Karl Halvor Teigen
Biographic Data
| ID | 375838 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Karl Halvor Teigen |
| GIVEN NAMES | Karl Halvor |
| FAMILY NAME | Teigen |
| SIGNATURE | TEIGEN K H |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Oslo |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-6165-9034 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 38 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 79 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 38 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1984 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 5 |
Negative verbal probabilities undermine communication of climate science
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) recommends describing low-probability outcomes using negative verbal probability terms such as unlikely, rather than positive terms such as a small probability. However, we propose that this choice of probability terms might undermine public perception and understanding of climate science. Across eight preregistered experiments ( N = 4,150), we find that participants perceive outcomes described…
Do claims about certainty make estimates less certain
Out of the blue: On the suddenness of perceived chance events
People commonly use terms like ‘random’, ‘by chance’, or ‘accidentally’ when they describe occurrences that sidestep the normal course of events, with no apparent causal link to ongoing activities. Such intrusive events are typically perceived as happening all of a sudden. This was demonstrated in seven experiments (N = 1299) by asking people to identify statements they believed belonged to stories about chance events, and by comparing chance vs.…
Dimensions of uncertainty communication: What is conveyed by verbal terms and numeric ranges
The paper reviews two strands of research on communication of uncertainty that usually have been investigated separately: (1) Probabilities attached to specific outcomes, and (2) Range judgments. Probabilities are sometimes expressed by verbal phrases (“rain is likely”) and at other times in a numeric format (“70% chance of rain”), whereas range judgments describe the potential amounts expected (“1–4 mm of rain”). Examination of previous research…
Combining verbal forecasts: The role of directionality and the reinforcement effect
Recent research has shown that when people combine verbal probabilistic forecasts from two sources, they are not simply averaged but can reinforce each other; so when two advisors both said an event was “rather likely,” some listeners concluded that the event was “quite likely”. Conversely, when both said the event was “rather unlikely,” people concluded that it was “quite unlikely.” The present studies demonstrate that the direction of this effe…
Climate Scientists’ Wide Prediction Intervals May Be More Likely but Are Perceived to Be Less Certain
The use of interval forecasts allows climate scientists to issue predictions with high levels of certainty even for areas fraught with uncertainty, since wide intervals are objectively more likely to capture the truth than narrow intervals. However, wide intervals are also less informative about what the outcome will be than narrow intervals, implying a lack of knowledge or subjective uncertainty in the forecaster. In six experiments, we investig…
Framing experts' (dis)agreements about uncertain environmental events
Agreements and disagreements between expert statements influence lay people's beliefs. But few studies have examined what is perceived as a disagreement. We report six experiments where people rated agreement between pairs of probabilistic statements about environmental events, attributed to two different experts or to the same expert at two different points in time. The statements differed in frame, by focusing on complementary outcomes (45% pro…
Textual health warning labels on snus (Swedish moist snuff): Do they affect risk perception
Adding "causes cancer" or removing "can" from "damages your health" did not strengthen short-time (1 year) risk perception, but the latter increased long-term (10 years) risk perception in Study 1. In the pre-post design in Study 2, risk perception increased regardless of warning label
When probabilities change: Perceptions and implications of trends in uncertain climate forecasts
Past research has revealed a trend effect when people are faced with a revised probabilistic forecast: A forecasted event that has become more (vs. less) certain is taken to signal a trend toward even stronger (weaker) certainty in future revisions of the forecast. The present paper expands this finding by exploring the boundary conditions of the trend effect and how it affects judgments of the forecaster. In Study 1, the trend effect was shown t…
When do past events require explanation? Insights from social psychology
Some past events incite more wonder about their causes than do others. For example, negative events require explanation more than positive events. We review social psychologists’ theoretical and empirical insights on what kinds of past events “beg explanation.” We draw on attribution theory that became popular among psychologists from the 1960s onward, on research on counterfactual reasoning, and on conversational and discursive critiques of attr…
More than 50% or Less than 70% Chance: Pragmatic Implications of Single‐Bound Probability Estimates
Probability estimates can be given as ranges or uncertainty intervals, where often only one of the interval bounds (lower or upper) is specified. For instance, a climate forecast can describe La Niña as having “more than 70% chance” or “less than 90% chance” of occurring. In three experiments, we studied how research participants perceived climate‐related forecasts expressed with lower‐bound (“over X% chance”) or upper‐bound (“under Y% chance”) p…
