Joaquín Artés
Biographic Data
| ID | 383760 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Joaquín Artés |
| GIVEN NAMES | Joaquín |
| FAMILY NAME | Artés |
| SIGNATURE | ARTÉS J |
| AFFILIATIONS | Universidad Complutense de Madrid |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-0677-6072 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 15 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 354 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 15 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2007 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 6 |
Roads and votes
Compulsory civic duty and turnout
We study the effect of compulsory civic duty on turnout. We take advantage of a natural experiment in Spain, where electoral officers are selected through a lottery and being an electoral officer is compulsory for those drafted. We analyze whether acting as an officer changes turnout and attitudes in subsequent elections. Our findings show that compulsory civic duty has a strong short-term and positive effect on electoral participation, but has n…
Are Firms Gerrymandered
We provide the first evidence that firms, not just voters, are gerrymandered. We compare allocations of firms in enacted redistricting plans to counterfactual distributions constructed using simulation methods. We find that firms are over-allocated to districts held by the mapmakers' party when partisans control the redistricting process; maps drawn by courts and independent commissions allocate firms more proportionately. Our results hold when w…
Una estimación del voto estratégico de Izquierda Unida al Partido Socialista en las elecciones generales del período 2000-2008
En este artículo utilizamos el método de simulación contrafáctica para estimar los votantes estratégicos de Izquierda Unida en las tres últimas elecciones generales españolas. Los votantes estratégicos a los que nos referimos son aquellos que, pese a tener a Izquierda Unida como primera preferencia política, votaron al Partido Socialista Obrero Español. El método de simulación contrafáctica consiste en examinar cómo varía la probabilidad de voto …
The effects of revealing the prosecution of political corruption on local finances
This paper analyzes the financial implications on local public budgets of disseminating information about the prosecution of political corruption at the local level. We build a database from a wave of corruption scandals in Spain to use a quasi-experimental design and find that after corruption is revealed, both local public revenues and expenditures decrease significantly (approximately by 7 and 5%, respectively) in corruption-ridden municipalit…
Do actions speak louder than words? Evidence on voter behavior from Madrid Rio Park
Government fragmentation and fiscal deficits
Some electoral systems favor strong single-party majority governments, while others the formation of coalitions. Having one or the other is likely to affect economic outcomes in ways that are unintended when the electoral rules are approved. In this paper, we show that government fragmentation has large fiscal implications. We also provide results that have a causal interpretation. Using a panel of Spanish municipalities, along with a close-elect…
The Fulfillment of Parties’ Election Pledges
Why are some parties more likely than others to keep the promises they made during previous election campaigns? This study provides the first large‐scale comparative analysis of pledge fulfillment with common definitions. We study the fulfillment of over 20,000 pledges made in 57 election campaigns in 12 countries, and our findings challenge the common view of parties as promise breakers. Many parties that enter government executives are highly l…
Strategic voting and non-voting in Spanish elections
The literature on strategic voting has provided evidence that some electors support large parties at the voting booth to avoid wasting their vote on a preferred but uncompetitive smaller party. In this paper we argue that district conditions also elicit reactions from abstainers and other party voters. We find that, when ballot gains and losses from different types of responses to the constituency conditions are taken into account, large parties …
Small Fish in a Big Pond or Big Fish in a Small Pond? The Effects of Educational Mismatch on Subjective Wellbeing
Do Spanish politicians keep their promises
In this article we analyse the fulfilment of economic pledges contained in the electoral manifestoes of the two main Spanish parties, PP and PSOE during the four electoral cycles that took place between 1989 and 2004. Consistent with previous research on programme fulfilment, we find that most promises are fulfilled by the party in government. In addition we find much lower fulfilment rates for the parties in opposition. Surprisingly, we find no …
Strategic voting and effective representation thresholds
The extent of strategic voting in the Spanish general elections of 2000, 2004 and 2008 is estimated using a new measure of strategic incentives suitable for proportional representation systems that avoids some of the problems associated with lagged variables. Strategic behaviour increased from 12 to 33 per cent of the electoral base of the United Left Party, the major victim of strategic defection. This estimate is a conservative one as elite mob…
