T Clifton Morgan
Biographic Data
| ID | 377092 |
|---|---|
| NAME | T Clifton Morgan |
| GIVEN NAMES | T Clifton |
| FAMILY NAME | Morgan |
| SIGNATURE | MORGAN T C |
| AFFILIATIONS | Rice University |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-8426-5510 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 38 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 1495 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 38 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1984 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2023 |
| H-INDEX | 18 |
Economic Sanctions: Evolution, Consequences, and Challenges
Taking an interdisciplinary perspective, we examine the evolution of economic sanctions in the post-World War II era and reflect on the lessons that could be drawn from their features and patterns of use. We observe that, during this time, there has been a remarkable increase in the use of sanctions as an instrument of foreign policy. We classify this period into four 'eras' and discuss, in this context, how the evolution of sanctions may be link…
Hearing the Noise: Economic Sanctions Theory and Anomalous Evidence
Our understanding of economic sanctions has progressed significantly over the past three decades. Sanctions scholars have done a remarkable job at using empirical anomalies to guide theoretical developments and then using these to guide the next iteration of data collection and empirical testing. Here, I argue that mounting empirical evidence suggests it is time to develop a new theoretical perspective. I identify a number of empirical results, s…
Threat and imposition of economic sanctions 1945–2005: Updating the Ties dataset
Recent research on economic sanctions has produced significant advances in our theoretical and empirical understanding of the causes and effects of these phenomena. Our theoretical understanding, which has been guided by empirical findings, has reached the point where existing datasets are no longer adequate to test important hypotheses. This article presents a recently updated version of the Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions dataset. T…
The secret ingredient on Iron Chef—road kill
The Effect of US Troop Deployment on Host States' Foreign Policy
Major powers often deploy troops abroad with the consent of host states. The stated aim of these deployments is often both to protect the host state and to foster stability in the region. Drawing from an extension of Palmer and Morgan's two-good theory of foreign policy, the authors explore some of the (perhaps unintended) effects of troop deployments abroad on the foreign policies of the host states. In particular, the authors focus on the effec…
Determinants of Sanctions Effectiveness: Sensitivity Analysis Using New Data
In the literature on sanctions effectiveness, scholars have identified a number of factors that may contribute to sanctions success. However, existing empirical studies provide mixed findings concerning the effects of these factors. This research note explores two possible reasons for this lack of consistency in the literature. First, informed by the recent theories that suggest threats are an important part of sanctions episodes, we analyze both…
A Theory of Foreign Policy
Deterring Rebellion: Deterring Rebellion
Journal Article Deterring Rebellion Get access Carla Martinez Machain, Carla Martinez Machain Rice University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar T. Clifton Morgan, T. Clifton Morgan Rice University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Patrick M. Regan Patrick M. Regan Binghamton University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Foreign Poli…
Ending Economic Coercion: Domestic Politics and International Bargaining
Research on when economic sanctions end has emphasized either the international bargaining game played by the sender and the target or the redistributive politics and ruling coalition changes in each state. We contend that neither approach offers a fully satisfactory explanation for economic coercion termination. Bargaining is inconsistent with long coercion episodes while ruling coalition changes cannot inform our understanding of very short epi…
The Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions, 1971—2000
Economic sanctions, increasingly used as instruments of foreign policy in recent decades, have been the focus of numerous academic studies. Recent theoretical advances in our understanding of sanctions cannot be tested adequately with existing data. This article presents a newly developed dataset that contains information on 888 cases in which sanctions were threatened and/or implemented in the 1971—2000 period. We describe the dataset, present d…
Multilateral Versus Unilateral Sanctions Reconsidered: A Test Using New Data
Policymakers frequently argue that multilateral sanctions are more likely to induce a target state to alter its behavior than are unilateral sanctions. Repeated empirical studies using the familiar Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot data set demonstrate that unilateral sanctions "work" more often than multilateral sanctions, however. In this study, we subject three theoretical explanations for this counterintuitive finding to additional empirical testi…
Power Transition, the Two-Good Theory, and Neorealism: A Comparison with Comments on Recent U.S. Foreign Policy
