Nathan Salmon
Biographic Data
| ID | 3866015 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Nathan Salmon |
| GIVEN NAMES | Nathan |
| FAMILY NAME | Salmon |
| SIGNATURE | SALMON N |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 16 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 62 |
| AUTHOR COUNT | 16 |
| EDITOR COUNT | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1984 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2025 |
| H-INDEX | 4 |
Ruffino on the Contingent A Priori
This is a rejoinder of sorts to Marco Ruffino’s critique in his book Contingent A Priori Truths (Springer, Switzerland, 2022) of my own criticism of Saul Kripke’s case for the contingent a priori. A distinction is drawn between knowledge concerning the meter stick S that its length is such-and-such and knowledge concerning S’s length that it is such-and-such
The Legacy of Naming and Necessity 1
What is Existence?
Four accounts, three of them Kantian, of true sentences of the form ' exists' are contrasted. Russell's theory that such sentences are meaningless is contrasted with two other Kantian theories that are analogous to one another: Frege's semantic-ascent theory and the Frege-inspired ungerade (indirect, 'oblique') theory. Frege's objection to the semantic-ascent account of identity is applied, ironically with equal force, against his account of exis…
A Theory of Bondage
Research Article| October 01 2006 A Theory of Bondage Nathan Salmon Nathan Salmon Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2006) 115 (4): 415–448. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-2006-009 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Permissions Search Site Citation Nathan Salmon; A Theory of Bondage. The Philosophical Review 1 October 2006; 115 (4): 415–448. doi: https://doi.org/10.…
Pronouns as Variables
Demonstrating and Necessity
and Saul Kripke's Naming and Necessity (Harvard University Press
Demonstrating and Necessity
Research Article| October 01 2002 Demonstrating and Necessity Nathan Salmon Nathan Salmon Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2002) 111 (4): 497–537. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-111-4-497 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Permissions Search Site Citation Nathan Salmon; Demonstrating and Necessity. The Philosophical Review 1 October 2002; 111 (4): 497–537. doi: ht…
Reflections on reflexivity
How not to become a Millian heir
Frege's Puzzle
The Logic of What Might Have Been
In earlier work I argued (following Hugh Chandler) that the conventionally accepted system S5 of (first-order) modal propositional logic, and even the weaker system S4, embody an invalid pattern of modal reasoning; they are fallacious systems for reasoning about what might have been.1 I argued, in fact, that the characteristic S4 axiom schema, IkDEIILI-or equivalently, the principle that for any necessarily true proposition p, the proposition tha…
XII—How to Measure the Standard Metre
Journal Article XII—How to Measure the Standard Metre Get access Nathan Salmon Nathan Salmon Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 88, Issue 1, 1 June 1988, Pages 193–218, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristotelian/88.1.193 Published: 09 September 2015
On the Plurality of Worlds
Existence
Frege's Puzzle
Impossible Worlds
Existence
The Logic of What Might Have Been
In earlier work I argued (following Hugh Chandler) that the conventionally accepted system S5 of (first-order) modal propositional logic, and even the weaker system S4, embody an invalid pattern of modal reasoning; they are fallacious systems for reasoning about what might have been.1 I argued, in fact, that the characteristic S4 axiom schema, IkDEIILI-or equivalently, the principle that for any necessarily true proposition p, the proposition tha…
Demonstrating and Necessity
Research Article| October 01 2002 Demonstrating and Necessity Nathan Salmon Nathan Salmon Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2002) 111 (4): 497–537. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-111-4-497 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Permissions Search Site Citation Nathan Salmon; Demonstrating and Necessity. The Philosophical Review 1 October 2002; 111 (4): 497–537. doi: ht…
A Theory of Bondage
Research Article| October 01 2006 A Theory of Bondage Nathan Salmon Nathan Salmon Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2006) 115 (4): 415–448. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-2006-009 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Permissions Search Site Citation Nathan Salmon; A Theory of Bondage. The Philosophical Review 1 October 2006; 115 (4): 415–448. doi: https://doi.org/10.…
Reflections on reflexivity
Demonstrating and Necessity
and Saul Kripke's Naming and Necessity (Harvard University Press
How not to become a Millian heir
On the Plurality of Worlds
Frege's Puzzle
Pronouns as Variables
Impossible Worlds
Existence
Frege's Puzzle
XII—How to Measure the Standard Metre
Journal Article XII—How to Measure the Standard Metre Get access Nathan Salmon Nathan Salmon Search for other works by this author on: Oxford Academic Google Scholar Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 88, Issue 1, 1 June 1988, Pages 193–218, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristotelian/88.1.193 Published: 09 September 2015
On the Plurality of Worlds
The Logic of What Might Have Been
In earlier work I argued (following Hugh Chandler) that the conventionally accepted system S5 of (first-order) modal propositional logic, and even the weaker system S4, embody an invalid pattern of modal reasoning; they are fallacious systems for reasoning about what might have been.1 I argued, in fact, that the characteristic S4 axiom schema, IkDEIILI-or equivalently, the principle that for any necessarily true proposition p, the proposition tha…
How not to become a Millian heir
Frege's Puzzle
Reflections on reflexivity
Demonstrating and Necessity
and Saul Kripke's Naming and Necessity (Harvard University Press
Demonstrating and Necessity
Research Article| October 01 2002 Demonstrating and Necessity Nathan Salmon Nathan Salmon Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2002) 111 (4): 497–537. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-111-4-497 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Permissions Search Site Citation Nathan Salmon; Demonstrating and Necessity. The Philosophical Review 1 October 2002; 111 (4): 497–537. doi: ht…
A Theory of Bondage
Research Article| October 01 2006 A Theory of Bondage Nathan Salmon Nathan Salmon Search for other works by this author on: This Site Google The Philosophical Review (2006) 115 (4): 415–448. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-2006-009 Cite Icon Cite Share Icon Share Facebook Twitter LinkedIn MailTo Permissions Search Site Citation Nathan Salmon; A Theory of Bondage. The Philosophical Review 1 October 2006; 115 (4): 415–448. doi: https://doi.org/10.…
Pronouns as Variables
What is Existence?
Four accounts, three of them Kantian, of true sentences of the form ' exists' are contrasted. Russell's theory that such sentences are meaningless is contrasted with two other Kantian theories that are analogous to one another: Frege's semantic-ascent theory and the Frege-inspired ungerade (indirect, 'oblique') theory. Frege's objection to the semantic-ascent account of identity is applied, ironically with equal force, against his account of exis…
The Legacy of Naming and Necessity 1
Ruffino on the Contingent A Priori
This is a rejoinder of sorts to Marco Ruffino’s critique in his book Contingent A Priori Truths (Springer, Switzerland, 2022) of my own criticism of Saul Kripke’s case for the contingent a priori. A distinction is drawn between knowledge concerning the meter stick S that its length is such-and-such and knowledge concerning S’s length that it is such-and-such
Philosophy (9 works) · Epistemology (7 works) · Computer Science (6 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (6 works) · Citation (4 works) · Contemporary philosophy (4 works) · Philosophy (4 works) · Pragmatism in Philosophy and Education (4 works) · Analytic philosophy (3 works) · Classical Philosophy and Thought (3 works)