Michael Bergmann
Biographic Data
| ID | 3748537 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Michael Bergmann |
| GIVEN NAMES | Michael |
| FAMILY NAME | Bergmann |
| SIGNATURE | BERGMANN M |
| AFFILIATIONS | Purdue University West Lafayette |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-1905-8638 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 20 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 78 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 18 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 2 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1997 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
The impact of national context on Covid-19 vaccine hesitancy across Europe
This study investigates vaccine hesitancy among the 50 + population in Europe during the COVID-19 pandemic, focusing on the role of national contexts alongside individual determinants. The framework is guided by the WHO’s Complacency, Convenience, and Confidence (3Cs) model to explore factors influencing vaccination intent. Data from over 45,000 SHARE Corona Survey respondents aged 50 + from 26 European countries were analysed regarding their int…
Education bias in probability-based surveys in Germany: Evidence and Possible Solutions
Précis of Radical Skepticism and Epistemic Intuition
In this précis of Radical Skepticism and Epistemic Intuition (Oxford 2021), I highlight the book’s main lines of argument and provide an overview of each of the book’s three parts. I explain how: part I identifies the best kind of argument for radical skepticism and objects to one of the two main ways of responding to it; part II presents my version of the other main way of responding to that skeptical argument (a version that relies heavily on e…
Replies to Smith, Doulas, Lycan, and Steup
In these replies, I respond to critical comments on my book ( Radical Skepticism and Epistemic Intuition , Oxford 2021) from Julia Smith, Louis Doulas, Bill Lycan, and Matthias Steup, who (along with me) contributed to a symposium on that book for this journal. I discuss the following topics (among others), all in the context of my commonsense response to radical skepticism: epistemic intuitions, evidence, disagreement, philosophical pessimism, e…
The Cambridge Handbook of Religious Epistemology
The Cambridge Handbook of Religious Epistemology, the first to appear on the topic, introduces the current state of religious epistemology and provides a discussion of fundamental topics related to the epistemology of religious belief. Its wide-ranging chapters not only survey fundamental topics, but also develop non-traditional epistemic theories and explore the religious epistemology endorsed by non-Western traditions. In the first section, Fai…
The Impact of Covid-19 on Informal Caregiving and Care Receiving Across Europe During the First Phase of the Pandemic
Purpose: We analyzed the effects of COVID-19 as well as its accompanying epidemiological control measures on health-related outcomes (physical and mental health) and unmet care needs of both caregivers and care recipients across Europe and Israel by taking into account country differences. Methods: We applied comparisons of adjusted predictions, controlling for a large set of relevant respondent characteristics, to investigate changes in the phys…
What was I thinking? A theoretical framework for analysing panel conditioning in attitudes and (response) behaviour
Though panel data are increasingly used in the social sciences, the question whether repeatedly participating in a panel survey affects respondents’ attitudes and (response) behaviour is still largely unsolved. Drawing on a model of associative networks that is extended by assumptions on survey satisficing, we present a theoretical framework that emphasizes the role of strength-related attributes of attitudes (accessibility, internal consistency,…
Intellectual Assurance: Essays on Traditional Epistemic Internalism
Here, twelve essays by prominent contemporary epistemologists provide a careful examination and critical evaluation of traditional epistemic internalism. They probe many objections to traditional internalism, and focus on three key topics: non-inferentially justified belief, inferentially justified belief, and the best response to skepticism.
