Harwood Fisher
Biographic Data
| ID | 3839100 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Harwood Fisher |
| GIVEN NAMES | Harwood |
| FAMILY NAME | Fisher |
| SIGNATURE | FISHER H |
| AFFILIATIONS | City College of New York |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 13 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 7 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 13 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1973 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2017 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Person, psychologist, and psychology suspended in a phase 1 science
Is a psychology of the “person” a science? An art? Or is it a case of a “phase 1 science”—with its own logical rules and with a continuous character of changeability? Can it be any other than this, if the concept of a psychological person is always derived from a particular and always subject to its changeability? In a suspended phase 1 science, the psychologist’s role as a person, who is a thinker, is central. The psychologist’s thinking about t…
Geometric icons and conceptual analogies: A doublet of dynamic forms that reveal, express, and impel analogies
Psychologists’ spatial representations and conceptual analogies form a semiotic doublet by which patterns of their seminal ideas can be compared across different eras. One powerful reappearing idea is Freud’s concept that two logics alternate as forms of thought. This elemental idea entails the individual’s access to analogical thinking, its forms, and its effect on the person’s selection of logical form. To go a recursive step back, I search out…
The stuff metaphor is made on
How do you describe the ‘nature of metaphor’? Two dilemmas block your path. The first occurs when you encounter the metaphor's status as ‘real’ in the face of its mere symbolic reference to objects. A second dilemma occurs when you look inward to describe the origin of metaphor. Although this look focuses the inner self as originator, it also reveals a mind-boggling question. How does your look inward relate to that of others? Resolution 1: A log…
Categories and Embodied Objects: The Subjective Self and the Psychologist within Natural Psychology
The immediate purpose of this paper is to develop the idea that the subjective self is a natural category. Its characteristics, such as reflexivity and recursiveness, provide for a mix of semiotic and logical depictions of subjectivity and the self. This conception of a subjective self dramatically affects the psychology of the self and the observer. Not only does a subjective self fit into current-day conceptions of autopoeisis and natural pheno…
Metonymy as concept: A metaphor for rhetoric, not for thought
Postmodern Agency: You and I Can Show it; Not Own it
Common to social constructionists and cognitive linguists is a retreat from the ontological issues of subjective experience to a combination of pragmatism and nominalism. What's gained is escape from conundrums of subjective experience; what's lost is psychological realities and self-determination. The postmodern bonus offer is to join with others in checking our observations of actions and functions. Take the offer and you can show, but not own,…
Metonymy, metaphor, and category: Logic versus semantics
Afin de repondre a la question qui consiste a se demander ce qui vient en premier, entre le sens et la logique, dans la creation des metaphores et dans la construction des analogies, l'A. se concentre sur les domaines semantiques et sur ce qui apparait comme formes paralogiques et protologiques, qu'il considere comme des groupements progressant dans la direction de categories logiques. Il argumente ainsi en faveur de la forme logique comme origin…
Empty Sets or Empty Self: A Response to Comments on `Whose Right is it to Define the Self
Responses to my critique of social constructionism (Fisher, 1995b) aver not only that my concepts of self appear dualistic, re-evoking Cartesian and neo-Cartesian dualities, but also that my claims about the self lack evidence. Freeman, Gergen, Harré, Hermans and Shotter (all 1995) reassert consciousness and conscience as social constructions. Yet, their reductionism splits mind from body. I argue to the contrary-that mind and body interrelate wi…
Whose Right is it to Define the Self
Descartes founded the psychology of the individual with a mind! body distinction that calls for internal dialogue and interactive exchange. Individuals struggle with their nature through an intracommunicative system, emanating not from social exchanges, but, instead, from autonomous rules and constraints inherent in the machine of the body. The attacks on these ideas by social constructionists, such as Gergen, Harré and Shotter, impel me to write…
The Logical Structure of Freud's Idea of the Unconscious: Toward a Psychology of Ideas
From object to image to object
The Language and Logic of Forming an Idea
Logic and Language in Defences
The Language and Logic of Forming an Idea
Logic and Language in Defences
Metonymy, metaphor, and category: Logic versus semantics
