceptions in Latin America
This paper argues that perceptions of corruption in Latin America exhibit predictable fluctuations in the wake of presidential turnover. Specifically, presidential elections that result in the partisan transfer of power are normally followed by a surge-and-decline pattern in perceived corruption control, with initial improvements that fade with time. The causes are multiple and stem from the removal of corrupt administrations, public enthusiasm a…
Electoral Systems and Campaign Finance
Studies that emphasize the importance of legislative electoral systems for campaign finance mostly fit into one of two groups. One literature identifies consequences of electoral systems that foster intraparty competition, including high levels of campaign spending and campaign finance–motivated pork, particularism, and political corruption. The second literature studies “spending effects” (i.e., vote-share gains per unit of expenditure), especia…
Economics (5 works) · Political science (5 works) · Politics (5 works) · Electoral Systems and Political Participation (4 works) · Law (4 works) · Public economics (4 works) · Campaign finance (3 works) · Law (3 works) · Legislature (3 works) · Political economy (3 works)