Mareike Kleine
Biographic Data
| ID | 3863559 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Mareike Kleine |
| GIVEN NAMES | Mareike |
| FAMILY NAME | Kleine |
| SIGNATURE | KLEINE M |
| AFFILIATIONS | London School of Economics and Political Science |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-7442-7328 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 13 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 188 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 13 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2007 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 7 |
Taming of the shrews? The (non-)enforcement of informal norms in the European Council
The impact of national democratic representation on decision-making in the European Union
The extent to which decision-making in the European Union (EU) is responsive to national democratic representation has profound implications for understanding how the EU works in practice and for assessing it normatively. The contributions to this special issue examine key aspects of national representation, including national public opinion, elections and partisan government control. They do so with a shared theoretical approach and a newly upda…
Negotiating under Political Uncertainty
This article explores if (and how) national elections affect the chances of concluding an international agreement. Drawing on a literature about the informational efficiency of elections, it examines how political uncertainty in the run-up to an election impacts the dynamics of international negotiations. Using the case of decision making in the European Union (EU), it finds that (1) pending national elections significantly reduce the chances of …
Keeping tabs on your cooperating partners
This article argues that opportunities for unilateral influence within international bureaucracies create a delegation problem akin to that in coalition governments. Parties in coalitions that suspect each another of diverting from the coalition bargain avail themselves of mechanisms, such as junior ministers and parliamentary scrutiny, to monitor their coalition partners’ actions within the executive. Similarly, states that suspect cooperating p…
Informal governance and legitimacy in EU politics
Informal governance often holds an aura of the covert and exclusive – aspects that are difficult to square with the ideal of a democratic process. Unfortunately, existing analyses mostly focus on the effect of informal governance on transparency, ignoring other channels through which a political order may generate legitimacy. However, existing analyses quite often conflate different types of informal governance or consider predominantly its effec…
National elections in a globalizing world
Liberal Intergovernmentalism and Its Critics
This introduction sets the stage for a special issue devoted to evaluating the contribution and continued relevance of Liberal Intergovernmentalism (LI) – a theory first formulated 25 years ago in this journal – in today's politicized and crisis‐ridden European Union (EU). We review the debates prompted by LI's three core claims about national preference formation, intergovernmental bargaining and institutional choice, as well as by the theory's …
Informal Governance in the European Union
This article reviews new studies of 'informal governance' in the European Union (EU). After exploring the concept's intellectual history and various meanings in EU studies, it introduces the reader to the International Relations school of informal governance. This school emphasizes that states have alternatives to following the official rules, and that these alternatives significantly alter the formal rules' effect. Consequently, and in contrast …
Informal Governance in the European Union
The European Union is the world's most advanced international organization, presiding over a level of legal and economic integration unmatched in global politics. To explain this achievement, many observers point to its formal rules that entail strong obligations and delegate substantial power to supranational actors such as the European Commission. This legalistic view, Mareike Kleine contends, is misleading. More often than not, governments and…
Trading control
According to principal-agent theory, states (the principals) delegate the implementation of a legalized agreement to an international organization (the agent). The conventional wisdom about states’ capacity to control international organizations is that differences among the member states impede control and consequently enhance the agent's autonomy, whereas agreement allows for effective control and limited autonomy. Contrary to this conventional…
Deliberation in negotiations
The past decade witnessed a growing interest in theories of deliberation and their application at the international level. This article takes stock of the state of the art. It argues that the ‘deliberative turn’ has forced both rationalist and constructivist scholars to refine their arguments and reconsider their methodology. We argue that the new research frontier for constructivists is in assessing under which circumstances arguments affect neg…
Leadership in the European Convention
Did the Chairman of the European Convention, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing (VGE), shape this body's deliberation toward an outcome that would not have occurred otherwise? I contend that VGE was able to influence the form of the Convention's outcome and to some extent its content on issues of minor importance, but not its very substance on institutional matters. Drawing on functional approaches to leadership, I argue that the Convention's rules of proc…