This paper compares the assumptions of three approaches to the study of international relations—neorealism, power transition, and the “two-good theory.” We show that neorealism is an underspecified theory that has limited empirical support. While there are significant differences between them, power transition and the two-good theory have much in common. The paper illustrates the differences between power transition and the two-good theory by app…
When Do They Stop? Modeling the Termination of War
This paper deals with war termination. We develop a formal model based on the logic of domestic political accountability. We assume that leaders seek to maximize the likelihood that they will stay in office and that their decisions regarding war termination are responsive to their winning coalition's expectations and sensitivity to costs and to the costs of war. Our model generates predictions about when state leaders will prefer to terminate an …
Teach a Man to Fish and You Can Sell Him Bait for a Lifetime
Journal Article Teach a Man to Fish and You Can Sell Him Bait for a Lifetime Get access The Institutional Economics of Foreign Aid. By Martens Bertin Mummert Uwe Murrell Peter Seabright Paul. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. 212 pp., $60.00 (ISBN: 0-5218-0818-9). T. Clifton Morgan T. Clifton Morgan Department of Political Science, Rice University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar International St…
Imposing Sanctions: States, Firms, and Economic Coercion1
The majority of research on economic sanctions focuses on the effectiveness of sanctions as an instrument of foreign policy. Although the number of sanctions episodes is rapidly growing, the empirical record suggests that sanctions, while possibly effective for symbolic purposes, often fail to alter the behavior of target states (Wagner 1988; Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot 1990; Pape 1997; Drury 1998, 2001). But even though the empirical work indic…
To Protect and to Serve: Alliances And Foreign Policy Portfolios
The consequences of alliance formation for other foreign policies of a state, including defense spending and the initiation of militarized disputes, are examined using a theory of foreign policy that is based on several assumptions. First, states pursue two goods-change (defending those aspects of the status quo that one likes) and maintenance (altering those aspects of the status quo that one dislikes)-through their foreign policies. Second, sta…
Give or Take: Foreign Aid and Foreign Policy Substitutability
The article attempts to explain state donations of foreign aid with the application of a general theory of foreign policy. This places foreign aid within the context of a state's creation of a foreign-policy portfolio. The general theory is based upon the assumption that states pursue two goods: `change', defined as the ability to alter the status quo in desirable ways, and `maintenance', the ability to prevent changes in favored aspects of the s…
A Model of Foreign Policy Substitutability: Selecting the Right Tools for the Job(s)
The authors present a model of substitutability that seeks to generalize beyond the restricted conditions and special case of realism. The derivations from the model lead to several hypotheses. First, if a state's relative capabilities increase, resources given to all foreign policies should increase. Second, when the efficiency of one policy increases, resources given to other policies should decline. Third, when the relative salience for one go…
Labour in Capitalist America: Ideology, Bureaucracy, Insurgency
AS THE DUST of collapse of communism has had about a decade to settle, and often bewildering realities of new millennium engulf us, a proliferation of problems and studies suggest truth of an old assertion of Jean-Paul Sartre. Marxism remains the philosophy of our time, because conditions that brought it into being — dynamic and incredibly creative/destructive realities of capitalism — continue to be framework within which we live. A majority of …
Domestic Support and Diversionary External Conflict in Great Britain, 1950- 1992
Recent studies have analyzed the diversionary theory of international conflict. The theory, which holds that state leaders occasionally turn to external conflict as a means of dealing with domestic political problems, has been widely accepted for centuries. Despite its intuitive appeal, quantitative studies have failed to document the phenomenon. Recent work has significantly refined the argument and empirical evidence supporting the revised theo…
A two‐good theory of foreign policy: An application to dispute initiation and reciprocation
We develop a general theory of foreign policy based on the assumption that states pursue two goals: security, defined as the ability to prevent changes in favored aspects of the status quo, and proaction, defined as the ability to change the status quo in desirable ways. We also assume a relationship between state power and production advantages for security and proaction. The model produces specific hypotheses relating state power and changes in…
Democracy and Diplomacy: The Impact of Domestic Politics on U.S. Foreign Policy, 1789–1994, by Melvin Small
Journal Article Democracy and Diplomacy: The Impact of Domestic Politics on U.S. Foreign Policy, 1789–1994, by Melvin Small Get access Democracy and Diplomacy: The Impact of Domestic Politics on U.S. Foreign Policy, 1789-1994 by Melvin Small. Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996. 200 pp. Cloth, $38.95; paper, $13.95. T. Clifton Morgan T. Clifton Morgan Rice University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google…