Reason and Faith: Themes from Richard Swinburne
The past fifty years have been an enormously fruitful period in the field of philosophy of religion, and few have done more to advance its development during this time than Richard Swinburne. His pioneering work in philosophy of religion is distinguished, not only for the way in which it systematically develops a comprehensive set of positions within this field, but also for the way in which it builds on and contributes to contemporary work in ot…
Skeptical Theism and the Problem of Evil
Justification without Awareness: A Defense of Epistemic Externalism
Virtually all philosophers agree that for a belief to be epistemically justified, it must satisfy certain conditions. Perhaps it must be supported by evidence, or perhaps it must be reliably formed, or perhaps there is some other ‘good-making’ features it must have. But does a belief’s justification also require some sort of awareness of its good-making features? The answer to this question has been hotly contested in contemporary epistemology, c…
Epistemic Circularity and Common Sense: A Reply to Reed
Defeaters and Higher-Level Requirements
Journal Article Defeaters and Higher‐Level Requirements Get access Michael Bergmann Michael Bergmann Purdue University, Indiana Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 55, Issue 220, July 2005, Pages 419–436, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0031-8094.2005.00408.x Published: 14 July 2005
Epistemic Justification: Internalism vs. Externalism, Foundations vs. Virtues
Book Review| July 01 2004 Epistemic Justification: Internalism vs. Externalism, Foundations vs. Virtues Laurence BonJour and Ernest Sosa, Epistemic Justification: Internalism vs. Externalism, Foundations vs. Virtues. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2003. Pp. vii, 240. Michael Bergmann Michael Bergmann Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2004) 113 (3): 435–437. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-113-3-4…
What's NOT Wrong with Foundationalism
One thing all forms of foundationalism have in common is that they hold that a belief can be justified noninferentially –i.e., that its justification need not depend on its being inferred from some other justified (or unjustified) belief. In some recent publications, Peter Klein argues that in virtue of having this feature, all forms of foundationalism are infected with an unacceptable arbitrariness that makes it irrational to be a practicing fou…
Epistemic Circularity: Malignant and Benign
Externalism and Skepticism
Externalism and Skepticism
Research Article| April 01 2000 Externalism and Skepticism Michael Bergmann Michael Bergmann Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (2): 159–194. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-109-2-159 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Permissions Search Site Citation Michael Bergmann; Externalism and Skepticism. The Philosophical Review 1 April 2000; 109 (2): 159–194. doi:…
Deontology and Defeat
It is currently fashionable to hold that deontology induces internalism. That is, those who think that epistemic justification is essentially a matter of duty fulfillment are thought to have a good reason for accepting internalism in epistemology. I shall argue that no deontological conception of epistemic justification provides a good reason for endorsing internalism. My main contention is that a requirement having to do with epistemic defeat-a …
Internalism, Externalism and The No-Defeater Condition
Epistemic Circularity: Malignant and Benign
Defeaters and Higher-Level Requirements
Journal Article Defeaters and Higher‐Level Requirements Get access Michael Bergmann Michael Bergmann Purdue University, Indiana Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 55, Issue 220, July 2005, Pages 419–436, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0031-8094.2005.00408.x Published: 14 July 2005
Internalism, Externalism and The No-Defeater Condition
What was I thinking? A theoretical framework for analysing panel conditioning in attitudes and (response) behaviour
Though panel data are increasingly used in the social sciences, the question whether repeatedly participating in a panel survey affects respondents’ attitudes and (response) behaviour is still largely unsolved. Drawing on a model of associative networks that is extended by assumptions on survey satisficing, we present a theoretical framework that emphasizes the role of strength-related attributes of attitudes (accessibility, internal consistency,…
Externalism and Skepticism
Research Article| April 01 2000 Externalism and Skepticism Michael Bergmann Michael Bergmann Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (2): 159–194. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-109-2-159 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Permissions Search Site Citation Michael Bergmann; Externalism and Skepticism. The Philosophical Review 1 April 2000; 109 (2): 159–194. doi:…
Education bias in probability-based surveys in Germany: Evidence and Possible Solutions
Epistemic Circularity and Common Sense: A Reply to Reed
What's NOT Wrong with Foundationalism
One thing all forms of foundationalism have in common is that they hold that a belief can be justified noninferentially –i.e., that its justification need not depend on its being inferred from some other justified (or unjustified) belief. In some recent publications, Peter Klein argues that in virtue of having this feature, all forms of foundationalism are infected with an unacceptable arbitrariness that makes it irrational to be a practicing fou…
Deontology and Defeat
It is currently fashionable to hold that deontology induces internalism. That is, those who think that epistemic justification is essentially a matter of duty fulfillment are thought to have a good reason for accepting internalism in epistemology. I shall argue that no deontological conception of epistemic justification provides a good reason for endorsing internalism. My main contention is that a requirement having to do with epistemic defeat-a …
Internalism, Externalism and The No-Defeater Condition
Externalism and Skepticism
Externalism and Skepticism
Research Article| April 01 2000 Externalism and Skepticism Michael Bergmann Michael Bergmann Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2000) 109 (2): 159–194. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-109-2-159 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Permissions Search Site Citation Michael Bergmann; Externalism and Skepticism. The Philosophical Review 1 April 2000; 109 (2): 159–194. doi:…
Deontology and Defeat
