Stephen Schiffer
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 3741811 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | Stephen Schiffer |
| NOMBRES | Stephen |
| APELLIDO | Schiffer |
| FIRMA | SCHIFFER S |
| AFILIACIONES | New York University |
| VERIFICADO | No |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 19 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 24 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 19 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 1976 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2019 |
| ÍNDICE H | 3 |
Amie Thomasson's Easy Approach to Ontology
Philosophers have long debated whether abstract objects such as numbers and properties exist, but in recent years philosophical debate about what things exist has been ratcheted up more than a notch to question whether even ordinary objects such as pineapples and tables exist. One view has it that all existence questions are difficult questions whose answers hang on achieving an ontological theory that succeeds in carving nature at its joints. So…
Meaning In Speech and In Thought
If we think in a lingua mentis, questions about relations between linguistic meaning and propositional‐attitude content become questions about relations between meaning in a public language (p‐meaning) and meaning in a language of thought (t‐meaning). Whether or not the neo‐Gricean is correct that p‐meaning can be defined in terms of t‐meaning and then t‐meaning defined in terms of the causal‐functional roles of mentalese expressions, it's apt to…
Interest‐Relative Invariantism
Facing Facts’ Consequences
Replies
Précis of The Things We Mean
The Things We Mean
There exist such things as the things we mean and believe, and they are what the book calls pleonastic propositions. The book is about what these propositions are in themselves, and about their place in nature, language, and thought. Chapters 1 and 2 advance the theory of pleonastic propositions, and of pleonastic entities generally. The remaining six chapters bring that theory to bear on issues in the theory of content: the existence and nature …
That-Clauses and the Semantics of Belief Reports
A Normative Theory of Meaning
Horwich on Meaning
Journal Article Horwich on Meaning Get access Meaning. By Paul Horwich. ( Oxford UP, 1998. Pp. xii + 527. Price £30.00 h/b, £13.99 p/b.) Stephen Schiffer Stephen Schiffer New York University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 50, Issue 201, October 2000, Pages 527–536, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9213.00206 Published: 07 January 2003
Williamson on Our Ignorance in Borderline Cases
Timothy Williamson's instructive and ingenious Vagueness advances an epistemic theory of vagueness. This theory asserts that if a thing a borderline case of a property, then it's either a fact that the thing has the property or else a fact that it doesn't, but that in neither case can one know what the fact of the matter is. Williamson deft at criticizing competing theories, and he does a creditable job defending the principle of bivalence, which…
Actual-Language Relations
A language is arguably an abstract object that may or may not be used by anyone. Esperanto is a language no one speaks, and it is a contingent property of French that the French or anyone else speak it: there are possible worlds in which, though French exists and stands ready for use, no one uses it. Also, it seems to be a necessary truth that 'La neige est blanche' means in French that snow is white, whereas it is clearly a contingent truth that…
Ceteris Paribus Laws
Ceteris Paribus Laws Get access STEPHEN SCHIFFER STEPHEN SCHIFFER 1CUNY Graduate Center 33 W 42nd St New York, NY 10036 USA Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Mind, Volume C, Issue 397, 1 January 1991, Pages 1–17, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/C.397.1 Published: 01 January 1991
Physicalism
Remnants of Meaning
Meaning and Value
The `Fido'-Fido Theory of Belief
Many will agree with Gareth Evans (1982) that there are what he called Russellian thoughts: thoughts that are about objects and whose contents cannot be specified without reference to those objects. The thought that I express when I say 'I am contemplating my future' is Russellian, and it is plausible that the same would be true of a thought expressed by an utterance of 'This is enjoyable', when the object in question is a visible book, and of a …
Indexicals and the theory of reference
Descartes on His Essence
H E HELD that he was a mind, a substance the whole essence of which was to think. This paper is about why Descartes held this thesis; it is also, perforce, about what the thesis means, and about the two related theses, that a body is a substance the whole essence of which is to be extended in length, breadth, and depth, and that minds and bodies, the only kinds of created substances, are entirely and absolutely distinct. In the first section of t…
Interest‐Relative Invariantism
The `Fido'-Fido Theory of Belief
Many will agree with Gareth Evans (1982) that there are what he called Russellian thoughts: thoughts that are about objects and whose contents cannot be specified without reference to those objects. The thought that I express when I say 'I am contemplating my future' is Russellian, and it is plausible that the same would be true of a thought expressed by an utterance of 'This is enjoyable', when the object in question is a visible book, and of a …
Meaning and Value
Williamson on Our Ignorance in Borderline Cases
