Alex Byrne
Biographic Data
| ID | 3865940 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Alex Byrne |
| GIVEN NAMES | Alex |
| FAMILY NAME | Byrne |
| SIGNATURE | BYRNE A |
| AFFILIATIONS | Massachusetts Institute of Technology |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 26 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 63 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 24 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 2 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1993 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2026 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
Replies to Moran, Gallois, and Bar-On and Johnson
I am very grateful to Dorit Bar-On, Drew Johnson, André Gallois, and Dick Moran for their thoughtful commentaries. Bar-On, Gallois, and Moran are discussed extensively in Transparency and Self-Know
The Paraphilia Natural Kind Hypothesis Is Alive and Well: A Response to Lawrence (2026)
The Female of the Species: Reply to Heartsilver
Maggie Heartsilver’s “Deflating Byrne’s ‘Are women adult human females?’” subjects the arguments and conclusion of “Are women...?” to a probing and comprehensive stress-test. The present paper responds to Heartsilver’s objections, and also discusses the significance of the proposition that trans women are women
Hallucination and Its Objects
When one visually hallucinates, the object of one’s hallucination is not before one’s eyes. On the standard view, that is because the object of hallucination does not exist, and so is not anywhere. Many different defenses of the standard view are on offer; each has problems. This article defends the view that there is always an object of hallucination—a physical object, sometimes with spatiotemporally scattered parts
The Norton Introduction to Philosophy
Indigenous voices in the State Library of New South Wales
The State Library of New South Wales holds the world’s most extensive collection on the European exploration and colonisation of Australia and its region and the subsequent development of Australia. Much is held about the Indigenous peoples, some created by Indigenous artists and chroniclers, but the majority by others including explorers, government officers, missionaries and settlers as well as the more recent ethnographers, historians and writ…
Using Modern Technologies to Capture and Share Indigenous Astronomical Knowledge
Indigenous Knowledge is important for Indigenous communities across the globe and for the advancement of our general scientific knowledge. In particular, Indigenous astronomical knowledge integrates many aspects of Indigenous Knowledge, including seasonal calendars, navigation, food economics, law, ceremony, and social structure. Capturing, managing, and disseminating this knowledge in the digital environment poses a number of challenges, which w…
Experience and Content
The ‘content view’, in slogan form, is ‘Perceptual experiences have representational content’. I explain why the content view should be reformulated to remove any reference to ‘experiences’. I then argue, against Bill Brewer, Charles Travis and others, that the content view is true. One corollary of the discussion is that the content of perception is relatively thin (confined, in the visual case, to roughly the output of ‘mid‐level’ vision). Fina…
Hoffman’s “proof” of the possibility of spectrum inversion
Content and modality: Themes from the philosophy of Robert Stalnaker
Introspection
What phenomenal consciousness is like
Color realism and color science
The target article is an attempt to make some progress on the problem of color realism. Are objects colored? And what is the nature of the color properties? We defend the view that physical objects (for instance, tomatoes, radishes, and rubies) are colored, and that colors are physical properties, specifically, types of reflectance. This is probably a minority opinion, at least among color scientists. Textbooks frequently claim that physical obje…
Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness
Conscious experience presents a deep puzzle. On the one hand, a fairly robust materialism must be true in order to explain how it is that conscious events causally interact with non-conscious, physical events. On the other hand, we cannot explain how physical phenomena give rise to conscious experience. In this wide-ranging study, Joseph Levine explores both sides of the mind-body dilemma, presenting the first book-length treatment of his highly …
Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness
Book Review| October 01 2002 Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness Joseph Levine, Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001. Pp. 204. Alex Byrne Alex Byrne Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2002) 111 (4): 594–597. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-111-4-594 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Twitter Permissions Search Site Citation Alex Byrne; Purple Haze: T…
