Jiabin Wu
Biographic Data
| ID | 3863083 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Jiabin Wu |
| GIVEN NAMES | Jiabin |
| FAMILY NAME | Wu |
| SIGNATURE | WU J |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Oregon |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-6515-9678 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 6 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 1 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 6 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2019 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 1 |
Institutional Screening and the Sustainability of Conditional Cooperation
This paper studies a preference evolution model in which a population of agents are matched to play a sequential prisoner's dilemma in an incomplete information environment. An institution can design an incentive-compatible screening scheme, such as a special zone that requires an entry fee, or a costly label for purchase, to segregate the conditional cooperators from the non-cooperators. We show that institutional intervention of this sort can h…
Defining and valuing reservoir ecosystem services
Minds and cooperation
This paper investigates a model of preference evolution in which agents are paired to play a sequential prisoner's dilemma under incomplete information. The population consists of two types of agents: conditional cooperators and defectors. We demonstrate that cooperation can be sustained when the first mover predicts the second mover's behavior by projecting themselves into the second mover's role, following the principles of social projection th…
Institutions, assortative matching and cultural evolution
Linkage between C4 vegetation expansion and dune stabilization in the deserts of NE China during the late Quaternary
A potential game approach to modelling evolution in a connected society
Linkage between C4 vegetation expansion and dune stabilization in the deserts of NE China during the late Quaternary
A potential game approach to modelling evolution in a connected society
Institutions, assortative matching and cultural evolution
Minds and cooperation
This paper investigates a model of preference evolution in which agents are paired to play a sequential prisoner's dilemma under incomplete information. The population consists of two types of agents: conditional cooperators and defectors. We demonstrate that cooperation can be sustained when the first mover predicts the second mover's behavior by projecting themselves into the second mover's role, following the principles of social projection th…
Institutional Screening and the Sustainability of Conditional Cooperation
This paper studies a preference evolution model in which a population of agents are matched to play a sequential prisoner's dilemma in an incomplete information environment. An institution can design an incentive-compatible screening scheme, such as a special zone that requires an entry fee, or a costly label for purchase, to segregate the conditional cooperators from the non-cooperators. We show that institutional intervention of this sort can h…
Defining and valuing reservoir ecosystem services
Economics (3 works) · Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation (3 works) · Sociology (3 works) · Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies (2 works) · Mathematical economics (2 works) · Nash equilibrium (2 works) · Aeolian processes and effects (1 work) · Biology (1 work) · Computer Science (1 work) · Culture, Economy, and Development Studies (1 work)