Education as a Positional Good
Electoral promises and minority governments
This article studies the relationship between electoral policy proposals and subsequent government actions in the case of minority governments. Content analysis of electoral pledges of Spanish parties is utilised to study the gains that a relatively small party obtains when it helps to sustain the governing party in office without entering a coalition government. According to the authors' results, cooperating in parliament to maintain the minorit…
Campaign spending and office-seeking motivations
The Fulfillment of Parties’ Election Pledges
Why are some parties more likely than others to keep the promises they made during previous election campaigns? This study provides the first large‐scale comparative analysis of pledge fulfillment with common definitions. We study the fulfillment of over 20,000 pledges made in 57 election campaigns in 12 countries, and our findings challenge the common view of parties as promise breakers. Many parties that enter government executives are highly l…
Do Spanish politicians keep their promises
In this article we analyse the fulfilment of economic pledges contained in the electoral manifestoes of the two main Spanish parties, PP and PSOE during the four electoral cycles that took place between 1989 and 2004. Consistent with previous research on programme fulfilment, we find that most promises are fulfilled by the party in government. In addition we find much lower fulfilment rates for the parties in opposition. Surprisingly, we find no …
Electoral promises and minority governments
This article studies the relationship between electoral policy proposals and subsequent government actions in the case of minority governments. Content analysis of electoral pledges of Spanish parties is utilised to study the gains that a relatively small party obtains when it helps to sustain the governing party in office without entering a coalition government. According to the authors' results, cooperating in parliament to maintain the minorit…
Education as a Positional Good
Strategic voting and effective representation thresholds
The extent of strategic voting in the Spanish general elections of 2000, 2004 and 2008 is estimated using a new measure of strategic incentives suitable for proportional representation systems that avoids some of the problems associated with lagged variables. Strategic behaviour increased from 12 to 33 per cent of the electoral base of the United Left Party, the major victim of strategic defection. This estimate is a conservative one as elite mob…
Small Fish in a Big Pond or Big Fish in a Small Pond? The Effects of Educational Mismatch on Subjective Wellbeing
Government fragmentation and fiscal deficits
Some electoral systems favor strong single-party majority governments, while others the formation of coalitions. Having one or the other is likely to affect economic outcomes in ways that are unintended when the electoral rules are approved. In this paper, we show that government fragmentation has large fiscal implications. We also provide results that have a causal interpretation. Using a panel of Spanish municipalities, along with a close-elect…
Strategic voting and non-voting in Spanish elections
The literature on strategic voting has provided evidence that some electors support large parties at the voting booth to avoid wasting their vote on a preferred but uncompetitive smaller party. In this paper we argue that district conditions also elicit reactions from abstainers and other party voters. We find that, when ballot gains and losses from different types of responses to the constituency conditions are taken into account, large parties …
Compulsory civic duty and turnout
We study the effect of compulsory civic duty on turnout. We take advantage of a natural experiment in Spain, where electoral officers are selected through a lottery and being an electoral officer is compulsory for those drafted. We analyze whether acting as an officer changes turnout and attitudes in subsequent elections. Our findings show that compulsory civic duty has a strong short-term and positive effect on electoral participation, but has n…
Una estimación del voto estratégico de Izquierda Unida al Partido Socialista en las elecciones generales del período 2000-2008
En este artículo utilizamos el método de simulación contrafáctica para estimar los votantes estratégicos de Izquierda Unida en las tres últimas elecciones generales españolas. Los votantes estratégicos a los que nos referimos son aquellos que, pese a tener a Izquierda Unida como primera preferencia política, votaron al Partido Socialista Obrero Español. El método de simulación contrafáctica consiste en examinar cómo varía la probabilidad de voto …
Do actions speak louder than words? Evidence on voter behavior from Madrid Rio Park
Campaign spending and office-seeking motivations
Campaign spending and office-seeking motivations
Electoral promises and minority governments
This article studies the relationship between electoral policy proposals and subsequent government actions in the case of minority governments. Content analysis of electoral pledges of Spanish parties is utilised to study the gains that a relatively small party obtains when it helps to sustain the governing party in office without entering a coalition government. According to the authors' results, cooperating in parliament to maintain the minorit…