Fools Suffer Gladly: The Use of Economic Sanctions in International Crises
A number of recent international situations have raised again questions regarding the usefulness of economic sanctions as an instrument of foreign policy. Sanctions continue to be applied in a variety of contexts, yet we have not developed a sufficient understanding of the processes involved to determine when, or even if, sanctions can "work." While a great deal has been written on the subject, there have been neither attempts to subject the theo…
State Characteristics and Crisis Outcomes: A Test of the Spatial Model
Two recent books, Interstate Crisis Behavior, 1816–1980 by Russell Leng and Untying the Knot of War by Cliff Morgan, have focused on the study of international crises. The two studies follow fundamentally different approaches, with Leng following an inductive strategy and Morgan developing a deductive theory, but there appears to be a great deal of overlap in the questions studied and in the variables examined. This research attempts to evaluate …
Economic sanctions as an instrument of foreign policy: The role of domestic politics
Most studies of economic sanctions have concluded that they are ineffective as instruments of foreign policy. In a previous effort, we applied the spatial model of bargaining to the question of sanctions effectiveness to identify the‐conditions under which sanctions can be expected to “work.” In this paper, we refine that analysis by examining the impact of domestic politics in the state that is the target of the sanctions. Sanction episodes may …
Domestic Structure, Decisional Constraints, and War: So Why Kant Democracies Fight
It has often been argued that democracies are less war-prone than other forms of government because the people, who must bear the costs of war in lives and resources, will restrain the aggressive impulses of their leaders. Most empirical studies addressing this hypothesis have produced results indicating that democracies fight as often as other states. The authors argue that previous studies have misspecified the theoretical argument. The argumen…
Domestic Discontent and the External Use of Force
Although the diversionary theory of international conflict is intuitively plausible and is supported by much anecdotal evidence, quantitative tests generally have failed to establish a systemic link between domestic political troubles and foreign policy adventurism. In this article we revise the diversionary theory. We argue that a state leader will treat an erosion of domestic support more seriously when it comes from within segments of society …
Fools Suffer Gladly: The Use of Economic Sanctions in International Crises
A number of recent international situations have raised again questions regarding the usefulness of economic sanctions as an instrument of foreign policy. Sanctions continue to be applied in a variety of contexts, yet we have not developed a sufficient understanding of the processes involved to determine when, or even if, sanctions can "work." While a great deal has been written on the subject, there have been neither attempts to subject the theo…
Good Times, Bad Times, and the Diversionary Use of Force: A Tale of Some Not-So-Free Agents
It is commonly asserted that state leaders, when faced with poor domestic political conditions, have an incentive to engage in diversionary foreign policy behavior. The standard view is that an aggressive foreign policy benefits the executive by leading the public to ignore domestic problems and to “rally around the flag” to meet the foreign threat. In this article, the authors formalize the diversionary argument as a principal-agent problem in w…
Threat and imposition of economic sanctions 1945–2005: Updating the Ties dataset
Recent research on economic sanctions has produced significant advances in our theoretical and empirical understanding of the causes and effects of these phenomena. Our theoretical understanding, which has been guided by empirical findings, has reached the point where existing datasets are no longer adequate to test important hypotheses. This article presents a recently updated version of the Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions dataset. T…
Multilateral Versus Unilateral Sanctions Reconsidered: A Test Using New Data
Policymakers frequently argue that multilateral sanctions are more likely to induce a target state to alter its behavior than are unilateral sanctions. Repeated empirical studies using the familiar Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot data set demonstrate that unilateral sanctions "work" more often than multilateral sanctions, however. In this study, we subject three theoretical explanations for this counterintuitive finding to additional empirical testi…
Take two democracies and call me in the morning: A prescription for peace
Many have argued that the spread of democracy will lead to a more peaceful international environment; however, the empirical record on this point is mixed. It appears that democracies fight as often as do other types of states, but they seldom, if ever, fight one another. Two main arguments have been offered as explanations for these empirical findings. The political culture argument contends that the interaction of state leaders’ culturally dete…
Determinants of Sanctions Effectiveness: Sensitivity Analysis Using New Data
