Karl Schafer
Biographic Data
| ID | 3866022 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Karl Schafer |
| GIVEN NAMES | Karl |
| FAMILY NAME | Schafer |
| SIGNATURE | SCHÄFER K |
| AFFILIATIONS | The University of Texas at Austin |
| VERIFIED | No |
| TOTAL WORKS | 18 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 61 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 16 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 2 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1955 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2023 |
| H-INDEX | 5 |
Kant's Reason
Kant’s Reason develops a novel interpretation of Kant’s conception of reason and its philosophical significance, focusing on two claims. First, it argues that Kant presents a powerful model for understanding the unity of theoretical and practical reason as two manifestations of a unified capacity for theoretical and practical understanding (or “comprehension”). This model allows us to do justice to the deep commonalities between theoretical and p…
Kant's Justification of Ethics
Owen Ware's excellent new monograph brings together several recent papers to construct a systematic picture of Kant's aims and methods in his two most foundational works of practical philosophy: The Groundwork and the second Critique. In doing so, Ware argues (convincingly to my mind) that the transition between the Groundwork and the second Critique does not represent the dramatic reversal in Kant's thought that many scholars have found in these…
The Sensible and Intelligible Worlds
For much of its history, analytic Kant scholarship has been dominated by the idea of Kant as a deeply anti-metaphysical philosopher. But in the last quarter century, analytically inclined Kant scholars have increasingly become skeptical of interpreting Kant as a philosopher who wished to truly “leave metaphysics behind.” Although such readings interpret Kant’s metaphysics in radically different ways, they share a common commitment to the idea tha…
Kant on Reason as the Capacity for Comprehension
This essay develops an interpretation of Kant’s conception of the faculty of reason as the capacity for what he calls ‘comprehension’ (Begreifen). In doing so, it first discusses Kant's characterizations of reason in relation to what he describes as the two highest grades of cognition—insight and comprehension. Then it discusses how the resulting conception of reason relates to more familiar characterizations as the faculty for inference and the …
Transcendental Philosophy As Capacities‐First Philosophy
In this essay, I propose a novel way of thinking about Kant’s philosophical methodology during the critical period. According to this interpretation, the critical Kant can generally be understood as operating within a “capacities‐first” philosophical framework – that is, within a framework in which our basic rational or cognitive capacities play both an explanatorily and epistemically fundamental role in philosophy – or, at least, in the sort of …
The Scenic Route? On Errol Lord’s The Importance of Being Rational
Constitutivism about Reasons
Contemporary forms of Kantian constitutivism generally begin with a conception of agency on which the constitutive aim of agency is some form of autonomy or self-unification. This chapter argues for a re-orientation of the Kantian constitutivist project towards views that begin with a conception of rationality on which both theoretical and practical rationality aim at forms of understanding. In a slogan, then, understanding-first as opposed to au…
Hard Problems Between Minds and Bodies
Intuitions and objects in Allais’s manifest reality
How Common is Peer Disagreement? On Self‐Trust and Rational Symmetry
In this paper I offer an argument for a view about the epistemology of peer disagreement, which I call the “Rational Symmetry View”. I argue that this view follows from a natural (if controversial) conception of the epistemology of testimony, together with a basic entitlement to trust our own faculties for belief formation. I then discuss some objections to this view, focusing on its relationship to other well‐known views in the literature. The u…
Realism and Constructivism in Kantian Metaethics (2)
In the second half of this essay, I discuss the robust conception of rationality that lies at the heart of the Kantian version of Rationalist Constructivism - offering some reasons to prefer this conception to the more minimal accounts of rationality associated with Humean views. I then go on to discuss some of the potential metaethical advantages of the resulting form of constructivism
Realism and Constructivism in Kantian Metaethics (1)
Metaethical constructivism is one of the main movements within contemporary metaethics - especially among those with Kantian inclinations. But both the philosophical coherence and the Kantian pedigree of constructivism are hotly contested. In the first half of this article, I first explore the sense in which Kant's own views might be described as constructivist and then use the resulting understanding as a guide to how we might think about Kantia…
Doxastic planning and epistemic internalism
Knowledge and Two Forms of Non‐Accidental Truth
Constructivism and Three Forms of Perspective‐Dependence in Metaethics 1
Faultless Disagreement and Aesthetic Realism
