Phil Dowe
Biographic Data
| ID | 3741815 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Phil Dowe |
| GIVEN NAMES | Phil |
| FAMILY NAME | Dowe |
| SIGNATURE | DOWE P |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Tasmania |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-5437-1139 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 19 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 44 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 18 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 1 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1992 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2021 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
Does Lewis’ Theory of Causation Permit Time Travel
David Lewis aimed to give an account of causation, and in particular, a semantics for the counterfactuals to which his account appeals, that is compatible with backwards causation and time travel. I will argue that he failed, but not for the reasons that have been offered to date, specifically by Collins, Hall and Paul and by Wasserman. This is significant not the least because Lewis’ theory of causation was the most influential theory over the l…
Would-Cause Semantics
This article raises two difficulties that certain approaches to causation have with would-cause counterfactuals. First, there is a problem with David Lewis's semantics of counterfactuals when we ‘suppose in’ some positive event of a certain kind. And, second, there is a problem with embedded counterfactuals. I show that causal-modeling approaches do not have these problems
Constraints on Data in Worlds with Closed Timelike Curves
It is claimed that unacceptable constraints on initial data are imposed by certain responses to paradoxes that threaten time travel, closed timelike curves (CTCs) and other backwards causation hypotheses. In this paper I argue against the following claims: to say “contradictions are impossible so something must prevent the paradox” commits in general to constraints on initial data, that for fixed point dynamics so-called grey state solutions expl…
Reality and Rationality
Cause and Chance: Causation in an Indeterministic World
Peer-reviewed
Causation and Misconnections
In this paper I show how the conserved quantity theory, or more generally the process theory of Wesley Salmon and myself, provides a sufficient condition in an analysis of causation. To do so I will show how it handles the problem of alleged ‘misconnections’. I show what the conserved quantity theory says about such cases, and why intuitions are not to be taken as sacrosanct
The Coincidences of Time Travel
In this paper I consider two objections raised by Nick Smith (1997) to an argument against the probability of time travel given by Paul Horwich (1995, 1987). Horwich argues that time travel leads to inexplicable and improbable coincidences. I argue that one of Smith's objections fails, but that another is correct. I also consider an instructive way to defend Horwich's argument against the second of Smith's objections, but show that it too fails. …
Causal Loops and the Independence of Causal Facts
According to Hugh Mellor in Real Time II (1998, Ch. 12), assuming the logical independence of causal facts and the ‘law of large numbers’, causal loops are impossible because if they were possible they would produce inconsistent sets of frequencies. I clarify the argument, and argue that it would be preferable to abandon the relevant independence assumption in the case of causal loops
Physical Causation
This book, published in 2000, is a clear account of causation based firmly in contemporary science. Dowe discusses in a systematic way, a positive account of causation: the conserved quantities account of causal processes which he has been developing over the last ten years. The book describes causal processes and interactions in terms of conserved quantities: a causal process is the worldline of an object which possesses a conserved quantity, an…
Jung’s Concept of ‘Coincidence’
Causality and Explanation
Peer-reviewed
The really big questions
The Conserved Quantity Theory of Causation and Chance Raising
In this paper I offer an ‘integrating account’ of singular causation, where the term ‘integrating’ refers to the following program for analysing causation. There are two intuitions about causation, both of which face serious counterexamples when used as the basis for an analysis of causation. The ‘process’ intuition, which says that causes and effects are linked by concrete processes, runs into trouble with cases of ‘misconnections’, where an eve…
Critical Notice: D. H. Mellor, The Facts of Causation
The Facts of Causation claims to be a “complete account of causation and its implications.” Mellor's concern is with singular causation; that is, where causes and effects are singular (he takes general causation to be a generalization concerning singular causation (pp. 6–7)). Singular causes and effects come in two sorts. Firstly, there are facts. Facts are actual states of affairs, and states of affairs correlate with whatever can be expressed i…
