Simon Keller
Biographic Data
| ID | 3865989 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Simon Keller |
| GIVEN NAMES | Simon |
| FAMILY NAME | Keller |
| SIGNATURE | KELLER S |
| AFFILIATIONS | Victoria University of Wellington |
| ORCID | 0000-0002-3001-5938 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 18 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 25 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 18 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2000 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2024 |
| H-INDEX | 3 |
Beyond Ideals of Friendship
What makes a friendship a good friendship? One way of answering that question, taken by Aristotle and many philosophers since, is to describe an ideal friendship, and then say that a friendship is a good friendship insofar as it resembles the ideal. An ideal of friendship, so presented, is intended to capture the qualities that all good friendships share, regardless of who the friends are and regardless of their circumstances. This approach to go…
The Virtue of Self-Compassion
Shared Belief and the Limits of Empathy
To show affective empathy is to share in another person's experiences, including her emotions. Most philosophers who write about emotions accept the broadly cognitivist view that emotions are rationally connected with beliefs. We argue that affective empathy is also rationally connected with belief; you can only share in another's emotions insofar as you can share certain of her beliefs. In light of that claim, we argue that affective empathy bri…
Love and the Moral Error Theory: Is Love a Mistake
No description supplied
Response to Löschke and Betzler
Partiality
We are partial to people with whom we share special relationships--if someone is your child, parent, or friend, you wouldn't treat them as you would a stranger. But is partiality justified, and if so, why? Partiality presents a theory of the reasons supporting special treatment within special relationships and explores the vexing problem of how we might reconcile the moral value of these relationships with competing claims of impartial morality. …
Against Friendship between Countries
The idea that countries (or nations or peoples) should sometimes be friends is embedded in everyday talk about international relations and receives sophisticated defences in recent works by P. E. Digeser and Catherine Lu. The idea relies upon an analogy between interactions between persons and interactions between countries — an analogy that this article argues to be ontologically and ethically dubious. Persons and countries are very different en…
Truth and Ontology
Book Review| April 01 2009 Truth and Ontology Trenton Merricks, Truth and Ontology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. xviii + 202 pp. Simon Keller Simon Keller Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (2): 273–276. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-2008-054 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Permissions Search Site Citation Simon Keller; Truth and Ontology. Th…
Welfarism
Welfarism is the view that morality is centrally concerned with the welfare or well-being of individuals. The division between welfarist and non-welfarist approaches underlies many important disagreements in ethics, but welfarism is neither consistently defined nor well understood. I survey the philosophical work on welfarism, and I offer a suggestion about how the view can be characterized and how it can be embedded in various kinds of moral the…
Are Patriotism and Universalism Compatible
Four Theories of Filial Duty
Children have special duties to their parents: there are things that we ought to do for our parents, but not for just anyone. Three competing accounts of filial duty appear in the literature: the debt theory, the gratitude theory and the friendship theory. Each is unsatisfactory: each tries to assimilate the moral relationship between parent and child to some independently understood conception of duty, but this relationship is different in struc…
Patriotism as Bad Faith
Freedom
Friendship and Belief
I intend to argue that good friendship sometimes requires epistemic irresponsibility. To put it another way, it is not always possible to be both a good friend and a diligent believer.