Assessing the Legitimacy of the EU's Treaty Revision Methods
How legitimate are the EU's treaty revision procedures, that is, IGCs and the Convention? Since the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty the recurrence to intergovernmental procedures appears as one way out of the current dilemma. We argue instead that the Convention method is not to blame for the current crisis. On the contrary, it increases the legitimacy of EU constitutionalization considerably
Assessing the Legitimacy of the EU's Treaty Revision Methods
How legitimate are the EU's treaty revision procedures, that is, IGCs and the Convention? Since the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty the recurrence to intergovernmental procedures appears as one way out of the current dilemma. We argue instead that the Convention method is not to blame for the current crisis. On the contrary, it increases the legitimacy of EU constitutionalization considerably
Deliberation in negotiations
The past decade witnessed a growing interest in theories of deliberation and their application at the international level. This article takes stock of the state of the art. It argues that the ‘deliberative turn’ has forced both rationalist and constructivist scholars to refine their arguments and reconsider their methodology. We argue that the new research frontier for constructivists is in assessing under which circumstances arguments affect neg…
Informal Governance in the European Union
This article reviews new studies of 'informal governance' in the European Union (EU). After exploring the concept's intellectual history and various meanings in EU studies, it introduces the reader to the International Relations school of informal governance. This school emphasizes that states have alternatives to following the official rules, and that these alternatives significantly alter the formal rules' effect. Consequently, and in contrast …
Negotiating under Political Uncertainty
This article explores if (and how) national elections affect the chances of concluding an international agreement. Drawing on a literature about the informational efficiency of elections, it examines how political uncertainty in the run-up to an election impacts the dynamics of international negotiations. Using the case of decision making in the European Union (EU), it finds that (1) pending national elections significantly reduce the chances of …
Liberal Intergovernmentalism and Its Critics
This introduction sets the stage for a special issue devoted to evaluating the contribution and continued relevance of Liberal Intergovernmentalism (LI) – a theory first formulated 25 years ago in this journal – in today's politicized and crisis‐ridden European Union (EU). We review the debates prompted by LI's three core claims about national preference formation, intergovernmental bargaining and institutional choice, as well as by the theory's …
Trading control
According to principal-agent theory, states (the principals) delegate the implementation of a legalized agreement to an international organization (the agent). The conventional wisdom about states’ capacity to control international organizations is that differences among the member states impede control and consequently enhance the agent's autonomy, whereas agreement allows for effective control and limited autonomy. Contrary to this conventional…
Leadership in the European Convention
Did the Chairman of the European Convention, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing (VGE), shape this body's deliberation toward an outcome that would not have occurred otherwise? I contend that VGE was able to influence the form of the Convention's outcome and to some extent its content on issues of minor importance, but not its very substance on institutional matters. Drawing on functional approaches to leadership, I argue that the Convention's rules of proc…
Informal governance and legitimacy in EU politics
Informal governance often holds an aura of the covert and exclusive – aspects that are difficult to square with the ideal of a democratic process. Unfortunately, existing analyses mostly focus on the effect of informal governance on transparency, ignoring other channels through which a political order may generate legitimacy. However, existing analyses quite often conflate different types of informal governance or consider predominantly its effec…
The impact of national democratic representation on decision-making in the European Union
The extent to which decision-making in the European Union (EU) is responsive to national democratic representation has profound implications for understanding how the EU works in practice and for assessing it normatively. The contributions to this special issue examine key aspects of national representation, including national public opinion, elections and partisan government control. They do so with a shared theoretical approach and a newly upda…
Keeping tabs on your cooperating partners
This article argues that opportunities for unilateral influence within international bureaucracies create a delegation problem akin to that in coalition governments. Parties in coalitions that suspect each another of diverting from the coalition bargain avail themselves of mechanisms, such as junior ministers and parliamentary scrutiny, to monitor their coalition partners’ actions within the executive. Similarly, states that suspect cooperating p…
Leadership in the European Convention
