Brian Callaci
Biographic Data
| ID | 376489 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Brian Callaci |
| GIVEN NAMES | Brian |
| FAMILY NAME | Callaci |
| SIGNATURE | CALLACI B |
| AFFILIATIONS | Open Markets Institute, Washington, DC, USA |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-0078-9091 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 7 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 11 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 7 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2019 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Supply and the Housing Crisis A Debate
After decades of relative stagnation, American housing policy is now several years into a period of radical change and experimentation. In California, where I am policy director for the state-level organization California YIMBY (Yes in My Backyard), city planners will often gripe (with, I have to admit, some justification) that state housing law is changing too quickly for them to keep up. Several other states—including Washington, Montana, Color…
The Effect of Franchise No-Poaching Restrictions on Worker Earnings
We evaluate the nationwide impact of the Washington State Attorney General's 2018-20 enforcement campaign against no-poach clauses in franchising contracts, which prohibited worker movement across locations within a chain. Implementing a staggered difference-in-differences research design using Burning Glass Technologies job vacancies and Glassdoor salary reports from numerous industries, we estimate a 6% increase in posted annual earnings from t…
Labor Unions and the Problem of Monopoly
The labor movement has long had an ambivalent relationship to antitrust policy in the United States. Trade unionists have considered concentrated markets to be more favorable environments for union power than decentralized markets: oligopoly demands fewer union resources for organizing and contract bargaining campaigns, and oligopolists can tame cutthroat competition and share product market rents with workers. This article takes a different view…
How Antitrust Can Help Tame Capital and Empower Labor
What Do Franchisees Do? Vertical Restraints as Workplace Fissuring and Labor Discipline Devices
Applying a simple model to a data set created from 530 franchise contracts, this article shows that the loosening of antitrust restrictions on vertical restraints—competition restrictions in agreements between firms at different levels of the production and distribution process—allows trademarked brands to control wages and working conditions across the boundaries of the firm, at legally separate franchised establishments. Some vertical restraint…
Control Without Responsibility
While the first business organizations to reach large size in the late nineteenth century did so through the route of vertical integration—formal ownership of assets and direct employment of workers—mid-twentieth-century franchising firms pioneered a new path to bigness, relying on restrictive contracts rather than formal integration to control their business organizations. Franchised chains replaced formal ownership and employment with contractu…
The Economics of Just Transition
We develop a Just Transition framework for U.S. workers and communities that are currently dependent on domestic fossil fuel production. Our rough high-end estimate for such a program is a relatively modest $600 million per year. This level of funding would pay for (1) income, retraining, and relocation support for workers facing retrenchments; (2) guaranteeing the pensions for workers in the affected industries; and (3) mounting effective transi…
The Economics of Just Transition
We develop a Just Transition framework for U.S. workers and communities that are currently dependent on domestic fossil fuel production. Our rough high-end estimate for such a program is a relatively modest $600 million per year. This level of funding would pay for (1) income, retraining, and relocation support for workers facing retrenchments; (2) guaranteeing the pensions for workers in the affected industries; and (3) mounting effective transi…
Control Without Responsibility
While the first business organizations to reach large size in the late nineteenth century did so through the route of vertical integration—formal ownership of assets and direct employment of workers—mid-twentieth-century franchising firms pioneered a new path to bigness, relying on restrictive contracts rather than formal integration to control their business organizations. Franchised chains replaced formal ownership and employment with contractu…
The Economics of Just Transition
We develop a Just Transition framework for U.S. workers and communities that are currently dependent on domestic fossil fuel production. Our rough high-end estimate for such a program is a relatively modest $600 million per year. This level of funding would pay for (1) income, retraining, and relocation support for workers facing retrenchments; (2) guaranteeing the pensions for workers in the affected industries; and (3) mounting effective transi…
Control Without Responsibility
While the first business organizations to reach large size in the late nineteenth century did so through the route of vertical integration—formal ownership of assets and direct employment of workers—mid-twentieth-century franchising firms pioneered a new path to bigness, relying on restrictive contracts rather than formal integration to control their business organizations. Franchised chains replaced formal ownership and employment with contractu…
What Do Franchisees Do? Vertical Restraints as Workplace Fissuring and Labor Discipline Devices
Applying a simple model to a data set created from 530 franchise contracts, this article shows that the loosening of antitrust restrictions on vertical restraints—competition restrictions in agreements between firms at different levels of the production and distribution process—allows trademarked brands to control wages and working conditions across the boundaries of the firm, at legally separate franchised establishments. Some vertical restraint…
Labor Unions and the Problem of Monopoly
The labor movement has long had an ambivalent relationship to antitrust policy in the United States. Trade unionists have considered concentrated markets to be more favorable environments for union power than decentralized markets: oligopoly demands fewer union resources for organizing and contract bargaining campaigns, and oligopolists can tame cutthroat competition and share product market rents with workers. This article takes a different view…
How Antitrust Can Help Tame Capital and Empower Labor
The Effect of Franchise No-Poaching Restrictions on Worker Earnings
We evaluate the nationwide impact of the Washington State Attorney General's 2018-20 enforcement campaign against no-poach clauses in franchising contracts, which prohibited worker movement across locations within a chain. Implementing a staggered difference-in-differences research design using Burning Glass Technologies job vacancies and Glassdoor salary reports from numerous industries, we estimate a 6% increase in posted annual earnings from t…
Supply and the Housing Crisis A Debate
After decades of relative stagnation, American housing policy is now several years into a period of radical change and experimentation. In California, where I am policy director for the state-level organization California YIMBY (Yes in My Backyard), city planners will often gripe (with, I have to admit, some justification) that state housing law is changing too quickly for them to keep up. Several other states—including Washington, Montana, Color…
Business (7 works) · Economics (7 works) · Labour economics (5 works) · Law (5 works) · Market economy (4 works) · Franchising Strategies and Performance (3 works) · Industrial organization (3 works) · Labor Movements and Unions (3 works) · Bargaining power (2 works) · Franchise (2 works)