Fact and Value: Essays on Ethics and Metaphysics for Judith Jarvis Thomson
A diverse collection of essays, which reflect the breadth of Judith Jarvis Thomson's philosophical work. The diversity of topics discussed in this book reflects the breadth of Judith Jarvis Thomson's philosophical work. Throughout her long career at MIT, Thomson's straightforward approach and emphasis on problem-solving have shaped philosophy in significant ways. Some of the book's contributions discuss specific moral and political issues such as…
Intentionalism Defended
Traditionally, perceptual experiences—for example, the experience of seeing a cat—were thought to have two quite distinct components. When one sees a cat, one’s experience is “about ” the cat: this is the representational or intentional component of the experience. One’s experience also has phenomenal character: this is the sensational component of the experience. Although the intentional and sensational components at least typically go together,…
Intentionalism Defended
Research Article| April 01 2001 Intentionalism Defended Alex Byrne Alex Byrne Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2001) 110 (2): 199–240. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-110-2-199 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Permissions Search Site Citation Alex Byrne; Intentionalism Defended. The Philosophical Review 1 April 2001; 110 (2): 199–240. doi: https://doi.org/10.1215…
Do Colours Look Like Dispositions? Reply to Langsam and Others
Dispositional theories of colour have been attacked by McGinn and others on the ground that ‘Colours do not look like dispositions’. Langsam has argued that on the contrary they do, in ‘Why Colours Do Look Like Dispositions’, The Philosophical Quarterly, 50 (2000), pp. 68–75. I make three claims. First, neither side has made its case. Secondly, it is true, at least on one interpretation, that colours do not look like dispositions. Thirdly, this d…
Cosmic Hermeneutics
Chalmers on Consciousness and Quantum Mechanics
In his book, The Conscious Mind , David Chalmers argues that his theory of consciousness can lend support to the Everett “no collapse” interpretation of quantum mechanics. We argue that Chalmers's argument fails, and that any Everett-style interpretation should be rejected
Problems of Vision: Rethinking the Causal Theory of Perception
Philosophy of Mind
Spin Control Comment on John McDowell's "Mind and World"
We have justified beliefs about the external world, and some of these are formed directly on the basis of perception. I may justifiably believe that a certain dog is in certain manger, and I may have this belief because I can see that the dog is in the manger. So far, so good. How is it that we can perceive and believe that things are thus and so and, moreoever, be justified in so believing? One of the main concerns of Mind and World1 is to answe…
Belief and Meaning: The Unity and Locality of Mental Content
Part 1 Belief, meaning, and the external world: what is meant by the of content? externalism what is meant by the of content?. Part 2 The unity of interntional content: the threat to the unity of content the orthodox externalisms why the orthodox externalisms threaten unity and mine doesn't some objections to the charge of disunity self-knowledge more objections to the charge of disunity. Part 3 Society and norm: the relevance of norms and rules …
Intentionalism Defended
Research Article| April 01 2001 Intentionalism Defended Alex Byrne Alex Byrne Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2001) 110 (2): 199–240. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-110-2-199 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Permissions Search Site Citation Alex Byrne; Intentionalism Defended. The Philosophical Review 1 April 2001; 110 (2): 199–240. doi: https://doi.org/10.1215…
Experience and Content
The ‘content view’, in slogan form, is ‘Perceptual experiences have representational content’. I explain why the content view should be reformulated to remove any reference to ‘experiences’. I then argue, against Bill Brewer, Charles Travis and others, that the content view is true. One corollary of the discussion is that the content of perception is relatively thin (confined, in the visual case, to roughly the output of ‘mid‐level’ vision). Fina…
Intentionalism Defended
Traditionally, perceptual experiences—for example, the experience of seeing a cat—were thought to have two quite distinct components. When one sees a cat, one’s experience is “about ” the cat: this is the representational or intentional component of the experience. One’s experience also has phenomenal character: this is the sensational component of the experience. Although the intentional and sensational components at least typically go together,…