In the literature on sanctions effectiveness, scholars have identified a number of factors that may contribute to sanctions success. However, existing empirical studies provide mixed findings concerning the effects of these factors. This research note explores two possible reasons for this lack of consistency in the literature. First, informed by the recent theories that suggest threats are an important part of sanctions episodes, we analyze both…
The Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions, 1971—2000
Economic sanctions, increasingly used as instruments of foreign policy in recent decades, have been the focus of numerous academic studies. Recent theoretical advances in our understanding of sanctions cannot be tested adequately with existing data. This article presents a newly developed dataset that contains information on 888 cases in which sanctions were threatened and/or implemented in the 1971—2000 period. We describe the dataset, present d…
Domestic Support and Diversionary External Conflict in Great Britain, 1950- 1992
Recent studies have analyzed the diversionary theory of international conflict. The theory, which holds that state leaders occasionally turn to external conflict as a means of dealing with domestic political problems, has been widely accepted for centuries. Despite its intuitive appeal, quantitative studies have failed to document the phenomenon. Recent work has significantly refined the argument and empirical evidence supporting the revised theo…
A Model of Foreign Policy Substitutability: Selecting the Right Tools for the Job(s)
The authors present a model of substitutability that seeks to generalize beyond the restricted conditions and special case of realism. The derivations from the model lead to several hypotheses. First, if a state's relative capabilities increase, resources given to all foreign policies should increase. Second, when the efficiency of one policy increases, resources given to other policies should decline. Third, when the relative salience for one go…
Issue Linkages in International Crisis Bargaining
Students of international relations have long been concerned with questions regarding the impact of issue linkages on bargaining outcomes; unfortunately, the body of theory attempting to provide a systematic and rigorous analysis of issue linkages is woefully underdeveloped. In this study I contribute to the development of this theory with a particular emphasis on accounting for cases in which issue linkage fails in international crisis bargainin…
A Spatial Model of Crisis Bargaining
This study deals with the problem of determining whether states engaged in an international crisis will arrive at a negotiated settlement or go to war. A formal model of crisis bargaining that is based on a spatial representation of the theory of games is proposed as an analytical tool. The paper shows how the model can be used to derive probabilistic predictions regarding crisis outcomes and that these predictions are identical to the Nash barga…
Economic sanctions as an instrument of foreign policy: The role of domestic politics
Most studies of economic sanctions have concluded that they are ineffective as instruments of foreign policy. In a previous effort, we applied the spatial model of bargaining to the question of sanctions effectiveness to identify the‐conditions under which sanctions can be expected to “work.” In this paper, we refine that analysis by examining the impact of domestic politics in the state that is the target of the sanctions. Sanction episodes may …
The War-Weariness Hypothesis: An Empirical Test
The hypothesis and other hypotheses of negative addictive contagion assert that war induces in its participants an inhibition against subsequent war for several years. These national-level hypotheses are tested empirically by examining the addictive effects of wars between the great powers over the period 1 500-1975. The findings are consistent over a variety of indicators of contagion: there is no empirical support for negative addiction hypothe…
Imposing Sanctions: States, Firms, and Economic Coercion1
The majority of research on economic sanctions focuses on the effectiveness of sanctions as an instrument of foreign policy. Although the number of sanctions episodes is rapidly growing, the empirical record suggests that sanctions, while possibly effective for symbolic purposes, often fail to alter the behavior of target states (Wagner 1988; Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot 1990; Pape 1997; Drury 1998, 2001). But even though the empirical work indic…
To Protect and to Serve: Alliances And Foreign Policy Portfolios
The consequences of alliance formation for other foreign policies of a state, including defense spending and the initiation of militarized disputes, are examined using a theory of foreign policy that is based on several assumptions. First, states pursue two goods-change (defending those aspects of the status quo that one likes) and maintenance (altering those aspects of the status quo that one dislikes)-through their foreign policies. Second, sta…
Give or Take: Foreign Aid and Foreign Policy Substitutability
The article attempts to explain state donations of foreign aid with the application of a general theory of foreign policy. This places foreign aid within the context of a state's creation of a foreign-policy portfolio. The general theory is based upon the assumption that states pursue two goods: `change', defined as the ability to alter the status quo in desirable ways, and `maintenance', the ability to prevent changes in favored aspects of the s…
