Hsu Yumin Wang
Biographic Data
| ID | 3838437 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Hsu Yumin Wang |
| GIVEN NAMES | Hsu Yumin |
| FAMILY NAME | Wang |
| SIGNATURE | WANG H Y |
| AFFILIATIONS | National Tsing Hua University |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-5779-9659 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 7 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 8 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 7 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Compromised Labor Rights and Regime Legitimacy Under Authoritarianism
How do citizens in authoritarian regimes respond when state promises go unfulfilled? In many such regimes, leaders enact prolabor legislation to signal responsiveness, yet enforcement often falls short in practice. This research note provides the first experimental evidence regarding how enforcement gaps in prolabor legislation shape mass political attitudes under authoritarian rule. Drawing on a preregistered survey experiment in China, I show t…
Does shaming make non-compliance with international court rulings costlier? Evidence from China
Can naming and shaming reduce domestic public support for a government that fails to comply with an international court ruling? While existing research suggests that such tactics can diminish public support for non-compliance with international law, this evidence largely stems from Western democracies. Far less is known about how naming and shaming functions in autocratic contexts. We address this gap by conducting a conjoint survey experiment wi…
Mimicking Democracy
Atomized Incorporation
Information, Equal Treatment, and Support for Regressive Taxation
Appeasing Workers without Great Loss
Under what conditions do dictators enact pro-worker legislation? Conventional wisdom suggests that heightened mass discontent motivates dictators to make policy concessions to defuse revolutionary threats. However, a more protective labor law may decrease elites' economic benefits-and thus loyalty to the regime. I argue that limited judicial independence helps dictators control the distributional outcomes of the law and therefore better respond t…
Centralization, Elite Capture, and Service Provision
Much recent work has debated the effect of decentralization on service provision, its underlying mechanisms, and the tradeoff between responsiveness and elite capture. This study contributes to that debate by investigating a rare partial rollout of institutional change that reversed administrative, fiscal, and political decentralization in Taiwan. Utilizing a difference-in-differences design, I find that centralization decreases public goods prov…
Mimicking Democracy
Centralization, Elite Capture, and Service Provision
Much recent work has debated the effect of decentralization on service provision, its underlying mechanisms, and the tradeoff between responsiveness and elite capture. This study contributes to that debate by investigating a rare partial rollout of institutional change that reversed administrative, fiscal, and political decentralization in Taiwan. Utilizing a difference-in-differences design, I find that centralization decreases public goods prov…
Does shaming make non-compliance with international court rulings costlier? Evidence from China
Can naming and shaming reduce domestic public support for a government that fails to comply with an international court ruling? While existing research suggests that such tactics can diminish public support for non-compliance with international law, this evidence largely stems from Western democracies. Far less is known about how naming and shaming functions in autocratic contexts. We address this gap by conducting a conjoint survey experiment wi…
Information, Equal Treatment, and Support for Regressive Taxation
Atomized Incorporation
Information, Equal Treatment, and Support for Regressive Taxation
Appeasing Workers without Great Loss
Under what conditions do dictators enact pro-worker legislation? Conventional wisdom suggests that heightened mass discontent motivates dictators to make policy concessions to defuse revolutionary threats. However, a more protective labor law may decrease elites' economic benefits-and thus loyalty to the regime. I argue that limited judicial independence helps dictators control the distributional outcomes of the law and therefore better respond t…
Centralization, Elite Capture, and Service Provision
Much recent work has debated the effect of decentralization on service provision, its underlying mechanisms, and the tradeoff between responsiveness and elite capture. This study contributes to that debate by investigating a rare partial rollout of institutional change that reversed administrative, fiscal, and political decentralization in Taiwan. Utilizing a difference-in-differences design, I find that centralization decreases public goods prov…
Does shaming make non-compliance with international court rulings costlier? Evidence from China
Can naming and shaming reduce domestic public support for a government that fails to comply with an international court ruling? While existing research suggests that such tactics can diminish public support for non-compliance with international law, this evidence largely stems from Western democracies. Far less is known about how naming and shaming functions in autocratic contexts. We address this gap by conducting a conjoint survey experiment wi…
Mimicking Democracy
Compromised Labor Rights and Regime Legitimacy Under Authoritarianism
How do citizens in authoritarian regimes respond when state promises go unfulfilled? In many such regimes, leaders enact prolabor legislation to signal responsiveness, yet enforcement often falls short in practice. This research note provides the first experimental evidence regarding how enforcement gaps in prolabor legislation shape mass political attitudes under authoritarian rule. Drawing on a preregistered survey experiment in China, I show t…
Economics (5 works) · Political science (4 works) · Politics (4 works) · Autocracy (3 works) · Law (3 works) · Political economy (3 works) · Authoritarianism (2 works) · Business (2 works) · China (2 works) · China's Socioeconomic Reforms and Governance (2 works)