Amir Horowitz
Biographic Data
| ID | 3866085 |
|---|---|
| NAME | Amir Horowitz |
| GIVEN NAMES | Amir |
| FAMILY NAME | Horowitz |
| SIGNATURE | HOROWITZ A |
| AFFILIATIONS | Open University of Israel |
| ORCID | 0000-0003-1913-0553 |
| VERIFIED | Yes |
| TOTAL WORKS | 8 |
| TOTAL CITATIONS | 0 |
| WORKS AS AUTHOR | 8 |
| WORKS AS EDITOR | 0 |
| FIRST PUBLICATION YEAR | 1992 |
| LATEST PUBLICATION YEAR | 2022 |
| H-INDEX | 0 |
What Can God Do? What Should God Do
The aim of this paper is to defend James Sterba's version (2019) of the logical argument from evil against the existence of God from two objections that have been raised against it: that God cannot "logically" prevent all evils and that the moral requirements that the argument poses for God may not apply to God. I argue that these objections do not refute the claim that God can prevent and should prevent any evil and do not undermine Sterba's arg…
Intentionality, evil, God, and necessity
In an article in this issue, Kenneth Pearce suggests a novel solution to the ‘logical problem of evil’. That is, he defends the consistency of the obtaining of evil with the existence of an omnipotent and good creator. The basic idea of Pearce's solution to the logical problem of evil is that according to the teleological theory of intentionality, which is self-consistent and consistent with the claim that God exists, some evil is necessary for t…
Turning the zombie on its head
Oral Cancer Knowledge and Opinions Among Maryland Nurse Practitioners
The reported knowledge of oral cancer, in conjunction with opinions about level of knowledge and training, point to a need for systematic educational updates in oral cancer prevention and early detection
Is There a Problem in Physicalist Epiphenomenalism
Physicalist epiphenomenalism is the conjunction of the doctrine that tokens of mental events are tokens of physical events and the doctrine that mental events do not exert causal powers by virtue of falling under mental types. The purpose of the paper is to show that physicalist epiphenomenalism, contrary to what many have thought, is not subject to the objections that have been raised against classic epiphenomenalism. This is argued with respect…
Searle's mind
Preview this article: Searle's mind: Physical, irreducible, subjective, and non-computational, Page 1 of 1 /docserver/preview/fulltext/pc.2.1.10hor-1.gif
Functional role and intentionality
Semantics and the Psyche
No prominent works on this page.
Functional role and intentionality
Semantics and the Psyche
Searle's mind
Preview this article: Searle's mind: Physical, irreducible, subjective, and non-computational, Page 1 of 1 /docserver/preview/fulltext/pc.2.1.10hor-1.gif
Is There a Problem in Physicalist Epiphenomenalism
Physicalist epiphenomenalism is the conjunction of the doctrine that tokens of mental events are tokens of physical events and the doctrine that mental events do not exert causal powers by virtue of falling under mental types. The purpose of the paper is to show that physicalist epiphenomenalism, contrary to what many have thought, is not subject to the objections that have been raised against classic epiphenomenalism. This is argued with respect…
Oral Cancer Knowledge and Opinions Among Maryland Nurse Practitioners
The reported knowledge of oral cancer, in conjunction with opinions about level of knowledge and training, point to a need for systematic educational updates in oral cancer prevention and early detection
Turning the zombie on its head
Intentionality, evil, God, and necessity
In an article in this issue, Kenneth Pearce suggests a novel solution to the ‘logical problem of evil’. That is, he defends the consistency of the obtaining of evil with the existence of an omnipotent and good creator. The basic idea of Pearce's solution to the logical problem of evil is that according to the teleological theory of intentionality, which is self-consistent and consistent with the claim that God exists, some evil is necessary for t…
What Can God Do? What Should God Do
The aim of this paper is to defend James Sterba's version (2019) of the logical argument from evil against the existence of God from two objections that have been raised against it: that God cannot "logically" prevent all evils and that the moral requirements that the argument poses for God may not apply to God. I argue that these objections do not refute the claim that God can prevent and should prevent any evil and do not undermine Sterba's arg…
Philosophy (7 works) · Epistemology (5 works) · Computer Science (4 works) · Philosophy and Theoretical Science (4 works) · Cognitive science (3 works) · Psychology (3 works) · Theology and Philosophy of Evil (3 works) · Artificial Intelligence (2 works) · Intentionality (2 works) · Metaphysics (2 works)