Better Safe than Sorry: Risking Irresponsibility by Seeking Uncertainty
Research findings differ as to whether choosing a risky option is an efficient strategy for decision makers seeking to avoid responsibility for potential failures. A risky choice may leave the final outcome to chance factors, but the decision maker can still be held responsible for choosing risk. Further, it is unclear whether a risky choice is a responsible choice. The present article investigates the putative relationship between risk‐taking an…
Probabilities Associated with Precise and Vague Forecasts
Forecasts of future outcomes, such as the consequences of climate change, are given with different degrees of precision. Logically, more precise forecasts (e.g., a temperature increase of 3–4°) have a smaller probability of capturing the actual outcome than less precise forecasts (e.g., a temperature increase of 2–6°). Nevertheless, people often trust precise forecasts more than vague forecasts, perhaps because precision is associated with knowle…
Everybody Will Win, and All Must Be Hired: Comparing Additivity Neglect with the Nonselective Superiority Bias
Two streams of research looking at referent‐dependent judgments from slightly different angles are subadditivity research and research on the nonselective superiority bias. Both biases violate basic formal constraints: the probabilities of a set of exclusive events cannot add up to more than 100%, and a set of attractive candidates cannot all be rated as superior to the group mean. We examine in three experiments how these two biases are related,…
Format dependent probabilities: An eye-tracking analysis of additivity neglect
When people are asked to estimate the probabilities of uncertain events, they often neglect the additivity principle, which requires that the probabilities assigned to an exhaustive set of outcomes should add up to 100%. Previous studies indicate that additivity neglect is dependent on response format, self-generated probability estimates being more coherent than estimates on rating scales. The present study made use of eye-tracking methodology, …
Revisions and Regret: The Cost of Changing your Mind
Decision reversals often imply improved decisions. Yet, people show a strong resistance against changing their minds. These are well‐established findings, which suggest that changed decisions carry a subjective cost, perhaps by being more strongly regretted. Three studies were conducted to explore participants' regret when making reversible decisions and to test the hypothesis that changing one's mind will increase post‐outcome regret. The first …
Can > Will: Predictions of What Can Happen are Extreme, but Believed to be Probable
Predictions of uncertain events are often described in terms of what can or what will happen. How are such statements used by speakers, and what are they perceived to mean? Participants in four experiments were presented with distributions of variable product characteristics and were asked to generate natural, meaningful sentences containing either will or can. Will was typically associated with either low or intermediate numeric values, whereas …
Pre‐outcome regret: Widespread and overlooked
Many real‐life decisions (e.g. promises, plans and agreements) involve a time interval between when the decision is made and the main outcome is revealed. Nearly all regret studies focus on anticipated or experienced post‐outcome regret. We argue that regret is also frequently experienced in the pre‐outcome period, and that this ‘pre‐outcome regret’ has other sources than regret experienced after the outcome is known. Regret experienced in the pr…
Progress framing and sunk costs: How managers’ statements about project progress reveal their investment intentions
Framing of imprecise quantities: When are lower interval bounds preferred to upper bounds
Imprecisely known quantities (e.g., predictions) are often described in approximate terms as “more than X ” or “less than Y ” (e.g., “Ann will earn more than $50 000” or “less than $60 000”). Such phrases carry both quantitative and qualitative (pragmatic) information. Three studies are reported showing that lower limit estimates ( more than, over, minimum ) are generally more frequent, and considered more appropriate than upper limit estimates (…
Better than average and better with time: Relative evaluations of self and others in the past, present, and future
Evaluations of self and others in the past, present, and future were examined by asking 385 students to rate themselves or an acquaintance relative to their peers on a number of personality traits. We predicted, and found, evidence for self‐enhancement, as most participants regarded themselves superior to ‘most others’ at all points in time. We also found a better than average improvement effect, as participants considered themselves more superio…
More than, less than, or minimum, maximum: How upper and lower bounds determine subjective interval estimates
Uncertain quantities can be described by single‐point estimates of lower interval bounds ( X 1 ), upper interval bounds ( X 2 ), two‐bound estimates (separate estimates of X 1 and X 2 ), and by ranges ( X 1 − X 2 ). A price estimation task showed that single‐bound estimates phrased as “ T costs more than X 1 ” and “ T costs less than X 2 ,” yielded much larger intervals than “minimum X 1 ” and “maximum X 2 .” This difference can be attributed to …
Looking back versus looking ahead: Framing of time and work at different stages of a project
