Charles Register
Biographic Data
| ID | 383790 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Charles Register |
| GIVEN NAMES | Charles |
| FAMILY NAME | Register |
| SIGNATURE | REGISTER C |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Oxford |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-5957-6376 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 11 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 14 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 11 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1984 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Psychedelics beyond medicine
The current revival of interest in classic psychedelics and other psychoactives such as ketamine and MDMA, coupled with changes to their regulatory status in many jurisdictions, necessitates rigorous ethical guidelines both within and beyond clinical and scientific contexts. This paper examines crucial ethical, philosophical, and policy considerations needed to ensure psychedelic use across various settings remains equitable, beneficial, consensu…
Privacy and Human-AI Relationships
Artificial intelligence (AI) agents such as chatbots and personal AI assistants are increasingly popular. These technologies raise new privacy concerns beyond those posed by other AI systems or information technologies. For example, anthropomorphic features of AI chatbots may invite users to disclose more information with these systems than they would otherwise, especially when users interact with chatbots in relationship-like ways. In this paper…
Individuating artificial moral patients
We may create artificial intelligence (AI) systems that matter morally for their own sake and thus are moral patients. In that case, we would have reasons to treat them well and avoid treating them badly. How we should treat AI moral patients depends in part on how they are to be individuated, that is, how they should be counted and identified, at a time and over time. If we don’t know how to individuate them, then we won’t know how we should tre…
Does Cognitive Psychology Imply Pluralism About the Self
Digital Duplicates, Relational Scarcity, and Value
Danaher and Nyholm (2024a) have recently proposed that digital duplicates—such as fine-tuned, “personalized” large language models that closely mimic a particular individual—might reduce that individual’s scarcity and thus increase the amount of instrumental value they can bring to the world. In this commentary, we introduce the notion of relational scarcity and explore how digital duplicates would affect the value of interpersonal relationships
How to Explain the Importance of Persons
We commonly explain the distinctive prudential and moral status of persons in terms of our mental capacities. I draw from recent work to argue that the common explanation is incomplete. I then develop a new explanation: We are ethically important because we are the object of a pattern of self-concern. I argue that the view solves moral problems posed by permissive ontologies, such as the recent personite problem
Hot-cold empathy gaps and the grounds of authenticity
Freedom of information acts and public sector corruption
Simulating bias in the estimator of labor market discrimination
Race and the Discouraged Female Worker
This article presents an empirical examination of female attachment to the labor market. An econometric model of the discouragement process is built to determine how strongly women exhibit the inclination to remain labor force participants over the course of the business cycle. The estimated results imply that women, as a group, have a stronger response to changes in short-run cyclical fluctuations and therefore will sever their attachment to the…
Civil Rights Legislation and Racial Employment Differentials
Freedom of information acts and public sector corruption
Civil Rights Legislation and Racial Employment Differentials
How to Explain the Importance of Persons
We commonly explain the distinctive prudential and moral status of persons in terms of our mental capacities. I draw from recent work to argue that the common explanation is incomplete. I then develop a new explanation: We are ethically important because we are the object of a pattern of self-concern. I argue that the view solves moral problems posed by permissive ontologies, such as the recent personite problem
Race and the Discouraged Female Worker
This article presents an empirical examination of female attachment to the labor market. An econometric model of the discouragement process is built to determine how strongly women exhibit the inclination to remain labor force participants over the course of the business cycle. The estimated results imply that women, as a group, have a stronger response to changes in short-run cyclical fluctuations and therefore will sever their attachment to the…
Hot-cold empathy gaps and the grounds of authenticity
Civil Rights Legislation and Racial Employment Differentials
Race and the Discouraged Female Worker
This article presents an empirical examination of female attachment to the labor market. An econometric model of the discouragement process is built to determine how strongly women exhibit the inclination to remain labor force participants over the course of the business cycle. The estimated results imply that women, as a group, have a stronger response to changes in short-run cyclical fluctuations and therefore will sever their attachment to the…
Simulating bias in the estimator of labor market discrimination
Freedom of information acts and public sector corruption
Hot-cold empathy gaps and the grounds of authenticity
Does Cognitive Psychology Imply Pluralism About the Self
Digital Duplicates, Relational Scarcity, and Value
Danaher and Nyholm (2024a) have recently proposed that digital duplicates—such as fine-tuned, “personalized” large language models that closely mimic a particular individual—might reduce that individual’s scarcity and thus increase the amount of instrumental value they can bring to the world. In this commentary, we introduce the notion of relational scarcity and explore how digital duplicates would affect the value of interpersonal relationships
How to Explain the Importance of Persons
We commonly explain the distinctive prudential and moral status of persons in terms of our mental capacities. I draw from recent work to argue that the common explanation is incomplete. I then develop a new explanation: We are ethically important because we are the object of a pattern of self-concern. I argue that the view solves moral problems posed by permissive ontologies, such as the recent personite problem
Psychedelics beyond medicine
The current revival of interest in classic psychedelics and other psychoactives such as ketamine and MDMA, coupled with changes to their regulatory status in many jurisdictions, necessitates rigorous ethical guidelines both within and beyond clinical and scientific contexts. This paper examines crucial ethical, philosophical, and policy considerations needed to ensure psychedelic use across various settings remains equitable, beneficial, consensu…
Privacy and Human-AI Relationships
Artificial intelligence (AI) agents such as chatbots and personal AI assistants are increasingly popular. These technologies raise new privacy concerns beyond those posed by other AI systems or information technologies. For example, anthropomorphic features of AI chatbots may invite users to disclose more information with these systems than they would otherwise, especially when users interact with chatbots in relationship-like ways. In this paper…
Individuating artificial moral patients
We may create artificial intelligence (AI) systems that matter morally for their own sake and thus are moral patients. In that case, we would have reasons to treat them well and avoid treating them badly. How we should treat AI moral patients depends in part on how they are to be individuated, that is, how they should be counted and identified, at a time and over time. If we don’t know how to individuate them, then we won’t know how we should tre…
Computer Science (6 works) · Economics (5 works) · Epistemology (4 works) · Philosophy (4 works) · Metaphysics (3 works) · Philosophy of language (3 works) · Philosophy of science (3 works) · Psychology (3 works) · Psychology of Moral and Emotional Judgment (3 works) · Social Psychology (3 works)