The Effect of US Troop Deployment on Host States' Foreign Policy
Major powers often deploy troops abroad with the consent of host states. The stated aim of these deployments is often both to protect the host state and to foster stability in the region. Drawing from an extension of Palmer and Morgan's two-good theory of foreign policy, the authors explore some of the (perhaps unintended) effects of troop deployments abroad on the foreign policies of the host states. In particular, the authors focus on the effec…
Ending Economic Coercion: Domestic Politics and International Bargaining
Research on when economic sanctions end has emphasized either the international bargaining game played by the sender and the target or the redistributive politics and ruling coalition changes in each state. We contend that neither approach offers a fully satisfactory explanation for economic coercion termination. Bargaining is inconsistent with long coercion episodes while ruling coalition changes cannot inform our understanding of very short epi…
The Frequency and Seriousness of War: An Inverse Relationship
The hypothesis that the frequency of war in a given period is inversely related to its seriousness is operationalized and tested for the modern great power system beginning in 1500. All imperial wars, as well as interstate wars since 1500, are identified and several indicators of the seriousness of war are constructed. It is found that the correlations between the frequency and seriousness of wars are consistently in the predicted direction, of m…
A two‐good theory of foreign policy: An application to dispute initiation and reciprocation
We develop a general theory of foreign policy based on the assumption that states pursue two goals: security, defined as the ability to prevent changes in favored aspects of the status quo, and proaction, defined as the ability to change the status quo in desirable ways. We also assume a relationship between state power and production advantages for security and proaction. The model produces specific hypotheses relating state power and changes in…
Democracy and war: Reflections on the literature
This article reviews the research addressing the question of whether democracies are less war‐prone than are other types of nation‐states. I argue that we have witnessed a great deal of cumulation in this body of literature and that our understanding has grown substantially over the past decades. Furthermore, I suggest that this literature has advanced through the interplay of theoretical and empirical work in which empirical analyses have posed …
Power, resolve and bargaining in international crises: A spatial theory
In this paper the spatial model of crisis bargaining is utilized to derive a number of hypotheses relating the relative power and resolve of crisis participants to crisis outcomes. The resolve and two power variables are defined and the manner in which they are incorporated into the model is demonstrated. The model, which represents a synthesis of traditional utility based bargaining models and the spatial theory of voting, is then used to establ…
Hearing the Noise: Economic Sanctions Theory and Anomalous Evidence
Our understanding of economic sanctions has progressed significantly over the past three decades. Sanctions scholars have done a remarkable job at using empirical anomalies to guide theoretical developments and then using these to guide the next iteration of data collection and empirical testing. Here, I argue that mounting empirical evidence suggests it is time to develop a new theoretical perspective. I identify a number of empirical results, s…
The Frequency and Seriousness of War: An Inverse Relationship
The hypothesis that the frequency of war in a given period is inversely related to its seriousness is operationalized and tested for the modern great power system beginning in 1500. All imperial wars, as well as interstate wars since 1500, are identified and several indicators of the seriousness of war are constructed. It is found that the correlations between the frequency and seriousness of wars are consistently in the predicted direction, of m…
A Spatial Model of Crisis Bargaining
This study deals with the problem of determining whether states engaged in an international crisis will arrive at a negotiated settlement or go to war. A formal model of crisis bargaining that is based on a spatial representation of the theory of games is proposed as an analytical tool. The paper shows how the model can be used to derive probabilistic predictions regarding crisis outcomes and that these predictions are identical to the Nash barga…
The War-Weariness Hypothesis: An Empirical Test
The hypothesis and other hypotheses of negative addictive contagion assert that war induces in its participants an inhibition against subsequent war for several years. These national-level hypotheses are tested empirically by examining the addictive effects of wars between the great powers over the period 1 500-1975. The findings are consistent over a variety of indicators of contagion: there is no empirical support for negative addiction hypothe…
Power in World Politics
Explores power relationships in world politics, focusing on what power is and what it is not, on the ways in which power has been assessed, and on the major lessons for international politics that can be gleaned through an analysis of power.