Progress on a well‐defined project can be described along a task dimension in terms of amount done, or as amount of work still to be completed. Time‐limited projects can also be described on a temporal dimension in terms of time spent versus time left. Five experiments are reported showing that such frames have predictable implications for speakers as well as for listeners: Statements by a team leader about time spent and work left are perceived …
The proximity heuristic in judgments of accident probabilities
In daily life, probabilities are often assessed informally through the perceived distance to a target event. Accident probabilities are believed to be high when a disastrous outcome appears to be close. This proximity heuristic can lead to exaggerated p(death) estimates in risky situations (Experiment 2), and sometimes higher probabilities for death after near-accidents than after actual accidents (Experiment 3 and 4). Near-accidents are also bel…
When the past becomes history: Effects of temporal order on explanations of trends
When people are asked to ‘explain’ a time series consisting of population statistics, they will suggest factors responsible for later events rather than for earlier events. This is shown in Experiment 1 for pairs of events and in Experiment 2 for triads of events with one deviant member. When the deviant statistic is the most recent one, it will in most cases be singled out for explanation. When it comes first, it is rarely explained, but accepte…
Societal risks as seen by a Norwegian public
In two studies, questionnaires originally developed to study risk perception in the United States were administered to Norwegian students. Level of perceived risk in Norway was clearly below American scores for most hazards, but slightly above what has been found in a parallel Hungarian study. Norwegians were more concerned than both Hungarians and Americans about narcotics, but less than Americans about chemicals used in food and agriculture, an…
Better than average and better with time: Relative evaluations of self and others in the past, present, and future
Evaluations of self and others in the past, present, and future were examined by asking 385 students to rate themselves or an acquaintance relative to their peers on a number of personality traits. We predicted, and found, evidence for self‐enhancement, as most participants regarded themselves superior to ‘most others’ at all points in time. We also found a better than average improvement effect, as participants considered themselves more superio…
Prediction and postdiction preferences in guessing
In three studies, it is shown that most subjects when asked to guess the outcome of an uncertain event (a die toss, the sex of a child, the winner of a match) will prefer to do so before the event. This holds regardless of consequences of the guess, or of variations in waiting time from the guess being made to the outcome being known. In a chance situation, a guess‐first preference may be partly explained by a ‘magical control’ hypothesis, but th…
When do past events require explanation? Insights from social psychology
Some past events incite more wonder about their causes than do others. For example, negative events require explanation more than positive events. We review social psychologists’ theoretical and empirical insights on what kinds of past events “beg explanation.” We draw on attribution theory that became popular among psychologists from the 1960s onward, on research on counterfactual reasoning, and on conversational and discursive critiques of attr…
Verbal probabilities: A question of frame
Verbal expressions of probability and uncertainty are of two kinds: positive (‘probable’, ‘possible’) and negative (‘not certain’, ‘doubtful’). Choice of term has implications for predictions and decisions. The present studies show that positive phrases are rated to be more optimistic (when the target outcome is positive), and more correct, when the target outcome actually occurs, even in cases where positive and negative phrases are perceived to…
Looking back versus looking ahead: Framing of time and work at different stages of a project
Progress on a well‐defined project can be described along a task dimension in terms of amount done, or as amount of work still to be completed. Time‐limited projects can also be described on a temporal dimension in terms of time spent versus time left. Five experiments are reported showing that such frames have predictable implications for speakers as well as for listeners: Statements by a team leader about time spent and work left are perceived …
More than 50% or Less than 70% Chance: Pragmatic Implications of Single‐Bound Probability Estimates
Probability estimates can be given as ranges or uncertainty intervals, where often only one of the interval bounds (lower or upper) is specified. For instance, a climate forecast can describe La Niña as having “more than 70% chance” or “less than 90% chance” of occurring. In three experiments, we studied how research participants perceived climate‐related forecasts expressed with lower‐bound (“over X% chance”) or upper‐bound (“under Y% chance”) p…
How good is good luck? The role of counterfactual thinking in the perception of lucky and unlucky events
Spontaneous references to ‘luck’ (e.g. in the mass media) frequently occur in connection with narrow escapes from accidents. The hypothesis that lucky events are not always positive, to the same degree as unlucky events are negative, was tested by asking Norwegian and Polish students to describe incidents of good and bad luck from their own lives, These stories were subsequently evaluated by the narrators and by a group of judges. Ratings showed …
Probabilities Associated with Precise and Vague Forecasts