Hallucination and Its Objects
When one visually hallucinates, the object of one’s hallucination is not before one’s eyes. On the standard view, that is because the object of hallucination does not exist, and so is not anywhere. Many different defenses of the standard view are on offer; each has problems. This article defends the view that there is always an object of hallucination—a physical object, sometimes with spatiotemporally scattered parts
Do Colours Look Like Dispositions? Reply to Langsam and Others
Dispositional theories of colour have been attacked by McGinn and others on the ground that ‘Colours do not look like dispositions’. Langsam has argued that on the contrary they do, in ‘Why Colours Do Look Like Dispositions’, The Philosophical Quarterly, 50 (2000), pp. 68–75. I make three claims. First, neither side has made its case. Secondly, it is true, at least on one interpretation, that colours do not look like dispositions. Thirdly, this d…
The Female of the Species: Reply to Heartsilver
Maggie Heartsilver’s “Deflating Byrne’s ‘Are women adult human females?’” subjects the arguments and conclusion of “Are women...?” to a probing and comprehensive stress-test. The present paper responds to Heartsilver’s objections, and also discusses the significance of the proposition that trans women are women
Philosophy of Mind
Matters of Metaphysics
This PDF file is made available by permission of Cambridge University Press. To order a hard copy, go to http://www.cambridge.org/9780521411172 (hardback) or www.cambridge.org/9780521044479 (paperback)
Belief and Meaning: The Unity and Locality of Mental Content
Part 1 Belief, meaning, and the external world: what is meant by the of content? externalism what is meant by the of content?. Part 2 The unity of interntional content: the threat to the unity of content the orthodox externalisms why the orthodox externalisms threaten unity and mine doesn't some objections to the charge of disunity self-knowledge more objections to the charge of disunity. Part 3 Society and norm: the relevance of norms and rules …
Spin Control Comment on John McDowell's "Mind and World"
We have justified beliefs about the external world, and some of these are formed directly on the basis of perception. I may justifiably believe that a certain dog is in certain manger, and I may have this belief because I can see that the dog is in the manger. So far, so good. How is it that we can perceive and believe that things are thus and so and, moreoever, be justified in so believing? One of the main concerns of Mind and World1 is to answe…
Philosophy of Mind
Cosmic Hermeneutics
Chalmers on Consciousness and Quantum Mechanics
In his book, The Conscious Mind , David Chalmers argues that his theory of consciousness can lend support to the Everett “no collapse” interpretation of quantum mechanics. We argue that Chalmers's argument fails, and that any Everett-style interpretation should be rejected
Problems of Vision: Rethinking the Causal Theory of Perception
Fact and Value: Essays on Ethics and Metaphysics for Judith Jarvis Thomson
A diverse collection of essays, which reflect the breadth of Judith Jarvis Thomson's philosophical work. The diversity of topics discussed in this book reflects the breadth of Judith Jarvis Thomson's philosophical work. Throughout her long career at MIT, Thomson's straightforward approach and emphasis on problem-solving have shaped philosophy in significant ways. Some of the book's contributions discuss specific moral and political issues such as…
Intentionalism Defended
Traditionally, perceptual experiences—for example, the experience of seeing a cat—were thought to have two quite distinct components. When one sees a cat, one’s experience is “about ” the cat: this is the representational or intentional component of the experience. One’s experience also has phenomenal character: this is the sensational component of the experience. Although the intentional and sensational components at least typically go together,…
Intentionalism Defended
Research Article| April 01 2001 Intentionalism Defended Alex Byrne Alex Byrne Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2001) 110 (2): 199–240. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-110-2-199 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Permissions Search Site Citation Alex Byrne; Intentionalism Defended. The Philosophical Review 1 April 2001; 110 (2): 199–240. doi: https://doi.org/10.1215…
Do Colours Look Like Dispositions? Reply to Langsam and Others