Power, resolve and bargaining in international crises: A spatial theory
In this paper the spatial model of crisis bargaining is utilized to derive a number of hypotheses relating the relative power and resolve of crisis participants to crisis outcomes. The resolve and two power variables are defined and the manner in which they are incorporated into the model is demonstrated. The model, which represents a synthesis of traditional utility based bargaining models and the spatial theory of voting, is then used to establ…
The Concept of War Its Impact on Research and Policy
Issue Linkages in International Crisis Bargaining
Students of international relations have long been concerned with questions regarding the impact of issue linkages on bargaining outcomes; unfortunately, the body of theory attempting to provide a systematic and rigorous analysis of issue linkages is woefully underdeveloped. In this study I contribute to the development of this theory with a particular emphasis on accounting for cases in which issue linkage fails in international crisis bargainin…
Domestic Structure, Decisional Constraints, and War: So Why Kant Democracies Fight
It has often been argued that democracies are less war-prone than other forms of government because the people, who must bear the costs of war in lives and resources, will restrain the aggressive impulses of their leaders. Most empirical studies addressing this hypothesis have produced results indicating that democracies fight as often as other states. The authors argue that previous studies have misspecified the theoretical argument. The argumen…
Take two democracies and call me in the morning: A prescription for peace
Many have argued that the spread of democracy will lead to a more peaceful international environment; however, the empirical record on this point is mixed. It appears that democracies fight as often as do other types of states, but they seldom, if ever, fight one another. Two main arguments have been offered as explanations for these empirical findings. The political culture argument contends that the interaction of state leaders’ culturally dete…
Domestic Discontent and the External Use of Force
Although the diversionary theory of international conflict is intuitively plausible and is supported by much anecdotal evidence, quantitative tests generally have failed to establish a systemic link between domestic political troubles and foreign policy adventurism. In this article we revise the diversionary theory. We argue that a state leader will treat an erosion of domestic support more seriously when it comes from within segments of society …
Democracy and war: Reflections on the literature
This article reviews the research addressing the question of whether democracies are less war‐prone than are other types of nation‐states. I argue that we have witnessed a great deal of cumulation in this body of literature and that our understanding has grown substantially over the past decades. Furthermore, I suggest that this literature has advanced through the interplay of theoretical and empirical work in which empirical analyses have posed …
Good Times, Bad Times, and the Diversionary Use of Force: A Tale of Some Not-So-Free Agents
It is commonly asserted that state leaders, when faced with poor domestic political conditions, have an incentive to engage in diversionary foreign policy behavior. The standard view is that an aggressive foreign policy benefits the executive by leading the public to ignore domestic problems and to “rally around the flag” to meet the foreign threat. In this article, the authors formalize the diversionary argument as a principal-agent problem in w…
State Characteristics and Crisis Outcomes: A Test of the Spatial Model
Two recent books, Interstate Crisis Behavior, 1816–1980 by Russell Leng and Untying the Knot of War by Cliff Morgan, have focused on the study of international crises. The two studies follow fundamentally different approaches, with Leng following an inductive strategy and Morgan developing a deductive theory, but there appears to be a great deal of overlap in the questions studied and in the variables examined. This research attempts to evaluate …
Economic sanctions as an instrument of foreign policy: The role of domestic politics
Most studies of economic sanctions have concluded that they are ineffective as instruments of foreign policy. In a previous effort, we applied the spatial model of bargaining to the question of sanctions effectiveness to identify the‐conditions under which sanctions can be expected to “work.” In this paper, we refine that analysis by examining the impact of domestic politics in the state that is the target of the sanctions. Sanction episodes may …
Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World
A two‐good theory of foreign policy: An application to dispute initiation and reciprocation