Forecasts of future outcomes, such as the consequences of climate change, are given with different degrees of precision. Logically, more precise forecasts (e.g., a temperature increase of 3–4°) have a smaller probability of capturing the actual outcome than less precise forecasts (e.g., a temperature increase of 2–6°). Nevertheless, people often trust precise forecasts more than vague forecasts, perhaps because precision is associated with knowle…
Revisions and Regret: The Cost of Changing your Mind
Decision reversals often imply improved decisions. Yet, people show a strong resistance against changing their minds. These are well‐established findings, which suggest that changed decisions carry a subjective cost, perhaps by being more strongly regretted. Three studies were conducted to explore participants' regret when making reversible decisions and to test the hypothesis that changing one's mind will increase post‐outcome regret. The first …
Combining verbal forecasts: The role of directionality and the reinforcement effect
Recent research has shown that when people combine verbal probabilistic forecasts from two sources, they are not simply averaged but can reinforce each other; so when two advisors both said an event was “rather likely,” some listeners concluded that the event was “quite likely”. Conversely, when both said the event was “rather unlikely,” people concluded that it was “quite unlikely.” The present studies demonstrate that the direction of this effe…
Pre‐outcome regret: Widespread and overlooked
Many real‐life decisions (e.g. promises, plans and agreements) involve a time interval between when the decision is made and the main outcome is revealed. Nearly all regret studies focus on anticipated or experienced post‐outcome regret. We argue that regret is also frequently experienced in the pre‐outcome period, and that this ‘pre‐outcome regret’ has other sources than regret experienced after the outcome is known. Regret experienced in the pr…
Progress framing and sunk costs: How managers’ statements about project progress reveal their investment intentions
Framing experts' (dis)agreements about uncertain environmental events
Agreements and disagreements between expert statements influence lay people's beliefs. But few studies have examined what is perceived as a disagreement. We report six experiments where people rated agreement between pairs of probabilistic statements about environmental events, attributed to two different experts or to the same expert at two different points in time. The statements differed in frame, by focusing on complementary outcomes (45% pro…
When probabilities change: Perceptions and implications of trends in uncertain climate forecasts
Past research has revealed a trend effect when people are faced with a revised probabilistic forecast: A forecasted event that has become more (vs. less) certain is taken to signal a trend toward even stronger (weaker) certainty in future revisions of the forecast. The present paper expands this finding by exploring the boundary conditions of the trend effect and how it affects judgments of the forecaster. In Study 1, the trend effect was shown t…
Everybody Will Win, and All Must Be Hired: Comparing Additivity Neglect with the Nonselective Superiority Bias
Two streams of research looking at referent‐dependent judgments from slightly different angles are subadditivity research and research on the nonselective superiority bias. Both biases violate basic formal constraints: the probabilities of a set of exclusive events cannot add up to more than 100%, and a set of attractive candidates cannot all be rated as superior to the group mean. We examine in three experiments how these two biases are related,…
Framing of imprecise quantities: When are lower interval bounds preferred to upper bounds
Imprecisely known quantities (e.g., predictions) are often described in approximate terms as “more than X ” or “less than Y ” (e.g., “Ann will earn more than $50 000” or “less than $60 000”). Such phrases carry both quantitative and qualitative (pragmatic) information. Three studies are reported showing that lower limit estimates ( more than, over, minimum ) are generally more frequent, and considered more appropriate than upper limit estimates (…
More than, less than, or minimum, maximum: How upper and lower bounds determine subjective interval estimates
Uncertain quantities can be described by single‐point estimates of lower interval bounds ( X 1 ), upper interval bounds ( X 2 ), two‐bound estimates (separate estimates of X 1 and X 2 ), and by ranges ( X 1 − X 2 ). A price estimation task showed that single‐bound estimates phrased as “ T costs more than X 1 ” and “ T costs less than X 2 ,” yielded much larger intervals than “minimum X 1 ” and “maximum X 2 .” This difference can be attributed to …
The proximity heuristic in judgments of accident probabilities
In daily life, probabilities are often assessed informally through the perceived distance to a target event. Accident probabilities are believed to be high when a disastrous outcome appears to be close. This proximity heuristic can lead to exaggerated p(death) estimates in risky situations (Experiment 2), and sometimes higher probabilities for death after near-accidents than after actual accidents (Experiment 3 and 4). Near-accidents are also bel…
A note on the origin of the term “nature and nurture: Not Shakespeare and Galton, but Mulcaster
A note on a Norwegian precursor of Charles Spearman
Thomas Parr (1862-1935), a Norwegian psychologist and high-school teacher, attempted to prove a version of the “unity of the intellect” doctrine. In two papers, published in 1897 and 1898, Parr reported school grades for 739 eleven-to-fifteen-year-old schoolchildren, and was able to demonstrate a correspondence between “manual” (sensorimotor) skills like handwriting and achievement in more “intellectual” school subjects.