Dispositional theories of colour have been attacked by McGinn and others on the ground that ‘Colours do not look like dispositions’. Langsam has argued that on the contrary they do, in ‘Why Colours Do Look Like Dispositions’, The Philosophical Quarterly, 50 (2000), pp. 68–75. I make three claims. First, neither side has made its case. Secondly, it is true, at least on one interpretation, that colours do not look like dispositions. Thirdly, this d…
Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness
Conscious experience presents a deep puzzle. On the one hand, a fairly robust materialism must be true in order to explain how it is that conscious events causally interact with non-conscious, physical events. On the other hand, we cannot explain how physical phenomena give rise to conscious experience. In this wide-ranging study, Joseph Levine explores both sides of the mind-body dilemma, presenting the first book-length treatment of his highly …
Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness
Book Review| October 01 2002 Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness Joseph Levine, Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001. Pp. 204. Alex Byrne Alex Byrne Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2002) 111 (4): 594–597. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-111-4-594 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Twitter Permissions Search Site Citation Alex Byrne; Purple Haze: T…
Color realism and color science
The target article is an attempt to make some progress on the problem of color realism. Are objects colored? And what is the nature of the color properties? We defend the view that physical objects (for instance, tomatoes, radishes, and rubies) are colored, and that colors are physical properties, specifically, types of reflectance. This is probably a minority opinion, at least among color scientists. Textbooks frequently claim that physical obje…
What phenomenal consciousness is like
Introspection
Hoffman’s “proof” of the possibility of spectrum inversion
Content and modality: Themes from the philosophy of Robert Stalnaker
Experience and Content
The ‘content view’, in slogan form, is ‘Perceptual experiences have representational content’. I explain why the content view should be reformulated to remove any reference to ‘experiences’. I then argue, against Bill Brewer, Charles Travis and others, that the content view is true. One corollary of the discussion is that the content of perception is relatively thin (confined, in the visual case, to roughly the output of ‘mid‐level’ vision). Fina…
Using Modern Technologies to Capture and Share Indigenous Astronomical Knowledge
Indigenous Knowledge is important for Indigenous communities across the globe and for the advancement of our general scientific knowledge. In particular, Indigenous astronomical knowledge integrates many aspects of Indigenous Knowledge, including seasonal calendars, navigation, food economics, law, ceremony, and social structure. Capturing, managing, and disseminating this knowledge in the digital environment poses a number of challenges, which w…
Indigenous voices in the State Library of New South Wales
The State Library of New South Wales holds the world’s most extensive collection on the European exploration and colonisation of Australia and its region and the subsequent development of Australia. Much is held about the Indigenous peoples, some created by Indigenous artists and chroniclers, but the majority by others including explorers, government officers, missionaries and settlers as well as the more recent ethnographers, historians and writ…
The Norton Introduction to Philosophy
The Female of the Species: Reply to Heartsilver
Maggie Heartsilver’s “Deflating Byrne’s ‘Are women adult human females?’” subjects the arguments and conclusion of “Are women...?” to a probing and comprehensive stress-test. The present paper responds to Heartsilver’s objections, and also discusses the significance of the proposition that trans women are women
Hallucination and Its Objects
When one visually hallucinates, the object of one’s hallucination is not before one’s eyes. On the standard view, that is because the object of hallucination does not exist, and so is not anywhere. Many different defenses of the standard view are on offer; each has problems. This article defends the view that there is always an object of hallucination—a physical object, sometimes with spatiotemporally scattered parts
Replies to Moran, Gallois, and Bar-On and Johnson
I am very grateful to Dorit Bar-On, Drew Johnson, André Gallois, and Dick Moran for their thoughtful commentaries. Bar-On, Gallois, and Moran are discussed extensively in Transparency and Self-Know
Philosophy (16 works) · Epistemology (15 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (10 works) · Psychology (10 works) · Computer Science (7 works) · Classical Philosophy and Thought (5 works) · Analytic philosophy (4 works) · Cognitive psychology (4 works) · Consciousness (4 works) · Contemporary philosophy (4 works)