A Miller’s Tale
A Defense of Backwards in Time Causation Models in Quantum Mechanics
Causality and Conserved Quantities: A Reply to Salmon
In a recent paper (1994) Wesley Salmon has replied to criticisms (e.g., Dowe 1992c, Kitcher 1989) of his (1984) theory of causality, and has offered a revised theory which, he argues, is not open to those criticisms. The key change concerns the characterization of causal processes, where Salmon has traded “the capacity for mark transmission” for “the transmission of an invariant quantity.” Salmon argues against the view presented in Dowe (1992c),…
On the Reduction of Process Causality to Statistical Relations
Peer-reviewed
Wesley Salmon's Process Theory of Causality and the Conserved Quantity Theory
This paper examines Wesley Salmon's “process” theory of causality, arguing in particular that there are four areas of inadequacy. These are that the theory is circular, that it is too vague at a crucial point, that statistical forks do not serve their intended purpose, and that Salmon has not adequately demonstrated that the theory avoids Hume's strictures about “hidden powers”. A new theory is suggested, based on “conserved quantities”, which fu…
Wesley Salmon's Process Theory of Causality and the Conserved Quantity Theory
This paper examines Wesley Salmon's “process” theory of causality, arguing in particular that there are four areas of inadequacy. These are that the theory is circular, that it is too vague at a crucial point, that statistical forks do not serve their intended purpose, and that Salmon has not adequately demonstrated that the theory avoids Hume's strictures about “hidden powers”. A new theory is suggested, based on “conserved quantities”, which fu…
On the Reduction of Process Causality to Statistical Relations
Peer-reviewed
The Conserved Quantity Theory of Causation and Chance Raising
In this paper I offer an ‘integrating account’ of singular causation, where the term ‘integrating’ refers to the following program for analysing causation. There are two intuitions about causation, both of which face serious counterexamples when used as the basis for an analysis of causation. The ‘process’ intuition, which says that causes and effects are linked by concrete processes, runs into trouble with cases of ‘misconnections’, where an eve…
The Coincidences of Time Travel
In this paper I consider two objections raised by Nick Smith (1997) to an argument against the probability of time travel given by Paul Horwich (1995, 1987). Horwich argues that time travel leads to inexplicable and improbable coincidences. I argue that one of Smith's objections fails, but that another is correct. I also consider an instructive way to defend Horwich's argument against the second of Smith's objections, but show that it too fails. …
Causality and Explanation
Peer-reviewed
Constraints on Data in Worlds with Closed Timelike Curves
It is claimed that unacceptable constraints on initial data are imposed by certain responses to paradoxes that threaten time travel, closed timelike curves (CTCs) and other backwards causation hypotheses. In this paper I argue against the following claims: to say “contradictions are impossible so something must prevent the paradox” commits in general to constraints on initial data, that for fixed point dynamics so-called grey state solutions expl…
Causal Loops and the Independence of Causal Facts
According to Hugh Mellor in Real Time II (1998, Ch. 12), assuming the logical independence of causal facts and the ‘law of large numbers’, causal loops are impossible because if they were possible they would produce inconsistent sets of frequencies. I clarify the argument, and argue that it would be preferable to abandon the relevant independence assumption in the case of causal loops
A Defense of Backwards in Time Causation Models in Quantum Mechanics
Wesley Salmon's Process Theory of Causality and the Conserved Quantity Theory
This paper examines Wesley Salmon's “process” theory of causality, arguing in particular that there are four areas of inadequacy. These are that the theory is circular, that it is too vague at a crucial point, that statistical forks do not serve their intended purpose, and that Salmon has not adequately demonstrated that the theory avoids Hume's strictures about “hidden powers”. A new theory is suggested, based on “conserved quantities”, which fu…
On the Reduction of Process Causality to Statistical Relations
Peer-reviewed
Causality and Conserved Quantities: A Reply to Salmon
In a recent paper (1994) Wesley Salmon has replied to criticisms (e.g., Dowe 1992c, Kitcher 1989) of his (1984) theory of causality, and has offered a revised theory which, he argues, is not open to those criticisms. The key change concerns the characterization of causal processes, where Salmon has traded “the capacity for mark transmission” for “the transmission of an invariant quantity.” Salmon argues against the view presented in Dowe (1992c),…