It has recently been argued that certain areas of discourse, such as discourse about matters of taste, involve a phenomenon of ‘‘faultless disagreement’’ that rules out giving a standard realist or contextualist semantics for them. Thus, it is argued, we are left with no choice but to consider more adventurous semantic alternatives for these areas, such as a semantic account that involves relativizing truth to perspectives or contexts of assessme…
Strafrecht und Strafverfahren
Strafrecht und Strafverfahren
The Sensible and Intelligible Worlds
For much of its history, analytic Kant scholarship has been dominated by the idea of Kant as a deeply anti-metaphysical philosopher. But in the last quarter century, analytically inclined Kant scholars have increasingly become skeptical of interpreting Kant as a philosopher who wished to truly “leave metaphysics behind.” Although such readings interpret Kant’s metaphysics in radically different ways, they share a common commitment to the idea tha…
Realism and Constructivism in Kantian Metaethics (1)
Metaethical constructivism is one of the main movements within contemporary metaethics - especially among those with Kantian inclinations. But both the philosophical coherence and the Kantian pedigree of constructivism are hotly contested. In the first half of this article, I first explore the sense in which Kant's own views might be described as constructivist and then use the resulting understanding as a guide to how we might think about Kantia…
Faultless Disagreement and Aesthetic Realism
It has recently been argued that certain areas of discourse, such as discourse about matters of taste, involve a phenomenon of ‘‘faultless disagreement’’ that rules out giving a standard realist or contextualist semantics for them. Thus, it is argued, we are left with no choice but to consider more adventurous semantic alternatives for these areas, such as a semantic account that involves relativizing truth to perspectives or contexts of assessme…
Transcendental Philosophy As Capacities‐First Philosophy
In this essay, I propose a novel way of thinking about Kant’s philosophical methodology during the critical period. According to this interpretation, the critical Kant can generally be understood as operating within a “capacities‐first” philosophical framework – that is, within a framework in which our basic rational or cognitive capacities play both an explanatorily and epistemically fundamental role in philosophy – or, at least, in the sort of …
How Common is Peer Disagreement? On Self‐Trust and Rational Symmetry
In this paper I offer an argument for a view about the epistemology of peer disagreement, which I call the “Rational Symmetry View”. I argue that this view follows from a natural (if controversial) conception of the epistemology of testimony, together with a basic entitlement to trust our own faculties for belief formation. I then discuss some objections to this view, focusing on its relationship to other well‐known views in the literature. The u…
Kant's Reason
Kant’s Reason develops a novel interpretation of Kant’s conception of reason and its philosophical significance, focusing on two claims. First, it argues that Kant presents a powerful model for understanding the unity of theoretical and practical reason as two manifestations of a unified capacity for theoretical and practical understanding (or “comprehension”). This model allows us to do justice to the deep commonalities between theoretical and p…
Constructivism and Three Forms of Perspective‐Dependence in Metaethics 1
Intuitions and objects in Allais’s manifest reality
Doxastic planning and epistemic internalism
Knowledge and Two Forms of Non‐Accidental Truth
Kant's Justification of Ethics
Owen Ware's excellent new monograph brings together several recent papers to construct a systematic picture of Kant's aims and methods in his two most foundational works of practical philosophy: The Groundwork and the second Critique. In doing so, Ware argues (convincingly to my mind) that the transition between the Groundwork and the second Critique does not represent the dramatic reversal in Kant's thought that many scholars have found in these…
Kant on Reason as the Capacity for Comprehension
This essay develops an interpretation of Kant’s conception of the faculty of reason as the capacity for what he calls ‘comprehension’ (Begreifen). In doing so, it first discusses Kant's characterizations of reason in relation to what he describes as the two highest grades of cognition—insight and comprehension. Then it discusses how the resulting conception of reason relates to more familiar characterizations as the faculty for inference and the …
The Scenic Route? On Errol Lord’s The Importance of Being Rational
Realism and Constructivism in Kantian Metaethics (2)
In the second half of this essay, I discuss the robust conception of rationality that lies at the heart of the Kantian version of Rationalist Constructivism - offering some reasons to prefer this conception to the more minimal accounts of rationality associated with Humean views. I then go on to discuss some of the potential metaethical advantages of the resulting form of constructivism
Strafrecht und Strafverfahren
Strafrecht und Strafverfahren
Faultless Disagreement and Aesthetic Realism