Did the Chairman of the European Convention, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing (VGE), shape this body's deliberation toward an outcome that would not have occurred otherwise? I contend that VGE was able to influence the form of the Convention's outcome and to some extent its content on issues of minor importance, but not its very substance on institutional matters. Drawing on functional approaches to leadership, I argue that the Convention's rules of proc…
Assessing the Legitimacy of the EU's Treaty Revision Methods
How legitimate are the EU's treaty revision procedures, that is, IGCs and the Convention? Since the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty the recurrence to intergovernmental procedures appears as one way out of the current dilemma. We argue instead that the Convention method is not to blame for the current crisis. On the contrary, it increases the legitimacy of EU constitutionalization considerably
Deliberation in negotiations
The past decade witnessed a growing interest in theories of deliberation and their application at the international level. This article takes stock of the state of the art. It argues that the ‘deliberative turn’ has forced both rationalist and constructivist scholars to refine their arguments and reconsider their methodology. We argue that the new research frontier for constructivists is in assessing under which circumstances arguments affect neg…
Informal Governance in the European Union
The European Union is the world's most advanced international organization, presiding over a level of legal and economic integration unmatched in global politics. To explain this achievement, many observers point to its formal rules that entail strong obligations and delegate substantial power to supranational actors such as the European Commission. This legalistic view, Mareike Kleine contends, is misleading. More often than not, governments and…
Trading control
According to principal-agent theory, states (the principals) delegate the implementation of a legalized agreement to an international organization (the agent). The conventional wisdom about states’ capacity to control international organizations is that differences among the member states impede control and consequently enhance the agent's autonomy, whereas agreement allows for effective control and limited autonomy. Contrary to this conventional…
Informal Governance in the European Union
This article reviews new studies of 'informal governance' in the European Union (EU). After exploring the concept's intellectual history and various meanings in EU studies, it introduces the reader to the International Relations school of informal governance. This school emphasizes that states have alternatives to following the official rules, and that these alternatives significantly alter the formal rules' effect. Consequently, and in contrast …
Keeping tabs on your cooperating partners
This article argues that opportunities for unilateral influence within international bureaucracies create a delegation problem akin to that in coalition governments. Parties in coalitions that suspect each another of diverting from the coalition bargain avail themselves of mechanisms, such as junior ministers and parliamentary scrutiny, to monitor their coalition partners’ actions within the executive. Similarly, states that suspect cooperating p…
Informal governance and legitimacy in EU politics
Informal governance often holds an aura of the covert and exclusive – aspects that are difficult to square with the ideal of a democratic process. Unfortunately, existing analyses mostly focus on the effect of informal governance on transparency, ignoring other channels through which a political order may generate legitimacy. However, existing analyses quite often conflate different types of informal governance or consider predominantly its effec…
National elections in a globalizing world
Liberal Intergovernmentalism and Its Critics
This introduction sets the stage for a special issue devoted to evaluating the contribution and continued relevance of Liberal Intergovernmentalism (LI) – a theory first formulated 25 years ago in this journal – in today's politicized and crisis‐ridden European Union (EU). We review the debates prompted by LI's three core claims about national preference formation, intergovernmental bargaining and institutional choice, as well as by the theory's …
Negotiating under Political Uncertainty
This article explores if (and how) national elections affect the chances of concluding an international agreement. Drawing on a literature about the informational efficiency of elections, it examines how political uncertainty in the run-up to an election impacts the dynamics of international negotiations. Using the case of decision making in the European Union (EU), it finds that (1) pending national elections significantly reduce the chances of …
The impact of national democratic representation on decision-making in the European Union
The extent to which decision-making in the European Union (EU) is responsive to national democratic representation has profound implications for understanding how the EU works in practice and for assessing it normatively. The contributions to this special issue examine key aspects of national representation, including national public opinion, elections and partisan government control. They do so with a shared theoretical approach and a newly upda…
Taming of the shrews? The (non-)enforcement of informal norms in the European Council
European Union Policy and Governance (13 works) · Political science (12 works) · Economics (11 works) · Law (11 works) · Law (9 works) · Politics (8 works) · Sociology (8 works) · European union (7 works) · Political economy (7 works) · Corporate governance (6 works)