Georges Rey
Biographic Data
| ID | 3774758 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Georges Rey |
| GIVEN NAMES | Georges |
| FAMILY NAME | Rey |
| SIGNATURE | REY G |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Maryland, College Park |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-4502-2396 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 19 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 28 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 18 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 1 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1976 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2022 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
The innocuousness of folieism and the need of intentionality where transduction fails: Replies to Adger and to Stainton & Viger
I reply to Stainton and Viger by pointing out that my “folieist” claim—that standard linguistic entities (“SLEs”) such as words and phonemes are illusions—would not have the calamitous consequences for linguistics that they fear. Talk of “a language” need only be understood as talk of an I‐language precisely as Chomskyans have proposed; and I reply to Adger by pointing out that, since SLEs are not generally describable as real, local physical phe…
A Companion to Chomsky
The Non-Primacy of Subjective Intentionality 1
In several of his papers, Brian Loar insisted on the primacy of the subjective in a theory of intentionality. Although he had very subtle ideas about the topic, I will argue that this primacy is mis-placed, motivated by a premature pessimism about a reduction of intentional to non-intentional terms, and an uncritical Cartesianism regarding our access to intentionality. Intentional states have a crucial role to play in an entirely objective psycho…
The many errors of Vyvyan Evans’ The Language Myth
Vyvyan Evans’
Experimental Philosophy of Language
Experimental philosophy of language uses experimental methods developed in the cognitive sciences to investigate topics of interest to philosophers of language. This article describes the methodological background for the development of experimental approaches to topics in philosophy of language, distinguishes negative and positive projects in experimental philosophy of language, and evaluates experimental work on the reference of proper names an…
Physicalism and its Discontents
Physicalism, a topic that has been central to modern philosophy of mind and metaphysics, is the philosophical view that everything in the space-time world is ultimately physical. The physicalist will claim that all facts about the mind and the mental are physical facts and deny the existence of mental events and state insofar as these are thought of as independent of physical things, events and states. This collection of essays, first published i…
Digging Deeper for the A Priori
Role, Not Content: Comments on David Rosenthal's “Consciousness, Content, and Metacognitive Judgments”
Language, Music and Mind
Resisting Primitive Compulsions
Keeping meaning more in mind
De nombreux philosophes supposent que les arguments de Quine contre la distinction analytique/synthétique ont condamné les approches de la psychosémantique en termes de "rôles conceptuels". Je distingue deux objections dans ces arguments : une objection "horizontale" touchant à la distinction entre signification et croyance et une objection "verticale" concernant la réductibilité de la première distinction à des termes non-sémantiques. Je soutien…
A Not "Merely Empirical" Argument for a Language of Thought
When Other Things Aren't Equal: Saving Ceteris Paribus Laws from Vacuity
A common view is that ceteris paribus clauses render lawlike statements vacuous, unless such clauses can be explicitly reformulated as antecedents of ‘real’ laws that face no counterinstances. But such reformulations are rare; and they are not, we argue, to be expected in general. So we defend an alternative sufficient condition for the non-vacuity of ceteris paribus laws: roughly, any counterinstance of the law must be independently explicable, …
The Problem of Consciousness: Essays Towards a Resolution
Meaning in Mind: Fodor and his Critics
Journal Article Book Reviews Get access Meaning in Mind: Fodor and his Critics. Edited By Barry Loewer and Georces Rey. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991. Pp. xxxvii + 342. Price £37.50.) Barry C. Smith Barry C. Smith Birkbeck College, University of London Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 43, Issue 173, October 1993, Pages 560–563, https://doi.org/10.2307/2220009 Published: …
Idealized Conceptual Roles
Fodor and Lepore (FL more intermediate positions-specifically, conceptual role theories (CRTSs) like Block's (chap. 6)-have been vitiated by Quine. They then argue, convincingly, that none of arguments for holism succeed, and so look forward to atomism. Modesty (p. 34) forbids them from arguing for this latter view, but they think that only arguments against it are arguments against particular versions of it, specifically, resemblance and conditi…
A Question About Consciousness
Toward a Computational Account of Akrasia and Self-Deception
Ii Survival
When Other Things Aren't Equal: Saving Ceteris Paribus Laws from Vacuity
