Jörgen W Weibull

Biographic Data

ID3822391
NAMEJörgen W Weibull
GIVEN NAMESJörgen W
FAMILY NAMEWeibull
SIGNATUREWEIBULL J W
AFFILIATIONSStockholm School of Economics
ORCID0000-0003-0817-0285
VERIFIEDYes
TOTAL WORKS9
TOTAL CITATIONS44
WORKS AS AUTHOR9
WORKS AS EDITOR0
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR1980
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2023
H-INDEX2

  • An analytically solvable principal-agent model

    Open AccessLars‐Göran Mattsson, Jörgen W WeibullARTICLEGames and Economic Behavior2023

    We analyze a principal-agent model with moral hazard where the principal is risk neutral while the agent is risk averse or risk neutral. The agent is free to choose any probability distribution over outcomes, where some distributions require more effort than others. The agent's effort-cost function is of “Legendre type” and satisfies an axiom of invariance under mergers of outcomes that are equally paid by the principal. We analyze a family of su…

  • Introduction to Robert Aumann’s Talk at the Colloquium

    Jörgen W Weibull, Jörgen WeibullARTICLERevue économique2023

    Ceci est la transcription du discours prononcé le 11 octobre 2021, lors du Colloque en l’honneur de Robert Aumann à l’Université Paris-Panthéon-Assas pour présenter le dernier orateur : Robert Aumann

  • Robustness to strategic uncertainty in the Nash demand game

    Open AccessOla Andersson, Cédric Argenton et al.ARTICLEMathematical Social Sciences2018References: 19

  • Social Norms and Economic Incentives in the Welfare State

    Assar Lindbeck, Sten Nyberg et al.ARTICLEThe Quarterly Journal of Economics1999

    This paper analyzes the interplay between social norms and economic incentives in the context of work decisions in the modem welfare state. We assume that to live off one's own work is a social norm, and that the larger the population share adhering to this norm, the more intensely it is felt by the individual. Individuals face two choices: one economic, whether to work or live off public transfers; and one political, how large the transfer shoul…

  • A model of political equilibrium in a representative democracy

    Open AccessAssar Lindbeck, Jörgen W WeibullARTICLEJournal of Public Economics1993

  • The Treaty of Kiel and its political and military background

    Jörgen W Weibull, Jörgen WeibullARTICLEScandinavian Journal of History1990Cited by: 1

    (1990). The Treaty of Kiel and its political and military background. Scandinavian Journal of History: Vol. 15, No. 3-4, pp. 291-301

  • Altruism and Time Consistency

    Assar Lindbeck, Jörgen W WeibullARTICLEJournal of Political Economy1988Cited by: 32References: 2

    This paper analyzes the strategic and intertemporal interaction between two economic agents who have "overlapping" concerns, such as altruistic concerns for each other's welfare. The agents may be two individuals, a social bureau and a client, or two units in an organization. The authors show how the presence of such common concerns may lead to socially inefficient outcomes, in which one economic agent "free rides" on the other's concerns. They a…

  • Paternalism, buyers' and sellers' market

    Open AccessJanos Kornai, Jörgen W WeibullARTICLEMathematical Social Sciences1983Cited by: 2References: 6

  • On the Numerical Measurement of Accessibility

    Open AccessJörgen W WeibullARTICLEEnvironment and Planning A…1980Cited by: 9References: 15

    The aim of this paper is to clarify the validity of a fairly broad range of numerical indicators of accessibility. To this purpose a measurement-theoretic framework is presented, where accessibility is considered as a property of configurations of opportunities for spatial interaction. Within this framework a few established indicators of accessibility are discussed and notions of separable, additive, and maxitive indicators are introduced. An an…