Welfare and the Achievement of Goals
On what is the war on terror
Expensive Tastes and Distributive Justice
An Interpretation of Plato's Cratylus
Plato's main concern in the Cratylus, I claim, is to argue against the idea that we can learn about things by examining their names, and in favour of the claim that philosophers should, so far as possible, look to the things themselves. Other philosophical questions, such as that of whether we should accept a naturalist or a conventionalist theory of namng, arise in the dialogue, but are subordinate. This reading of the Cratylus, I say, explains …
Four Theories of Filial Duty
Children have special duties to their parents: there are things that we ought to do for our parents, but not for just anyone. Three competing accounts of filial duty appear in the literature: the debt theory, the gratitude theory and the friendship theory. Each is unsatisfactory: each tries to assimilate the moral relationship between parent and child to some independently understood conception of duty, but this relationship is different in struc…
Against Friendship between Countries
The idea that countries (or nations or peoples) should sometimes be friends is embedded in everyday talk about international relations and receives sophisticated defences in recent works by P. E. Digeser and Catherine Lu. The idea relies upon an analogy between interactions between persons and interactions between countries — an analogy that this article argues to be ontologically and ethically dubious. Persons and countries are very different en…
Welfarism
Welfarism is the view that morality is centrally concerned with the welfare or well-being of individuals. The division between welfarist and non-welfarist approaches underlies many important disagreements in ethics, but welfarism is neither consistently defined nor well understood. I survey the philosophical work on welfarism, and I offer a suggestion about how the view can be characterized and how it can be embedded in various kinds of moral the…
Love and the Moral Error Theory: Is Love a Mistake
No description supplied
Truth and Ontology
Book Review| April 01 2009 Truth and Ontology Trenton Merricks, Truth and Ontology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. xviii + 202 pp. Simon Keller Simon Keller Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (2): 273–276. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-2008-054 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Permissions Search Site Citation Simon Keller; Truth and Ontology. Th…
On what is the war on terror
An Interpretation of Plato's Cratylus
Plato's main concern in the Cratylus, I claim, is to argue against the idea that we can learn about things by examining their names, and in favour of the claim that philosophers should, so far as possible, look to the things themselves. Other philosophical questions, such as that of whether we should accept a naturalist or a conventionalist theory of namng, arise in the dialogue, but are subordinate. This reading of the Cratylus, I say, explains …
Expensive Tastes and Distributive Justice
Friendship and Belief
I intend to argue that good friendship sometimes requires epistemic irresponsibility. To put it another way, it is not always possible to be both a good friend and a diligent believer.
Welfare and the Achievement of Goals
On what is the war on terror
Patriotism as Bad Faith
Freedom
Four Theories of Filial Duty
Children have special duties to their parents: there are things that we ought to do for our parents, but not for just anyone. Three competing accounts of filial duty appear in the literature: the debt theory, the gratitude theory and the friendship theory. Each is unsatisfactory: each tries to assimilate the moral relationship between parent and child to some independently understood conception of duty, but this relationship is different in struc…
Are Patriotism and Universalism Compatible
Against Friendship between Countries
The idea that countries (or nations or peoples) should sometimes be friends is embedded in everyday talk about international relations and receives sophisticated defences in recent works by P. E. Digeser and Catherine Lu. The idea relies upon an analogy between interactions between persons and interactions between countries — an analogy that this article argues to be ontologically and ethically dubious. Persons and countries are very different en…
Truth and Ontology
Book Review| April 01 2009 Truth and Ontology Trenton Merricks, Truth and Ontology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. xviii + 202 pp. Simon Keller Simon Keller Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2009) 118 (2): 273–276. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-2008-054 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Permissions Search Site Citation Simon Keller; Truth and Ontology. Th…
Welfarism
Welfarism is the view that morality is centrally concerned with the welfare or well-being of individuals. The division between welfarist and non-welfarist approaches underlies many important disagreements in ethics, but welfarism is neither consistently defined nor well understood. I survey the philosophical work on welfarism, and I offer a suggestion about how the view can be characterized and how it can be embedded in various kinds of moral the…
Partiality
We are partial to people with whom we share special relationships--if someone is your child, parent, or friend, you wouldn't treat them as you would a stranger. But is partiality justified, and if so, why? Partiality presents a theory of the reasons supporting special treatment within special relationships and explores the vexing problem of how we might reconcile the moral value of these relationships with competing claims of impartial morality. …
Response to Löschke and Betzler
Love and the Moral Error Theory: Is Love a Mistake
No description supplied
The Virtue of Self-Compassion
Shared Belief and the Limits of Empathy
To show affective empathy is to share in another person's experiences, including her emotions. Most philosophers who write about emotions accept the broadly cognitivist view that emotions are rationally connected with beliefs. We argue that affective empathy is also rationally connected with belief; you can only share in another's emotions insofar as you can share certain of her beliefs. In light of that claim, we argue that affective empathy bri…
Beyond Ideals of Friendship
What makes a friendship a good friendship? One way of answering that question, taken by Aristotle and many philosophers since, is to describe an ideal friendship, and then say that a friendship is a good friendship insofar as it resembles the ideal. An ideal of friendship, so presented, is intended to capture the qualities that all good friendships share, regardless of who the friends are and regardless of their circumstances. This approach to go…
Philosophy (16 works) · Epistemology (15 works) · Sociology (13 works) · Law (9 works) · Political science (9 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (8 works) · Psychology (8 works) · Social Psychology (8 works) · Political Philosophy and Ethics (6 works) · Economics (5 works)