Aidan Gray
Biographic Data
| ID | 3865949 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Aidan Gray |
| GIVEN NAMES | Aidan |
| FAMILY NAME | Gray |
| SIGNATURE | GRAY A |
| AFFILIATIONS | University of Illinois Chicago |
| ORCID | 0000-0001-5510-434X |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 5 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 7 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 5 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2017 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 2 |
Frege cases and rationalizing explanations
Russellians, Relationists, and Fregeans disagree about the nature of propositional‐attitude content. We articulate a framework to characterize and evaluate this disagreement. The framework involves two claims: i) that we should individuate attitude content in whatever way fits best with the explanations that characteristically appeal to it, and ii) that we can understand those explanations by analogy with other ‘higher‐level’ explanations. Using …
Mental filing, continued
Mental filing
We offer an interpretation of the mental files framework that eliminates the metaphor of files, information being contained in files, etc . The guiding question is whether, once we move beyond the metaphors, there is any theoretical role for files. We claim not. We replace the file‐metaphor with two theses: the semantic thesis that there are irreducibly relational representational facts ( viz . facts about the coordination of representations); an…
Lexical-rule predicativism about names
Relational approaches to Frege's puzzle
Frege's puzzle is a fundamental challenge for accounts of mental and linguistic representation. This piece surveys a family of recent approaches to the puzzle that posit representationalrelations. I identify the central commitments of relational approaches and present several arguments for them. I also distinguish two kinds of relationism-semantic relationism and formal relationism-corresponding to two conceptions of representational relations. I…
Relational approaches to Frege's puzzle
Frege's puzzle is a fundamental challenge for accounts of mental and linguistic representation. This piece surveys a family of recent approaches to the puzzle that posit representationalrelations. I identify the central commitments of relational approaches and present several arguments for them. I also distinguish two kinds of relationism-semantic relationism and formal relationism-corresponding to two conceptions of representational relations. I…
Lexical-rule predicativism about names
Relational approaches to Frege's puzzle
Frege's puzzle is a fundamental challenge for accounts of mental and linguistic representation. This piece surveys a family of recent approaches to the puzzle that posit representationalrelations. I identify the central commitments of relational approaches and present several arguments for them. I also distinguish two kinds of relationism-semantic relationism and formal relationism-corresponding to two conceptions of representational relations. I…
Lexical-rule predicativism about names
Mental filing
We offer an interpretation of the mental files framework that eliminates the metaphor of files, information being contained in files, etc . The guiding question is whether, once we move beyond the metaphors, there is any theoretical role for files. We claim not. We replace the file‐metaphor with two theses: the semantic thesis that there are irreducibly relational representational facts ( viz . facts about the coordination of representations); an…
Mental filing, continued
Frege cases and rationalizing explanations
Russellians, Relationists, and Fregeans disagree about the nature of propositional‐attitude content. We articulate a framework to characterize and evaluate this disagreement. The framework involves two claims: i) that we should individuate attitude content in whatever way fits best with the explanations that characteristically appeal to it, and ii) that we can understand those explanations by analogy with other ‘higher‐level’ explanations. Using …
Epistemology (5 works) · Philosophy (5 works) · Computer Science (4 works) · Linguistics (4 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (4 works) · Philosophy and History of Science (3 works) · Metaphysics (2 works) · Philosophy of language (2 works) · Attachment and Relationship Dynamics (1 works) · Cognition (1 works)