Societal risks as seen by a Norwegian public
In two studies, questionnaires originally developed to study risk perception in the United States were administered to Norwegian students. Level of perceived risk in Norway was clearly below American scores for most hazards, but slightly above what has been found in a parallel Hungarian study. Norwegians were more concerned than both Hungarians and Americans about narcotics, but less than Americans about chemicals used in food and agriculture, an…
Prediction and postdiction preferences in guessing
In three studies, it is shown that most subjects when asked to guess the outcome of an uncertain event (a die toss, the sex of a child, the winner of a match) will prefer to do so before the event. This holds regardless of consequences of the guess, or of variations in waiting time from the guess being made to the outcome being known. In a chance situation, a guess‐first preference may be partly explained by a ‘magical control’ hypothesis, but th…
Yerkes-Dodson: A Law for all Seasons
The paper traces the vicissitudes of the Yerkes-Dodson law from 1908 to the present. In its original form, the law was intended to describe the relation between stimulus strength and habit-formation for tasks varying in discrimination difficultness. But later generations of investigations and textbook authors have rendered it variously as the effects of punishment, reward, motivation, drive, arousal, anxiety, tension or stress upon learning, perf…
How good is good luck? The role of counterfactual thinking in the perception of lucky and unlucky events
Spontaneous references to ‘luck’ (e.g. in the mass media) frequently occur in connection with narrow escapes from accidents. The hypothesis that lucky events are not always positive, to the same degree as unlucky events are negative, was tested by asking Norwegian and Polish students to describe incidents of good and bad luck from their own lives, These stories were subsequently evaluated by the narrators and by a group of judges. Ratings showed …
Linda versus World Cup: Conjunctive Probabilities in Three-event Fictional and Real-life Predictions
Conjunction errors in probability judgments have been explained in terms of representatives, non-normative combination procedures, and linguistic, conversational, or conceptual misunderstandings. In two studies, a three-event variant of the classical Linda scenario (Tversky and Kahneman, 1983) was contrasted with estimates of Norway’s chances in three coming World Cup soccer matches. Conjunction errors occurred even in the latter, real-life predi…
Judgments of risk and probability: The role of frequentistic information
Risks and probabilities are often normatively defined in terms of the relative frequency of a target outcome. Psychological studies have shown that people are skilled in processing frequency information. Despite this, they often form discrepant estimates of probabilities and risks. The present paper traces this discrepancy to the perceived relevance of frequency information. In Study 1, student participants were asked to produce arguments for or …
Good luck and bad luck: How to tell the difference
Good luck implies comparison with a worse counterfactual outcome, whereas bad luck implies upward comparisons. People will accordingly describe themselves as particularly lucky after recollecting situations where they avoided something negative, and as particularly unlucky after recollecting episodes in which they missed something positive (Study 1). Upward and downward comparisons can be created by the way a situation develops, and are accentuat…
Ambiguous probabilities: When doesp=0.3 reflect a possibility, and when does it express a doubt
Verbal phrases denoting uncertainty are usually held to be more vague than numerical probability statements. They are, however, directionally more precise, in the sense that they are either positive, suggesting the occurrence of a target outcome, or negative, drawing attention to its non-occurrence. A numerical probability will, in contrast, sometimes be perceived as positive and sometimes as negative. When asked to complete sentences such as ‘Th…
Two fuzzy themes in a clear message
Simple Heuristics That Make Us Impressed
Verbal probabilities: A question of frame
Verbal expressions of probability and uncertainty are of two kinds: positive (‘probable’, ‘possible’) and negative (‘not certain’, ‘doubtful’). Choice of term has implications for predictions and decisions. The present studies show that positive phrases are rated to be more optimistic (when the target outcome is positive), and more correct, when the target outcome actually occurs, even in cases where positive and negative phrases are perceived to…
When the past becomes history: Effects of temporal order on explanations of trends
When people are asked to ‘explain’ a time series consisting of population statistics, they will suggest factors responsible for later events rather than for earlier events. This is shown in Experiment 1 for pairs of events and in Experiment 2 for triads of events with one deviant member. When the deviant statistic is the most recent one, it will in most cases be singled out for explanation. When it comes first, it is rarely explained, but accepte…
Looking back versus looking ahead: Framing of time and work at different stages of a project