A common view is that ceteris paribus clauses render lawlike statements vacuous, unless such clauses can be explicitly reformulated as antecedents of ‘real’ laws that face no counterinstances. But such reformulations are rare; and they are not, we argue, to be expected in general. So we defend an alternative sufficient condition for the non-vacuity of ceteris paribus laws: roughly, any counterinstance of the law must be independently explicable, …
A Not "Merely Empirical" Argument for a Language of Thought
Resisting Primitive Compulsions
Ii Survival
A Question About Consciousness
Toward a Computational Account of Akrasia and Self-Deception
The Problem of Consciousness: Essays Towards a Resolution
Meaning in Mind: Fodor and his Critics
Journal Article Book Reviews Get access Meaning in Mind: Fodor and his Critics. Edited By Barry Loewer and Georces Rey. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991. Pp. xxxvii + 342. Price £37.50.) Barry C. Smith Barry C. Smith Birkbeck College, University of London Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar The Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 43, Issue 173, October 1993, Pages 560–563, https://doi.org/10.2307/2220009 Published: …
Idealized Conceptual Roles
Fodor and Lepore (FL more intermediate positions-specifically, conceptual role theories (CRTSs) like Block's (chap. 6)-have been vitiated by Quine. They then argue, convincingly, that none of arguments for holism succeed, and so look forward to atomism. Modesty (p. 34) forbids them from arguing for this latter view, but they think that only arguments against it are arguments against particular versions of it, specifically, resemblance and conditi…
Keeping meaning more in mind
De nombreux philosophes supposent que les arguments de Quine contre la distinction analytique/synthétique ont condamné les approches de la psychosémantique en termes de "rôles conceptuels". Je distingue deux objections dans ces arguments : une objection "horizontale" touchant à la distinction entre signification et croyance et une objection "verticale" concernant la réductibilité de la première distinction à des termes non-sémantiques. Je soutien…
A Not "Merely Empirical" Argument for a Language of Thought
When Other Things Aren't Equal: Saving Ceteris Paribus Laws from Vacuity
A common view is that ceteris paribus clauses render lawlike statements vacuous, unless such clauses can be explicitly reformulated as antecedents of ‘real’ laws that face no counterinstances. But such reformulations are rare; and they are not, we argue, to be expected in general. So we defend an alternative sufficient condition for the non-vacuity of ceteris paribus laws: roughly, any counterinstance of the law must be independently explicable, …
Resisting Primitive Compulsions
Language, Music and Mind
Role, Not Content: Comments on David Rosenthal's “Consciousness, Content, and Metacognitive Judgments”
Physicalism and its Discontents
Physicalism, a topic that has been central to modern philosophy of mind and metaphysics, is the philosophical view that everything in the space-time world is ultimately physical. The physicalist will claim that all facts about the mind and the mental are physical facts and deny the existence of mental events and state insofar as these are thought of as independent of physical things, events and states. This collection of essays, first published i…
Digging Deeper for the A Priori
Experimental Philosophy of Language
Experimental philosophy of language uses experimental methods developed in the cognitive sciences to investigate topics of interest to philosophers of language. This article describes the methodological background for the development of experimental approaches to topics in philosophy of language, distinguishes negative and positive projects in experimental philosophy of language, and evaluates experimental work on the reference of proper names an…
The many errors of Vyvyan Evans’ The Language Myth
Vyvyan Evans’
The Non-Primacy of Subjective Intentionality 1
In several of his papers, Brian Loar insisted on the primacy of the subjective in a theory of intentionality. Although he had very subtle ideas about the topic, I will argue that this primacy is mis-placed, motivated by a premature pessimism about a reduction of intentional to non-intentional terms, and an uncritical Cartesianism regarding our access to intentionality. Intentional states have a crucial role to play in an entirely objective psycho…
A Companion to Chomsky
The innocuousness of folieism and the need of intentionality where transduction fails: Replies to Adger and to Stainton & Viger
I reply to Stainton and Viger by pointing out that my “folieist” claim—that standard linguistic entities (“SLEs”) such as words and phonemes are illusions—would not have the calamitous consequences for linguistics that they fear. Talk of “a language” need only be understood as talk of an I‐language precisely as Chomskyans have proposed; and I reply to Adger by pointing out that, since SLEs are not generally describable as real, local physical phe…
Philosophy (15 works) · Epistemology (12 works) · Psychology (8 works) · Linguistics (6 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (6 works) · Classical Philosophy and Thought (5 works) · Computer Science (5 works) · Philosophy (4 works) · Philosophy and History of Science (4 works) · Cognitive science (3 works)