Daniel Rothschild
Datos Biográficos
| ID | 3861996 |
|---|---|
| NOMBRE | Daniel Rothschild |
| NOMBRES | Daniel |
| APELLIDO | Rothschild |
| FIRMA | ROTHSCHILD D |
| AFILIACIONES | University College London |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-4868-6884 |
| VERIFICADO | Sí |
| TOTAL DE OBRAS | 14 |
| TOTAL DE CITAS | 8 |
| TOTAL COMO AUTOR | 14 |
| TOTAL COMO EDITOR | 0 |
| PRIMER AÑO DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2006 |
| AÑO MÁS RECIENTE DE PUBLICACIÓN | 2023 |
| ÍNDICE H | 1 |
Lockean Beliefs, Dutch Books, and Scoring Systems
On the Lockean thesis one ought to believe a proposition if and only if one assigns it a credence at or above a threshold (Foley in Am Philos Q 29(2):111–124, 1992). The Lockean thesis, thus, provides a way of characterizing sets of all-or-nothing beliefs. Here we give two independent characterizations of the sets of beliefs satisfying the Lockean thesis. One is in terms of betting dispositions associated with full beliefs and one is in terms of …
The influence of polarity items on inferential judgments
Definiteness projection
We argue that definite noun phrases give rise to uniqueness inferences characterized by a pattern we calldefiniteness projection. Definiteness projection says that the uniqueness inference of a definite projects out unless there is an indefinite antecedent in a position that filters presuppositions. We argue that definiteness projection poses a serious puzzle for e-type theories of (in)definites; on such theories, indefinites should filter existe…
Independence Day?
Two recent and influential papers, van Rooij 2007 and Lassiter 2012, propose solutions to the proviso problem that make central use of related notions of independence—qualitative in the first case, probabilistic in the second. We argue here that, if these solutions are to work, they must incorporate an implicit assumption about presupposition accommodation, namely that accommodation does not interfere with existing qualitative or probabilistic in…
Belief is weak
Game Theory and Scalar Implicatures
Connectives without truth tables
Explaining presupposition projection with dynamic semantics
Heim's (1982, 1983b) dynamic semantics provides an attractive system for capturing the basic facts about presupposition projection. A long-standing criticism of this semantics is that it requires for each connective lexical stipulations that are not determined by its truth-conditional meaning. I give a precise formulation of this criticism in terms of what I call a "rewrite semantics". Then, I use this idea of a rewrite semantics to formulate a n…
Exhaustivity in questions with non-factives
This paper is concerned with the conditions under which a person can be said to have told someone or predicted (the answer to a question like) 'who sang'. It is standardly claimed that while (i) the true answer must be completely specified, it is not necessary that (ii) it be specified *as being* the complete answer. Here the non-factive verbs 'tell' and 'predict' are said to differ from the factive verb 'know', which typically does impose the *s…
Modularity and intuitions in formal semantics
Transparency Theory and its dynamic alternatives
“Be Articulate: A Pragmatic Theory of Presupposition Projection” is a remarkable paper in at least two respects: First, it is the only broadly Gricean treatment of presuppositions that generates precise and accurate predictions about the pattern of presupposition projection. Schlenker proposes that presuppositions arise as a result of a pragmatic prohibition against using one short construction to express two independent meanings. This basic idea…
Presupposition Projection and Logical Equivalence
The Elusive Scope of Descriptions
Sentences with more than one quantifier often exhibit ambiguities. For example, 'Every miner went to a meeting' has two readings depending on whether we take there to be one meeting that every miner went to or (possibly) different meetings corresponding to each miner. This paper discusses the theory that such ambiguities are directly akin to quantifier scope ambiguities in logic. Certain syntactic and semantic evidence suggests that with indefini…
President and the Man on the Street
Kripke's "modal argument" uses consideration about scope within modal contexts to show that proper names and definite descriptions must be of two different semantic types. I reexamine the data that is used to motivate Kripke's argument, and suggest that it, in fact, indicates that proper names behave exactly like a certain type of definite description, which I call "particularized" descriptions