Education as a Positional Good
Strategic voting and effective representation thresholds
The extent of strategic voting in the Spanish general elections of 2000, 2004 and 2008 is estimated using a new measure of strategic incentives suitable for proportional representation systems that avoids some of the problems associated with lagged variables. Strategic behaviour increased from 12 to 33 per cent of the electoral base of the United Left Party, the major victim of strategic defection. This estimate is a conservative one as elite mob…
Do Spanish politicians keep their promises
In this article we analyse the fulfilment of economic pledges contained in the electoral manifestoes of the two main Spanish parties, PP and PSOE during the four electoral cycles that took place between 1989 and 2004. Consistent with previous research on programme fulfilment, we find that most promises are fulfilled by the party in government. In addition we find much lower fulfilment rates for the parties in opposition. Surprisingly, we find no …
Small Fish in a Big Pond or Big Fish in a Small Pond? The Effects of Educational Mismatch on Subjective Wellbeing
Strategic voting and non-voting in Spanish elections
The literature on strategic voting has provided evidence that some electors support large parties at the voting booth to avoid wasting their vote on a preferred but uncompetitive smaller party. In this paper we argue that district conditions also elicit reactions from abstainers and other party voters. We find that, when ballot gains and losses from different types of responses to the constituency conditions are taken into account, large parties …
The Fulfillment of Parties’ Election Pledges
Why are some parties more likely than others to keep the promises they made during previous election campaigns? This study provides the first large‐scale comparative analysis of pledge fulfillment with common definitions. We study the fulfillment of over 20,000 pledges made in 57 election campaigns in 12 countries, and our findings challenge the common view of parties as promise breakers. Many parties that enter government executives are highly l…
Government fragmentation and fiscal deficits
Some electoral systems favor strong single-party majority governments, while others the formation of coalitions. Having one or the other is likely to affect economic outcomes in ways that are unintended when the electoral rules are approved. In this paper, we show that government fragmentation has large fiscal implications. We also provide results that have a causal interpretation. Using a panel of Spanish municipalities, along with a close-elect…
Do actions speak louder than words? Evidence on voter behavior from Madrid Rio Park
The effects of revealing the prosecution of political corruption on local finances
This paper analyzes the financial implications on local public budgets of disseminating information about the prosecution of political corruption at the local level. We build a database from a wave of corruption scandals in Spain to use a quasi-experimental design and find that after corruption is revealed, both local public revenues and expenditures decrease significantly (approximately by 7 and 5%, respectively) in corruption-ridden municipalit…
Una estimación del voto estratégico de Izquierda Unida al Partido Socialista en las elecciones generales del período 2000-2008
En este artículo utilizamos el método de simulación contrafáctica para estimar los votantes estratégicos de Izquierda Unida en las tres últimas elecciones generales españolas. Los votantes estratégicos a los que nos referimos son aquellos que, pese a tener a Izquierda Unida como primera preferencia política, votaron al Partido Socialista Obrero Español. El método de simulación contrafáctica consiste en examinar cómo varía la probabilidad de voto …
Compulsory civic duty and turnout
We study the effect of compulsory civic duty on turnout. We take advantage of a natural experiment in Spain, where electoral officers are selected through a lottery and being an electoral officer is compulsory for those drafted. We analyze whether acting as an officer changes turnout and attitudes in subsequent elections. Our findings show that compulsory civic duty has a strong short-term and positive effect on electoral participation, but has n…
Are Firms Gerrymandered
We provide the first evidence that firms, not just voters, are gerrymandered. We compare allocations of firms in enacted redistricting plans to counterfactual distributions constructed using simulation methods. We find that firms are over-allocated to districts held by the mapmakers' party when partisans control the redistricting process; maps drawn by courts and independent commissions allocate firms more proportionately. Our results hold when w…
Roads and votes
Economics (11 works) · Political science (11 works) · Electoral Systems and Political Participation (9 works) · Law (8 works) · Law (7 works) · Politics (7 works) · Public economics (6 works) · Business (5 works) · Demographic economics (5 works) · Government (linguistics (5 works)