A Miller’s Tale
A Defense of Backwards in Time Causation Models in Quantum Mechanics
Critical Notice: D. H. Mellor, The Facts of Causation
The Facts of Causation claims to be a “complete account of causation and its implications.” Mellor's concern is with singular causation; that is, where causes and effects are singular (he takes general causation to be a generalization concerning singular causation (pp. 6–7)). Singular causes and effects come in two sorts. Firstly, there are facts. Facts are actual states of affairs, and states of affairs correlate with whatever can be expressed i…
The really big questions
The Conserved Quantity Theory of Causation and Chance Raising
In this paper I offer an ‘integrating account’ of singular causation, where the term ‘integrating’ refers to the following program for analysing causation. There are two intuitions about causation, both of which face serious counterexamples when used as the basis for an analysis of causation. The ‘process’ intuition, which says that causes and effects are linked by concrete processes, runs into trouble with cases of ‘misconnections’, where an eve…
Physical Causation
This book, published in 2000, is a clear account of causation based firmly in contemporary science. Dowe discusses in a systematic way, a positive account of causation: the conserved quantities account of causal processes which he has been developing over the last ten years. The book describes causal processes and interactions in terms of conserved quantities: a causal process is the worldline of an object which possesses a conserved quantity, an…
Jung’s Concept of ‘Coincidence’
Causality and Explanation
Peer-reviewed
Causal Loops and the Independence of Causal Facts
According to Hugh Mellor in Real Time II (1998, Ch. 12), assuming the logical independence of causal facts and the ‘law of large numbers’, causal loops are impossible because if they were possible they would produce inconsistent sets of frequencies. I clarify the argument, and argue that it would be preferable to abandon the relevant independence assumption in the case of causal loops
The Coincidences of Time Travel
In this paper I consider two objections raised by Nick Smith (1997) to an argument against the probability of time travel given by Paul Horwich (1995, 1987). Horwich argues that time travel leads to inexplicable and improbable coincidences. I argue that one of Smith's objections fails, but that another is correct. I also consider an instructive way to defend Horwich's argument against the second of Smith's objections, but show that it too fails. …
Cause and Chance: Causation in an Indeterministic World
Peer-reviewed
Causation and Misconnections
In this paper I show how the conserved quantity theory, or more generally the process theory of Wesley Salmon and myself, provides a sufficient condition in an analysis of causation. To do so I will show how it handles the problem of alleged ‘misconnections’. I show what the conserved quantity theory says about such cases, and why intuitions are not to be taken as sacrosanct
Reality and Rationality
Constraints on Data in Worlds with Closed Timelike Curves
It is claimed that unacceptable constraints on initial data are imposed by certain responses to paradoxes that threaten time travel, closed timelike curves (CTCs) and other backwards causation hypotheses. In this paper I argue against the following claims: to say “contradictions are impossible so something must prevent the paradox” commits in general to constraints on initial data, that for fixed point dynamics so-called grey state solutions expl…
Would-Cause Semantics
This article raises two difficulties that certain approaches to causation have with would-cause counterfactuals. First, there is a problem with David Lewis's semantics of counterfactuals when we ‘suppose in’ some positive event of a certain kind. And, second, there is a problem with embedded counterfactuals. I show that causal-modeling approaches do not have these problems
Does Lewis’ Theory of Causation Permit Time Travel
David Lewis aimed to give an account of causation, and in particular, a semantics for the counterfactuals to which his account appeals, that is compatible with backwards causation and time travel. I will argue that he failed, but not for the reasons that have been offered to date, specifically by Collins, Hall and Paul and by Wasserman. This is significant not the least because Lewis’ theory of causation was the most influential theory over the l…
Philosophy (18 works) · Epistemology (17 works) · Philosophy and History of Science (15 works) · Computer Science (11 works) · Mathematics (10 works) · Causation (9 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (7 works) · Mathematical economics (7 works) · Philosophy of science (7 works) · Physics (7 works)