President and the Man on the Street
Kripke's "modal argument" uses consideration about scope within modal contexts to show that proper names and definite descriptions must be of two different semantic types. I reexamine the data that is used to motivate Kripke's argument, and suggest that it, in fact, indicates that proper names behave exactly like a certain type of definite description, which I call "particularized" descriptions
The Elusive Scope of Descriptions
Sentences with more than one quantifier often exhibit ambiguities. For example, 'Every miner went to a meeting' has two readings depending on whether we take there to be one meeting that every miner went to or (possibly) different meetings corresponding to each miner. This paper discusses the theory that such ambiguities are directly akin to quantifier scope ambiguities in logic. Certain syntactic and semantic evidence suggests that with indefini…
Transparency Theory and its dynamic alternatives
“Be Articulate: A Pragmatic Theory of Presupposition Projection” is a remarkable paper in at least two respects: First, it is the only broadly Gricean treatment of presuppositions that generates precise and accurate predictions about the pattern of presupposition projection. Schlenker proposes that presuppositions arise as a result of a pragmatic prohibition against using one short construction to express two independent meanings. This basic idea…
Presupposition Projection and Logical Equivalence
Explaining presupposition projection with dynamic semantics
Heim's (1982, 1983b) dynamic semantics provides an attractive system for capturing the basic facts about presupposition projection. A long-standing criticism of this semantics is that it requires for each connective lexical stipulations that are not determined by its truth-conditional meaning. I give a precise formulation of this criticism in terms of what I call a "rewrite semantics". Then, I use this idea of a rewrite semantics to formulate a n…
Exhaustivity in questions with non-factives
This paper is concerned with the conditions under which a person can be said to have told someone or predicted (the answer to a question like) 'who sang'. It is standardly claimed that while (i) the true answer must be completely specified, it is not necessary that (ii) it be specified *as being* the complete answer. Here the non-factive verbs 'tell' and 'predict' are said to differ from the factive verb 'know', which typically does impose the *s…
Modularity and intuitions in formal semantics
Connectives without truth tables
Game Theory and Scalar Implicatures
Belief is weak
Independence Day?
Two recent and influential papers, van Rooij 2007 and Lassiter 2012, propose solutions to the proviso problem that make central use of related notions of independence—qualitative in the first case, probabilistic in the second. We argue here that, if these solutions are to work, they must incorporate an implicit assumption about presupposition accommodation, namely that accommodation does not interfere with existing qualitative or probabilistic in…
Definiteness projection
We argue that definite noun phrases give rise to uniqueness inferences characterized by a pattern we calldefiniteness projection. Definiteness projection says that the uniqueness inference of a definite projects out unless there is an indefinite antecedent in a position that filters presuppositions. We argue that definiteness projection poses a serious puzzle for e-type theories of (in)definites; on such theories, indefinites should filter existe…
The influence of polarity items on inferential judgments
Lockean Beliefs, Dutch Books, and Scoring Systems
On the Lockean thesis one ought to believe a proposition if and only if one assigns it a credence at or above a threshold (Foley in Am Philos Q 29(2):111–124, 1992). The Lockean thesis, thus, provides a way of characterizing sets of all-or-nothing beliefs. Here we give two independent characterizations of the sets of beliefs satisfying the Lockean thesis. One is in terms of betting dispositions associated with full beliefs and one is in terms of …
Philosophy (13 obras) · Epistemology (12 obras) · Linguistics (12 obras) · Computer Science (11 obras) · Mathematics (9 obras) · Syntax, Semantics, Linguistic Variation (7 obras) · Logic, Reasoning, and Knowledge (6 obras) · Artificial Intelligence (5 obras) · Presupposition (5 obras) · Algorithm (4 obras)