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Carl Gillett

Biographic Data

ID3866003
NAMECarl Gillett
GIVEN NAMESCarl
FAMILY NAMEGillett
SIGNATUREGILLETT C
AFFILIATIONSNorthern Illinois University
VERIFIEDNo
TOTAL WORKS6
TOTAL CITATIONS33
WORKS AS AUTHOR5
WORKS AS EDITOR1
FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR2001
LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR2019
H-INDEX3
  • Defending pluralism about compositional explanations

    Open Access•Kenneth Aizawa, Carl Gillett•ARTICLE•Studies in History and Philosophy…•2019•Cited by: 3•References: 1

  • Moving beyond the subset model of realization

    Open Access•Carl Gillett•ARTICLE•Synthese•2010•Cited by: 7•References: 33

  • Understanding The New Reductionism

    Carl Gillett, Inc Journal of Philosophy•ARTICLE•The Journal of Philosophy•2007•Cited by: 19

  • Samuel Alexander’s Emergentism

    Open Access•Carl Gillett•ARTICLE•Synthese•2006•Cited by: 2•References: 16

  • Infinitism Redux? A Response to Klein

    Open Access•Carl Gillett•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2003•Cited by: 2•References: 2

    Foundationalist, Coherentist. Skeptic etc., have all been united in one respect—all accept epistemic justification cannot result from an unending, and non‐repeating. chain of reasons. Peter Klein has recently challenged this minimal consensus with a defense of what he calls “Intinitism”—the position that justification can result from such a regress. Klein provides surprisingly convincing responses to most of the common objections to Infinitism, b…

  • Physicalism and its Discontents

    Open Access•David Papineau, Gillett Carl et al.•EDITOR•BOOK•Physicalism and Its Discontents•2001

    Physicalism, a topic that has been central to modern philosophy of mind and metaphysics, is the philosophical view that everything in the space-time world is ultimately physical. The physicalist will claim that all facts about the mind and the mental are physical facts and deny the existence of mental events and state insofar as these are thought of as independent of physical things, events and states. This collection of essays, first published i…

  • Understanding The New Reductionism

    Carl Gillett, Inc Journal of Philosophy•ARTICLE•The Journal of Philosophy•2007•Cited by: 19

  • Moving beyond the subset model of realization

    Open Access•Carl Gillett•ARTICLE•Synthese•2010•Cited by: 7•References: 33

  • Defending pluralism about compositional explanations

    Open Access•Kenneth Aizawa, Carl Gillett•ARTICLE•Studies in History and Philosophy…•2019•Cited by: 3•References: 1

  • Samuel Alexander’s Emergentism

    Open Access•Carl Gillett•ARTICLE•Synthese•2006•Cited by: 2•References: 16

  • Infinitism Redux? A Response to Klein

    Open Access•Carl Gillett•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2003•Cited by: 2•References: 2

    Foundationalist, Coherentist. Skeptic etc., have all been united in one respect—all accept epistemic justification cannot result from an unending, and non‐repeating. chain of reasons. Peter Klein has recently challenged this minimal consensus with a defense of what he calls “Intinitism”—the position that justification can result from such a regress. Klein provides surprisingly convincing responses to most of the common objections to Infinitism, b…

  • Physicalism and its Discontents

    Open Access•David Papineau, Gillett Carl et al.•EDITOR•BOOK•Physicalism and Its Discontents•2001

    Physicalism, a topic that has been central to modern philosophy of mind and metaphysics, is the philosophical view that everything in the space-time world is ultimately physical. The physicalist will claim that all facts about the mind and the mental are physical facts and deny the existence of mental events and state insofar as these are thought of as independent of physical things, events and states. This collection of essays, first published i…

  • Infinitism Redux? A Response to Klein

    Open Access•Carl Gillett•ARTICLE•Philosophy and Phenomenological…•2003•Cited by: 2•References: 2

    Foundationalist, Coherentist. Skeptic etc., have all been united in one respect—all accept epistemic justification cannot result from an unending, and non‐repeating. chain of reasons. Peter Klein has recently challenged this minimal consensus with a defense of what he calls “Intinitism”—the position that justification can result from such a regress. Klein provides surprisingly convincing responses to most of the common objections to Infinitism, b…

  • Samuel Alexander’s Emergentism

    Open Access•Carl Gillett•ARTICLE•Synthese•2006•Cited by: 2•References: 16

  • Understanding The New Reductionism

    Carl Gillett, Inc Journal of Philosophy•ARTICLE•The Journal of Philosophy•2007•Cited by: 19

  • Moving beyond the subset model of realization

    Open Access•Carl Gillett•ARTICLE•Synthese•2010•Cited by: 7•References: 33

  • Defending pluralism about compositional explanations

    Open Access•Kenneth Aizawa, Carl Gillett•ARTICLE•Studies in History and Philosophy…•2019•Cited by: 3•References: 1

Epistemology (6 works) · Philosophy (5 works) · Metaphysics (4 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (4 works) · Philosophy (3 works) · Philosophy and History of Science (3 works) · Causation (2 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (2 works) · Philosophy of language (2 works) · Philosophy of mind (2 works)

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