It has recently been argued that certain areas of discourse, such as discourse about matters of taste, involve a phenomenon of ‘‘faultless disagreement’’ that rules out giving a standard realist or contextualist semantics for them. Thus, it is argued, we are left with no choice but to consider more adventurous semantic alternatives for these areas, such as a semantic account that involves relativizing truth to perspectives or contexts of assessme…
Constructivism and Three Forms of Perspective‐Dependence in Metaethics 1
Knowledge and Two Forms of Non‐Accidental Truth
Doxastic planning and epistemic internalism
How Common is Peer Disagreement? On Self‐Trust and Rational Symmetry
In this paper I offer an argument for a view about the epistemology of peer disagreement, which I call the “Rational Symmetry View”. I argue that this view follows from a natural (if controversial) conception of the epistemology of testimony, together with a basic entitlement to trust our own faculties for belief formation. I then discuss some objections to this view, focusing on its relationship to other well‐known views in the literature. The u…
Realism and Constructivism in Kantian Metaethics (2)
In the second half of this essay, I discuss the robust conception of rationality that lies at the heart of the Kantian version of Rationalist Constructivism - offering some reasons to prefer this conception to the more minimal accounts of rationality associated with Humean views. I then go on to discuss some of the potential metaethical advantages of the resulting form of constructivism
Realism and Constructivism in Kantian Metaethics (1)
Metaethical constructivism is one of the main movements within contemporary metaethics - especially among those with Kantian inclinations. But both the philosophical coherence and the Kantian pedigree of constructivism are hotly contested. In the first half of this article, I first explore the sense in which Kant's own views might be described as constructivist and then use the resulting understanding as a guide to how we might think about Kantia…
Intuitions and objects in Allais’s manifest reality
Constitutivism about Reasons
Contemporary forms of Kantian constitutivism generally begin with a conception of agency on which the constitutive aim of agency is some form of autonomy or self-unification. This chapter argues for a re-orientation of the Kantian constitutivist project towards views that begin with a conception of rationality on which both theoretical and practical rationality aim at forms of understanding. In a slogan, then, understanding-first as opposed to au…
Hard Problems Between Minds and Bodies
Transcendental Philosophy As Capacities‐First Philosophy
In this essay, I propose a novel way of thinking about Kant’s philosophical methodology during the critical period. According to this interpretation, the critical Kant can generally be understood as operating within a “capacities‐first” philosophical framework – that is, within a framework in which our basic rational or cognitive capacities play both an explanatorily and epistemically fundamental role in philosophy – or, at least, in the sort of …
The Scenic Route? On Errol Lord’s The Importance of Being Rational
The Sensible and Intelligible Worlds
For much of its history, analytic Kant scholarship has been dominated by the idea of Kant as a deeply anti-metaphysical philosopher. But in the last quarter century, analytically inclined Kant scholars have increasingly become skeptical of interpreting Kant as a philosopher who wished to truly “leave metaphysics behind.” Although such readings interpret Kant’s metaphysics in radically different ways, they share a common commitment to the idea tha…
Kant on Reason as the Capacity for Comprehension
This essay develops an interpretation of Kant’s conception of the faculty of reason as the capacity for what he calls ‘comprehension’ (Begreifen). In doing so, it first discusses Kant's characterizations of reason in relation to what he describes as the two highest grades of cognition—insight and comprehension. Then it discusses how the resulting conception of reason relates to more familiar characterizations as the faculty for inference and the …
Kant's Reason
Kant’s Reason develops a novel interpretation of Kant’s conception of reason and its philosophical significance, focusing on two claims. First, it argues that Kant presents a powerful model for understanding the unity of theoretical and practical reason as two manifestations of a unified capacity for theoretical and practical understanding (or “comprehension”). This model allows us to do justice to the deep commonalities between theoretical and p…
Kant's Justification of Ethics
Owen Ware's excellent new monograph brings together several recent papers to construct a systematic picture of Kant's aims and methods in his two most foundational works of practical philosophy: The Groundwork and the second Critique. In doing so, Ware argues (convincingly to my mind) that the transition between the Groundwork and the second Critique does not represent the dramatic reversal in Kant's thought that many scholars have found in these…
Epistemology (14 works) · Philosophical Ethics and Theory (12 works) · Philosophy (11 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (9 works) · Computer Science (8 works) · Philosophy (8 works) · Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics (7 works) · Political science (5 works) · Rationality (4 works) · Citation (3 works)