Progress on a well‐defined project can be described along a task dimension in terms of amount done, or as amount of work still to be completed. Time‐limited projects can also be described on a temporal dimension in terms of time spent versus time left. Five experiments are reported showing that such frames have predictable implications for speakers as well as for listeners: Statements by a team leader about time spent and work left are perceived …
The proximity heuristic in judgments of accident probabilities
In daily life, probabilities are often assessed informally through the perceived distance to a target event. Accident probabilities are believed to be high when a disastrous outcome appears to be close. This proximity heuristic can lead to exaggerated p(death) estimates in risky situations (Experiment 2), and sometimes higher probabilities for death after near-accidents than after actual accidents (Experiment 3 and 4). Near-accidents are also bel…
More than, less than, or minimum, maximum: How upper and lower bounds determine subjective interval estimates
Uncertain quantities can be described by single‐point estimates of lower interval bounds ( X 1 ), upper interval bounds ( X 2 ), two‐bound estimates (separate estimates of X 1 and X 2 ), and by ranges ( X 1 − X 2 ). A price estimation task showed that single‐bound estimates phrased as “ T costs more than X 1 ” and “ T costs less than X 2 ,” yielded much larger intervals than “minimum X 1 ” and “maximum X 2 .” This difference can be attributed to …
Better than average and better with time: Relative evaluations of self and others in the past, present, and future
Evaluations of self and others in the past, present, and future were examined by asking 385 students to rate themselves or an acquaintance relative to their peers on a number of personality traits. We predicted, and found, evidence for self‐enhancement, as most participants regarded themselves superior to ‘most others’ at all points in time. We also found a better than average improvement effect, as participants considered themselves more superio…
Framing of imprecise quantities: When are lower interval bounds preferred to upper bounds
Imprecisely known quantities (e.g., predictions) are often described in approximate terms as “more than X ” or “less than Y ” (e.g., “Ann will earn more than $50 000” or “less than $60 000”). Such phrases carry both quantitative and qualitative (pragmatic) information. Three studies are reported showing that lower limit estimates ( more than, over, minimum ) are generally more frequent, and considered more appropriate than upper limit estimates (…
Pre‐outcome regret: Widespread and overlooked
Many real‐life decisions (e.g. promises, plans and agreements) involve a time interval between when the decision is made and the main outcome is revealed. Nearly all regret studies focus on anticipated or experienced post‐outcome regret. We argue that regret is also frequently experienced in the pre‐outcome period, and that this ‘pre‐outcome regret’ has other sources than regret experienced after the outcome is known. Regret experienced in the pr…
Progress framing and sunk costs: How managers’ statements about project progress reveal their investment intentions
Revisions and Regret: The Cost of Changing your Mind
Decision reversals often imply improved decisions. Yet, people show a strong resistance against changing their minds. These are well‐established findings, which suggest that changed decisions carry a subjective cost, perhaps by being more strongly regretted. Three studies were conducted to explore participants' regret when making reversible decisions and to test the hypothesis that changing one's mind will increase post‐outcome regret. The first …
Can > Will: Predictions of What Can Happen are Extreme, but Believed to be Probable
Predictions of uncertain events are often described in terms of what can or what will happen. How are such statements used by speakers, and what are they perceived to mean? Participants in four experiments were presented with distributions of variable product characteristics and were asked to generate natural, meaningful sentences containing either will or can. Will was typically associated with either low or intermediate numeric values, whereas …
Format dependent probabilities: An eye-tracking analysis of additivity neglect
When people are asked to estimate the probabilities of uncertain events, they often neglect the additivity principle, which requires that the probabilities assigned to an exhaustive set of outcomes should add up to 100%. Previous studies indicate that additivity neglect is dependent on response format, self-generated probability estimates being more coherent than estimates on rating scales. The present study made use of eye-tracking methodology, …
Everybody Will Win, and All Must Be Hired: Comparing Additivity Neglect with the Nonselective Superiority Bias
Two streams of research looking at referent‐dependent judgments from slightly different angles are subadditivity research and research on the nonselective superiority bias. Both biases violate basic formal constraints: the probabilities of a set of exclusive events cannot add up to more than 100%, and a set of attractive candidates cannot all be rated as superior to the group mean. We examine in three experiments how these two biases are related,…
Psychology (33 works) · Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics (30 works) · Social Psychology (23 works) · Mathematics (21 works) · Social Psychology (17 works) · Computer Science (15 works) · Statistics (15 works) · Economics (13 works) · Cognitive psychology (11 works) · Econometrics (10 works)