Afin de repondre a la question qui consiste a se demander ce qui vient en premier, entre le sens et la logique, dans la creation des metaphores et dans la construction des analogies, l'A. se concentre sur les domaines semantiques et sur ce qui apparait comme formes paralogiques et protologiques, qu'il considere comme des groupements progressant dans la direction de categories logiques. Il argumente ainsi en faveur de la forme logique comme origin…
Logic and Language in Defences
The Language and Logic of Forming an Idea
From object to image to object
The Logical Structure of Freud's Idea of the Unconscious: Toward a Psychology of Ideas
Empty Sets or Empty Self: A Response to Comments on `Whose Right is it to Define the Self
Responses to my critique of social constructionism (Fisher, 1995b) aver not only that my concepts of self appear dualistic, re-evoking Cartesian and neo-Cartesian dualities, but also that my claims about the self lack evidence. Freeman, Gergen, Harré, Hermans and Shotter (all 1995) reassert consciousness and conscience as social constructions. Yet, their reductionism splits mind from body. I argue to the contrary-that mind and body interrelate wi…
Whose Right is it to Define the Self
Descartes founded the psychology of the individual with a mind! body distinction that calls for internal dialogue and interactive exchange. Individuals struggle with their nature through an intracommunicative system, emanating not from social exchanges, but, instead, from autonomous rules and constraints inherent in the machine of the body. The attacks on these ideas by social constructionists, such as Gergen, Harré and Shotter, impel me to write…
Metonymy, metaphor, and category: Logic versus semantics
Afin de repondre a la question qui consiste a se demander ce qui vient en premier, entre le sens et la logique, dans la creation des metaphores et dans la construction des analogies, l'A. se concentre sur les domaines semantiques et sur ce qui apparait comme formes paralogiques et protologiques, qu'il considere comme des groupements progressant dans la direction de categories logiques. Il argumente ainsi en faveur de la forme logique comme origin…
Postmodern Agency: You and I Can Show it; Not Own it
Common to social constructionists and cognitive linguists is a retreat from the ontological issues of subjective experience to a combination of pragmatism and nominalism. What's gained is escape from conundrums of subjective experience; what's lost is psychological realities and self-determination. The postmodern bonus offer is to join with others in checking our observations of actions and functions. Take the offer and you can show, but not own,…
Categories and Embodied Objects: The Subjective Self and the Psychologist within Natural Psychology
The immediate purpose of this paper is to develop the idea that the subjective self is a natural category. Its characteristics, such as reflexivity and recursiveness, provide for a mix of semiotic and logical depictions of subjectivity and the self. This conception of a subjective self dramatically affects the psychology of the self and the observer. Not only does a subjective self fit into current-day conceptions of autopoeisis and natural pheno…
Metonymy as concept: A metaphor for rhetoric, not for thought
The stuff metaphor is made on
How do you describe the ‘nature of metaphor’? Two dilemmas block your path. The first occurs when you encounter the metaphor's status as ‘real’ in the face of its mere symbolic reference to objects. A second dilemma occurs when you look inward to describe the origin of metaphor. Although this look focuses the inner self as originator, it also reveals a mind-boggling question. How does your look inward relate to that of others? Resolution 1: A log…
Geometric icons and conceptual analogies: A doublet of dynamic forms that reveal, express, and impel analogies
Psychologists’ spatial representations and conceptual analogies form a semiotic doublet by which patterns of their seminal ideas can be compared across different eras. One powerful reappearing idea is Freud’s concept that two logics alternate as forms of thought. This elemental idea entails the individual’s access to analogical thinking, its forms, and its effect on the person’s selection of logical form. To go a recursive step back, I search out…
Person, psychologist, and psychology suspended in a phase 1 science
Is a psychology of the “person” a science? An art? Or is it a case of a “phase 1 science”—with its own logical rules and with a continuous character of changeability? Can it be any other than this, if the concept of a psychological person is always derived from a particular and always subject to its changeability? In a suspended phase 1 science, the psychologist’s role as a person, who is a thinker, is central. The psychologist’s thinking about t…
Philosophy (10 works) · Epistemology (9 works) · Psychology (9 works) · Language, Metaphor, and Cognition (7 works) · Sociology (7 works) · Computer Science (6 works) · Social Representations and Identity (6 works) · Linguistics (5 works) · Academic and Historical Perspectives in Psychology (4 works) · Metaphor (4 works)