It is currently fashionable to hold that deontology induces internalism. That is, those who think that epistemic justification is essentially a matter of duty fulfillment are thought to have a good reason for accepting internalism in epistemology. I shall argue that no deontological conception of epistemic justification provides a good reason for endorsing internalism. My main contention is that a requirement having to do with epistemic defeat-a …
Epistemic Justification: Internalism vs. Externalism, Foundations vs. Virtues
Book Review| July 01 2004 Epistemic Justification: Internalism vs. Externalism, Foundations vs. Virtues Laurence BonJour and Ernest Sosa, Epistemic Justification: Internalism vs. Externalism, Foundations vs. Virtues. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2003. Pp. vii, 240. Michael Bergmann Michael Bergmann Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2004) 113 (3): 435–437. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-113-3-4…
What's NOT Wrong with Foundationalism
One thing all forms of foundationalism have in common is that they hold that a belief can be justified noninferentially –i.e., that its justification need not depend on its being inferred from some other justified (or unjustified) belief. In some recent publications, Peter Klein argues that in virtue of having this feature, all forms of foundationalism are infected with an unacceptable arbitrariness that makes it irrational to be a practicing fou…
Epistemic Circularity: Malignant and Benign
Defeaters and Higher-Level Requirements
Journal Article Defeaters and Higher‐Level Requirements Get access Michael Bergmann Michael Bergmann Purdue University, Indiana Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 55, Issue 220, July 2005, Pages 419–436, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0031-8094.2005.00408.x Published: 14 July 2005
Justification without Awareness: A Defense of Epistemic Externalism
Virtually all philosophers agree that for a belief to be epistemically justified, it must satisfy certain conditions. Perhaps it must be supported by evidence, or perhaps it must be reliably formed, or perhaps there is some other ‘good-making’ features it must have. But does a belief’s justification also require some sort of awareness of its good-making features? The answer to this question has been hotly contested in contemporary epistemology, c…
Epistemic Circularity and Common Sense: A Reply to Reed
Skeptical Theism and the Problem of Evil
Intellectual Assurance: Essays on Traditional Epistemic Internalism
Here, twelve essays by prominent contemporary epistemologists provide a careful examination and critical evaluation of traditional epistemic internalism. They probe many objections to traditional internalism, and focus on three key topics: non-inferentially justified belief, inferentially justified belief, and the best response to skepticism.
Reason and Faith: Themes from Richard Swinburne
The past fifty years have been an enormously fruitful period in the field of philosophy of religion, and few have done more to advance its development during this time than Richard Swinburne. His pioneering work in philosophy of religion is distinguished, not only for the way in which it systematically develops a comprehensive set of positions within this field, but also for the way in which it builds on and contributes to contemporary work in ot…
What was I thinking? A theoretical framework for analysing panel conditioning in attitudes and (response) behaviour
Though panel data are increasingly used in the social sciences, the question whether repeatedly participating in a panel survey affects respondents’ attitudes and (response) behaviour is still largely unsolved. Drawing on a model of associative networks that is extended by assumptions on survey satisficing, we present a theoretical framework that emphasizes the role of strength-related attributes of attitudes (accessibility, internal consistency,…
The Impact of Covid-19 on Informal Caregiving and Care Receiving Across Europe During the First Phase of the Pandemic
Purpose: We analyzed the effects of COVID-19 as well as its accompanying epidemiological control measures on health-related outcomes (physical and mental health) and unmet care needs of both caregivers and care recipients across Europe and Israel by taking into account country differences. Methods: We applied comparisons of adjusted predictions, controlling for a large set of relevant respondent characteristics, to investigate changes in the phys…
The Cambridge Handbook of Religious Epistemology
The Cambridge Handbook of Religious Epistemology, the first to appear on the topic, introduces the current state of religious epistemology and provides a discussion of fundamental topics related to the epistemology of religious belief. Its wide-ranging chapters not only survey fundamental topics, but also develop non-traditional epistemic theories and explore the religious epistemology endorsed by non-Western traditions. In the first section, Fai…
Précis of Radical Skepticism and Epistemic Intuition
In this précis of Radical Skepticism and Epistemic Intuition (Oxford 2021), I highlight the book’s main lines of argument and provide an overview of each of the book’s three parts. I explain how: part I identifies the best kind of argument for radical skepticism and objects to one of the two main ways of responding to it; part II presents my version of the other main way of responding to that skeptical argument (a version that relies heavily on e…
Replies to Smith, Doulas, Lycan, and Steup
In these replies, I respond to critical comments on my book ( Radical Skepticism and Epistemic Intuition , Oxford 2021) from Julia Smith, Louis Doulas, Bill Lycan, and Matthias Steup, who (along with me) contributed to a symposium on that book for this journal. I discuss the following topics (among others), all in the context of my commonsense response to radical skepticism: epistemic intuitions, evidence, disagreement, philosophical pessimism, e…
The impact of national context on Covid-19 vaccine hesitancy across Europe
This study investigates vaccine hesitancy among the 50 + population in Europe during the COVID-19 pandemic, focusing on the role of national contexts alongside individual determinants. The framework is guided by the WHO’s Complacency, Convenience, and Confidence (3Cs) model to explore factors influencing vaccination intent. Data from over 45,000 SHARE Corona Survey respondents aged 50 + from 26 European countries were analysed regarding their int…
Education bias in probability-based surveys in Germany: Evidence and Possible Solutions
Epistemology (13 works) · Philosophy (13 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (12 works) · Computer Science (8 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (8 works) · Theology and Philosophy of Evil (8 works) · Psychology (7 works) · Skepticism (7 works) · Externalism (6 works) · Citation (4 works)