Elisabetta Sacchi
Biographic Data
| ID | 3865520 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Elisabetta Sacchi |
| GIVEN NAMES | Elisabetta |
| FAMILY NAME | Sacchi |
| SIGNATURE | SACCHI E |
| AFFILIATIONS | San Raffaele University of Rome |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 4 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 4 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2016 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
The representational and phenomenal richness of perceptual experience
This paper deals with the issue of the admissible content of perceptual experience at the centre of the debate that opposes Conservatives and Liberals —who advocate, respectively, a Sparse and a Rich Content-View— and aims, specifically, to consider how this debate interacts with the Externalism/Internalism debate in philosophy of perception. Indeed, apart from a few exceptions (Siegel, 2006, 2010, 2013; Bayne, 2009; Ashby, 2020a; Raleigh, 2022),…
Is so-called Phenomenal Intentionality Real Intentionality
Against Phenomenal Externalism
We maintain that no extant argument in favor of phenomenal externalism (PE) is really convincing. PE is the thesis that the phenomenal properties of our experiences must be individuated widely insofar as they are constituted by worldly properties. We consider what we take to be the five best arguments for PE. We try to show that none of them really proves what it aims at proving. Unless better arguments in favor of phenomenal externalism show up …
Music therapy embrace for patients in radiation oncology
No prominent works on this page.
Music therapy embrace for patients in radiation oncology
Against Phenomenal Externalism
We maintain that no extant argument in favor of phenomenal externalism (PE) is really convincing. PE is the thesis that the phenomenal properties of our experiences must be individuated widely insofar as they are constituted by worldly properties. We consider what we take to be the five best arguments for PE. We try to show that none of them really proves what it aims at proving. Unless better arguments in favor of phenomenal externalism show up …
Is so-called Phenomenal Intentionality Real Intentionality
The representational and phenomenal richness of perceptual experience
This paper deals with the issue of the admissible content of perceptual experience at the centre of the debate that opposes Conservatives and Liberals —who advocate, respectively, a Sparse and a Rich Content-View— and aims, specifically, to consider how this debate interacts with the Externalism/Internalism debate in philosophy of perception. Indeed, apart from a few exceptions (Siegel, 2006, 2010, 2013; Bayne, 2009; Ashby, 2020a; Raleigh, 2022),…
Psychology (3 works) · Cognitive science (2 works) · Epistemology (2 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (2 works) · Philosophy (2 works) · Philosophy and History of Science (2 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (2 works) · Aesthetic Perception and Analysis (1 work) · Biology (1 work) · Cognitive psychology (1 work)