Timothy Williamson's instructive and ingenious Vagueness advances an epistemic theory of vagueness. This theory asserts that if a thing a borderline case of a property, then it's either a fact that the thing has the property or else a fact that it doesn't, but that in neither case can one know what the fact of the matter is. Williamson deft at criticizing competing theories, and he does a creditable job defending the principle of bivalence, which…
Actual-Language Relations
A language is arguably an abstract object that may or may not be used by anyone. Esperanto is a language no one speaks, and it is a contingent property of French that the French or anyone else speak it: there are possible worlds in which, though French exists and stands ready for use, no one uses it. Also, it seems to be a necessary truth that 'La neige est blanche' means in French that snow is white, whereas it is clearly a contingent truth that…
Replies
Précis of The Things We Mean
Descartes on His Essence
H E HELD that he was a mind, a substance the whole essence of which was to think. This paper is about why Descartes held this thesis; it is also, perforce, about what the thesis means, and about the two related theses, that a body is a substance the whole essence of which is to be extended in length, breadth, and depth, and that minds and bodies, the only kinds of created substances, are entirely and absolutely distinct. In the first section of t…
Indexicals and the theory of reference
The `Fido'-Fido Theory of Belief
Many will agree with Gareth Evans (1982) that there are what he called Russellian thoughts: thoughts that are about objects and whose contents cannot be specified without reference to those objects. The thought that I express when I say 'I am contemplating my future' is Russellian, and it is plausible that the same would be true of a thought expressed by an utterance of 'This is enjoyable', when the object in question is a visible book, and of a …
Physicalism
Remnants of Meaning
Meaning and Value
Ceteris Paribus Laws
Ceteris Paribus Laws Get access STEPHEN SCHIFFER STEPHEN SCHIFFER 1CUNY Graduate Center 33 W 42nd St New York, NY 10036 USA Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Mind, Volume C, Issue 397, 1 January 1991, Pages 1–17, https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/C.397.1 Published: 01 January 1991
Actual-Language Relations
A language is arguably an abstract object that may or may not be used by anyone. Esperanto is a language no one speaks, and it is a contingent property of French that the French or anyone else speak it: there are possible worlds in which, though French exists and stands ready for use, no one uses it. Also, it seems to be a necessary truth that 'La neige est blanche' means in French that snow is white, whereas it is clearly a contingent truth that…
Williamson on Our Ignorance in Borderline Cases
Timothy Williamson's instructive and ingenious Vagueness advances an epistemic theory of vagueness. This theory asserts that if a thing a borderline case of a property, then it's either a fact that the thing has the property or else a fact that it doesn't, but that in neither case can one know what the fact of the matter is. Williamson deft at criticizing competing theories, and he does a creditable job defending the principle of bivalence, which…
Horwich on Meaning
Journal Article Horwich on Meaning Get access Meaning. By Paul Horwich. ( Oxford UP, 1998. Pp. xii + 527. Price £30.00 h/b, £13.99 p/b.) Stephen Schiffer Stephen Schiffer New York University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 50, Issue 201, October 2000, Pages 527–536, https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9213.00206 Published: 07 January 2003
A Normative Theory of Meaning
The Things We Mean
There exist such things as the things we mean and believe, and they are what the book calls pleonastic propositions. The book is about what these propositions are in themselves, and about their place in nature, language, and thought. Chapters 1 and 2 advance the theory of pleonastic propositions, and of pleonastic entities generally. The remaining six chapters bring that theory to bear on issues in the theory of content: the existence and nature …
That-Clauses and the Semantics of Belief Reports
Facing Facts’ Consequences
Replies
Précis of The Things We Mean
Interest‐Relative Invariantism
Meaning In Speech and In Thought
If we think in a lingua mentis, questions about relations between linguistic meaning and propositional‐attitude content become questions about relations between meaning in a public language (p‐meaning) and meaning in a language of thought (t‐meaning). Whether or not the neo‐Gricean is correct that p‐meaning can be defined in terms of t‐meaning and then t‐meaning defined in terms of the causal‐functional roles of mentalese expressions, it's apt to…
Amie Thomasson's Easy Approach to Ontology
Philosophers have long debated whether abstract objects such as numbers and properties exist, but in recent years philosophical debate about what things exist has been ratcheted up more than a notch to question whether even ordinary objects such as pineapples and tables exist. One view has it that all existence questions are difficult questions whose answers hang on achieving an ontological theory that succeeds in carving nature at its joints. So…
Philosophy (16 obras) · Epistemology (13 obras) · Philosophy (9 obras) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (9 obras) · Computer Science (8 obras) · Linguistics (6 obras) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (5 obras) · Citation (4 obras) · Classical Philosophy and Thought (4 obras) · Library science (4 obras)