We develop a general theory of foreign policy based on the assumption that states pursue two goals: security, defined as the ability to prevent changes in favored aspects of the status quo, and proaction, defined as the ability to change the status quo in desirable ways. We also assume a relationship between state power and production advantages for security and proaction. The model produces specific hypotheses relating state power and changes in…
Democracy and Diplomacy: The Impact of Domestic Politics on U.S. Foreign Policy, 1789–1994, by Melvin Small
Journal Article Democracy and Diplomacy: The Impact of Domestic Politics on U.S. Foreign Policy, 1789–1994, by Melvin Small Get access Democracy and Diplomacy: The Impact of Domestic Politics on U.S. Foreign Policy, 1789-1994 by Melvin Small. Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996. 200 pp. Cloth, $38.95; paper, $13.95. T. Clifton Morgan T. Clifton Morgan Rice University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google…
Fools Suffer Gladly: The Use of Economic Sanctions in International Crises
A number of recent international situations have raised again questions regarding the usefulness of economic sanctions as an instrument of foreign policy. Sanctions continue to be applied in a variety of contexts, yet we have not developed a sufficient understanding of the processes involved to determine when, or even if, sanctions can "work." While a great deal has been written on the subject, there have been neither attempts to subject the theo…
Domestic Support and Diversionary External Conflict in Great Britain, 1950- 1992
Recent studies have analyzed the diversionary theory of international conflict. The theory, which holds that state leaders occasionally turn to external conflict as a means of dealing with domestic political problems, has been widely accepted for centuries. Despite its intuitive appeal, quantitative studies have failed to document the phenomenon. Recent work has significantly refined the argument and empirical evidence supporting the revised theo…
A Model of Foreign Policy Substitutability: Selecting the Right Tools for the Job(s)
The authors present a model of substitutability that seeks to generalize beyond the restricted conditions and special case of realism. The derivations from the model lead to several hypotheses. First, if a state's relative capabilities increase, resources given to all foreign policies should increase. Second, when the efficiency of one policy increases, resources given to other policies should decline. Third, when the relative salience for one go…
Labour in Capitalist America: Ideology, Bureaucracy, Insurgency
AS THE DUST of collapse of communism has had about a decade to settle, and often bewildering realities of new millennium engulf us, a proliferation of problems and studies suggest truth of an old assertion of Jean-Paul Sartre. Marxism remains the philosophy of our time, because conditions that brought it into being — dynamic and incredibly creative/destructive realities of capitalism — continue to be framework within which we live. A majority of …
Give or Take: Foreign Aid and Foreign Policy Substitutability
The article attempts to explain state donations of foreign aid with the application of a general theory of foreign policy. This places foreign aid within the context of a state's creation of a foreign-policy portfolio. The general theory is based upon the assumption that states pursue two goods: `change', defined as the ability to alter the status quo in desirable ways, and `maintenance', the ability to prevent changes in favored aspects of the s…
Teach a Man to Fish and You Can Sell Him Bait for a Lifetime
Journal Article Teach a Man to Fish and You Can Sell Him Bait for a Lifetime Get access The Institutional Economics of Foreign Aid. By Martens Bertin Mummert Uwe Murrell Peter Seabright Paul. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. 212 pp., $60.00 (ISBN: 0-5218-0818-9). T. Clifton Morgan T. Clifton Morgan Department of Political Science, Rice University Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar International St…
Imposing Sanctions: States, Firms, and Economic Coercion1
The majority of research on economic sanctions focuses on the effectiveness of sanctions as an instrument of foreign policy. Although the number of sanctions episodes is rapidly growing, the empirical record suggests that sanctions, while possibly effective for symbolic purposes, often fail to alter the behavior of target states (Wagner 1988; Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot 1990; Pape 1997; Drury 1998, 2001). But even though the empirical work indic…
To Protect and to Serve: Alliances And Foreign Policy Portfolios
The consequences of alliance formation for other foreign policies of a state, including defense spending and the initiation of militarized disputes, are examined using a theory of foreign policy that is based on several assumptions. First, states pursue two goods-change (defending those aspects of the status quo that one likes) and maintenance (altering those aspects of the status quo that one dislikes)-through their foreign policies. Second, sta…
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